


# **Duel for Europe**

**BY JOHN SCOTT**



**U.S.S.R.  
WESTERN HALF**

SCALE OF  
MILES 0 50 100 500

**MILITARY DISTRICTS** (indicated borders - military)

1	The Odessa Military District - Headquarters at Odessa
2	Kiev
3	Kharkov
4	Sverdlovsk
5	Leningrad
6	Moscow
7	Orel
8	Kalinin
9	Central Asiatic
10	North Caucasus
11	Trans-Caucasus
12	Special Western
13	Volga
14	Baltic
15	Archangel

Total Red Army mobilized forces in Spring of 1941 is estimated to have been.....

80 Motorized Infantry Div	roughly 1.3 million men
120 Non-motorized "	" 2.2 "
50 Tank Brigades	" .4 "
40 Cavalry Divisions	" .4 "
200 Regiments of Light Artillery	.8
100 " Heavy	.4
Attached to and included in infantry divisions	Total 4.3
Air Force	Excluding

1 Symbol represents roughly 5 Divisions, Brigades thus 2 = 10 Tank Brigades] or Regiments, etc.





# **Duel for Europe**

Stalin versus Hitler

*Books by* JOHN SCOTT

BEHIND THE URALS  
DUEL FOR EUROPE

# **Duel for Europe**

**STALIN VERSUS HITLER**

**BY JOHN SCOTT**

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*The Riverside Press*

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To my Mother



## Preface

DURING the first decades of the present century Germany developed an industry more powerful than any other in Europe, and challenged British domination of the Continent. She was defeated in the First World War, but came back again in less than a quarter of a century immeasurably stronger than Britain.

During that quarter-century, however, Russia emerged as the strongest power in Europe, though most people did not realize it. During the twenty-five years from 1913 till 1938 Russian steel production increased nearly fivefold. All during the middle thirties Soviet pig iron and steel production was larger than Germany's; Russian tractor output surpassed even that of the United States. Large-scale economic planning made it possible for the Russians to perform feats unprecedented in history, such as the recapitalization of fifty-six per cent of their national income in a single year, and the creation of a large and expensive synthetic-rubber industry before war closed off sources of natural rubber. More significant still, the ideas and forces released by the October Revolution began to rock the structure of western-European society.

Beginning in the early thirties Germany adopted many principles borrowed from the Bolsheviks. But the mass of Russia's natural resources still gave the Soviet Union the edge in armament industries and industrial expansion. By virtue of her ideology and organization and her economic development, the Soviet Union upset the balance of power in Europe within a few years. By the late thirties both Germany and Russia had left Britain far behind in everything except naval strength, and the ephemeral power of the City of London. Russia and Germany emerged like King Lear's daughters as pretenders to the European scepter which was so obviously slipping from British hands.

Long before the first shot was fired the main war in Europe was that between Germany and Russia. Hitler and Stalin might conceivably have divided their heritage and got along with each other in a friendly fashion,

benefiting from the economic collaboration to which their complementary economies pointed, had the ruling groups and personalities, particularly in Germany, been older and wiser. Stalin would probably have been willing to pursue such a policy, and certainly made gestures in this direction, but Hitler was unable to collaborate with anyone except on a basis of master and slave.

Thus during the 1930's the basis was laid for the duel between Stalin and Hitler. The situation was complicated, however, by contradictions between Germany and several other capitalist countries. The Bolsheviks had been saying for years that the capitalist countries would destroy each other in a stupid, fratricidal war. The Bolsheviks would have proved right, had it not been for the universal miscalculation of Germany's military strength. As it was, Germany outmaneuvered and outbluffed Britain and France for half a decade, then overran Europe, and finally attacked the Soviet Union. But during the two years previous to the actual attack the struggle between Stalin and Hitler passed rapidly through a number of phases involving periods of diplomatic friendship and economic collaboration. At one point in the spring of 1940 Stalin even came within an ace of finding himself at war against Britain and France.

The logic of history in terms of economic development of national units made the Soviet-German War almost inevitable. On the other hand the logic of the Leninist-Internationalist-Class struggle analysis pointed toward a combined capitalist attack against the Soviet Union. The fact that today Soviet Russia is the ally of Britain and the United States would seem to indicate that at least for the moment, the former historic concept is the closer to reality.

\* \* \* \* \*

This is the story of the duel between Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler for the continent of Europe. It is the story of the maneuvering, intrigue, and deceit whereby each tried in advance to win the war against the other and against other lesser enemies in this wolf-eat-wolf world of ours. It is told as seen from the east rather than from the west because I happen to have spent most of the time between 1938 and 1941 in Moscow.

It is not a nice story. Lying and blackmail, browbeating and beguiling,

these are the stock in trade of contemporary diplomacy. Those who try other means often come to no good end. Our own President Wilson tried to introduce fair play into European diplomacy a quarter of a century ago, and ended up a brilliant failure internationally, and a defeated and broken man at home. Stalin did not make Wilson's commendable mistake.

I want to make it clear that this story has very little to do with the Russian people, the hard-working and patient Mishas and Mashas who have made the Soviet Union what it is today, and of whom I tried to write in *Behind the Urals*. They were busy working in mine and mill, behind desk or plow. A few hundred, or at most a few thousand, men in Moscow were lying and bluffing, deluding and circumventing in the name of nearly two hundred million simple, kindly men and women who were too busy producing and living to be able to follow events closely even had they been informed of the facts. Only since war has been brought to their homes by Hitler have the Mishas and Mashas become the all-important factors they are today — fighting as their forefathers fought at Borodino, as the American farmers fought at Bunker Hill, as the Greeks fought at Thermopylae.

But the bulk of this book is about the complicated chess game, played without rules, in which the Mishas and Mashas were at best pawns, and more frequently mere specks of dust on the vast checkered board.

It is an ugly story, one unworthy of the Russian people.

Yet it is the true story of a logical policy conceived in the interests of the Russian nation, and carried through to its logical conclusion with relatively few mistakes.

J. S.

NEW YORK

June, 1942



## ERRATA

Page 10, line 5: *For* 'April eighth' *read* 'May third'

Page 10, line 5 from bottom: *For* 'April' *read* 'May'

Page 19, line 16: *For* 'July' *read* 'June'

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## **Part One**

From Munich to Moscow  
September, 1938, to August, 1939





WHEN the Big Four sat down together at Munich in September, 1938, to stave off a western-European war by appeasing Hitler and ignoring Russia, a great many thinking people expected the Nazis to attack the Soviet Union. A prominent member of the French Right told me, 'Here is where the Holy Crusade against Communism girds on its Krupp-Vickers-Cruizot-Skoda armorplate and goes into action.' His face beamed with satisfaction as he sipped his 'pernod' on a Champs Elysées café terrace.

Stalin likewise saw the handwriting on the wall.

Hitler had always made a great point of his defense of Europe against Bolshevism. He referred covetously to the riches of the Urals and the Ukraine. Stalin had tried collective security; Litvinov had sped from capital to capital organizing resistance to the aggressor; Soviet troops had fought the Fascists in Spain. Result—Chamberlain and Daladier sat down with Mussolini and Hitler to bargain for power at Russia's expense.

For a long time Stalin had realized that an attack on the Soviet Union was the logical solution for many problems confronting the statesmen of the western-European capitals. In January, 1931, in his speech to the factory managers, he stated unequivocally that Russia must bring itself up to the industrial and military levels of the western-European countries within ten years if it hoped to avoid destruction. Stalin's aim was to press forward industrialization and military preparations and to avoid war as long as possible.

Stalin did not want to fight anyone. Russia was not prepared for a major war. Stalin knew it. But collective security had failed. It was necessary, therefore, to explore the possibility of making a deal with Germany. Stalin spent the twelve months following Munich exploring.

He began by sending a special emissary, one Kandalaki, to Berlin to

try to make contact with Hitler. The Fuehrer refused to commit himself. For a decade anti-Bolshevism had been the main fishhook on which he had caught the support of the French and British, not to speak of his own, industrialists and financiers. It was not that Hitler had any objection in principle to a marriage of convenience with Russia. It was simply that the time was not ripe, because a Soviet-German alliance, if concluded, would inevitably alienate all the sympathetic British lords and French reactionaries who were convinced that in assisting, or at least appeasing, Hitler, they were fighting the United Front and securing future dividends.

In February, 1939, the Soviet Military Attaché in Germany said to General Keitel at a luncheon, 'If in the course of events Poland collapses, we cannot be expected to remain indifferent to the fate of our fellow Russians and Ukrainians in Poland.' It was the first real hint at a partitioning of Poland. Keitel reported the matter to Hitler, who ordered it hushed up. It was not a new idea.

In mid-March the Eighteenth Party Congress opened. Stalin made his expected report on the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He made no direct overtures to the Germans, but refrained from attacking them. Other speakers did, but Stalin kept his hands clean. In his speech he stated that Russia was willing to be friends with anyone who refrained from attacking the Soviet Union or violating her interests. He meant it. Preferably he would stay friends with everyone until they were all too weak to be able to attack or violate. Stalin pointed out that Germany was heading west, not east. Furthermore, he stated that France and Britain were trying unsuccessfully to push Germany into war against Russia.

The majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security . . . and have taken up a policy of non-intervention, of 'neutrality.'

Formally speaking, the policy of non-aggression might be defined as follows: 'Let each country defend itself against the aggressor as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade with both the aggressors and with their victims!' But actually speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression. . . . They (England

and France) have begun egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings and prompting them, 'Just start a war on Bolshevism and everything will be all right. . . .' They are saying quite openly, however, that the Germans have cruelly 'disappointed them,' for, instead of marching farther east, against the Soviet Union, they have turned to the west and are demanding colonies. . . .

Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of freedom, treachery, and so on . . . Politics is politics, as the old case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them. . . .

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit:

1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. . . .
2. We stand for peaceful, close, and friendly relations with all neighboring countries. . . .

Our tasks in the sphere of foreign policy are:

1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries. . . .
2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull their chestnuts out of the fire for them. . . .
3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Navy to the utmost.
4. To strengthen the bonds of international friendship with the working peoples of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations.

Thus Stalin warned London and Paris quite clearly that their policy might boomerang into a Soviet-German rapprochement. It was a remarkable speech, and plain as *Mein Kampf* for anyone who could read it. But almost no one understood. In the meantime, Hitler was not idle. In March German troops occupied Czechoslovakia.

## 2

On April first, 1939, Hitler's birthday, the German Army put on one of the most impressive military parades in history. I arrived in Berlin from Vienna early in the morning, after sitting up all night in the train. Indeed, I was lucky to have been able to sit. German transport was already virtually monopolized by the military. During the night we passed through what had been Czechoslovakia. German soldiers with fixed bayonets patrolled the platforms of every Czech station at which the train stopped. Only bearers of special passes were permitted to alight.

In Berlin flags were flying and the air was heavy with the pounding of German military boots and the roar of tank and truck motors. I made my way through the dense crowds to Hitler's residence on Wilhelmstrasse. To my astonishment I got within fifty feet of the balcony. At eight o'clock sharp the Fuehrer appeared, to listen to the birthday songs of groups of Berlin school children, and displayed himself to a mass of hysterical housewives who screamed and shouted enthusiastically. The Fuehrer looked melodramatic. His eyes burned with fanaticism and fury. I saw three women faint from excitement.

Then for four hours the German Army rolled down Unter den Linden — artillery, tanks, motorized infantry, and other units. One field piece was displayed mounted on rubber tires and pulled by four tractors. It was so large that the street literally shook. Crowds of ardent Germans shouted themselves hoarse as they watched behind the lines of brown-shirted, pot-bellied S.A. men. Special delegates had been invited from the Balkan states to get an idea of what a fine country Germany was to come to terms with in a peaceful manner. They were duly impressed. So were the British and the French.

The only building in Berlin which was not adorned with German flags was the Soviet Embassy, right on Unter den Linden. The Berliners frowned and spat. But inside the Embassy a slim, blond man named

Astakhov, Counselor of Embassy, was already working on the outline of a Soviet-German agreement. He was carrying on the work of Kandalaki, who after having seen Hitler in 1938 disappeared in the purge.

Astakhov was an interesting chap. Born in the late nineties, the Revolution caught him as a student. He became a Bolshevik and went off to the Ukraine to fight in the Civil War. Knowing some French, it fell to his lot to negotiate with a French admiral in Sevastopol during the days when the mutinous French Navy units were being driven and withdrawn from the northern shores of the Black Sea. Later he went to Central Asia, where he did difficult and responsible work organizing anti-British sentiment among the Afghans. From there he went to the Kremlin Press Bureau. In 1930 he was sent to Persia, then to Turkey, as a diplomat, and in 1933 to London as Counselor of Embassy. He was recalled in 1935 and sent off to Tiflis as representative of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. After a few months he was brought back to Moscow and became head of the Press Department of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat. In this capacity the foreign journalists got to know him and found him exceedingly able and astonishingly unafraid. He almost always said what he thought despite the fact that at that time few public officials opened their mouths to foreigners. He got along well with foreign diplomats and correspondents.

Karl Radek was then in jail telling Thousand-and-One-Night tales to avoid NKVD<sup>1</sup> officials. Everyone who had had anything to do with foreign affairs was terrified of Radek.<sup>2</sup> A more or less loyal Stalinist until his arrest and disgrace, he became a really big-time wrecker, getting as many honest men into trouble as he could. This was not difficult at that time, particularly for a man of his experience and contacts. The NKVD axe fell right and left in the Soviet Foreign Office. From vice commissar to office boy, all shook with fear.

But Astakhov remained in good standing and, to his surprise and delight, in the worst days of the purge, in June, 1937, he was sent to Berlin

<sup>1</sup> People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Formerly the O.G.P.U.

<sup>2</sup> Incidentally Radek made himself hated by many people, and few were surprised when he was murdered in 1940 by two unidentified fellow-prisoners while serving his ten-year sentence.



as Counselor of Embassy. Astakhov traveled in the same train with the British Ambassador to Moscow and Lady Chilston. When he crossed the Soviet-Polish frontier at Negoreloe he nearly collapsed with joy. His friends and colleagues were disappearing nightly and he was off to Berlin! In the German capital he was a success. He inspired the respect of the Germans and commanded the confidence of Moscow. He was flanked by several NKVD checkup men, but he did his work well.

Astakhov in Berlin and Count von der Schulenberg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, were the ones who laid the groundwork for the Soviet-German rapprochement. In the Kremlin, Stalin, Molotov, Mikoyan, and Zhdanov knew what was going on, as did Hitler and Ribbentrop and perhaps several others in Berlin. The rest of the world knew nothing.

I was unable to get anything out of Astakhov in Berlin, which was not surprising as Moscow was still hammering away at its official policy of collective security. Litvinov still traveled around and made speeches. Indeed he had just proposed a conference of representatives of France, Britain, Russia, Rumania, and Poland to deal with the threat of German aggression, and the British Government had rejected the idea as being premature.

Pressure from the Left was strong in London, and eight days after the German invasion of Czechoslovakia R. S. Hudson, Secretary of the British Department of Overseas Trade, came to the Red capital with a trade delegation to discuss Soviet-British trade possibilities. Hudson was not altogether boss of his own mission. A certain Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin, who wrote novels about Japan and other places under the name of John Paris, accompanied Hudson and told him what to do. The same man, incidentally, accompanied Lord Runciman on his notorious Czechoslovakian trip.

## 3

Many influential people in London were pressing Chamberlain and Halifax to skip past trade relations and talk about an anti-German, anti-Fascist alliance. The newspapermen in Moscow were aware of this and questioned Hudson sharply at a press conference the day after his arrival. He would say nothing. During the following three days he was received by Mikoyan, Foreign Trade Commissar, and by Molotov. Hudson then prepared to proceed to Helsinki, which was the next stop on his round-robin trip to drum up British overseas trade. The evening of his departure he was taken to the opening of the new Gypsy Theatre. In the middle of the performance the British Ambassador, Sir William Seeds, was called out and given a telegram from Chamberlain . . . 'No politics in communiqué please.'

The communiqué on the results of Hudson's talks had already been written, however, and turned over to the news agencies, including Tass, though not released. Only two hours remained before the departure of the train. There was much coming and going; Foreign Commissariat officials were routed out and stood around smoking cigarettes. Finally Hudson and his delegation ran for the train, leaving the correspondents with two communiqués. Tass published the original version, which stated that the conversations had been successful, both sides having expressed a desire for a new trade agreement, negotiations for which would begin in London, and which ended with:

A friendly exchange of views on international affairs . . . permitted the governments of the two states to become acquainted with each other's views and make a clean point of contact in their position in the cause of strengthening peace.

This sentence was deleted by Hudson after receiving Chamberlain's cable. This was the 'politics' to which the British Prime Minister objected.

Stalin was perfectly aware of Chamberlain's attitude.

I was back in Paris, waiting for a Soviet visa and watching Moscow's policies as closely as I could with what material was available in the press and from occasional travelers.

On April eighth, 1939, Litvinov resigned and was replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Premier. Litvinov retired into obscurity, though he appeared occasionally in the sessions of the Supreme Soviet, to which he was a deputy from the Leningrad district. Molotov took over the reins rather gracefully. He abolished censorship of foreign correspondents' telegrams, a measure which remained in force until December 31, 1939.

On April ninth British Ambassador Sir William Seeds, a round little Irishman, delivered a note from the British Government regarding the possibility of a Soviet-British alliance. As a basis for this alliance His Britannic Majesty's Government suggested Soviet guarantees to come to the aid of Britain and France or other countries guaranteed by London and Paris, but offered no satisfactory assurance that Britain and France would come to Russia's aid in case the latter were attacked. Several days later *Izvestia* attacked the Axis in an editorial. Declarations of good will were made toward Turkey. The impression was created among Moscow observers that the Kremlin was satisfied with the British proposals. They were sadly mistaken. Not only was Stalin dissatisfied, he was scornful. But he took his time in looking around for the most appropriate manner in which to express his sentiments.

Several days after Molotov became Foreign Minister, Seeds and Naggiar, the French Ambassador, called on him and asked whether his appointment indicated any change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Molotov replied that it did not and that the Ambassadors of Britain and France would shortly receive a new set of proposals along the lines of those made by Litvinov and characterized as 'premature' by London. A few days later, on April seventeenth, the Russian proposal for a triple alliance against German aggression was made. It contained four main points:

1. Russia would guarantee Belgium, Holland, and France against German aggression. In return, Britain and France would guarantee

Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania against German aggression.

2. Indirect aggression was to be defined and provisions were to be made to prevent Germany from working her way into the bordering countries, particularly Lithuania.

3. The Red Army was to receive the right to operate on the territories of Poland and the Baltic countries in the struggle against Germany which might follow.

4. Anglo-Franco-Russian staff talks were to take place immediately.

French Ambassador Naggiar was all for accepting these conditions immediately. London stalled. An interminable juridical discussion began on the subject of 'indirect aggression.' Whitehall dillydallied. Only on August twenty-third, on the day Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow, did London finally cable Ambassador Seeds to accept the proposals. Then it was too late.

Had Naggiar had his way, had the proposals had been accepted four months sooner, there is a chance that the whole subsequent course of events might have been changed. But Chamberlain, as a matter of principle, did not want to come to terms with Russia.

The contents of the above-mentioned Molotov proposal to London and Paris were not made public. I learned its provisions long afterward from the Moscow ambassador of one of the countries concerned.

During April and May Russia seemed to be getting closer and closer to the democracies. President Kalinin cabled warm congratulations to President Roosevelt on the occasion of the latter's appeal to the Axis powers. The Soviet press congratulated Roosevelt too and condemned the aggressive answer of Rome and Berlin to the American President's appeal for peace.

The Soviet Ambassador to London made a trip to the Red capital. Anti-British, even anti-Chamberlain statements disappeared from the Soviet press. When, on April twenty-seventh, the conscription bill passed in London, the readers of *Pravda* joined the French people in nodding their approval.

'The British really mean business this time,' was heard as commonly in the Moscow Metro as it was in the Paris busses.

The Soviet press suggested immediate economic and military action against the Axis, while the May first Communist International declarations asserted that a war against German Fascism would be a 'just war.'

On May twenty-fourth the Kremlin issued a communiqué on the question of the remilitarization of the Aland Islands, which lie between Sweden and Finland in the throat of the Bay of Bothnia. This communiqué was, in essence, Stalin's answer to the British proposals delivered a month earlier. The Finns, to whom the islands belonged, wanted to fortify them. The Russians insisted that they remain demilitarized. This irritated London. The Russians had not been invited to participate in the original convention providing for the demilitarization of the islands, and here they were trying to exercise influence over parts of the world which had been specifically organized as a barrier against Soviet influence.

Telegraph wires from Moscow to London and Paris were kept hot with complicated messages, coded, then enciphered, and then superimposed.

On May twenty-seventh, the actual Anglo-French-Russian negotiations began. Seeds and Jean Payart, the French Chargé d' Affaires in the absence of Ambassador Naggiar, met with Molotov and presented fresh proposals, more generous than those contained in the British note of April ninth. The two western democracies were considering the idea of guaranteeing the Russian frontiers. It was awkward, as the main idea of many of the gentlemen of Downing Street was to get the Germans to attack Russia and then sit back and finance the loser in order to make the fight last longer. Of course the British rulers had welched on their guarantees before, but it was always uncomfortable.

## 4

On the thirty-first of May Molotov spoke unexpectedly on foreign affairs at the closing session of the Supreme Soviet. He made a number

of pertinent remarks. He scored the absence of reciprocity in the Anglo-French proposals, but stated definitely that the Soviet Union had no sympathy with the aggressors, and outlined what his government would consider reasonable as a basis of a three-power alliance among Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. The pact must be a defensive alliance with reciprocal guarantees. It must guarantee all the six countries on the Soviet Union's western frontier. At the same time Molotov remarked the impossibility of guaranteeing a small country which insisted on being neutral but was unable to defend its neutrality. It was a good point, and one on which Britain and France were to receive a fine object lesson just a year later when Germany crashed through neutral Belgium and Holland, which had refused Anglo-French collaboration in their defenses. Molotov had three things in mind when he raised this point. In the first place, he was trying to gain time and to allow the Soviet-German talks to progress. Secondly, he was thinking of the three Baltic countries, Finland, Belorussia and the Ukraine, and Bessarabia, all of which had been part of Russia before the Revolution and had been taken away when Russia was weak and disunited. He wanted to change these countries from the 'Cordon Sanitaire' of Versailles into allied states or perhaps incorporate them into the Soviet Union. In the third place, he was thinking of a very real military problem. If the tri-power alliance did go through and Germany did start out eastward, who was to keep the field-gray legions out of the Baltic states and away from the Soviet frontier? The countries could not defend themselves, that was clear. Britain and France could hardly defend them, even if they sincerely tried, and none of the aforementioned states wanted help from the Red Army. It was too risky.

Molotov was surprisingly outspoken. Any first-rate diplomat should have seen that Moscow was posing these same questions to Berlin. Unfortunately the only first-rate diplomats in the Red capital at the time were the representatives of the Axis powers.

Stalin was bidding London against Berlin.

On June first and second, Seeds and Naggjar met Molotov and received the Soviet reply to their governments' proposals. As might have been expected, it pointed out the necessity of a guarantee of the Baltic coun-

tries. Again the British and French cipher officers sat up the clock round, sweating out their unpronounceable groups of letters.

Pressure from the Left forced Chamberlain to send William Strang as special envoy to Moscow. This decision was made public on June tenth. On the same day Molotov announced the new appointments to his staff in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs — Messrs. Dekanosov, of the Secret Police, and Lozovsky, an old Jewish metalworker and trade-unionist, until recently the head of the Profintern (Moscow's Trade Union International).

Strang was an unfortunate choice of the Chamberlain Government. To begin with, his appointment insulted the Russians because he was not a high official. He had the rank of Counselor of Embassy. He had been in Russia several times before. From 1930 to 1933 he was Counselor of Embassy in the Red capital. During this time he handled the Metro-Vickers<sup>3</sup> trial and did a rather good job, to the discomfort of the Russians as the Soviet Government's badly prepared case made an unfavorable impression on many observers. He came to Moscow again with Anthony Eden in 1935. He was consistently snubbed by the Russians during his several weeks' stay in the summer of 1939.

Oddly enough, both the British and the Russians were under the impression that time was working in their favor and were wasting as much of it as possible. Negotiating with the Russians had seldom been rapid, but under these circumstances it was not astonishing that Strang, arrived on the fourteenth of June, saw Molotov or one of his deputies almost every day for two months without accomplishing anything.

Had Halifax or Eden instead of Strang flown to Moscow, the Kremlin would have taken the Allied proposals much more seriously. It might even have been possible to wean the Russians away from Germany.

Two basic factors precluded any such result, however. First, Chamberlain did not want an alliance with Russia. He wanted to see the Germans and Russians come to blows. He wanted to get rid of the aggressive Nazi menace and 'Red imperialism' both at the same time. Strang's orders were to mark time. Second, the Russians were becoming surer and surer all the time that they could get from Germany everything that

<sup>3</sup> Trial of a group of British engineers working in Soviet industry convicted of espionage and sabotage.

the British were loath to give them — a free hand in Poland, the Baltics, and Finland, and peace. There may even have been talk of the Dardanelles.

It is relevant to mention here that certain diplomatic circles in Berlin were well informed as early as May twenty-second as to the possibilities of a Soviet-German non-aggression pact and the partitioning of Poland by the two countries. M. Coulondres, French Ambassador in Berlin, telegraphed his government on May twenty-second that, according to reliable information gathered by himself in the German capital, coming in part indirectly from Goering himself, Ribbentrop was working at a number of interesting variants. One was an agreement with Russia according to which Poland — in the opinion of Ribbentrop, Poland could not long remain an independent sovereign state — would be divided by Germany and Russia through a basic rapprochement between these two countries.

Such a rapprochement, in the long run, is both indispensable and inevitable in the opinion of Ribbentrop (wrote Coulondres). (Furthermore), One of the immediate aims which the protagonists of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union desire to achieve would be, it seems, to have Russia play in the eventual dismemberment of Poland the rôle which the latter country played with regard to Czechoslovakia. The more distant objective would be to utilize the material and human resources of the U.S.S.R. as an instrument with which to destroy the British Empire.

(See Appendix 1.)

It is worth noting that the first of these aims was realized very literally within four weeks of the Soviet-German rapprochement. It would be interesting to know whether or not Bonnet read this telegram; if so, whether he advised London of its contents, and lastly whether anyone in either Downing Street or the Quay D'Orsay took the trouble to contemplate the results of such a contingency and try to preclude it by giving in to all Russian requests and concluding an alliance with Moscow before Germany got around to it.

In another telegram to Bonnet on June thirteenth, Coulondres pointed out that Ribbentrop, and even Hitler, were being very polite to Moscow and that Ribbentrop was hoping for an agreement with Russia and a



joint partitioning of Poland. Ribbentrop was awaiting anxiously the outcome of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations which had already begun, the French Ambassador wrote. (See Appendix 2.)

A third warning was received by Bonnet from his Consul General in Hamburg, M. Garreau, on July fourth, 1939. Garreau wrote that Hamburg business circles, usually well informed, believed that 'if an agreement is not reached soon among London, Paris, and Moscow the Soviet Government will be ready to sign a five-year non-aggression pact with Germany.' (See Appendix 3.)

Nor were the French the only ones who were getting such reports. Joseph E. Davies, in his recent *Mission to Moscow*, states that on April third, 1939, he suggested to Ambassador Kennedy in London, 'Tell Chamberlain from me that if they (the British) are not careful they will drive Stalin into Hitler's arms.' On April eighteenth Davies sent a personal message to the President of the United States and to the Secretary of State, warning them that the question of peace or war was hanging in the balance dependent upon a French-British agreement with Russia.

## 5

My Soviet visa came through at last and I traveled across Europe from Paris to Moscow during the Strang talks. I was delighted to be back in Russia, as my wife and children were in Magnitogorsk, in the Urals, and I had not seen them for nearly a year. I came from the jittery Paris of blackouts, mobilization signs, and patrols of 'Gardes Mobiles,' past the barbed-wire-entangled German-Dutch frontier to the Rhine. Germany was quiet and working hard. Anti-Communist and anti-Czech propaganda had given place to blasts against the Poles. My German acquaintances all wanted peace, but they also wanted 'entlich' to get a road across to their East Prussia. They were anxious about the war,

but not jittery. Workers were busy and getting good wages. New social legislation, maternity vacations, 'Kraft durch Freude' excursions — all these things had won the staunch approval of the population. Everyone was impressed with Hitler's successes. No one thought England would get around to making serious trouble over Danzig, a German city, which had voted overwhelmingly in favor of re-entry into the Reich. The Russians in the Soviet Embassy were non-communicative.

The Poles were talking big. They would fight. The Russians were Slavs too, albeit Bolsheviks, and would probably help them if Germany attacked. In any case, they would fight to the death. 'Our glorious cavalry. . . ' The country looked miserable and neglected, as it always did when one traveled east from the Elbe.

Moscow was intense and strained, not over the international situation, but with the struggle to live, to get into streetcars, into stores, and then to the counter to get food; to make each pay envelope last till the next. It was a tenseness which has been characteristic of Russia ever since the first time I went there, in 1932.

Shortly after my arrival we sent the children to their grandmother's, in a village near Moscow, and Masha and I went on a three weeks' trip through the industrial regions in the Ukraine, to the Caucasus, and to the Black Sea coast. Food was scarcer in the Donbas than in Moscow. The coal miners already had 'closed stores'<sup>4</sup> despite a law specifically forbidding them. The trains were terribly crowded, as usual, with workers and peasants and their families. In many places peasants were leaving the collective farms to go back to individual farming in spite of heavy taxation and social pressure. In Kharkov there were no cigarettes and very little food. Except in Sochi, the Soviet Atlantic City, and Moscow, there was a sugar shortage everywhere we went, and had been for months. These and not the international situation were the things that preoccupied the Russians.

Industrial production was better than it had been. Two heavy-industry plants I visited in the Donbas were in good shape. Coal, iron, benzol, and naphthalene were being produced in ever-increasing quan-

<sup>4</sup> A store where only people having a special ration card were privileged to make purchases.

tities. The internal political atmosphere had cleared. Many arrested individuals had been freed. They told grueling stories when they were sure of their listeners, but they were back. They were back working, struggling, straining, fighting to produce more iron and steel — fighting in queues for train tickets, for rolls in the station-platform kiosk.

I went back to Moscow to the Havas news office, back to reading forty newspapers a day and trying to understand what was happening in the Soviet Union. We could not find an apartment, so I stayed temporarily in the Havas office, while Masha went to the village to join the children and wait for me to make living arrangements.

Though an attempt was made to maintain an optimistic outlook among diplomats and correspondents as to the outcome of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, it was clear to everyone that discord was poisoning relations between the British and French. Furthermore, many things indicated that the inner circles of the Kremlin did not expect the tri-power pact to be concluded.

During June and July French business men in Moscow remarked on several occasions that Mikoyan and other officials of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade were working and planning as though the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations were doomed to failure. Some of us learned of this, but Naggiar insisted that the French and British correspondents refrain from sending the story.

The French were in no position to choose. They wanted security from the Nazi monster which they saw coiling itself to spring on the other side of the Rhine. They were willing to pay any price. On one occasion when Naggiar and Seeds went to the Kremlin to present new proposals, Naggiar said to his British colleague, 'If your next proposals are no better than these, you can take them to the Kremlin yourself.'

Strang was suave and cheerful but uncommunicative. We pieced the facts together afterward. The Russians insisted on guaranteeing the Baltic countries, which did not desire to be guaranteed by the Red Army. Then the question arose — guarantee them against what? The Russians insisted that the guarantees cover indirect as well as direct aggression. Indirect aggression, according to the Soviet definition, meant pernicious political infiltration by an aggressor into another country leading to

the establishment of a government friendly to the aggressor, which government eventually invited the aggressor to come in to maintain order or to guarantee protection against some third power. This was a sore point, as there had been plenty of evidence, in Austria, the Sudetenland, and Danzig, of the actuality of such tactics on the part of the Germans. Moreover, the Baltic countries themselves, particularly Lithuania, had shown marked signs of a growing pro-German attitude all during the spring. The British were perfectly willing that this German infiltration in the Baltic countries be guaranteed against, and if possible liquidated, but only if the new political organization of these countries be pro-British and not pro-Soviet. The Chamberlain Government still felt Bolshevism to be a greater danger and menace than National Socialism. It was a fine point which Strang and the Russians discussed with polite finesse, while Naggiar and the whole French Embassy staff fermented in cigarette smoke.

Late in July Andrei Zhdanov, one of the most influential members of the all-powerful Political Bureau of the Communist Party, head of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Parliament and Chief of the Communist Party in Leningrad, published an interesting letter in *Pravda*. In it he demanded a cast-iron guarantee of the Baltic states. Inasmuch as the British had no troops to send, and could not get them there if they had, this would have amounted in essence to the sending of Red Army units to Baltic territory. Zhdanov emphasized that he was expressing his own personal opinion. It was a bitter pill for any Englishman of the old school to swallow.

The Baltic states had been created by Versailles and financed by Britain, with whom they did most of their trading. The people in power in the Baltics certainly were terrified of the Red Army. They would have much preferred the German legions. Under the Nazis they would at least be Hachas and Tissos — local Gauleiters. They felt that if the Red Army came, no matter what the pretext, they would be in the shadow of the gallows.

Strang, Seeds, and Naggiar saw Molotov several times in early July, and on the tenth a Soviet communiqué stated that the negotiations had produced no results. That was all. We scribes were left guessing. There

was no press censorship at that time and we could have sent whatever we knew, but we could find out nothing.

## 6

On the twenty-second of July something important happened in Berlin. German-Soviet trade negotiations were resumed. I read about it in the Soviet press in the morning and, like most foreigners, passed it off as an incident irrelevant to the Kremlin's general foreign policy. In talking it over with Charles Bohlen, the very able second secretary of the American Embassy, we stumbled onto the quotation from Stalin's speech at the Eighteenth Party Conference:

We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position, and we shall adhere to it as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

Later, in conversation with several Russian journalists, I found that they too had interpreted the resumption of trade negotiations as an application of Stalin's policy, which, however, had nothing to do with his avowed antipathy to Fascism.

By July twenty-seventh the Russians stated that they were in agreement in principle with London and Paris but wanted staff talks on the question of just how the proposed guarantees of Poland and the Baltic states were to be realized in concrete military terms.

Strang was in an excellent frame of mind. He was not only fulfilling his function of stalling for time but he was bluffing the Germans with the prospects of Allied staff talks. He could already see the resultant abatement of the furore of the German press campaign around Danzig, he said. It was not a bad job for a man with the rank of Counselor of Embassy, who had come to Moscow without plenipotentiary powers to

sign anything or even to discuss the possibility of Soviet guarantees to the Baltic states.

But if Strang was elated, the foreign press was insane. Stories came every day of pacts signed, alliances concluded. We, in Moscow, did our best to deny them but pressure was all the other way. The Allied, and also the American, press wanted to hear that the Russians were lining up in a peace front against Germany. Even the conservative press in England was talking about the great Russian people and their valuable contributions between 1914 and 1917. Furthermore, we uninformed correspondents thought things *were* going in the direction of a tri-power pact. Most of the Anglo-French-American correspondents in Moscow disliked and distrusted the Kremlin on general principles, and particularly because of the odious political trials of 1936-38, but tolerated, and even defended, the Soviets as a bulwark against the Nazi menace. Even Champenois, of Havas, an astute realist with an objective and penetrating mind, was convinced that the Russians were coming around.

*Izvestia*, on July thirtieth, strengthened this impression when it said editorially, 'One hundred and seventy million people are ready at any moment to smash to atoms any Fascist aggressor daring to fan the flames of the second imperialist war on the frontiers of the Soviet Union.'

Stalin himself would never have made such a blunt statement, even though he had been convinced of its correctness. His own most recent speech had left the way open for almost anything. He took no personal part in the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations. An anonymous *Izvestia* editorial writer was entrusted with shaking his fist at the Fascist aggressors at a time when Astakhov in Berlin was already well on the road to coming to terms with them.

On August third, 1939, the Soviet press informed the Russian public that the Anglo-French military missions were arriving and also gave the names of the Red Army staff officers chosen to meet with them. This Soviet delegation of five was headed by Marshal Voroshilov, the Metalworker-Political Commissar, and, for ten years, Stalin's Commissar for Defense. The other members were Kuznetsov, Commissar of the Navy, Loktionov, Chief of the Red Air Fleet, Shaposhnikov, Chief of Staff and reputed to be the best soldier in the Red Army, and Smorodinov, Assistant Chief of Staff.

The Anglo-French missions were coming on a boat to Leningrad and would arrive on the tenth. It would have been difficult for them to choose a slower method of reaching Moscow.

Strang left on the seventh. He had done his job well, having marked time for the best part of two months. In doing so he had met with the best cooperative spirit on the part of the Russians.

For the next three days both the British and French Embassies, as well as the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, were busy arranging quarters for the military missions, which, it was learned, were coming with nine tons of baggage, a dozen orderlies to clean boots and press trousers, as well as a whole crew of experts, cipher officers, and aides-de-camp.

During these days Moscow had a slight diversion — the presence in the capital of a group of strictly unofficial, but nonetheless impressive, visitors. Twenty-five deputies of the Bulgarian Parliament, almost a third of its members, came to the 'Great Slavic Big Sister' to look at the Agricultural Exposition.

Seeds and Naggiar stayed at home pending the arrival of the soldiers.

## 7

The arrival of the missions was impressive. They were met by the entire staffs of the British and French Embassies, with the exception of the Ambassadors, by Assistant Chief of Staff Smorodinov, who was to negotiate with them, and by an unusual display of plain-clothes men who craned their necks in a most obvious manner and scowled at the arriving officers with the menacing, reddish, sleepless eyes of the NKVD. Smorodinov had a red hamlike face and low forehead and looked as though he had had too much to eat for lunch. He and one or two other Red Army officers were dressed smartly and behaved in a businesslike, efficient manner. The Red Army chauffeurs and orderlies distinguished themselves by an artificial show of ceremony and heel-clicking which was obviously not a matter of habit.

The dignified British Admiral Drax was the first to alight from the train, closely followed by the French General Doumenc. Both were resplendent in gold braid and medals. Doumenc had made his name by organizing supply for the French armies at Verdun. He was a small man, well along in years, whose face was criss-crossed with deep furrows, like a chicken yard after a rain. He looked enigmatic and shrewd and made a deep impression on the Russians, just as the young toughness and simplicity of the Red Army commanders impressed the Allied officers.

The missions were assailed by photographers. After ten minutes of handshaking all were whisked away to their respective embassies. As usual on the occasion of the arrival of foreign celebrities, the railroad platform had been cleared of the Russian public. One side of the station was cut off by police lines through which one was admitted only when one was known to be, or proved oneself, a diplomat, correspondent, or duly authorized Soviet functionary. The missions thus went to their automobiles without coming into contact with the throng of ragged humanity, carrying babies and bulging burlap bags, which swarms every Soviet railroad station.

The heads of the Allied missions were received by Voroshilov at 11 A.M. and by Molotov at three o'clock. We went back to our offices to find that *Pravda* had marked their arrival by publishing an article on 'The Growth of Anti-Fascist Sentiment in Germany.'

While Voroshilov was receiving his guests, the new United States Ambassador, Laurence A. Steinhardt, was presenting his credentials to President Kalinin. It was a difficult time to arrive in Moscow straight from Peru and be expected to understand what was happening.

Fortunately, the Soviet Government had found a house to put at the disposal of the missions while they were in Moscow, so that the visiting soldiers had quarters suitable to their rank. I say 'fortunately' because in Moscow it was only with difficulty that a visitor got a small room in a hotel, while appropriate accommodations for visiting generals and admirals were almost out of the question. Moscow was equipped for one million inhabitants — its population in 1913. In 1939 it had had on four millions, and almost as many old houses had been torn down as new ones built.



In the evening Voroshilov dined the visiting missions, the British and French Ambassadors, several responsible officials of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat, and a number of high officers of the Red Army. They had a good dinner during which Voroshilov, Drax, and Doumenc toasted each other in the friendliest terms.

The next morning at eleven the talks commenced in the immense and well guarded Spiridonovka Palace. Voroshilov, being at once the senior officer and the chief of the Soviet delegation, sat at the head of the table. He made a very good impression on the French and British. He was strong, had authority and confidence, and seemed to know thoroughly what he was about. Except for Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov, the Soviet delegation seemed to be composed of men of second-rate ability and third-rate authority, Doumenc said.

The talks started with an impressive speech by the Soviet marshal. 'All cards on the table, please, gentlemen.'

The next three days were spent in a very gingerly laying of cards on the table. The Soviet press contributed to the negotiations by a strong article in the navy newspaper emphasizing the importance of defending Estonia and particularly Tallinn against the German aggressors, who intended to use it as a jumping-off place to get to Leningrad.

Meeting twice a day with the Russians, then separately with each other and then even more separately with their own ambassadors, the Anglo-French military missions had their hands full.

During the first days of the staff talks Voroshilov stressed the importance of immediate united action against the chief aggressor. He said the Soviet Union was producing seven hundred planes a month and had five lateral railroads on the western frontier. However, in order to proceed effectively, it was necessary to concede the occupation by the Red Army of certain districts in Poland and the Baltic states. When the United States aided the Allies in 1918 they did this by sending American troops through the territory of France, said the marshal. Only in this way were they able to come in contact with the German Army. Just as the British and Americans were able to assist the French only by operating on French territory, so the Red Army could cooperate against the aggressor only if allowed to operate on Polish territory.

Doumenc would have liked to concede this point without further discussion. However, he had no authority from Paris to do so and, furthermore, Drax was the head of the combined mission and the British had no intention of permitting Soviet troops on Polish territory even had the Polish Government been willing to allow it. For the Chamberlain Government it was just as bad for the Russian troops to enter Lvov as for the Germans to go through the Corridor.

The British, therefore, made speeches on general naval and military strategy and the French again fermented in cigarette smoke.

## 8

On August sixteenth Harold Denny of the *New York Times* left Moscow, having been relieved by G. E. R. Gedye. On the same evening German Ambassador Schulenberg gave a large reception attended by Axis and other diplomats. In the middle of his own party Schulenberg was called to the Kremlin and was gone for more than two hours. He returned beaming. The Soviet-German pact had been initialed. Very few of the guests at Schulenberg's reception had any clear idea of what was going on, but the old Junker's geniality was contagious. At eleven-thirty several German correspondents went to the Belorussian Station to see Denny off. They arrived in dinner jackets with a couple of bottles of champagne. Portzgen of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and his twerpish wife — nominally correspondent of a Berlin weekly but actually much more concerned with her duties as self-appointed social lioness of the Moscow Axis colony — were particularly boisterous. They broke their bottle of champagne and gave Denny a glass.

'Drink to Count von der Schulenberg,' said Frau Portzgen with a slight hiccough.

Denny grinned and handed the glass to one of the Germans.

The initialing of the Soviet-German rapprochement was the second

turning point in Soviet foreign policy in 1939. The first had been in April when actual Soviet-German political conversations began; when Litvinov was ousted; when, impressed by Munich, the Kremlin had definitely stopped counting on Britain and France for any sincere attempt at a common front against Germany.

From August sixteenth on it was just a question of playing the Anglo-French missions for as much as they were worth. Interestingly enough, it seems likely that Voroshilov knew nothing of the German negotiations and the initialing of the agreement until at least three days later. While Schulenberg was in the Kremlin on the sixteenth, Voroshilov and all the Anglo-French, as well as the Soviet, missions were dining at the French Embassy in a very friendly manner. The next day the missions met as usual, the Russians this time bringing up thoroughly concrete demands: The Red Army was to operate in the Lvov and Stanislaw districts and part of the Novogrudok and Vilno districts from the day of the outbreak of war. Voroshilov also began asking about Polish mobilization plans and the possible extent of prospective direct Anglo-French assistance to Poland.

On the nineteenth there was a change in Voroshilov's attitude. He began to bluster. He said the same things he had said previously but with sound and fury rather than conviction. The French mission chewed on its mustaches.

The same day the Soviet press published a Tass mail story from London based on an article in the *Daily Worker* for August seventh, 1939. It accused the Chamberlain Government of an attempt to make a new Munich. Hitler's demands were to be satisfied indirectly at the expense of the Soviet Union. The United States was to participate in the new appeasement deal, the Soviet Union was not to be invited. It was a dispatch from London, but in essence it was an expression of Kremlin policy, or an explanation thereof. It was and still is a favorite technique of the Soviet press to publish long dispatches from all sorts of remote places, or to deny press reports in some little-known paper, as a method of making a point without taking the responsibility of editorial comment.

On the twenty-first the Soviet radio broadcast the news that the Soviet-German commercial negotiations in Berlin had terminated with the sign-

ing of a new trade agreement involving a German credit of two hundred million marks at five per cent for seven years for purchases to be made within two years. (See Appendix 4.) A *Pravda* editorial on the new agreement stated that it might well lead to an improvement in the political relations between the two countries. The members of the military missions, particularly the French, were furious with London for having lacked elasticity in their treatment of the Russian demands.

On that same pivotal August twenty-first the missions met. Voroshilov blustered out an impassioned appeal. 'Gentlemen, now is the time for a decisive move against the chief aggressor, to be made all together. Let us make the common cause . . . ' etc.

The next day the press announced that Hitler's Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was going to Moscow to discuss an improvement in political relations between Russia and Germany. The communiqué read:

The Trade and Credit Pact having been concluded, the question of improving political relations between Germany and Russia arises. An exchange of opinions took place on this question between the governments of the two countries, and disclosed the mutual desire to discharge the tension between the two countries, dispel the possibility of war, and conclude a non-aggression pact. In this connection the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, will come to Moscow in the course of the next few days for the necessary conversations.

A few hours later it was announced that Ribbentrop would arrive the next day, the twenty-third. He had been on the road when the announcement of his trip was first made.

For the diplomats directly involved in the negotiations the situation was now clear. Moscow and Berlin had come to terms.

The military missions did not meet on the twenty-second. Instead Seeds and Naggiar went to the Kremlin to see Molotov, who received them separately for an hour each. They asked him what the Ribbentrop trip meant. Molotov was evasive and indefinite. Seeds gave way to his Irish ire and said to the pudgy Prime Minister, 'M. the President of the Council, you have given us a most flagrant display of bad faith.'

While Seeds and Naggiar were being received by Molotov, the members of the mission were being politely shown around the museum of

the Kremlin, which contains, among many other priceless objects, the Czarist crown jewels.

On the twenty-third, at 1 P.M. Ribbentrop and his party arrived in two great Condor planes. The Moscow airport was decorated with Nazi flags. Some of the swastikas pointed in the wrong direction, so hastily had they been prepared. The band refrained from playing the 'Horst Wessel' song. The German Foreign Minister was met by Potemkin, as Molotov's first assistant, Schulenberg, Rosso, the Italian Ambassador, and the whole staff of the German Embassy as well as by the journalists. Ribbentrop was packed into one of Stalin's big bullet-proof Packards and, escorted by several guard cars, set off for the German Embassy along the Leningradsky Chaussée and the old Tverskaya, now Gorky Street, both of which had been kept clear of all other traffic for some time previous. After lunch at the German Embassy, Ribbentrop was received by Molotov, with whom he conferred from three-thirty until six-thirty and from ten until one in the morning, when the pact was signed. Stalin, Schulenberg, and several other people were present. Ribbentrop had a telephone line to Berlin all day, but did not use it much.

Stalin made a very good impression on the visiting Germans. They afterward said that he was like a nice old uncle, very kind and good-natured. All his suggestions were pertinent and clear.

'Stalin has a wonderful faculty,' stated one of the participants of these meetings in my presence some time later, 'of picking out the important point, having cleared it of all unessential detail, and grasping it in its essence as the instrument for solution of many other less important points.'

Stalin has made this impression on many people.

Having hammered the pact into exactly the shape they wanted it to have, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed it and the latter went to the old former Austrian Embassy on Death Lane to spend the rest of the night. He slept literally under the noses of the Anglo-French military missions, who were housed in the next building.

The next morning the newspapers all came out late. Huge queues, in some cases blocks long, formed in front of the kiosks and waited for hours. The news had gone round that a pact had been signed with Ger-

many. The Moscovite, preoccupied as he was with his half-kilo of meat and getting to work on time, was jolted out of his usual political stoicism. The queues were wild with opinion, in a country where most people had learned to keep their mouths shut on political subjects not explained and briefed by the press or other official literatures. Most people registered astonishment.

'What the hell! Pact with the Fascists?' (The word was still current, though beginning with the next day it disappeared from the political vocabulary of the well-informed and loyal Soviet citizen.) 'Hope it won't mean war with anyone.'

The papers finally came and were bought up with real avidity. There was the pact with a picture of Stalin, Molotov, and Ribbentrop on the first page. The text was perfectly clear — ten-year non-aggression pact and mutual promises not to participate in any combination of powers directed against the other. It had, moreover, an important consultation clause. (See Appendix 5.)

In addition to signing the published non-aggression and consultation pact, Ribbentrop and the Kremlin leaders went into a detailed discussion of future German relations. It was agreed in principle that Finland and the Baltic countries were to fall within the Soviet sphere of influence; that in case of war and the destruction of Poland, Russia was to get approximately half the territory of that country; that when an appropriate moment came Russia would get Bessarabia from Rumania. It was further agreed that what was left of the Communist Party of Germany would abstain from activities directed against the National Socialist Government.

The experienced and wily Stalin probably maintained an attitude of sound skepticism toward everything Ribbentrop said. He would have liked to believe in the possibility of a long-term Soviet-German working agreement, economic and political, but his astute instincts warned him of the danger of doing business with Hitler. Many of the younger and less experienced Soviet officials, however, took Ribbentrop at face value and envisaged decades of peaceful cooperation between the two countries. I talked with several such individuals.

Ribbentrop and his staff left on the twenty-fourth at 1:20 P.M., having

been in Moscow just over twenty-four hours. They were seen off with all the honors that Moscow could produce. With respect to the staff, incidentally, stories circulated at the time to the effect that Ribbentrop had come accompanied by a dozen sound-experts who had put on a talking movie of Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden, urging Germany to attack Russia and offering all kinds of enticements to Hitler if he did. This was obvious nonsense. The Russians knew without any sound-men that British diplomacy would have liked to see Hitler fight Russia. Besides, the Soviet-German pact had been initialed since the sixteenth of the month.

The Reich's Foreign Minister flew back to Berlin leaving the foreigners in Moscow with open mouths or else grinding their teeth, while the Russians wagged their heads and made impolite remarks about each other's mothers in astonishment.

The military missions were furious with each other and with the Kremlin.

'It's the dirtiest trick in history,' one colonel said to me.

As a matter of fact the British Government had sent the mission to Moscow with the intention of pulling exactly the same sort of trick on the Russians. Such tactics are an accepted practice for the British in their relations with colonial peoples or other European states, just as it was among the Italian city-states of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in dealing with each other. What made Sir William Seeds and Admiral Drax and others boil was that this trick had been played on them by the bloody Bolsheviks, of all people, and at such an embarrassing time.

The missions had had enough. They went to see Voroshilov, bade him a cold farewell on the twenty-fifth, and left the same night for Finland. The same people who had met them saw them off at the station. All was cordial and correct. However, when the train had pulled out of the station, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Smorodinov, turned to Colonel Suvorov, the Commandant of the City of Moscow, slapped him on the back and let out a guffaw of laughter, much to our amusement.

As soon as the missions were safely in Finland, the Soviet press published an interview given by Voroshilov to a correspondent of *Izvestia*.

(See Appendix 6.) He explained the breakdown of the Anglo-French-Soviet military talks as due to the discovery of insurmountable differences of opinion between the two sides. He explained the signing of the pact with Germany as the result of the breakdown of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet staff talks. He asserted the justice of the Soviet demand for the right to deploy on Polish territory if the Red Army was to help fight Germany. Like many other Soviet statements it was all true except the actual facts. The Soviet-German pact obviously did not result from the breakdown of the Anglo-French-Soviet staff talks, as the former had been initialed before the Anglo-French military talks were even well under way. It was perfectly true, however, that Admiral Drax and General Doumenc had been sent to Moscow by their governments to stall for time and to placate the pro-Russian elements in their own countries, rather than to conclude an alliance with the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, on the twenty-fifth, an Anglo-Polish mutual-assistance pact was signed in London. Chamberlain apparently made up his mind to fight over Poland. Having betrayed several countries who were willing to take a stand against aggression, he was now pushed by public opinion into the rôle of a sterling Launcelot. Had he betrayed just one more country and sold Poland down the river, Hitler and Stalin would probably have quarreled over the partitioning of Poland, and Chamberlain's long-standing dream would have been realized — a Soviet-German war with Britain neutral, attempting to hold the balance of power.

But the Birmingham merchant did not have the consistency and fortitude to pursue any policy through to its logical conclusion.

On the thirty-first of August the Supreme Soviet ratified the German-Soviet pact with its usual unanimity. Gathered together in the foreign press box with a plain-clothes man for every two or three of us, we listened to Molotov read out his long speech about the Soviet policy of peace and British support of the unreasonable Polish Government. He accused the military missions of having come to Moscow without authority to sign anything. The thousand-odd Soviet deputies listened in silence, bewildered but stoical, while Stalin surveyed the scene from his usual inconspicuous place at the back of the platform. When Molotov had finished speaking, a motion was made and passed unanimously



to dispense with discussion. Another motion to ratify the Soviet-German pact was unanimously passed. Such was the organization of Soviet democracy.

## 9

The next day Germany invaded Poland.

So quick had been the volte-face in Soviet policy and so few people had known that it was coming that the *Krokodile*, the Soviet humorous weekly, came out on August twenty-fifth with anti-German caricatures. For many days we received provincial papers carrying old-line anti-Fascist articles on foreign affairs.

A few die-hards in the Moscow diplomatic corps still hoped and prayed that Russia would follow the example of London and Paris and declare war on Germany. Russia did nothing. The inevitable war, foreseen and dreaded in the Soviet Union for two decades, had become a reality, but to all appearances Russia was not involved. A Soviet school teacher expressed himself to me thus: 'It is a war between two groups of capitalist powers, all of them part of the capitalist encirclement. Russia is at peace and a defender of peace. Our enemies are fighting each other.'

It was logical that Russia should line up with Germany rather than with the Allies, if for no other reason than that the Allies wanted Russia to fight, whereas all Germany wanted Russia to do was to sit quiet and furnish raw materials in return for much-needed manufactured goods. Many people waxed indignant at Stalin's 'oriental perfidy.' It was hardly fair to use the word 'oriental.' When Britain double-crossed Spain with the Non-Intervention Commission no one used the term 'oriental.' Yet London had every reason, both moral and selfish, to assist Madrid. What basis did Moscow have for trusting Chamberlain? The Kremlin certainly had no moral obligations after Munich.

## **Part Two**

The Spoils of Peace — September, 1939



EUROPE was at war and Russia at peace. Stalin's strategy seemed remarkably successful. But the Kremlin took no time out for jubilation. Stalin set about immediately making the necessary organizational arrangements to draw a maximum of advantage from his first tactical victory.

On September second Alexander Shkvartsev was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, replacing Merekalov, who was not purged but remained in the Soviet Foreign Office as specialist on central-European affairs. Until 1938 Shkvartsev held a responsible post in a big textile institute. He was one of the many young amateurs picked out to spruce up the Soviet Foreign Service after the purge of 1936-38 had accounted for a number of the older and more experienced diplomats. Shkvartsev was Special Counselor in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin before his appointment as Ambassador. The Soviet Embassy in Berlin was simultaneously fortified by a new secretary, one Vladimir Pavlov, who had been Molotov's personal secretary and his interpreter in his conversations with Ribbentrop. At the same time General Purkayev was appointed Soviet Military Attaché in Berlin. Previously Chief of Staff of the Red Army's Belorussian Military District, Purkayev had already been in Berlin several months when his appointment came through.

I spent most of my time struggling with the Soviet press, trying to find out what was happening by reading several dozen central and provincial newspapers. It was very difficult.

During the first day of hostilities the Soviet newspapers offered their readers an extremely objective rapportage from the front. Dispatches from Berlin, Paris, London, Warsaw, and elsewhere were printed in order of apparent importance. The Soviet reader was given the information and left to figure it out for himself. The only assistance offered

was a paragraph in the *Pravda* editorial for September second, which threw mud on all the belligerents:

Among the dirty intrigues of international imperialist swindlers and the provocative gambling of the warmongers, only our country, the great Soviet Union, is staying firmly aloof as a source of honor, honesty, and strength; as a bulwark of world peace.

For purposes of internal propaganda this position was a good one. The rest of the world was lumped together as 'imperialist warmongers.' The Stalinist 'Peace Policy' of the Soviet Union was emphasized. The peoples of the Soviet Union suffered nearly a decade of continuous war beginning with 1914 and many of them remembered it vividly. A peace policy is always popular. It was on a peace program that the Bolsheviks first came to power in 1917.

Abroad, however, the position was more complicated. Overnight thousands of little men who did not like Fascism — small business men, liberals, Christian Scientists, college professors, and dentists — people who had been members of the 'Friends of the Soviet Union' because they felt Russia was a check to the Hitler menace, or who had attached themselves to or aided other organizations close to the Comintern for similar reasons — were suddenly jolted into the realization that the Soviet Union was playing an essentially nationalist game and apparently had come to terms with Fascism. The press in America facilitated this cruel awakening by printing silly think-pieces by desk men in New York stating that Moscow was now run from Berlin, and that Stalin had sold his soul to Fascism.

The above-mentioned liberals stood to be alienated by the Bolshevik volte-face; Moscow was perfectly aware of that. It was a part of the price Stalin had been willing to pay for peace and improved frontiers. If the war lasted long enough these same liberals would come trooping back to a pro-Soviet position, so Stalin reckoned, because Russia would be the only country advocating peace.

During the first three weeks of the war the Comintern left its various sections high and dry. Of course communications broke down and there were other complicating technical factors. But, undoubtedly, the im-

portant reason was that the entire Comintern was as much surprised and consternation-stricken as were the political bureaus of the British or American or any other parties. It took time for them to find out just what the line was going to be. On the basis of some remarks made by people who knew a great deal about such things, I am convinced Dmitroff, Manuilski, and other Comintern leaders had to analyze Moscow's new position for themselves with the sole aid of *Pravda* and Stalin's speech at the Eighteenth Party Congress, which they could re-read and reinterpret.

For the time being the Comintern and the Central Committees of the various Communist Parties stammered out ambiguous theses — it was an imperialist war; Fascism was a menace, yes, but so was British imperialism. . . . Many somewhat independent comrades like Harry Pollitt drew themselves up nice resolutions about the necessity of fighting the most reactionary force — Fascism. Such individuals were subsequently expelled from the party or relieved of responsible posts.

While consternation, confusion, and indignation surged through the Soviet Union's great international following, most Soviet citizens said to themselves, 'Thank God we are not in the war,' and went about their business. The Kremlin leaders turned their attention toward strengthening the country's defenses for all possible eventualities. They thought they would have many weeks, if not several months, before the Germans broke Polish resistance. They undertook immediate measures aimed at the conservation of military materials and made every effort to increase the sinking power and shock-absorbing capacity of the Red Army.

A story went around Moscow that Soviet civil aviation had been practically liquidated and all the planes given to the army. I telephoned the Foreign Office, which stated that it knew nothing of such a measure. 'Intourist,' the Soviet travel agency, was no more informative. Finally I went out to the airport and found out that the lines running from Moscow to Tashkent, Sochi, Sverdlovsk, Rostov, Baku, Tblisi, Ashkhabad, and Zaporozhiye were suspended 'until further notice.' I further gathered that the planes were being reconditioned as combat craft or training and reconnaissance ships.

On September third a general re-registration of the reservists was

ordered. No announcement was made in the press, but posters appeared on walls and factories and offices became re-registration points for several million Red Army reservists.

A large candy factory near Moscow closed down because its supplies of sugar had been requisitioned. I happen to know of this particular case personally because of acquaintances working there, but the same thing occurred in hundreds of other enterprises all over the country at the same time. Sugar disappeared from the stores. The population, sensitive to such things, began to lay in reserves. Great queues, blocks long, formed outside stores to buy sugar, salt, flour, tinned fish and meat, and other imperishable foods. The sale of gasoline was restricted.

On September fifth an order signed by Defense Commissar Voroshilov appeared in the press. It provided for conscription of the classes of 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921. This immense new contingent was to appear at the recruiting stations in mid-September. Accurate figures were hard to find. We estimated that between two and three million men were to come up.

On the same day two military doctors, Kopilov and Shubnikov, were appointed to head the anti-epidemic organization of the Commissariat of Health.

On September ninth lines formed in front of many savings banks. The people of Moscow were laying in supplies of food and needed ready money. It was hard on the banks and on the grocery stores.

A Supreme Soviet decree empowered the Commissariat of Foreign Trade to limit or stop exports to countries where emergency economic regulations had created unfavorable trade conditions for Russia.

On the next day the press published a long article headed 'England's Unfriendly Actions.' It accused Britain of refusing to permit the shipment to Russia of sixty-four lathes, four presses, eight hundred and fifty-five tons of rubber, and other commodities contracted for and paid for by the Soviet Union before the war. At the same time it became known that several British ships in Archangel and Murmansk, loaded with timber, apatites, and other cargoes bound for Britain, had not been permitted to sail. A high official in the Foreign Trade Commissariat told me that it was 'extremely unfortunate' that events had taken such a

turn. War or no war, he pointed out, Soviet industry must expand. Equipment must be replaced and machinery was needed. If Britain could not provide the necessary commodities, then Russia would have to turn elsewhere. German trade with western Europe and America would be drastically curtailed by the war. Russia would have to trade with Germany whether she liked it or not, he said.

Meanwhile German tanks were smashing through the Polish lines, and the Luftwaffe was disorganizing Polish communications and bombing military concentrations all over Poland.

## 2

In the Far East Russia put a sudden end to the military operations which had developed between Soviet and Japanese army units early in August along the Manchukuo-Mongolian frontier in the region of the river Khalkhingol. During the first two weeks in September while several divisions of infantry were fighting furiously and hundreds of tanks and planes were in action on both sides, Japanese Ambassador Togo scurried back and forth from the German Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Office. As the Polish lines crumbled, the Kremlin decided it had better pay attention to more important things and on September fifth direct negotiations were started. The new Abe Government in Tokyo apparently was no more anxious than Moscow to keep on with the undeclared war, and on September fifteenth the details of a truce were arranged. The next day the press published the welcome news that hostilities had ceased, prisoners and dead were being exchanged. A mixed frontier commission was appointed to settle the original trivial territorial dispute.

The Soviet Government appointed K. A. Smetanin Ambassador to Tokyo. Smetanin had been Counselor and Chargé d'Affaires in the Japanese capital for some time before his appointment. There were hints at a forthcoming Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, but here the ques-



tion of Soviet aid to China effectively spiked all attempts to bring about a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement for nearly two years.

### 3

While the Soviet Union was making peace in the Far East — a peace, be it known, far from dishonorable — the decks were being cleared for action in the west. As early as September eighth it became obvious in Moscow that reservists were being called up. Several chauffeurs of my acquaintance were ordered to appear at the big stadium near the airfield with their cars. They were allowed two or three hours to get there. The cars were requisitioned and the owners, in most cases Soviet organizations, got them back many weeks later. Horses were likewise requisitioned with their *izvozchiks* (drivers). Driving around Moscow one could see hundreds of horses and ramshackle carts herded together in open spaces in the outlying parts of the city. The drivers were poorly dressed and they and their horses went without food for whole days. The mobilization started out badly.

Beginning with the evening of September eighth the Moscow railroad stations, particularly the Belorussian Station, whence trains departed for Poland and the Baltic countries, were crowded with departing mobilized reservists and their families. I went through several mobilizations in France. There was weeping and gnashing of teeth, but at least the departing *poilus* were well equipped and knew, or thought they knew, what they were mobilizing for. During those days in September thousands of reservists, hardly one of whom had a complete uniform, streamed through the Red capital going westward. They did not know where they were going. Some said they were going to fight the Germans. Some said it was the British. Some ventured that they were going to invade Poland. They were lethargic and fatalistic. They were usually hungry, as arrangements for their food were wholly inadequate. Almost

none of them was armed — probably a combination of bad organization and good precautionary judgment. Vodka had disappeared from the stores, so there was little drunkenness. Just misery and dejected resignation.

For three days the mobilization went on without any public announcement. About three-quarters of the motor-cars in the capital disappeared; the stations were jammed with provincial and Moscovite Red Army men traveling westward. There were more tears than cheers in the stations. The platforms were crowded with women seeing their men off. 'Yego vzyali na voinu' was on everyone's lips. It means literally '*They* took him to war.'

Night after night we journalists piled into someone's automobile and made the rounds of the stations, making our way as best we could through the mass of humanity which packed the streets. The militia kept order as well as could have been expected, but could not prevent tens or hundreds of thousands of quiet, lethargic workers and peasants from assembling around the stations to watch the hungry, ragged soldiers leaving for an unknown front. Many of these onlookers expressed the opinion that there would be a war with the Germans. 'It will be like the last time — the Germans will shoot us down like sausages,' I heard one bearded peasant say to his wife as they watched a trainload of reservists pull out of the Belorussian Station.

Ragged and ill-equipped as were the troops which passed through Moscow on their way to the front, they were much better off than recruits from other parts of the country. I did not see a single barefoot soldier, for example. Acquaintances who watched the mobilization near Kiev reported that many recruits entrained unarmed and barefoot.

It would have been a pitiful affair, indeed, if these troops had actually gone into battle against Hitler's well-equipped and well-trained legions. During the twenty-two months which were to elapse before the Soviet-German War, these men were trained and equipped. When the war actually started they were prepared to take the field against Germany, but in 1939 it would have been little more than a monotonous massacre.

The highways out of Moscow were crowded with tanks and trucks moving westward as fast as they could go. A number of schools were

taken over by the military to use as mobilization points. The children who usually studied there were squeezed into other schools on an evening shift. The National Hotel next door to the American Embassy was taken over for use as auxiliary staff headquarters. Personnel departments of stores, offices, and enterprises of all kinds began to scurry about trying to fill the vacancies left in their staffs by the mobilization. Many women went to work in place of their husbands, fathers, or brothers. Half a million women were said to be working on railroads alone in the middle of September.

On September tenth a laconic communiqué in the newspapers announced that a partial mobilization of reservists had been ordered in about one-third of European Russia including the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Orel, Moscow, Kalinin, and Leningrad military districts. The communiqué spoke of the spreading of the German-Polish War and its increasing menace to innocent bystanders.

Most Moscovites tended to regard the mobilization as a precautionary measure or as a prelude to an attack against Poland. This view was substantiated by *Pravda*. One article on September eleventh asserted that further Polish resistance was almost impossible because of the absence of effective Allied assistance. An editorial on the fourteenth scored the national tyranny of the Polish State, which 'began to disintegrate after the first military defeat.' The editorial stated further that the military collapse was due in part to the cultural, national, and economic oppression of eight million Ukrainians and three million Belorussians living in eastern Poland which, *Pravda* asserted, was in essence a colonial appendage to Poland proper.

On September sixteenth a German bomber was forced down in the Soviet Ukraine. The crew of five was 'interned' — that is, they were sent to Moscow, where they stayed in the most fashionable hotel in town and spent a great deal of money on knickknacks which they later took back with them to Germany. During the week three Polish planes likewise violated Soviet frontiers and were forced down. Their crews were also interned, but they never turned up in the foyer of the Hotel Metropole in Moscow.

By September sixteenth nearly two million Red Army reservists had

been called to the colors, had been more or less equipped and sent in crowded freight cars to the Polish frontier.

## 4

At four o'clock in the morning of September seventeenth I was awakened by the telephone. It was a friend from the Polish Embassy who told me that his ambassador, Grzybowski, had been called to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where Vice Commissar Potemkin handed him a note declaring that the Polish Government no longer existed, ergo all treaties and agreements concluded with it were invalid. (See Appendix 7.) The Kremlin thus annulled the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact with a stroke of the pen. The note concluded with the statement that the Red Army had been ordered to enter Poland, take under its protection the lives and property of the Ukrainian and Belorussian populations and deliver them from the war into which their misguided and unscrupulous leaders had dragged them. A few minutes later we learned that the Red Army had crossed the frontier into Poland. The first units to advance were regulars, stationed permanently on the frontier, well equipped, clothed, and organized. The newly mobilized reservists stayed behind, in most cases remaining on the old frontier for at least several days.

Conversations later with soldiers who had participated in these operations gave me an opportunity to fill in the gaps in the official communiqués.

The unit which advanced from Negoreloe along toward Stolpce had little to do but destroy the barbed-wire entanglements at the border and move forward into Poland. The advance was led by a half-dozen tanks, one of which knocked down the big sign which hung over the railway line exactly on the border reading 'Workers of the World, Unite.' The frontier ceased to exist.

The troops advanced through the dawn after exchanging a few shots with Polish outposts. Just before reaching Stolpce they were met by a group of peasants waving kerchiefs and cheering. An old woman ran along beside a tank inviting the machine-gunner to come into her hut for some warm milk. Others pointed out the location of Polish fortifications. The peasants were Belorussians and so were most of the Red Army men.

The Polish fortifications offered almost no resistance. Most of the senior officers ran away. Some of them were caught and held by their own men. Many Polish soldiers came out of their pillboxes, stuck their bayonets into the ground, and came up to the Red soldiers with outstretched arms.

'We have no reason to fight the Red Army.'

In the little town of Stolpce the Red soldiers stopped to hold a meeting. Polish regulars, local peasants, and railway workers participated. A Red Army commissar said a few words. He spoke very simply in the Belorussian language.

Organize a provisional administration. Prepare to confiscate the land of the landlords. Hunt down the Polish officers who have escaped into the woods. Maintain order. Arrest the Polish gendarmes.

Some communications workers asked what they could do to help.

Establish telephonic and telegraphic communication with Negoreloe.

The Red soldiers got back into their tanks and went on. This happened all along the frontier.

In the bigger cities there was some resistance. In Vilno units of the Polish Army composed principally of officers and hastily mobilized high school students fought all day in the streets. The Red Army refrained from shelling or bombing because of the ill-will and material damage which would have resulted. By evening the city was in the hands of the Red troops, which took up residence in the newly evacuated Polish military barracks. The next day the provisional administration was at work. It was composed of a local leather worker, the director of a local high school, and a political commissar from the Red Army. They had plenty to do. Communications and commerce must function;

representatives must go out to near-by towns and villages and set up local provisional administrations, and the workers' militia must be organized to keep order in the city and to arrest the gendarmes, landlords, and police officers still at large.

The Polish officials, the army officers, and the more well-to-do elements had their doubts about the 'Reds.' Any other invading army might be expected to honor certain rights and privileges in the occupied country. But here it was a different matter. The Red Army had gone through Poland twenty years before under circumstances of bitter class war. Now the landlords and their overseers, bankers and such people knew that they could expect the rope, if not from the Red Army then from the hostile and long-oppressed local peasantry. Most of them tried to get to Rumania or to Lithuania. Few succeeded. The distances were too great and transport was completely disorganized by the war. They ended up by forming bands in the forests and swamps. It was against these guerrillas that the Red Army did most of its fighting.

The political administration of the army accompanied or followed the first units and went to work immediately. Poland was honeycombed with illegal Communist cells, trade unions, and Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalist groups and circles. The political commissars made contact with these groups as soon as they could. Their line was simple:

The Red Army has come to liberate you. We are your friends. Organize peasant committees and take the land and the livestock from the big landholders. Organize committees and take over the government of the villages and towns. Re-establish broken communications, repair roads and railroads where they are damaged.

While the political commissars and also numerous party officials sent in after the Red Army for the purpose were organizing Poland, village by village, the Red Army was pressing on and the distance between the German and the Russian lines was decreasing. On September eighteenth German and Soviet radio stations broadcast a joint Soviet-German communiqué which stated that in order to avoid groundless rumors regarding the aims of the German and Russian armed forces in Poland,

It is hereby jointly stated that the forces are not pursuing contradictory objectives. The spirit and letter of the Soviet-German non-aggression

pact will be observed. It is the intention of both German and Soviet troops to bring calm and order to Poland.

There were nevertheless minor conflicts. The most important was just outside Lvov. Several hundreds were killed on both sides and Marshal Timoshenko, later to become War Commissar but then merely commander of the Ukrainian front, had the satisfaction of ambushing and smashing up a rather large German mechanized force. The whole thing was called off as soon as the G.H.Q.'s of both armies learned what was happening. The Germans left Lvov to the Russians as previously arranged.

Of course the Red Army entered Poland at a time when the Polish ruling class and the army had been shattered by the Germans on the western front. Still, the ease and speed with which the Red soldiers did their job cannot be explained by that alone. The semi-feudal Polish ruling classes had impoverished their country rather than enriched it, though they got it from the hands of Hohenzollern Germany, Hapsburg Austria, and Czarist Russia, none of whom had gone out of their way to do things for the local populations of their semi-colonies or outlying districts. Here are a few figures, widely publicized by the Soviet press during September:

In 1913 there were ninety coal mines working in the territory which later became Poland, and they produced forty-one million tons of coal. In 1937 there were only sixty-four mines working with a production of thirty-six million tons.

Oil production in Poland in 1937 (501,000 tons) was about half of the production in 1913.

In 1936 there were thirty-four fewer high schools in Poland than in 1928 and there were twenty thousand unemployed teachers. Parents had to pay for the education of their children and when they had no money the schools were closed. There were six hundred and ninety-eight Polish language schools in the country in 1937, twenty-six Ukrainian, two Jewish, and no Belorussian schools. There were almost no books printed in the Belorussian or the Ukrainian languages. There was not a single higher educational institution in Poland operating in any other language except Polish. (The population was forty per cent national minorities.)

This was the Poland into whose territories the Red Army was welcomed by most of the population.

For some sensitive persons what the Red Army did in western Ukraine and western Belorussia was annoying, even disgusting. They dispossessed; they hung recalcitrant officers, policemen, agents provocateurs; they made it very unpleasant for the well-to-do. In this process Poland's culture, such as it was, suffered. But this was to be expected because a revolution was going on in the new Soviet districts—a revolution pricked along by the bayonets of the Red Army.

Of course, the show was run from Moscow. No revolutionary groups in central or eastern Europe were in a position to compete with Moscow for leadership of the new sovietized geographic units as they were chipped out of the 'capitalist world' by Red bayonets.

One can have whatever opinions one wishes about the justice, the aesthetic desirability, or the authoritarian correctness of what went on, but one had but to watch the Red troops traveling to and from Poland and hear them tell of their activities there to be convinced that the export value of Bolshevism was high among a large portion of the population of eastern Europe.

## 5

On September nineteenth the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, asked for his passport. On the same day a German military mission arrived in Moscow and was put up in the Hotel National, where they were seen strutting about in full uniform between conferences with Red Army staff men. They discussed a temporary boundary in Poland. They departed by plane on the twenty-first, having drawn up a mutually satisfactory agreement on the zones of operation of the two armies. The demarcation between these zones was published in the Soviet newspapers on September twenty-second. It went along the Pisa River to its



junction with the Narev; along the Narev to its junction with the Bug; thence along the Bug to its junction with the Vistula; thence along the Vistula to its junction with the San; then along the San to its source in the Carpathians. In this way Warsaw was to be in the German zone but Praha, a suburb of the old Polish capital, would be in the Soviet Union, as would Vilno, Bialystok, Lvov, Przemyśl, and Lublin. This division would have given Russia eight or ten million Poles and about half the territory of what had been Poland. It looked fine. Speakers at factory meetings in Moscow threw out their chests and slapped the map: 'We are getting back what was taken from us when we were weak. The fatherland is growing.' The remark might have been made in 1878 or 1813 or 1794 or 1729.

After long negotiations, in which the German Ambassador in Moscow played the gentleman and the officer and persuaded the Soviet authorities to allow the Polish diplomatic and consular officers in Russia to depart with dignity, an exchange was arranged. The Soviet representatives in Warsaw were safely released on September twenty-sixth. However, it was not until October eighth that Grzybowski and his staff crossed the frontier into Finland.

While the Red Army was crossing Poland a number of things had been going on in Moscow. Everyone realized that the collapse of Poland and the advent of Soviet-German cooperation made Moscow the capital of eastern Europe. Rumania sent a new minister to Moscow, one Davidescu. Bulgaria sent Colonel Boidev, their Chief of Aviation, to organize a direct Moscow-Sofia air line. As for Estonia, that unfortunate little country sent its Foreign Minister to attempt to regulate an incident which had taken place when a Polish submarine interned in Tallinn had 'escaped.' The Turkish Foreign Minister, Sarajoglou, came to Moscow ostensibly to return the visit of Potemkin to Ankara, but actually to talk over basic questions as to the attitude of the Soviet Union in case of a war in the Balkans.

And so when, on September twenty-seventh, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop flew to the Red capital for the second time within five weeks, he found Moscow buzzing with diplomatic activity. He arrived with thirty-eight experts and advisers. A special Red Air Force guard

of honor stood at attention on the air field as the three Nazi planes landed. The field was decorated with intertwined swastika and hammer-and-sickle flags. Ribbentrop was whisked off to supper at the German Embassy before beginning his talks with Molotov. Some of the newspapermen waited at the airport for the arrival of Selter on his second trip to Moscow within two days. The rest went home just in time to hear a special radio broadcast stating that a Soviet merchant ship had been sunk with loss of life in Narva Bay by an unknown submarine. It looked bad for Doctor Selter.

Ribbentrop conferred with Molotov and Stalin for three hours on the twenty-seventh; and for about as many hours on the afternoon of the twenty-eighth, after which they all attended an elaborate dinner in the Kremlin, whence they went to the Ballet. The Leningrad star, Galina Ulanova, did her best before the German Foreign Minister, most of the Political Bureau, and half a dozen ambassadors. When the performance ended Ribbentrop called the second secretary of the German Embassy, von Walter, and instructed him to present five hundred of the best roses to Ulanova in the name of the Foreign Minister of the Reich. That was one job von Walter never did. Roses in Moscow in late September were just not to be had.

After the Ballet they went back to the Kremlin, and in the small hours of the next morning they signed a Friendship and Frontier Pact, a joint declaration and two very important letters providing for unprecedented economic collaboration between the two countries in the near future. (See Appendix 8.)

The Friendship and Frontier Pact documented the division of Poland along approximately the Kursen line. The new frontiers left Russia with comparatively few Poles and with nearly all the Ukrainians and the Belorussians that had been in Poland. A piece of territory about the size of Switzerland, which had gone to Russia under the temporary agreement of a fortnight before, went to Germany. The Soviet Union was left with the best defensive line in Poland, and a population increased by about thirteen millions.

The declaration was not less important. It fixed the war guilt on Britain and France, which thereafter were referred to in the Soviet press

as the 'warmongers.' It stated that Germany and Russia would in future jointly decide all questions concerning eastern Europe and would not tolerate the interference of any third power. It asserted that the Soviet Government would back Germany's peace offers to the Allies and in case they were refused, would consult with Germany on the necessary joint steps to be taken.

This last point had immediate and serious repercussions on the Communist Parties all over the world. They were given to understand that the Allies were the aggressors, and that the German peace offer was backed by the U.S.S.R. Left in the dark for four weeks about what line they should take with regard to the war, they executed their volte-face obediently. Pollitt was expelled from leadership in the British Party. The Communist press throughout the world took up the new line. The largest centralized international political organization in the world was, in effect, put at the disposal of Nazi Germany, at least for the time being.

In a letter to Ribbentrop, signed simultaneously with the pact and published with it in the newspapers the next day, Molotov called for the increase of the Soviet-German annual trade turnover to equal the highest figure attained since World War I.<sup>1</sup> Molotov further stated that Soviet raw materials would be exchanged for German manufactured goods. Economic programs were to be drawn up by both governments in order to facilitate the realization of this gigantic plan of economic collaboration between the two largest countries in Europe.

This German pact was duly ratified and Doctor Karl Schnurre, head of the Economic Department of the German Foreign Ministry, came to Moscow to formulate the new Soviet-German economic collaboration in an agreement which was signed in February, 1940. In the meantime a frontier commission was appointed and an agreement was signed providing for the voluntary emigration of Germans and people of German origin in Soviet Poland to Germany, and of Ukrainians and Belorussians from German Poland to the Soviet Union. The exchange of populations was carried out systematically, the most remarkable thing being that while nearly one hundred thousand Germans elected to go back to Germany from western Ukraine and Belorussia, only some six thousand Ukrainians and Belorussians came back to Russia.

<sup>1</sup> The peak in Soviet-German trade was the figure for 1931, i.e., one billion marks.

## 6

Ribbentrop departed in the afternoon after a hurried visit to the Agricultural Exhibition. Before getting into the plane he gave a statement to the press in which he asserted that Soviet-German friendship was now firmly established; that henceforth neither country would allow anyone else to meddle in eastern-European affairs; that both desired the restoration of peace in Europe, and that in case 'warmongers in Britain and France maintain ascendancy, Germany and Soviet Russia will know how to deal with them.'

Ribbentrop flew off to Berlin leaving *Izvestia* to publish a violent editorial accusing Poland, Britain, and France of making war on Germany, pleading for peace in western Europe, and threatening even closer collaboration between Moscow and Berlin if peace were not restored.

These were the published results of Ribbentrop's second trip to Moscow. Here, as before, much more was agreed upon than was made public. A line was drawn through eastern Europe, dividing German and Russian spheres of influence. The Baltic countries had already been allotted to Russia at the first Ribbentrop-Molotov conference. Now the line was drawn farther. All of Finland, the three Baltic countries, eastern Poland up to the new frontier, Bessarabia, part of Bukovina, Rumanian Moldavia and Dobruja, as well as a strip of the Bulgarian coast were on Russia's side of the line. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was to get a naval base and additional rights on the Straits.

From the day the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier there was an intensive press campaign in the entire Soviet Union. Meetings were organized in offices and factories. Molotov's radio declaration was read and speeches were made:

The glorious Red Army is liberating our blood-brothers, the Belorussians and Ukrainians, from the yoke of the Polish pans. The capitalist world is forced to withdraw before the sledgehammer blows of the Red Army . . . etc.

The Polish-German War was scarcely mentioned. It might have tarnished the Red Army's glory. Many of the meetings were far from enthusiastic. I went to one in a factory near Moscow. Its organization was simple. Half an hour before quitting time all the factory gates but one were closed. When the whistle blew a meeting started at the one gate which remained open. The workers went to the meeting principally because they could not get through the gate.

After the first two or three days public interest died down. Considerably more enthusiasm for foreign conquests was noticed when the Red Army men began coming back from 'the front' with trunkloads of all kinds of manufactured goods bought at low prices in Poland. The Soviet Government deliberately allowed this traffic to go on because it gave the people a concrete material interest in the foreign expeditions of the Red Army. In 1939 shoes, suits, bicycles, underwear, socks, radio sets, almost everything one can think of, were hard to obtain in Moscow and harder to procure in the rest of the Soviet Union. A pair of foreign shoes from a brother in the army was an event in the life of many Russians.

In the new areas a great deal of serious and effective work was carried out from the very first day. Railroad section gangs went to work immediately to widen the Polish railroads to the Russian gauge. This was completed in less than two weeks on several of the main roads. Russian rolling-stock began circulating in Poland. Industry was set in motion.

On the heels of the incoming Red Army whole troops of the singers, actors, and political workers went into the new districts. They put on performances from Vilno to Bukovina. They also bought whole carloads of all kinds of fancy foods and merchandise, some of which they ate or wore, but a great deal of which was sold at a handsome profit in the commission stores in Moscow and other old cities in the Soviet Union where such articles were scarce. Alexei Tolstoi, writer and literary secretary to Stalin, got into trouble with the Kremlin by trying to bring two carloads of acquisitions, including a mosaic, from Lvov to his estate near Moscow.

The provisional administrations set up in the occupied districts took over all power. They assumed control of most industrial enterprises whose owners had fled. They took over the banks and all public services.

A man going to a bank to withdraw money in any large quantity had to have the O.K. of the provisional administration. This was given in cases where the money was drawn to meet a payroll or to buy materials to set an idle plant in operation, but was refused in cases where the money was going for individual needs. Local peasant committees confiscated landlords' lands and property and distributed them to the poor peasants. Church property met the same fate. Small business was let alone for several months. The only restrictions were that prices must not be raised and the stores must be kept open.

As soon as the Red Army crossed the border the Russian rouble was set up in competition with the zloty at one rouble to one zloty. This move involved great benefit to the Russians, as the buying power of the zloty was roughly ten times that of the rouble. A million Red Army soldiers and officers came into Poland with their pockets full of roubles and bought everything they could get their hands on at about one-tenth the price they would have had to pay in Moscow.

On the other hand the Soviet Union shipped to Poland several deficit commodities, for which the Polish peasants had always had to pay high prices—for example, matches, salt, and kerosene—and sold them in Poland at the same price as previously, obviously taking a serious loss. Kerosene sold for fifty-five groszej a liter. Soviet kerosene was sent in and sold for the same price, that is, fifty-five kopeks. In state stores in Moscow it cost sixty-five kopeks and in outlying districts on the open market it fetched about a rouble a liter.

Factories and industrial enterprises of all kinds in the new districts were put into production as soon as possible. The labor power was there in the form of a large army of unemployed and the equipment and materials were available. The Soviet Union furnished what had previously been lacking, namely a market.

Large numbers of unemployed who could not be absorbed into local industry were sent off to the industrial districts of the Soviet Union to work. Several hundred thousand workers with their families went to Kazakhstan, Semipolitinsk, Nizhne-Tagil, and particularly to the Donbas. This labor power was absorbed in the Soviet Union without the slightest difficulty, as unskilled hands, particularly in the mining dis-

tricts, had been in great demand for many months. Of course these Polish workers earned the same wages as any Soviet worker,<sup>2</sup> but in buying power this represented much less than a Polish worker was accustomed to. There was not much he could do about it, except just not work. In the fall and winter of 1939 hundreds of Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Jewish youths, who had never worked and had no trades, lolled around cafés in the industrial cities of the Donbas and the Urals. They sold their clothes, which gave them enough to live on for a while. Many of the Jews, quick to adjust themselves to new circumstances, got inside jobs as barbers, watch repairers, office workers, and what not. Others went to work eventually in mine and mill. But generally speaking they were not a success in Soviet industry, and for one reason or another most of them were sent on farther east to construction gangs in Siberia.

While the Polish soldiers were sent home, the officers — those who had not had time to get across the Rumanian or Lithuanian frontiers — were treated less decorously. Many were sent under guard to Russia, where they eventually found themselves in concentration camps doing construction work in distant districts.

In most small factories and stores the workers were given the opportunity to vote as to whether the old boss, if he had not run away, was to continue as salaried director of the plant or to be dealt with more severely. Many of these elections resulted in the boss's staying. In these cases, however, as in banks and large stores, a political commissar was appointed by the temporary administration to check the work of the director and to see that he treated the workers fairly and did not steal anything or expropriate state funds. Some acquaintances of mine who went to Lvov in the late fall of 1939 reported that local bankers who had not run away were quite pleased with the way things were going. Business was booming, they said. They were still running their banks, although they did not own them any more. They lived more or less as they had lived. They had commissars looking over their shoulders, usually polite but stupid individuals who did not interfere much. My acquaintances, who knew what had happened in Russia after the NEP, laughed. 'Just wait,' they advised the Lvov bankers. It took about six months for the com-

<sup>2</sup> The 1938 average was 281 roubles a month.

missars to learn their new trades. The old bosses could then be got rid of without causing breakdowns in the transaction of business.

During the autumn, after the situation had become more settled, Moscow undertook some serious industrial work in the new districts. A great deal of attention was paid to oil production in the Galician fields, which fell almost entirely on the Soviet side of the new frontier. The production of these wells had dropped by fifty per cent during the years of Polish control. In 1940 production was probably brought up to a half-million tons, or the equivalent of the entire German production. The Russians sent in dozens of their best engineers and hundreds of skilled workers as well as thousands of roubles' worth of the best equipment the Soviet Union could produce. A major economic development in eastern Poland was the construction of the Dnieper-Bug Canal, connecting the Black Sea with the Vistula and making possible the transport of wheat, petroleum, and other heavy freights by water to Germany over a route which could not be blockaded by the British Navy. This canal was constructed in 1847 but was not used except for floating timber. After 1918 it fell into disuse and had to be completely reconditioned and deepened in 1939. All the locks and other equipment installed in 1939-40 were wooden and, in the words of a friend of mine, a Soviet engineer who worked on the job, 'were not good enough for more than a couple of years.' Despite high-sounding phrases about friendship with Germany, Stalin was not spending unnecessary money on permanent installations on the Soviet-German frontier.

Collectivization of agriculture was not undertaken for several months, and most small stores were left in the hands of their owners for nearly a year after the sovietization of eastern Poland. Collective farms were organized only after the Soviet régime had become firmly established and the local NKVD had become strong enough to take in its stride any possible discontent and unrest.

The Church was technically left alone in that it was not outlawed, but much of its property was nationalized and put to other uses.

Many prominent landlords like Count Radziwill were captured either by the Red Army or by local temporary administrations and dealt with summarily. Landlords, particularly Poles, had never been popular in eastern Poland, and their lot under the new régime was not enviable.



## 7

A revolutionary ideology was built up in the new districts. Communists were released from prisons and put in important positions. They became national heroes and were sent to Moscow as delegates to the Central Government. Among them was Sergei Prititski, whose story, which I heard from a Polish Communist in 1938, is so picturesque that it is worth telling. In Vilno in the middle 1930's a police agent provocateur wormed his way into the district committee of the Young Communist League and betrayed all its members to the 'Defensiva', the Polish secret police. The police agent gave evidence at the subsequent trial in the district court in Vilno. In the middle of the trial Young Communist Prititski came into the courtroom, walked up to within a few yards of the witness stand, whipped out two revolvers and put half a dozen bullets into the agent witness, who died on the spot. Prititski then turned and shot his way out of the courthouse through several dozen uniformed and plain-clothes policemen. He was captured on the steps with seventeen bullet wounds in his body. He recovered despite the adverse conditions of a Polish prison and was sentenced to death. The incident had put the police in rather a bad light because of their use of an agent provocateur, however, and what with that and a great deal of pressure from all sorts of trade unions and workers' organizations, Prititski's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He sat in a Polish jail until the Red Army came and let him out. He came to Moscow in October, 1939, as a delegate from the Bialystok region. I heard his impassioned and sincere speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow. The freshness, fire, and profound sincerity of Prititski and his comrades made a striking contrast to the rotund smugness of the case-hardened Soviet functionaries, who, having spent much of their time and energy during recent years trying to raise efficiency, cut costs, enforce good labor discipline, make a political machine run smoothly,

eliminate opposition, etc., had developed into very much the same kind of people as their capitalist colleagues in Detroit, Leipsic, or Lyons engaged in the same activities. Prititski subsequently became a member of the Bialystok City Soviet and of the Supreme Soviet of the Union in Moscow.

The acquisition of the new provinces was not expensive. The costs, according to official statistics given by Molotov in his report to the Supreme Soviet, were 737 Red Army men killed, 1862 wounded. To this must be added the costs of mobilizing nearly two million men and the gasoline and other materials necessary to send many of them across half of Poland. It was very cheap, indeed, for a piece of territory just a little smaller than Holland, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia combined, with thirteen million inhabitants and, far more important, an improved frontier.

But the agreements concluded by Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow in September were to become a heavy liability.

Stalin could make a good case for his August non-aggression pact with Berlin. It was his only way out of an impossible situation and it left him an independent neutral. The agreements signed on September twenty-ninth, however, pledged Russia to economic and political support of Nazi Germany; the Comintern became the ally of the Gestapo for many months; Fascism became 'a matter of taste,' as *Izvestia* put it. All this was unnecessary. Stalin's miscalculations were based on an underestimation of Germany's military power and an overestimation of the value of Hitler's promises. Like Chamberlain, who erred in the same direction, Stalin had to pay dearly for his mistake.



## **Part Three**

The Bloodless Conquest of the Balticum



I SPENT one evening in early October with a German Embassy official in Moscow. He was a Baltic German by origin and we quite naturally discussed the question of the ultimate fate of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 'And are you really going to turn the Baltic countries over to the Russians, finally and irrevocably?' I remember saying to him.

He shrugged his shoulders. 'We have made a fundamental agreement with Stalin. The Baltic countries are to go to Russia. We do not break our agreements. We will evacuate all our Germans from the Baltic countries and pursue our national aims in other directions.'

He went ahead to describe in glowing terms what Soviet-German friendship was going to mean: peace in eastern Europe, raw materials for Germany, manufactured goods for Russia. It sounded convincing. Many Russians with whom I talked took this official German line seriously. Whatever the Kremlin leaders thought about their relations with Germany, they lost no time in making use of the opportunity so conveniently offered them by Berlin.

The Baltic countries became a part of Russia in the beginning of the eighteenth century and remained so until 1918. As a result of Allied policy after World War I, the three little countries were set up as independent states. Politically reactionary, one of their main functions was to keep Bolshevism out of Europe.

For twenty years, from 1919 till 1939, industry declined in the Baltic countries. The extensive market for industrial products which had been at their disposal before 1917, when they were part of immense agricultural Russia, was no longer available because of their bad relations with the Soviet Union, the latter's foreign-trade monopoly, and the fact that England, the mother and father of the little countries, was interested in selling them British-manufactured goods.

The rise of National Socialism in Germany produced its effects in the

Baltic countries. A large sector of the population was German. When Hitler took to whipping up nationalist sentiments among Germans all over the world, the Baltic Germans began to want to emulate their Reich German cousins. Furthermore, Germany built up its trade with the Baltics at Britain's expense. The reactionary Baltic governments naturally rallied to Germany with its anti-Bolshevik program. This affinity was intensified by the fact that there was always a real Bolshevik danger in the Baltic countries. The governments put down all revolutionary activities with a firm hand, but they were nonetheless afraid and wanted the protection of a near-by great power.

Russia wanted the Baltic countries principally because they commanded the Baltic Sea and were of great strategic importance for the defense of Russia against either Germany or Britain, and also because they were relatively rich countries, boasting industries, shipyards, and even a good deal of gold in London and New York. Furthermore, the Balticum had been Russian for two centuries. It was the part of Peter the Great's Russia of which he was proudest. And as the Bolsheviks became prouder of Peter, they felt more and more the insult of having lost the Baltic countries.

When Moscow and Berlin shook hands, when the latter commenced evacuating the Germans from the Baltics, the structural foundation on which the Baltic governments had rested for two decades tottered. When Britain went to war and all her connections and influence in eastern Europe were shattered by the German victory over Poland, this structure collapsed. When Russia and Germany divided Poland and declared themselves sole bosses in eastern Europe, it disappeared completely. It was just a matter of time until the formalities of occupation and sovietization were performed.

## 2

The Polish submarine *Orzel* escaped from Gdynia shortly after the outbreak of the Polish War and went to Tallinn, where she was interned.

The guns were dismounted, all the torpedoes except five removed, the crew first interned and then paroled. One night toward the middle of September the crew of the submarine overpowered the Estonian sentries, boarded their vessel, and sailed away into the Baltic. About two weeks later she ran through the Kattegat and the Skagerrak and went to England, where she joined the British North Sea Fleet. But during her two weeks or so at large in the Baltic, she provided an excuse for Russian action against Estonia.

The Estonian Foreign Minister, Doctor Selter, came to Moscow on September twenty-fourth accompanied by the director of the Commercial Department of the Economics Ministry, Doctor Uemaa. Their arrival had been announced only the day before and we chroniclers, rather bewildered by the war in general, did not pay much attention to it. The Counselor of the Estonian Legation, rotund, good-natured little Mr. Ojonsoon, told us that they were coming to discuss the extension of the Soviet-Estonian trade agreement. He stated that there was no connection between the arrival of the Foreign Minister and the escape of the Polish submarine, which was being hunted high and low by the Red Fleet. 'The Russians have accepted our explanation of the escape of the submarine and feel satisfied that our removal of the chief of the port and several naval officials from their positions guarantees against repetition of such regrettable occurrences,' he said with just a quaver in his voice.

He went ahead to build up the trade agreement. There were already some Estonian railroad experts in Moscow going into a proposed revision of freight rates. They had run into some questions of sufficient importance to warrant the presence of the Foreign Minister.

We went on about our business grumbling about one more visiting foreign minister to watch.

The next day Selter arrived with his wife and an economist. The station was decorated with flowers and with Soviet and Estonian flags. I thought immediately of the flowers and flags with which Czechoslovakia's Premier Hacha had been met in Berlin the year before when he went to sign away his country to Hitler. Lozovsky, the Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, met the train, as did the Soviet trade representative



in Tallinn, Krasnov, and some people from the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. That was protocol. But the flowers and the flags! They comprised a political gesture. Selter proceeded to the Estonian Legation, where he dined. Then he and the members of the staff went to the opera. As they were leaving the opera house Selter was summoned to the Kremlin, where he spent four hours. He was talked to by Molotov and Stalin. The submarine was not even mentioned. Selter was told in so many words that Moscow was interested in defending Estonia against aggression. In order effectively to assist Estonia in defending herself, the Red Army must have military bases on the country's coasts and islands and also a mutual-assistance pact. Selter protested and sweated. It was unfair. It was blackmail. The Russians elaborated: Such a pact would not involve changes in the internal political system in Estonia. He, Doctor Selter, Foreign Minister, would continue to occupy his post and to live his life as he had always lived it. If, however, the Estonian Government refused to accept the proposition, then . . . well, there were about as many Red Army men near the Estonian frontier as there were men, women, and children in all Estonia. And in such an eventuality it seemed highly unlikely that Doctor Selter would carry on as Foreign Minister.

Selter pleaded incompetence to discuss such a question without special powers from his government. After hearing a few words of sound advice to the effect that Britain was not in a position to come to the assistance of anyone in eastern Europe, while Germany would not do so, Selter was dismissed. 'Go consult your government and be back within forty-eight hours,' he was told.

At the crack of dawn he flew off to Tallinn in a special plane.

The next day August Rei, the Estonian Minister to Moscow, flew to Tallinn with a Kremlin draft of just exactly what military bases were wanted. Just before Rei left, the Soviet press published a communiqué on the 'Soviet-Estonian Conversations':

Because of the unsatisfactory character of the explanation offered by the Estonian Government of the circumstances surrounding the escape of the Polish submarine from Tallinn, conversations have started between the Soviet Union and Estonia concerning measures calculated to ensure the safety of Soviet waters . . . .

The communiqué further pointed out that while the Estonians claimed the submarine was damaged, it could have escaped only if the Estonians had supplied fuel and rendered assistance in repair work. The appearance of still other unknown submarines in the Baltic in recent days had given the whole affair a very serious character, concluded the communiqué.

Late in the afternoon it became known in Moscow that the commander of the Baltic Red Fleet had sent destroyers to hunt down several unidentified submarines which had been sighted in the Gulf of Finland.

On September twenty-seventh Selter returned to Moscow, authorized by his government to sign anything which would preserve Estonia's independence and sovereignty. His plane landed at 6.15 P.M., just fifteen minutes after Ribbentrop and his party had arrived.

At 9 P.M., about an hour after Selter had gone to the Kremlin, a special radio bulletin broadcast over the entire Soviet network informed the public that a Soviet ship, the *Metalist* of four thousand tons, had been torpedoed at 6 P.M. by an unknown submarine near Narva Bay and sunk; nineteen of the crew were saved, five were missing.

The conference went on during most of the night. About three in the morning Selter signed a mutual-assistance pact giving the Russians bases in Estonia. After a few hours' rest he went back and signed a trade agreement. Both were announced in a special news broadcast from the Moscow radio in the middle of the evening of September twenty-eighth, and appeared in full text in the newspapers the next morning.

The preamble of the pact spoke of the development of friendly relations and the peaceful settlement of all conflicts. The main points were as follows:

Article 1. The signatories guaranteed to render assistance in case of an attack by any European power either by land, air, or sea.

Article 2. The U.S.S.R. undertook to furnish military materials and military aid to Estonia.

Article 3. Estonia leased to Russia naval and aviation bases on three Baltic islands and at Port Tallinn. Russia was to pay rent for these bases, for whose protection a 'strictly limited' garrison of Soviet troops was to be maintained.

Article 4. Each signatory agreed not to enter into blocs or alliances directed against the other.

Article 5. The pact did not infringe on or violate the sovereignty of either signatory, or involve changes in their political or economic systems.

The economic agreement signed at the same time provided for an increase in Soviet-Estonian trade turnover by four and one-half times and for reciprocal freight transit rights. (See Appendix 9.)

It did not look bad, but many farsighted Estonian businessmen saw that it was just a matter of time before Estonia was annexed and tried to get themselves, their families, and as much capital as possible to New York, or even to London.

The next day Selter was taken to see the Agricultural Fair; he was wined and dined in the Kremlin and in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and was slapped on the back by most of the Political Bureau. The pact was ratified in the afternoon by the Supreme Soviet and in the evening Selter went, properly escorted, to the opera, where he saw 'Ivan Susanin,' an old opera portraying the defense of Holy Russia against the 'Polish interventionists' at the beginning of the seventeenth century. During all these activities the Russians were extremely considerate and polite to him.

After much difficulty we got to see Selter for a few minutes. His face was glowing. He told us that, to his delight and, off the record, to his surprise, the Russians had been as polite and correct, even considerate, as he could have wished anyone to be. It was clear that he had thought himself dealing with a gang of plug-uglies and could not get over his astonishment at being treated with the respect and courtesy due the representative of a sovereign country. When Doctor Selter left on September thirtieth, the airport was again decorated with Estonian flags.

The unidentified submarines and the two Soviet ships which had ostensibly been attacked were forgotten. A high Soviet official told me in a careless moment that the Kremlin felt rather foolish about the performance, which had been a precautionary measure, necessary in order to prove Estonian aggression in case an Estonian rejection of Soviet proposals had necessitated Red Army action.

In mid-October the Estonian Government ratified the pact and the

customary documents were exchanged. The next day a Soviet military mission, consisting of high Red Army, Navy, and Air Force officials and officers, went to Tallinn to arrange for the garrisoning of the new bases. At the same time the Soviet Legation in Tallinn gave an immense reception. General Meretskov, later to become Chief of Staff of the Red Army, was present as Moscow's military representative. The Estonians drank toasts to the Red Army and to Stalin.

Beginning the next day the Estonian press became decidedly pro-Soviet. Soviet newspapers and Communist literature, banned for two decades, were put on sale and eagerly read by the Estonians. This was a development which the Selters and Laidoners did not exactly like, but there was not much they could do to stop it.

### 3

On October second, Latvian Foreign Minister Munters arrived at the airport in Moscow and was escorted and met as Selter had been. There was no official announcement as to the purpose of his visit but, the Soviet-Estonian pact having been announced only three days previously, there was no question in anyone's mind about its inevitable outcome.

Molotov spent two hours with Munters immediately upon his arrival. There was no unidentified-submarine comedy this time. It was perfectly straightforward. It took three days to draw up the pact and designate the exact location of the Soviet bases and garrisons on Latvian territory. I was informed that there never was any question as to whether or not the Latvians would sign. Latvia was a little larger than Estonia. Its population reached two million and it boasted a small army and even a warship or two. But after the Estonian capitulation and the very gentlemanly way in which the Russians subsequently treated the Estonians, Latvian resistance would have been impossible, both internally and militarily.

The Soviet-Latvian pact signed October fifth was almost identical with the Soviet-Estonian pact. The Riga press became pro-Soviet. Everything proceeded as per schedule. The trade agreement, signed on October eighteenth, provided for a tripling of Soviet-Latvian trade. (See Appendix 10.) The Soviet military mission charged with working out the details connected with bases and garrisons arrived in Riga on the nineteenth. General Baldin, later Commander of the Odessa Military District, was its chief. There was the routine wining, dining, and toasting.

By this time it was perfectly obvious what was going on. The Soviet press made no bones about it. As early as October third, *Izvestia* stated that Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland were expected to follow the sensible and judicious example of Estonia.

'The safety and integrity of the Estonian Republic is now guaranteed by the ever-growing power of the great Soviet Union,' said the organ of the Soviet Parliament, adding that Estonia was breaking a trail for others.

Three days later an article in *Pravda* stated accusingly:

British politicians not only sought to utilize Latvia as a drill-ground and place d'armes for their plans of aggression against the U.S.S.R., they also tried to convert her into a colony, into an agrarian appendage of industrial England.

*Pravda* further pointed out that Latvia's economy had been greatly harmed by the secession of 1919; now her old industrial prosperity would return with the help of the great Russian market and Russian capital.

The Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Doctor Urbsys, arrived on September second with his Latvian colleague. He had a two-hour conversation with Molotov and Stalin and then went back to Kaunas quietly. To the Kremlin chiefs he had expressed the deep and earnest wish of his government and, indeed, of the Lithuanian people, that their historic capital, Vilno — taken by the Poles in violation of their treaty obligations in 1920 — should be returned to Lithuania. Urbsys pointed out that giving Vilno to Lithuania would placate many people in Britain who had been opposed to its acquisition by Poland. It would arouse the enthusiastic approval of all the Baltic peoples and all the several millions of Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians living in the United States. Further-

more, Stalin and Molotov would be doing something that was almost without historic precedent. It would become the Soviet Union to show its strength and righteousness. . . . When Urbsys returned to Moscow four days later accompanied by the Vice President of his council of ministers, as well as the commander of the Lithuanian Army, General Rashtikis, things went smoothly. On the tenth a pact was signed. It gave the city of Vilno and the Vilno district to Lithuania. The pact contained other provisions analogous to the Soviet-Estonian and the Soviet-Latvian mutual-assistance pacts signed during the preceding days.

Vilno was the largest city in Lithuania, though no longer essentially Lithuanian. It was an important railroad center and boasted leather, lumber, and textile industries.

The Lithuanians were delighted. Stalin and Molotov smiled benignly, confident that all Lithuania, including Vilno, would fall into their laps within a comparatively short time. Their magnanimity cost them nothing.

I had a long informal talk with a Soviet official at this time. He was an intelligent fellow and spoke with candor. The Kremlin, particularly the boss (Stalin), was highly elated; things were working out very well, he told me. The British and French had turned down Hitler's peace offers and Germany was fulfilling its commercial obligations to Russia. Some high Kremlin officials, including Zhdanov, were afraid that London and Berlin would come to terms within a short time, which would have been catastrophe for the Soviet Union. But Stalin seemed sure that the war in the west would last at least long enough to permit Russia to wind up matters in the Baltic states.

The Soviet press played up the successes of Stalin's policy in the Baltics to the hilt. An iron ring had been created in the Baltics, ensuring the defense of the Soviet Union and simultaneously guaranteeing the Baltic countries against the horrors of war. The liberating Red Army would soon take up its positions in the Baltic countries to safeguard peace in eastern Europe.

While the Kremlin proceeded confidently to make propositions to the Finns similar to those already accepted by the three little Baltic countries, economic and military steps were taken to consolidate Soviet positions already won on the shores of the Baltic Sea.

On October fifteenth a trade pact was signed in Moscow providing for a hundred per cent increase in Soviet-Lithuanian trade turnover; the new frontier was defined and marked. (See Appendix 11.) On October eighteenth Lithuanian troops entered Vilno and the Red Army retired. Everything went smoothly until the Red Army had evacuated the city; then rioting broke out and a small pogrom was organized by Polish nationalist elements in the city. The Red Army had to send a detachment of tanks back to Vilno to restore order and help the Lithuanians establish themselves. While the rioting was still going on the Soviet and Lithuanian Governments exchanged flowery telegrams complimenting and congratulating each other.

On October eleventh a large squadron of the Soviet Baltic Fleet weighed anchor and sailed for Estonian waters. Meetings on the deck were organized, the sailors were told they were making a historic trip. Russia had struggled for centuries for windows to the sea, for access to open waters. As one of the speakers on the *Minsk*, the flagship of the squadron, said:

Peter the Great spent twenty-one years fighting for the Baltic. Now, in our Stalinist epoch, the problem has been solved peacefully without the firing of a single shot and almost overnight.

Other speakers pointed out that President Kalinin was once a machinist in a factory in Revel (Tallinn), a city which Peter the Great had founded.

On approaching Tallinn the squadron saluted. 'The shore shone with flags of the Soviet Union,' said the newspapers in describing the scene. A Soviet journalist who was on the flagship permitted himself the following: 'Then we went ashore, remarked the pedagogical cleanliness everywhere and the medieval streets.'

Meetings were organized all over the city. The Red sailors made every effort to behave themselves. Many interesting anecdotes circulated in Moscow among Russians about these episodes. It was said that a group of Soviet sailors went to a peasants' bazaar in Tallinn. They saw mountains of eggs, tubs of butter, clothes, wristwatches, good woollen material, all in immense quantities. One of them remarked to an

Estonian sailor who was conducting them, 'It sure must have cost your government plenty to prepare all this stuff for us to see.' Soviet practice called for displays of merchandise in the stores on holidays. That there should be a normal surplus of such desirable commodities in Estonia was beyond the understanding and credulity of the Soviet sailor.

On October eighteenth about twenty thousand Red Army men marched into Estonia. The Estonian Government forbade the sale of intoxicating liquors to the population for three days prior to this in order to avoid incidents. Apparently there were none. The Red troops entered with bands blaring and flags waving, and proceeded by tank and truck to their garrison points. They were not a very good-looking outfit, judging by the reports of eyewitnesses on the Estonian side. Their equipment tended to be shoddy and obsolete. Most of the Russians' first-line equipment was still in Poland. Within the next few days Red Army units had taken up their positions in Latvia and Lithuania. The agreements defining the positions and size of the Soviet garrisons in the Baltic countries were never made public and no exact information is available. It was estimated, however, that between sixty thousand and eighty thousand men were involved. More important still, the Baltic fleet had ice-free bases and was not tied to Kronstadt.

Russia had accomplished that which had been refused by the Allies before the war. They were entrenched in the Baltic countries and in possession of half of Poland. It was a very good showing. Regardless of one's opinion of the morals and ethics involved in Stalin's deal, one cannot but reflect that if France and Britain had adopted a similar policy toward Holland and Belgium — that is, gone in and garrisoned them rather than making a fetish of the independence and neutrality which they could not defend — Germany might never have been able to break through as she did in the spring of 1940. As *Izvestia* remarked, this was not the time and Europe was not the place for small countries unable to defend themselves.



## 4

Chronologically, we should now turn our attention to the Finnish and Turkish negotiations. However, in the interests of clarity, I think it would be better to go on immediately and finish up with the Baltic countries. It involves a lapse of roughly six months during which the Russians were very polite to the Balts. The Soviet Fleet cruised around to and from its new bases, the press referred to the Baltic Sea as 'Mare Nostrum,' and the Russian soldiers fought their disastrous war in Finland.

During the winter of 1939-40 Russia had her hands full in Finland. So full were they, in fact, that she had no time for any other, even secondary, operations. But the Kremlin was worried about the possibility of a negotiated peace between the Germans and the Allies at Russia's expense. Germany had not yet struck on the west and the Sitzkrieg was the object of many a nervously ironical sally in the Soviet press. Therefore, when the Finnish War was ended in March, the Russians turned their attention to the Baltic countries again and went about finishing the job which they would undoubtedly have cleared up months before had not the Finns proved so recalcitrant and so tough.

Two points were chosen around which to focus operations in the Baltics. The first was the existence of Polish nationalist conspiratorial organizations, particularly in Lithuania, aided and financed by London and Paris. These organizations, several of which were exposed by the Lithuanian police during the winter, apparently operated on a platform of 'Give Vilno Back to a Newly Organized Greater Poland.' Their actual work, according to Moscow, was the organization of spying and wrecking activities directed against Lithuania and her great eastern neighbor and, more important, the stirring up of trouble calculated to kindle war in eastern Europe. This motif the Russian press repeated from time to time during the early spring. The second point was the mistreatment of

the Red Army troops garrisoned in the Baltic countries, who, the Russians claimed, were kidnapped, beaten up, pumped for information, and even murdered by nefarious Allied agents under the protection of the local police.

On May twenty-eighth *Pravda* ran a half-column story from its 'Special Correspondent' in Tallinn complaining that the Estonian press systematically emphasized its loyalty to Britain, while the Estonian business classes believed that it was more lucrative to trade with Britain than with Germany or the U.S.S.R. The article went on:

That part of the Estonian intelligentsia which is hostile to Germany spreads rumors of an impending breach in Soviet-German relations which would lead to war between these countries and consequent suffering for the Estonian people. Certain individuals spreading these rumors are connected by various threads with the British and American Legations.

The article named a certain Englishman, Harris, an alleged British resident agent occupied with anti-Soviet espionage and propaganda. The Estonian ruling classes, stated the article, tried to remain neutral, siding neither with Germany nor with Britain and avoiding even mentioning the Soviet Union:

They consider that the Soviet-Estonian Pact saved Estonia from war but that it is not necessary to speak of this to the people; that while Soviet-Estonian trade helped Estonia to carry on a normal economic life under war conditions, this fact should not be made public.

Many of these leaders of the Estonian State were afraid of what Britain might think of their relations with the Soviet Union, the article concluded.

The Kremlin struck at Britain through Estonia, thus improving their stock in Berlin and paving the way for more drastic attacks on the Estonian Government, which came soon.

On May twenty-ninth Molotov sent a note to the Kaunas Government accusing the Lithuanian authorities of protecting the kidnappers of several Red Army men. A communiqué published in the Soviet press told in detail how two Red Army men were tortured and starved in

attempts to make them disclose information relative to the strength and equipment of the tank unit in which they served. 'The Soviet Government expresses its hopes that the Lithuanian Government will acquiesce and not force the use of other means,' concluded the communiqué. Molotov's note warned the Lithuanian Government that these kidnappings were provocative and pregnant with serious consequences. It demanded that the Kaunas Government undertake effective measures to punish the kidnappers and to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

On June seventh Lithuanian Premier Merkis and on June tenth Foreign Minister Urbsys came to Moscow. Both were met with the respect required by protocol. On June tenth the German western offensive started. The Kremlin heaved a sigh of relief.

For a week the Lithuanian Government officials negotiated with the Kremlin. Perhaps 'negotiated' is not the word. They explained, protested, beseeched. The Russians began by being polite but firm. Then they were just firm. On the fifteenth the Lithuanians agreed to the Russian demands and an official communiqué was issued. It appeared in all the Soviet newspapers under the headline 'The Liquidation of the Soviet-Lithuanian Conflict.' It asserted that the Lithuanian Government had been guilty of crass violations of the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual-assistance pact. These had taken the form of arrests by the Lithuanian authorities of many Lithuanian citizens occupied in construction of barracks for the Red Army garrisons; of kidnapping Red Army men from these garrisons; and, furthermore, of a 'Baltic entente' with Latvia and Estonia — a secret military alliance which had been proved to the satisfaction of the Soviet Government to be directed against the Soviet Union. All these violations, asserted the communiqué, were perpetrated despite the exceedingly benevolent policy of the Soviet Government, which, however, had now decided that such a situation could no longer be tolerated. The concrete Soviet demands were as follows:

1. The immediate indictment of the Lithuanian Minister of Internal Affairs and the head of the political police for provocative actions directed against the Soviet Union.

2. The immediate formation of a Lithuanian government willing and able to ensure the honest realization of the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual-assistance pact and to deal with those opposed to such a policy.

3. The immediate entry into Lithuania of Soviet troops in sufficient strength to assure the realization of the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual-assistance pact and to prevent anti-Soviet provocations in Lithuania.

The Lithuanian Government was informed that if it did not agree to these conditions within twenty-four hours Moscow would consider that they had been rejected.

The delivery of this note had been preceded by the dispatch of about ten Red Army divisions to the Lithuanian frontier. What with this and the twenty thousand or so Red Army troops already in the country, any resistance would have been absolutely suicidal. The Lithuanians communicated their acceptance of the demands on the fifteenth of June at 9 A.M. At 3 P.M. on the same day Red Army motorized units crossed the frontier and by 6 P.M. were in Kaunas. About five divisions entered Lithuania. The Soviet press claimed a warm welcome was given the 'liberating Red Army' by the Lithuanian people. Eyewitnesses disagree violently and it is my impression — having talked with many of them — that, as in Poland, a great many of the poorer elements threw bouquets, cheered, and made their offerings of bread and milk, while the middle and business classes abstained from expressing the hostility most of them felt. It is a fact that many of the ruling class attempted to escape the country. Some are known to have succeeded. President Smetona, for instance, was interned after having crossed the German frontier. There was talk of his being extradited at the request of the Soviet Government, but the Germans thought better of it and gave him a large villa in Königsberg, where he lived for many months.

While the Soviet tanks were still rumbling along the streets of Kaunas, Latvia and Estonia followed the example of the largest Baltic country and capitulated to Moscow. Similar Soviet notes were delivered on the fifteenth to Latvia and Estonia. There was one new point — these countries were accused of having attempted to draw Finland into the Baltic alliance. When this appeared many Moscow diplomats predicted a new move against Finland. It did not come, however. The Russians had burned, or more correctly, frozen their fingers in Finland once. In suggesting Finnish participation in an anti-Soviet alliance they were just going on record for possible future use.

On the seventeenth of June swift Red Army units entered Latvia and Estonia. They were greeted approximately as other units had been greeted in Lithuania, except that in Riga the police tried to break up a demonstration and killed two demonstrators. The police officials responsible for this incident were later indicted and some of them shot for their 'anti-Soviet activities.'

Within the next week new governments were formed. Political prisoners had been liberated by the incoming Red Army and many of them stepped immediately into high administrative positions. A campaign was started to cleanse the state apparatus of reactionary elements. New ministers and functionaries were picked from the intelligentsia and from among trade-union and Communist leaders. Physicians, engineers, and professors were made ministers and departmental chiefs. Reactionary and conservative political parties were dissolved. Universal free education, as well as free medical attention, was declared an integral part in the policies of the new government.

## 5

During that same week about twenty-five divisions of the Red Army took up their positions in the Baltic countries. Many stories were spread, particularly in Lithuania, about the German attack which ostensibly had been planned for the third week in June, that is, just after the Red Army actually entered the country. This story, I am convinced, was started by Russian sources in order to explain the entrance of the Red Army to the Lithuanians. Those who had doubts as to whether the Red Army came to liberate them from their own Lithuanian government might readily believe that the Russians came to prevent a German occupation which had been feared and expected by many of the common people of Lithuania ever since Germany had taken Memel in March, 1939. So reckoned certain Soviet politicians. These stories were readily believed by many

Lithuanians and also by certain American and British journalists. Stories appeared in the press in London and New York about tension between Germany and Russia and immense Red Army concentrations in Lithuania in preparation for an attack on Germany. These stories provoked a vigorous Soviet denial which stated that only eighteen or twenty Red Army divisions had entered the Baltic countries and that they were there to ensure the realization of the mutual-assistance pacts which the Baltic states had concluded with Moscow, and not to put pressure on Germany. The friendly relations between Germany and Soviet Russia were not to be shaken by rumors and propaganda because they were based on the fundamental interests of the two countries, concluded the statement. In my opinion this expression of Soviet policy was sincere and to be taken quite literally. The Kremlin was convinced more and more every day that an era of prosperous Soviet-German cooperation was dawning. The wary Stalin was suspicious, of course, as he was of everything. He started building fortifications on the new Soviet frontiers, but I think that at the time old Uncle Joe was mainly concerned about a British attack in case of a German defeat, or a combined attack after a negotiated peace. It was only after the collapse of France that fear of a German attack became the all-powerful political factor that it remained throughout the winter of 1940-41 and until June twenty-second.

During the spring of 1940 Soviet-German relations were more than friendly. Berlin made arrangements for the evacuation of some forty thousand Reichsdeutsche from Lithuania. The Russians did not inform Berlin of the date when the Red armies were to enter the Baltic countries. But this was in no way a violation of the consultation clause of the pact concluded between the two countries, because Germany had definitely handed the Baltics over to Russia as a Soviet sphere of influence and had evacuated most of the German minority resident in Latvia and Estonia. Berlin had renounced all claim to the Baltic countries almost ten months before and did not expect to be informed or consulted on questions involving the Baltics.

In the Baltic countries themselves, during the first days of the Red Army's occupation, there were several anti-German 'anti-Fascist' demonstrations. These were spontaneous expressions of enthusiasm on the

part of the extreme Left and particularly Jewish elements in Riga and Kaunas who were still on the old anti-Fascist-Comintern line. They were stopped abruptly after representations had been made in Berlin to the Soviet Ambassador.

New governments having been formed, elections were called for mid-July to choose new parliaments. Immediately United Front parties, or 'alliances,' were formed in all three countries. Their platforms called for freedom of speech, press, meeting, and organization 'in the interests of the toilers' (the qualification which prefixes the Bill of Rights in the Soviet 'Stalinist' Constitution), increases in wages, improvement in workers' living conditions, liquidation of unemployment, free schools, universities, hospitals, and clinics, and other social legislation. The 'alliances' had nothing in their programs about the Soviet power, about nationalization of banks, land, and industries, or about the entry of the Baltic countries into the Soviet Union.

During these days wages were drastically increased, sometimes three to four hundred per cent, while prices were fixed by decree. There was a real improvement in the workers' standard of living. Peasants were assured that no one would touch their land, and that collectivization was nothing but a bugbear of foreign spies and bourgeois wreckers. The Popular Front 'alliances' therefore had considerable success. In addition to this, in order to organize the new Baltic democracies in good Bolshevik style and to frustrate the base traitors of the toiling masses who wanted to utilize the elections in order to spread slanderous anti-Soviet propaganda and campaign on basic social issues, the one-candidate ballot was introduced. As in all Soviet and most German elections during the last five years, the balloting was secret and direct and the electorate very large, but only the name of the official candidate appeared on the ballot. In the case in point, these were the names of the candidates of the 'Working People's Alliances.' Between eighty and one hundred per cent of the electorate voted for the candidate of the 'alliances.' There was no one else to vote for.

It has always been difficult for me to write about Soviet elections. They are essentially not elections at all, but processions.

To naïve Westerners like myself, to elect still means to choose one of

several alternatives. Now nearly all over the continent of Europe elections have become occasions when people are permitted, urged, begged, badgered, and blackmailed into coming to flower-decked polls and registering a nominal approval of people and policies chosen and planned and often already carried out by some leading party or group. As an example, the official Tass description of the results of the July elections in Latvia stated in part:

... 1,179,649 ballots or ninety-four per cent of the total number of persons enjoying the right of suffrage, were cast in the elections. The names of the candidates were crossed out on 27,919 . . . .

About two and a half per cent of the electorate were reckless enough to cross out the name of the candidate of the Working People's Alliances. At the next election the percentage was smaller. Natural selection is a great thing, and people learn.

The Communist Parties were very active, of course, organizing and running the Working People's Alliances. A great many of the leading functionaries of the parties had spent years in jail and had been released only a few days before, when the Red Army came in. They had energy and a fanatic sincerity which made them popular. Giant demonstrations were organized all over the three countries. Speakers hailed the era of unprecedented prosperity and freedom into which the Baltic peoples were entering.

The newly elected parliaments met on the twenty-first and twenty-second of July. There were fifteen-minute ovations to Stalin. The unanimously adopted agenda contained the following points: the form of state power; the entry of the Baltic countries into the Soviet Union; nationalization of the land, the banks, and the big industries.

The parliaments proceeded to their work with Bolshevik tempo. Within three days the Soviet power had been declared in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. All three had expressed their desire to enter the Soviet Union as constituent Soviet republics. The land was declared state property. Banks, big industries, and large commercial enterprises were ordered nationalized.

On August fifth three delegations, one from each of the Baltic states, presented formal applications for admission into the Soviet Union. The



applications were bound in the form of enormous books the size of large atlases. They were read aloud to the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin, and then presented to the chairman.

From the foreign press box I had a good view of the diplomats and saw several of the Baltic diplomatic representatives frantically applauding the great Stalin. None of these men was ever seen again by the Moscow diplomatic corps. Several were known to have been exiled shortly afterward, others disappeared. In our box there sat an Estonian journalist. He had been a sailor and had served prison terms for revolutionary activity in Estonia. Now he sat uncomfortably between a couple of silent, red-eyed plain-clothes men and told us furtively in English that he wished he were somewhere else. The rest of the foreign press — five Americans, a Frenchman, seven Germans, a Japanese, and two Englishmen — wrote our stories and sneaked looks at Stalin through a pair of forbidden binoculars.

Anna Louise Strong turned up unexpectedly among the Lithuanian delegates. So closely had she become associated with the Lithuanian Communists during her stay there before the Anschluss, that she had come all the way from Kaunas in the delegates' train and was seated with them during the Kremlin session. She was brimming with enthusiasm about the wonders of sovietization in the Baltic countries and was hard at work on a book on the subject for a Soviet publishing house. The book was to appear in Rumanian, Bulgarian, Spanish, Finnish, German, and Turkish. However, much to the author's surprise, most of her glowing account was cut out by Glavlit, the Soviet censor. Even her enthusiasm was found inadequate for the task of preparing other peoples for the great experience of sovietization.

To the credit of the Kremlin leaders, sovietization of the Baltic countries was accomplished gradually. More than six million people, accustomed for two decades to standards of living higher than those prevalent in the adjacent countries — Russia and Poland — were eased into Socialism. It was a judicious policy and it paid. There was almost no trouble within the Baltic countries. Executions were few.

There was some trouble with the outside world. The United States froze the assets of the Baltic countries, an action which provoked protest

from Moscow. Churchill injudiciously stated that the British Government would not recognize territorial acquisitions made in such a fashion. Less than three months later, however, Cripps delivered British Government proposals to Moscow offering, among other things, a *de facto* recognition of the absorption of the Baltic countries into the Soviet Union. No countries except Germany dignified the Anschluss by a *de jure* recognition, and Germany did so only some six months later.

## 6

Isolation was the first principle adopted by Moscow in its dealings with the new Soviet republics. The old frontiers remained intact. No Soviet citizen could go to Riga or Tallinn without special permission. No Balt could go to Moscow. Foreign travelers required Latvian visas to fly from Moscow to Stockholm long after Latvia had ceased to be a sovereign state. Merchandise could not be shipped in or out of the Baltic countries without special permission. The currency, postal communications, and railroad systems in the Baltic countries continued functioning quite independently for many months. The rouble was not legal tender.

On August twelfth the Foreign Office in Moscow requested all foreign powers to close their legations and consulates in the Baltic countries by August twenty-fifth. The Moscow missions of the powers concerned protested and were granted an extension until September fifth. On that date all complied except the Germans, who, by special arrangement, maintained consulates general in Riga and Kaunas until the spring of 1941. Thus, the new Soviet republics were almost completely isolated from the rest of the Soviet Union and from the rest of the world.

For the first time the Soviet Union had come by territories whose economic internal systems were intact. They had suffered neither war nor revolution. Everything was well organized and ran more or less smoothly. Moscow made every effort to keep things functioning as

normally as possible. This was done by introducing a sort of modified system of socialism or state capitalism into the Baltic countries. The policy was comparable with the NEP in 1923-28 in the Soviet Union proper, but its aims were completely different. The NEP was introduced in order to facilitate the resuscitation of a country completely disorganized and dislocated by war, revolutions, civil war, and famine. Individual initiative was utilized to get the fields plowed and sown, to set the wheels of commerce and industry turning again, and to prevent possible serious difficulties with the peasantry, which had been bled white for years. In the Baltic countries the aim was to ease the process of sovietization of a functioning economy, and to level off the economic standards of the Baltic states to those of the Soviet Union.

Some interpreted this policy as an attempt to improve on socialism as applied in the Soviet Union proper. This was inaccurate. The Kremlin was not even contemplating an improved socialism. The Baltic policy was one of local expedience.

For if Germany did attack, the Baltics might well be a battleground and were sure to be an important industrial and supply base for the Red Army. In either case the Kremlin wanted the population as well disposed as possible. The Baltic peoples, particularly the Latvians, are stubborn, tough people. They made some of the most efficient Chekists in the days of the Red Terror, men like Peters, Ulrikh, and Latsis. If the standard of living current in the Soviet Union, particularly in its outlying districts, were thrust suddenly on them, there might well be serious trouble. It might become necessary to clear the Baltic peoples out of their territories completely. This was done with the Karelians and the Koreans in their border districts. They were uprooted wholesale, packed off to North or Central Asia, and replaced by Russian peasants considered more reliable. Such a performance in the Baltics, however, would have been very expensive and extremely destructive.

On August twenty-sixth *Pravda* asserted that the basic task of Soviet policy in the Baltics was to assist these countries to catch up to the political and cultural heights attained by the Soviet Union during two decades while Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were wallowing in the quagmire of capitalism. The youth of the new Soviet republics made it

expedient to permit the temporary operation of limited private enterprise. This, stated *Pravda*, would give the lie to the bourgeois propaganda about obligatory collectivization and persecution of artisans. *Pravda* warned darkly that the remnants of the old plutocracies, the 'class enemies,' would attempt to stab the young Soviet republics in the back, and to wreck them. *Pravda* urged the sharpest vigilance.

The concrete expression of the policy adopted in the Baltic countries was to be found in the constitutions adopted by the Baltic parliaments on August twenty-fifth. These constitutions were based on the 'Stalinist' Constitution of the Soviet Union. There were, however, a number of interesting differences. While the land was declared 'state property,' small individual farms were left to their owners:

Land occupied by peasant farms within the limits of the law is attached to them for eternal use without rent.

In practice farms up to thirty hectares were left untouched. A further law referred to collectivization:

Any attempt to infringe on the private property of the peasants, or to draw them into collective farms against their will, will be punished.

Whereas the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. speaks of 'factories' being state property, the Baltic constitutions specified 'large factories.' These were generally defined as factories with more than ten employees. The term 'large houses' was substituted for 'houses' in the same connection. 'Small industrial and commercial enterprises are permitted to operate within the limits of the law.' Commercial enterprises employing less than ten persons were usually considered small.

Shipping was nationalized only in certain cases. A decree of the Latvian Supreme Soviet defined those boats and ships not to be nationalized as:

Non-power-driven sea-going vessels up to fifty tons.

Non-power river and lake vessels up to five tons.

Power-driven ocean-going vessels with a power unit up to fifteen horsepower.

Power-driven river and lake boats up to ten horsepower.

Fishing boats up to twenty tons.

Another decree of the Latvian Soviet gives an idea of the criteria followed in the nationalization of private houses:

The following houses are subject to nationalization: In the five main cities over two hundred and twenty square meters of floor space; in the rest of the country over one hundred and seventy square meters. Regardless of their size the following kinds of houses are to be nationalized: Houses whose owners fled abroad; houses of historical, artistic, or social value; houses occupied by state institutions. All hotels with more than ten rooms. All clinics. All hospitals, pharmacies. All cinema houses, with their apparatus.

While in the cities there was a good deal of nationalization, according to official statistics only ten per cent of the industrial, commercial, and communal enterprises of Estonia, by value, had been nationalized by the end of August, 1940. Individual craftsmen, jewelers, shoemakers, and carpenters were all permitted to work as usual.

There was, of course, strict control over the non-nationalized enterprises. Commissars kept an eye on the bookkeeping and were empowered to see that the boss deposited all receipts in the bank, paid wages regularly, and did not try to embezzle or to destroy anything. The storekeeper or the industrialist could not draw money from the bank without the permission of the commissar, who accorded it only when the funds were for legitimate purposes, such as wages and materials.

The new constitutions made concessions to the religious tendencies of the peasantry. Priests and other religious functionaries who had land were permitted to keep it on the same basis as a peasant. Parish priests received three hectares of parish land.

The constitutions provided for free schools and for the protection of national cultures. The courts must function in the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian languages, with facilities for interpreting for those who did not know these languages.

At the time of the adoption of the constitutions several districts of the Soviet Union proper, the populations of which were predominantly Lithuanian, were incorporated into the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. Not that it made any difference, you may say. We may say the same thing when finally the Russians or Germans or someone else forges a Balkan

federation and little districts like Dobruja and Macedonia are divided on ethnological lines. But for a long time much blood has been spilled on every acre of borderline territory in Europe. It is not without interest that five predominantly Lithuanian districts of the Belorussian Soviet Republic went to the Lithuanian Republic by order of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union without any friction anywhere. I am sure the people living in the districts considered it of great importance, as did most Lithuanians regardless of where they lived.

## 7

Nationalization commenced the day the new parliament met and went on for several weeks. In Lithuania six hundred industrial and commercial enterprises, with an assessed value of four hundred million lits, were nationalized. This property had belonged to a thousand families whose incomes ranged from twenty thousand to a half million lits a year. The owners received no compensation. The enterprises went on working, in many cases without losing an hour. Workers' committees practically took over the administration of the plants. In most cases the technical staff stayed. In those enterprises in whose operation the owner habitually took no part, the nationalization was not even noticed. In many cases the owners who had taken an active part in the running of the factory were asked by the workers' committees to stay on as directors. They were usually given a salary well above the earnings of the skilled workers.

One difficulty which all the plants began to experience was lack of raw materials. Overnight the demand for manufactured goods became unlimited and all enterprises tried to increase output. In cases of 'deficit' raw materials, the nationalized enterprises received priorities — very inconvenient for the small manufacturer whose enterprise had remained his own property.

One of the first things which happened after the declaration of the

Soviet power was that workers' committees went to the owners and directors of all plants and stores and demanded that they take on additional labor in order to liquidate unemployment. Thus, in many cases, the number of employees was artificially brought up to ten and the enterprise nationalized. Unemployment was liquidated. By 1941 the Baltic newspapers were full of advertisements of people looking for machinists, typists, secretaries. One factor instrumental in this process was the sending of doctors, engineers, and skilled workers with their families to distant regions of the Soviet Union, like Kazakhstan, which were just being developed. Such voluntary emigrants were helped to find a suitable job and their traveling expenses were paid to the new place of work. In the beginning many Baltic doctors, mathematicians, and other professionals expressed a desire to go out pioneering in Siberia or in Central Asia. When these first hardy adventurers began writing back about the primitive conditions, and, above all, the bad supplies in these new districts, enthusiasm waned. Many wanted to go to Moscow or Leningrad, but this was not permitted.

Land as well as industries was nationalized. The beneficiaries of this process were much more numerous than the dispossessed. This rendered any organized resistance difficult or impossible. In Lithuania, according to official figures, landless peasants received eight to ten hectares and peasants with very little land three to four hectares from the fund of confiscated land. In this way, say the figures, 600,000 hectares were distributed to 71,000 landless and poor peasants. In Estonia 23,000 landless peasants and 32,000 poor peasants received land. In Latvia 73,000 peasants received 550,000 hectares of land.

While all these economic reforms were going on prices had risen in the Baltic countries by twenty to two hundred per cent, despite strict laws. Wages had gone up by one hundred, even two hundred per cent, and in some cases much more. This was all very well, but free market business cannot operate for long under such conditions. In the first place commodities began to disappear because the workers' buying power had doubled, while they were producing little more than previously. In the second place currencies began to lose value. Both developments were expected, even desired, by Moscow. It was necessary to devalue the

krone, the lat, and the lit substantially before introducing the rouble. It took five months' devaluation before the rouble was finally introduced in December, 1940, more or less on a parity with local currencies.

## 8

Starting about September, 1940, one began to see Riga bicycles in the big Moscow department store 'Mostorg,' and Baltic suits and coats in all the commission stores. Wrist-watches became so plentiful that the market was glutted and prices fell by about fifty per cent. In 1939 a Cyma wrist-watch brought eight hundred roubles. In 1940 one could be bought in any Moscow watch store for four hundred roubles. These facts were much more important to most Soviet citizens than the texts of the Baltic constitutions.

The frontiers between the Baltics and the old U.S.S.R. remained closed. The Government was determined to put the consumers' goods which could be skimmed off the Baltic countries into state stores in Moscow and other Soviet cities at good, stiff prices rather than have them circulate around bazaars at speculative prices equally high.

Nationalist sentiment did not die in the Baltic countries. Several diplomats who traveled through them in the late fall of 1940 told me that most Latvians were anxious to stick together. They were confident that they could maintain a higher standard than that prevalent in the Soviet Union because they were better organizers and better workers, by and large, than the Russians.

The national sentiments of the Lithuanians remained very strong. Here is an interesting incident which occurred in September, 1940, in Kaunas. The Lithuanian Commissar of Education made a speech to fourteen thousand teachers. He delivered a good, pious Bolshevik lecture for some minutes. Then he let himself go and made a ringing and sincere appeal to the Lithuanian people to stand together now as never



before, shoulder to shoulder, to maintain Lithuanian national culture, political freedom, and independence. When he had finished, all fourteen thousand teachers burst into the Lithuanian national anthem and sang all the verses. The Commissar was not even arrested as he expected to be.

One phase of the sovietization of the Baltics which met with unquestionably enthusiastic popular approval was the introduction of free education. The Baltic peoples have long had the same attitude toward higher education as the French peasant had toward his *bas de laine*, and for very much the same reasons. In both cases they desired to have something which would be their own, which could not be taken away from them and yet would always be of service. The demand for professional men and technicians in the Soviet Union was so great that the Latvians and Lithuanians would have ample opportunity to get all the higher education they could absorb.

During its first four months the Lithuanian-Soviet Government opened three hundred and twenty new lower schools, twenty-six new secondary schools, fourteen new trade schools, and ten kindergartens. Very much the same thing happened in Estonia and Latvia. Numbers of special courses were organized to teach women industrial trades.

By and large, though there was a good deal of dissatisfaction in the Baltic countries as prices rose, buying power decreased, and the supply of commodities diminished, I am convinced that most of the common people in the Baltic countries were not displeased with what had happened to them. They were at peace. Of course, the old governing classes were liquidated to a considerable degree. But the average peasant or machinist or bookkeeper led his life more or less as before, while his children could go to school and have assurances of work when they graduated. There were the people who went to the polls in early January, 1941, and gave roughly ninety per cent of their votes for the Stalinist candidates. To be sure there were no other candidates, but still over ninety per cent of the electorate went to the polls and they knew beforehand what kind of election it was going to be.

The rest of the world has been too much preoccupied with wars, bombings, and what not to evaluate the Baltic metamorphosis in a reasonable and judicious way. The Russians were mainly interested in strengthen-

ing their frontiers, cushioning themselves against the attack they feared. They took advantage of a favorable moment and stepped in. Once there they proceeded to establish themselves. Their technique was that of utilizing revolutionary economic theory and practice to get the support of the local masses, establishing the Communist Party as a dominating factor and letting the countries vote themselves into the Soviet Union. We have turned many a trick more clumsily in Latin America. The performance is not to be compared with that of the Germans in Czechoslovakia or the Japanese in Manchuria.

Moreover the pattern of sovietization established in the Baltics may be followed in other places if and when the Soviet Union, for whatever reasons, resumes the expansion into Europe begun in 1939.



## **Part Four**

Finland — A Tragedy of Errors



I CROSSED the frontier from the Soviet Union into Finland in the spring of 1938 and then spent some time in and around Helsinki. Finland was the cleanest, most equitably organized country I had ever visited. There were neither slums nor private steam yachts; everyone was well dressed and well fed. Almost all political, cultural, and religious groups enjoyed freedom of speech, of the press, and of worship. The Communist Party was the principal exception. It had been outlawed by the Finnish Government as a foreign-run propaganda organization, directed in the interest of the Soviet Union.

I remember the shock of crossing the Soviet-Finnish frontier. On the Russian side, the traditional disorder and dirt, the perennial Russian lengthy speeches and numerous slogans about the construction of a brave new world of communism. On the Finnish side, no speeches at all, order, cleanliness, and plenty; a modified state capitalism or state socialism operating quietly and efficiently in the interests of the vast majority of the Finnish people.

The Finns were very conscious of the differences between their country and Russia and were ever fearful of Soviet attack. A long conversation with a Finnish army officer in 1938 convinced me that the Finns really expected the Soviet Union to attack them and were systematically preparing. I laughed at the idea. There seemed to be no reason for such action except the relative prosperity of Russia's little neighbor.

In October, 1939, having occupied a third of Poland and concluded advantageous mutual-assistance pacts with the Baltic countries involving Soviet land and naval bases on the territory of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the Russians turned their attention northward to 'Suomi,' the land of lakes and reindeer. From the Kremlin Finland looked very similar to the Baltic countries.

Both Germany and Britain had, at various times, engaged in actual military operations against the Soviet Union based on Finnish territory.

German troops facilitated the bloody Finnish counter-revolution in 1918, during which twenty-five thousand Finnish Communists were massacred. To render impossible a repetition of such an attack and to improve his general strategic position in the north, Stalin began negotiations with the Finns on October fifth. The Kremlin made it known that it would like to secure: a thirty-year lease on the port of Hanko for the creation of a Soviet naval base, garrisoned with five thousand Soviet troops, to guard the Gulf of Finland against Russia's enemies; the demilitarization of the Finnish frontier regions near Leningrad; the cession by Finland of four Baltic islands near Leningrad; the cession by Finland of the western part of the Fishermen's Peninsula near Petsamo on the Arctic Sea; the amplification of the existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact into a mutual agreement not to join any groups or alliances directly or indirectly hostile to the other party. The territory thus demanded by Russia amounted to 2761 square kilometers. Moscow offered Finland 5529 square kilometers in Central Karelia and agreed to permit Finland to fortify the Aland Islands, provided that no foreign power should in any way participate in this undertaking.

These Soviet demands were presented in writing on October seventh to a Finnish delegation appointed by the Helsinki Cabinet. This mission, headed by Vanio A. Tanner, Finnish Minister of Finance, and Doctor Juho Paasikivi, Finnish Minister to Sweden, arrived in Moscow on October eleventh. Paasikivi was a bullet-headed individual who seemed to personify the dignified solidity of the Finnish people in his compact body and phlegmatic mien. He consistently refused to talk to journalists, as did the Finnish Minister, Baron A. S. Yrjo-Koskinen, so we maintained our contacts with the Finns through Counselor Solanko of the Finnish Legation, who spoke both French and English and was always ready to give us as much information as he could.

The Paasikivi-Tanner mission transmitted Stalin's written demands to Helsinki on October twelfth, commenting in a diplomatic aside that what the Russians wanted was complete domination of the Gulf of Finland and the cession of the entire Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus, thus leaving Finland unprotected.

Contrary to the expectations of many foreign observers, Germany

took no position in the Soviet-Finnish negotiations. The only country which had anything to say was the United States, whose Ambassador, Laurence Steinhardt, took a note around to the Kremlin expressing Washington's hope that 'nothing will occur that would be calculated to affect injuriously the peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and Finland.' I remember the cynical sneer on the Ambassador's face. He was, as usual, scrupulously careful not to tell the correspondents what he was doing and we were at the time ignorant of the content of the note he was delivering, but his attitude was one of exasperation with the naïveté of those gentlemen in Washington who thought that an American note would have any effect on Kremlin policy.

Actually, this note did stimulate three other governments, those of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, to send similar communications, but the total effect on Soviet policy was unnoticeable.

On October thirteenth the delegation returned to Helsinki to consult with Foreign Minister Erkko on the Soviet demands. Finnish leaders asserted their determination to prevent their country from being drawn into war or from signing any agreement which would violate the absolute neutrality of Finland. The Soviet press began to rumble ominously about Finland as the tool of foreign powers hostile to the Soviet Union.

On October twenty-third the Finnish delegation returned to Moscow bearing counter-proposals calculated to satisfy the Kremlin without violating Finnish neutrality. Helsinki offered to cede three of the four Gulf islands, to negotiate on territorial changes on the Karelian Isthmus, and to rewrite the non-aggression pact. Helsinki absolutely refused to consider the lease of Hanko, which they held to be incompatible with unconditional neutrality. The Russians replied immediately. The Kremlin insisted on leasing Hanko, though it modified its original thirty-year demand to 'until the end of the war between England and France and Germany.'

Paasikivi and Tanner returned to Helsinki on the twenty-fifth for new instructions. Throughout these comings and goings, the Finnish delegates maintained a dignified calm which contrasted with the nervousness of the Baltic delegates under similar circumstances. The Russians with whom I talked at the time were convinced that this Finnish



confidence was based on promises of assistance from Britain, the United States, or some other great power. 'How can a country of three million people defy the great Soviet Union unless they have promises of extensive help?' asked a Soviet journalist acquaintance of mine.

On October thirty-first Molotov spoke in the session of the Supreme Soviet. He referred to the special character of Soviet-Finnish relations because of the proximity of Leningrad to the Soviet frontier or, more accurately, the frontier to Leningrad. Russia's second largest city must be protected, Molotov stated, warning of possible serious consequences if the Finns persisted in their hostile uncooperativeness.

On November first Paasikivi and Tanner returned to the Soviet capital and put in ten days of intensive negotiations culminating in a long altercation in the presence of Stalin himself over the question of the lease of Hanko or near-by Finnish islands for purposes of creating Red Army and Navy bases. On the tenth the Finnish Government informed Moscow that it 'does not consider it possible to cede in any form whatsoever territory situated in Hanko or in any other regions of the Finnish coast with a view to its being employed for the establishment of military bases.'

'The Finns refuse to see our point,' a Foreign Office official told me. The 'point' which this comrade had in mind was that Russia's fiftyfold population superiority and corresponding industrial and military power would make it possible for the Soviet Union to annihilate Finland in a few days if Helsinki did not capitulate. It was true, the Finns did not see this 'point.' The delegation returned to Helsinki on November thirteenth and the Soviet press began a violent campaign against the Finnish Government, featuring thinly masked threats of a Soviet invasion.

## 2

The Finnish delegates were not the only ones who traveled back and forth from Moscow to Helsinki. Soviet diplomatic and trade representa-

tives, as well as odd people like Tass correspondents and tourists carrying varied passports, crossed and recrossed the Soviet-Finnish frontier. It was the duty of these individuals to inform the Soviet Foreign Office, the Kremlin, the Red Army General Staff, the Comintern, and the NKVD what was going on in Finland. I happened to meet one of the Tass correspondents particularly active in Helsinki during this period, whose duties apparently transcended those of a news reporter. He was well equipped with office help, entertainment allowances, and semi-diplomatic immunities, and had been well trained in the Hegelian dialectic, Marxian economic materialism, and Leninism, but he did not understand Finland. He reasoned thus:

(a) Finnish recalcitrance can only be based on promises of extensive aid to Finland from some great power. Germany is our friend and will in no way support Finland against us because it would be contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Soviet-German pact. It would be inconceivable for the United States to send armed assistance to Finland. It must therefore be France and England who are plotting to utilize Finland as a place d'armes for an attack against the Soviet Union.

(b) If Finland does attack the Soviet Union, the workers of Suomi as well as those of any other countries which may be involved in the venture will revolt. The advancing Red armies will be greeted by the people as they were in Poland.

I am convinced that Stalin would not have agreed to the Tass correspondent's first thesis. Stalin never took the Soviet-German pact as seriously as most Soviet officials. He probably realized the possibility of German hostility and therefore may well have feared that some German intriguing lay behind the stubborn recalcitrance of the Finnish Government. Point two, however, would probably have reflected the opinions of all the Kremlin leaders, including Stalin, based largely on inaccurate information from various Soviet agents in Finland. Many Soviet representatives abroad have a tremendous capacity for seeing what they want to see, of interpreting revival meetings as revolutionary upsurges and negro spirituals as expressions of desire for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In Finland, my Tass correspondent acquaintance dismissed the prosperity of the people, the excellence of food, clothing, and shelter, the

orderliness and cleanliness, as unimportant details. He was impressed by the blood-sucking parasitism of a few score fairly large Swedish and Finnish landlords and the political terror directed against the Communist Party in Finland. That the average Finn might actually prefer social democracy as it operated in his country to the dictatorship of the proletariat à la Stalin was inconceivable. It did not correspond with Leninism. The Soviet Union was the fatherland of the workers of all the world; therefore, obviously, the Finnish masses, being workers, owed their allegiance to the Soviet Union first. It was very simple, and my Tass acquaintance could find all the relevant quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in a few moments.

### 3

For nearly two weeks, from November thirteenth to the twenty-sixth, the Soviet press raved and Soviet diplomats pounded tables, while the Finns stolidly mobilized part of their little army. It cost them nearly a million dollars a day, but with the Soviet press calling Finland's Prime Minister a jackanapes and threatening military intervention, the Finns could hardly leave their fortifications unmanned. After November twentieth the Soviet press, particularly the Leningrad *Pravda*, became most insulting to the Finns. Not only were personal attacks on Suomi's leaders printed, but meetings were organized in factories, schools, and offices throughout the Soviet Union to stimulate anti-Finnish feeling and drum up Soviet patriotism. The Soviet press published hundreds of resolutions passed at thousands of meetings in farm and factory calling for the immediate chastisement of the Finnish barons. These documents were read by the various embassies in Moscow and reported to their governments. But these resolutions were written by the central authorities and sometimes not even voted on at the meetings. The Soviet workers were and continued to be uninterested in Finland. I heard many plain

Moscovites expressing shame at the recent Soviet-German partitioning of Poland and waxing indignant over the press demands for intervention in Finland. The Soviet people felt they had their hands full without fighting wars on someone else's territory.

On November twenty-sixth a Soviet note handed to Minister Koskinen accused Finland of serious provocative action on the Soviet-Finnish frontier. (See Appendix 12.) At 3.45 P.M. seven artillery shells had fallen near the village of Mainilia, killing three Soviet soldiers and one officer and wounding nine others. 'In consequence of the provocative firing on Soviet troops from Finnish territory, the Soviet Government is obliged to declare now that the concentration of Finnish troops in the vicinity of Leningrad . . . is in fact an act hostile to U.S.S.R. which has already resulted in aggression against Soviet troops causing casualties.' In order to prevent repetitions 'of acts of this nature' the Finnish Government was requested to withdraw its troops twenty to twenty-five kilometers, which would have involved giving up a considerable part of the Mannerheim Line of Finnish fortifications.

When we went to the Finnish Legation we found Mrs. Solanko disposing of furniture and other bulky property, while the Counselor himself was supervising the burning of the mission's archives. 'We started doing this weeks ago,' he said, 'and will just about finish today.' Later in his office he talked to us at length. 'We knew it was coming but what could we do?' he said. Members of the entire diplomatic corps visited the Finnish Legation to offer moral encouragement and to buy furniture, office equipment, shoes, overcoats, and pots and pans, so difficult to obtain in the Soviet capital.

On the twenty-seventh a Finnish note was delivered stating that an inquiry had revealed that no shots had been fired on the Finnish side of the frontier and furthermore that there were no Finnish guns within range of Mainilia. The Finns offered to cooperate in a joint detailed investigation of the incident and expressed their willingness to go into the question of a mutual withdrawal of troops.

The next day brought a blast in the Soviet press demanding the chastisement of the inveterately hostile Finnish Government, while a Soviet note stated that a withdrawal of Soviet troops was out of the question

since they were already stationed in the suburbs of Leningrad. The note further charged that Finland's refusal to withdraw represented a hostile act incompatible with the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact, which the Soviet Government was therefore obliged to renounce.

All this was received coldly by most of the Soviet population. I heard many Russians saying 'We know about this artillery firing' with cynical significance. There was grumbling and sneering even in streetcars and in queues in stores. The workers assembled in meetings to pass fiery resolutions were indifferent. There had been too much provocation employed internally by the Soviet authorities during the purge of 1936-38.

Months later I was told by a Red Army man who had been stationed near Mainilia that no one in his unit had heard of the reported incident on the twenty-sixth. From the standpoint of Realpolitik it is unimportant, however, whether the seven shells were fired at all or whether they came from Soviet or Finnish guns. The significant fact was that the Soviet public at large did not believe the government assertions.

On the twenty-ninth a long telegram was received by the Finnish Legation in Moscow, offering to withdraw Finnish troops from the frontier and to accede to almost all of Molotov's original demands. The Helsinki Government, convinced of the imminence of a Soviet attack and skeptical of the willingness and ability of any of the great powers to come to Finland's assistance in the uneven struggle, had decided to capitulate. Owing to the length of the telegram, however, it was nearly midnight before the note was decoded, translated, and typed for delivery to the Foreign Office. Before it was actually transmitted Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs Potemkin informed Koskinen that diplomatic relations had been severed because of continued Finnish attacks on Soviet troops. During the night Soviet troops invaded Finland near Petsamo. Early in the morning the Red Air Force bombed Helsinki and several other Finnish towns, killing eighty-five people, while the Red Army crossed the frontier at a number of points.

Finnish appeals for reopening of negotiations fell on deaf ears. Moscow demanded unconditional surrender by 3 A.M. of December first. The Cajander Cabinet in Helsinki fell and was replaced by a government

headed by Risto Ryti, Governor of the Bank of Finland. The new prime minister had no choice but to organize the defense of the country.

On December first Stalin played what he probably thought was his trump card. A lengthy declaration by the Communist Party of Finland, allegedly broadcast from Terioki (a fishing village on the Finnish coast occupied by the Red troops a few hours after the commencement of hostilities), was rebroadcast on the Soviet radio in 'Russian translation' and published in the Soviet press. It announced the formation of a 'Finnish People's Government' headed by Otto Kuusinen, veteran Finnish Communist and Commissar of Education in the short-lived Finnish-Soviet Republic of 1918. This new government modestly professed to represent the interests of the Finnish people and invited the masses of Finnish workers and peasants to overthrow the 'bandit White Guard gang' in Helsinki and join the Free Finland of Otto Kuusinen.

Within a few hours a pact was signed between the Soviet Government and the 'People's Government of the Democratic Republic of Finland.' (See Appendix 13.) It embodied the original demands of Molotov and ceded to Finland a large portion of Soviet Karelia and \$8,400,000.

The whole Terioki fiasco was so transparent and crude that the simplest Moscovites were skeptical, even amused, when *Pravda* front-paged a photograph of Stalin and Kuusinen after the signature of the pact. There was no radio station in Terioki which could have broadcast the declaration of the new government; Kuusinen had not been in Finland in two decades, and until quite recently had headed the Anglo-American section of the Comintern; and the Terioki Government was laughed at by most Finns. These facts were widely known among Moscovites. It was the only instance I can remember in nearly a decade in Russia when large numbers of average Soviet citizens actually laughed at Stalin's government. At various times Stalin had been praised, maligned, worshiped, cursed, feared, and hated, but the Terioki performance made him an object of ridicule for many streetcar conductors, plumbers, and other ordinary citizens.

On December third Finland appealed to the League of Nations, while President Roosevelt declared a moral embargo against the Soviet Union. The League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union after having received a Russian explanation couched in the following terms:

1. The Soviet Union was not at war with Finland and did not threaten the Finnish people with war.

2. Moscow was maintaining peaceful relations with the 'People's Government of Finland.'

3. The Helsinki Government no longer represented the Finnish people.

4. All outstanding questions had been settled by the Moscow-Teriki pact.

The United States avoided sending any help to the Finns because of possible threats to American neutrality, but Britain and France, as well as the Scandinavian countries, made limited contributions.

For a long time the official Soviet position remained the same. There was no war in Finland. The Red Army was extending fraternal assistance to the people of Finland in driving out a band of scoundrels and blackguards who refused to recognize the real government of Finland. The Communist Parties in the various countries reflected this position beautifully. The *Daily Worker* headline on December first read, 'Red Army Hurls Back Invading Finnish Troops.' On December fourth, 'Finns Greet New People's Government, Mannerheim-Ryti Army in Flight.'

## 4

While the Red Army shambled forth into the frozen wastes of Finland, circumstances brought about considerable changes in my own personal life. For months I had been hunting for an apartment. It was hopeless. The Foreign Office refused to help because I was not an accredited correspondent, but merely an assistant to Champenois, the Havas representative. The horribly expensive hotel room we had been living in became more and more difficult and our youngest daughter was still staying in the village.

Unexpectedly a golden opportunity presented itself. An enterprising young American had a syndicate of newspaper connections in Moscow. He was the correspondent of the *News Chronicle*, the *Observer*, and the *Exchange Telegraph* of London, the authoritative *Politiken* in Copenhagen, and *Business Week* in New York. This empire had been created by his brother-in-law, who departed in '37 leaving him an apartment and a great deal of work to do. For two years he was an anonymous exploitee, working hard for a meager two hundred dollars a month, while the brother-in-law in New York collected twice or three times that amount as a sort of absentee landlord. Eventually he bought out the business and for a year or so did very well for himself with the aid of a couple of assistants to whom he paid extremely modest wages. In 1939 this rugged individualist decided for a number of reasons to go to America and invited me to take over part of his empire and his apartment on a proletarian basis, leaving him the absentee landlord for an unstipulated time. I did not like the idea, but the temptation of a four-room apartment with all conveniences was too much for me. I became the acting correspondent for the London *News Chronicle* with a joint interest with another colleague in the remainder of the empire. It involved giving up my work with Havas, which I regretted because of my admiration and respect for Champenois, but under the circumstances it was unavoidable. One frigid night we piled our suitcases into a car and crawled through the blackout to the Arbat and our new apartment, and for the first time in more than two years Masha and I established ourselves with both the children under one roof.

Immediately I was engulfed in work. The arrangement provided that I do most of the writing. Some days I would have to knock out two or three sets of three cables each, which had to be substantially different in content.

Subsequently, with the occupation of Denmark and the intensification of Soviet censorship, the *Observer*, *Politiken*, and *Business Week* discontinued their Moscow service and nothing was left of the empire except the *Exchange Telegraph* and the *News Chronicle*. Concurrently, our absentee boss, who was by then playing tennis in Southern California, fell far behind in his payment of our salaries, whereupon we



spilled the beans to the London offices and told them that if they wanted continued Moscow service they should appoint us. My colleague took the *Exchange Telegraph* and I became the officially accredited Moscow correspondent of the *London News Chronicle*.

I never did meet any official representative of my paper, but my relations, such as they were, i.e., occasional letters, were excellent. As far as I know they never changed my stories, though they sometimes cut them or did not use them at all.

## 5

A detailed account of the operations of the Finnish-Soviet War would be long, gruesome, and not particularly instructive. Moreover, the published data on the subject are still limited. I, therefore, propose to dispose of these operations in a few sentences.

The Red Army Command thought:

(a) There would be no war at all because the Helsinki Government would capitulate.

(b) If there was a war the Finnish workers would revolt and join the Terioki Government, while the soldiers would desert.

(c) If by any chance this did not happen and the Finnish Army did fight, the overwhelming numbers of the Red Army, its superior mechanized equipment, and its air force would shatter Finnish resistance within a few days.

On the outbreak of war the Soviet press stated that the Red Army would be in Helsinki within ten days. The Red officers and the General Staff were extremely cocky and very badly prepared. In a good army the soldier is cocky and the staff is sober, modest, and realistic. In Russia in 1939 the soldiers were indifferent and cynical while the staff was arrogant and cocksure.

No preparations were made for serious military operations against Fin-

land. It was known that the Karelian Isthmus was heavily fortified. The Leningrad District Red Army Staff, which directed operations during the first phase of the war, decided to break through in central Finland and take Helsinki from the northeast.

The invading Russians found immediately

(a) That the Finnish Army would fight.

(b) That the Finnish population was extremely anti-Russian and had no intention of backing up the Terioki Government, and

(c) That the Red Army was badly prepared and equipped.

The advancing Red units went through a belt a dozen or so miles wide, thoroughly sown with mines. Every house, railroad station, road, ditch, and hollow was infested with these insidious weapons. Whole units blew themselves to pieces without as much as seeing a Finnish soldier.

Having penetrated the mine fields with heavy losses, the Red armies on the central front were faced with several hundred miles of snow-bound forest and lake country. Almost none of the Russians could ski, and any other means of transportation was slow and painful. Regiments, even whole divisions, of the Red Army struggled through the snow for several miles, only to be cut off by tiny mobile Finnish units and annihilated principally by cold and hunger.

From the first day of the war morale was bad among the second- and third-rate troops deployed on the central front. The soldiers had inadequate winter clothing and were sometimes sent out at forty below without gloves. Whole units went for weeks without a hot meal and for days without bread. They scarcely ever saw the enemy. Even commanding officers became demoralized. A story which may or may not be true illustrates the point. A divisional commander named Vinogradov was sent to battle with orders to 'proceed westward and take Helsinki.' He started out with his division across the wastes of central Finland. Men were lost continually. Finnish snipers accounted for some; cold and exposure disposed of others. Foraging and reconnoitering parties seldom returned. For four days Vinogradov's division struggled along through the deep snow, losing several hundred men without killing a single Finn. Seeing that his communications were becoming impossibly difficult, that he had no support from either left or right, and that he

could not possibly reach Helsinki with the supplies at his disposal, even if there were no Finnish Army, Vinogradov turned around and took his division back toward the Soviet frontier. Vinogradov was court-martialed and sentenced to death. All the Red troops within reach were assembled to see him shot.

Gradually Stalin and the Central Red Army Command in Moscow realized that they would have to really fight against the Finns. Morale at the front was crumbling. Transport was working very badly, and economic and industrial demoralization was making itself evident throughout the Soviet Union. General Kulik and General Meretskov were put in charge of the Finnish front under the direct supervision of War Commissar Marshal Voroshilov, who made several trips to the front and found out what was going on. They realized what any transport engineer could have told them from the first day of the war — namely, that an invasion of Finland north of Lake Ladoga was impracticable in winter because existing railroad and other transport facilities could not supply more than a very few divisions in the whole area. It was necessary to crack the Mannerheim Line. The Russians had almost uncontested supremacy of the air, while their tanks and artillery far outclassed anything the Finns had. It was, nevertheless, a laborious process to hammer to pieces the Finnish casemates and pillboxes and advance toward Viipuri. Late in January, however, the Red Army Command organized the attack in a systematic fashion and brought up first-line troops. From then on the advance was slow and costly but steady.

In many cases the Red troops could bring up mortars and field guns to within machine-gun range of the Finnish lines without even bothering about camouflage. The Finns had no shells. Sometimes they were reduced to resisting with their bayonets. They fought stubbornly and exacted enormous losses from the Red Army.

An acquaintance of mine drove a truck on the Finnish front for nearly a month until he was wounded in early March. He told me that when taking ammunition to the front he passed hundreds of Red Army wounded who crawled to the edge of the road and begged to be taken to some base before they froze to death. Some of them, frozen from the waist down, would pull themselves along the ground, sometimes stretch-

ing themselves out on the road in order to make the truck stop. Several truck drivers who stopped against orders, to pick up wounded men, were shot. Their job was to get ammunition to the front. They were to stop for nothing.

But the Russians pressed on and by late February it became obvious that only a large expeditionary force could save Finland.

## 6

While Red units were blasting their way across the Karelian Isthmus considerable disorganization was evidenced throughout the Soviet Union. In Moscow a food shortage commenced on January ninth and lasted throughout the month. Savings banks suffered heavy runs, while stores found it impossible to keep anything in stock. The Soviet public feared the worst and bought as much bread and other foods as possible. Moscow, Leningrad, and many other towns in northern Russia were blacked out, while fuel became scarce and transport functioned badly. For about three days in Moscow it was almost impossible to buy bread. An unusually severe cold snap knocked out a great portion of the bread-distributing trucks and the populace, hearing stories of imminent famine, mobbed the stores.

Finnish broadcasts in Russian had some detrimental effect on Soviet morale, though Moscow jamming stations usually succeeded in shouting down the Finnish broadcasts almost as soon as they began.

Reports later made available revealed a number of interesting facts about industrial and transport breakdowns during the Finnish War. In the field of water transport, for example, plan fulfillment for the second half of 1939 and the first half of 1940 was unprecedentedly low, particularly in the transportation of petroleum products on the Caspian Sea. The Water Transport Commissariat ran behind plan by 700,000,000 ton-kilometers. During the first six months of 1940 the Caspian fleet

transported 1,498,000 tons of petroleum less than was planned. The main difficulty was in getting the petroleum loaded and unloaded. Organization broke down. The average number of days per year during which ships were docked for repairs ran between forty-five and fifty-five until 1936, sixty-five to eighty-five in 1937 and 1938 as a result of the purge, ninety-one to one hundred and five in 1939 and the first quarter of 1940 respectively. 'This scandalous increase is due to bad organization in the docks and in the central organization,' stated *Pravda* in explaining the situation.

The factories and plants of the Commissariat for General Machine Building fulfilled their semi-annual plan by only forty-one and two-tenths per cent for the first six months of 1940. The Commissar, Peter Parshin, explained this bad work as the result of

(1) Failure to get the planned amount of electric power, raw materials, new equipment, replacements, and spare parts.

(2) Inefficient transport.

(3) Inadequate supplies

(4) Bad organization in the Commissariat for General Machine Building itself.

In the field of truck transport incredible chaos prevailed. According to an official statement in *Pravda*, the trucks of the Soviet Union ran empty forty-eight per cent of the total truck miles as a result of faulty organization. Moreover, according to official figures of the State Planning Commission, in 1936, fifty-six and two-tenths per cent of the registered trucks in the Soviet Union were actually in working order. In 1939 only forty-one and two-tenths per cent of the registered trucks were in working order, while in the first quarter of 1940 the situation became substantially worse.

These examples could be reproduced ad infinitum. They indicate that the Finnish War was much more than a local military operation involving troops from two or three of the sixteen military districts. No Finnish bombs bothered the Caspian oil-tanker fleet, but popular demoralization in the Soviet Union as a result of the Finnish War and intensified by the obvious inaccuracies and understatements of the Soviet military communiqués tended to disintegrate the economic and industrial

fiber of the country. There were no strikes. The Russians went to work in the morning, they stayed at work all day, yet somehow not as much got done. The Russian people have a genius for this method of expressing their dissatisfaction or irritation with something.

Not only did the war cause disorganization, it involved tremendous expense. As a result prices rose. For example, Moscovites had to pay forty kopeks per cubic meter of water used after the twenty-sixth of January instead of ten kopeks as previously. Gas rates, rents, food prices, railroad fares, and other items increased substantially. The Russians were paying for their Finnish War.

On the last day of December, 1939, censorship was re-established over our press telegrams. The technique was the same as that which had existed under Litvinoff before May, 1939; i.e., the correspondents' telegrams were submitted in two copies to the Censorship Bureau in the Press Department of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat. After a lapse of from a few minutes to several days the censor returned one copy with his signature and stamp. Words or sentences of which the censor did not approve were crossed out with heavy blue or red pencil. Sometimes the entire telegram was crossed out. With the censor's stamp and signature the telegram could be presented in the Central Telegraph Office for transmission. There was no arguing with the censor. The correspondents could write what they pleased, and the censor could cross out what he wished. Before the war, under Litvinoff, the censorship had been somewhat more reasonable. Then anything which appeared in the Soviet press or anything which the correspondent saw himself could be sent. Litvinoff's criterion was, 'You can send anything that is true.'

After January first, 1940, however, the criterion changed. In fact there were no criteria, or at least we never could find out what they were.

The turnover among censors was high, and at least one was fired in disgrace for passing an undesirable story, while another was discharged for discourtesy to the correspondents. The censors had detailed instructions as to what to pass and what not to pass. These instructions probably changed from day to day. Very often we were not permitted to mention a certain subject; for several months we could not mention Litvinoff's name in any connection. Most of the censors could barely

speaking any language other than Russian. Besides which, the bureaucratic organization of the Press Department made it almost impossible to see the censors. In January all references to food shortages were deleted from our telegrams. An official notice published in all the papers announcing increases in prices of certain commodities was likewise cut from our cables. Speculation and prognostications were usually penciled out summarily. The correspondents grumbled considerably. Working under censorship is always distasteful. Moscow was no exception.

Some correspondents took to writing mail stories which were uncensored, though they arrived so late that they were usually worthless. I had so many cables to write until the final disintegration of the empire that I never got around to doing many mail stories.

## 7

During the Finnish War the attitude of the great powers toward both the Soviet Union and Finland remained more or less constant. Britain promised Finland:

- 152 planes
- 223 guns
- 297,200 shells
- 50,000 grenades
- 20,500 aerial bombs
- 100,000 overcoats
- 48 ambulances

and delivered:

- 101 planes
- 114 guns
- 185,000 shells
- 50,000 grenades
- 15,700 aerial bombs
- 100,000 overcoats
- 48 ambulances

France's promises and deliveries were slightly larger than those of Great Britain. Sweden supplied Finland with a considerable number of aeroplanes and other material. Italy sent some planes, but after a sharp Soviet protest to Berlin, the Germans refused to transship them to Finland.

The Germans gave no formal assistance to either side, though unofficially they were reported to have supplied the Red Army with the plans of the Mannerheim Line casemates and equipment installed by German firms. The Russians were engaged in organizing the Soviet sphere of influence as defined by the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement. The French campaign was still in the future and Germany was being very nice to Russia. Wilhelmstrasse was particularly scrupulous about its friendship with the Kremlin because of the fact that Soviet oil and wheat deliveries to Germany were made as per schedule and other undertakings were fulfilled to the letter. This was something of a surprise for many Germans, and it made them value their new Russian friends even more than the European balance of power and the Soviet-German pact required.

When the British and French were contemplating the sending of expeditionary forces to Finland, Germany stepped in immediately and warned Oslo and Stockholm that the passage of any allied military units through the territory of Norway or Sweden would result in immediate German occupation of those countries. Furthermore, on February twenty-eighth the German Minister in Helsinki rendered further aid to Russia by informing the Finnish Government that a formal Finnish request for military aid from the Allies would be followed by immediate German military action against Finland. So the Finns never formally asked for an expeditionary force, while the Swedes and Norwegians never agreed to let one cross their territory, and the British and French never had an expeditionary force anywhere near ready to send. Petsamo was in the hands of the Russians. The Baltic Sea was bottled up by Germany and Russia. There seemed no way of aiding Finland.

And yet Britain and France did much to save Finland from complete defeat. Whereas dozens or hundreds of Soviet agents, diplomatic, mili-



tary, and sundry, had been in Finland, there were perhaps thousands or tens of thousands of these individuals in Britain, France, and Turkey. This army of informers gathered together an astonishing array of intelligence indicating that a continuation of the Soviet-Finnish War would probably involve Russia in military operations against Britain and France. During January and February of 1940 General Weygand and his Near Eastern Army were planning an attack on the Caucasus. At the same time Turkish and British leaders were paying great attention to the Moslem elements in the Soviet Caucasus as the basis for a possible pan-Turkish movement. British bases in Iraq and French bases in Syria were prepared for bombing operations against Baku. These Allied intrigues against the Soviet Union were motivated mainly by the desire to prevent the continued shipment of Baku oil to Germany and were certainly not principally aimed at assisting Finland. However, their effect on the Kremlin was the same.

Stalin was overwhelmingly interested in keeping the Soviet Union out of war with any major power. If continued hostilities with Finland increased the possibility of an Anglo-French expeditionary force to aid Finland against the Soviet Union, then it was necessary to terminate hostilities immediately. The Russian agents in London and Paris probably grossly exaggerated the imminence of Anglo-French intervention in the Finnish War.

On February twelfth Finland sent a note through Stockholm suggesting peace negotiations. Moscow refused because 'the Kuusinen Government is the only authorized representative of the Finnish people.' However, on February twenty-second the Soviet Ambassador in London requested the British Government to transmit peace proposals to Helsinki. This the British Government refused to do because of the harshness of the Soviet terms. On February twenty-sixth the fortress of Koivisto, one of the key points in the Mannerheim Line, was taken and within the next week the Russians had reached the outskirts of Viipuri.

It seems probable that Russia's ambassadress in Stockholm, Alexandra Kolontai, was instrumental in transmitting the proposals of March sixth. It is possible that Sir Stafford Cripps, later to become British Am-

bassador to Moscow, also had something to do with the affair. Traveling as a private citizen Cripps arrived in Moscow from Chungking in late February and had two long talks with Foreign Commissar Molotov, though he did not even pay his respects at the British Embassy. The actual proposal was delivered by Swedish diplomatic pouch to Minister Asserson in Moscow, who presented it to Molotov with the assistance of American Ambassador Steinhardt.

On March seventh a Finnish peace delegation arrived in Moscow by plane from Stockholm. It was met by the American Ambassador and the Swedish Minister, whose function as far as we could find out was that of guarantor of safe conduct of the Finnish diplomats. Minister Paasikivi headed the Finnish delegation, which spent a week on Soviet soil negotiating peace while Finns and Russians were killing each other at the front.

The Finnish mission was housed in the famous Foreign Office house on Death Lane, where the Anglo-French military missions had stayed the previous year. The Finns were extremely closely guarded. No one in Moscow except two or three of the embassies and a small number of officials of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat knew of their arrival. We correspondents found out about it on the eighth. We lurked around the Finns' residence and managed on one or two occasions to see Paasikivi getting into his car. John Wallace, the Reuter correspondent, even managed to shoulder his way through the plug-ugly NKVD guards and exchange a word with one of the members of the mission. But no reference to any peace negotiations could we get through the censorship until the treaty was actually signed early in the morning of the thirteenth. We could neither confirm nor deny queries from our papers, and personal telegrams were strictly controlled to avoid the possibility of one of the correspondents getting out a coded message. For nearly a week we sat on a story of world interest unable to send a line.

During this week Paasikivi and the Russians spent many an hour in difficult negotiations. Molotov agreed to disregard Kuusinen and to deal with the Helsinki Government as representing the Finnish people. Molotov further agreed to recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Finland. He insisted, however, on the cession to the Soviet

Union of the entire Karelian Isthmus and a considerable area of Finnish Karelia, as well as the four Gulf islands and the Fishermen's Peninsula. He also insisted on the lease of Hanko.

The Finns finally yielded. They had no choice. It was clear that no help was coming to them. The Russians were already through the Mannerheim Line.

The peace treaty was signed some time after midnight of March twelfth-thirteenth by Molotov, Zhdanov, and Commander Vasilevsky for the Soviet Union and by Ryti, Paasikivi, and two other representatives for Finland. (See Appendix 14.) Before noon on March thirteenth the Russians took Viipuri 'by storm.' At noon hostilities ceased.

The Russians had obtained without compensation a large portion of southern Finland as well as all the military bases they had originally demanded. Moreover, they had secured transit rights across the Petsamo region to Norway and had been granted the privilege of constructing a railroad across central Finland connecting the Gulf of Bothnia with Kandalaksha on the Murmansk Railroad. Furthermore, each signatory agreed not to conclude any alliances or participate in any coalitions directed against the other.

The costs of the war had been enormous. Molotov officially admitted 48,745 killed and 158,863 wounded. The Red Army Staff estimated 60,000 Finnish dead and 250,000 wounded. Baron Mannerheim declared that more than 15,000 Finns had been killed and asserted that 200,000 Russians had paid with their lives while 1500 Russian tanks and more than seven hundred Red aeroplanes had been destroyed.

Neutral military observers in Moscow considered Mannerheim's estimate of Soviet casualties to be conservative. While I have no basis for forming an intelligent opinion on the subject, a number of Russians, participants in the Finnish War, with whom I subsequently talked all spoke of casualties so great — whole regiments, even divisions, annihilated to a man — that I cannot but conclude that Mannerheim's figure was at least more accurate than Molotov's. Two hospitals in the Caucasus were still full of recuperating Finnish War wounded in the early spring of 1941. Most of them were serious frostbite cases who will go through the rest of their lives with whole chunks of their anatomies missing.

In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on March twenty-ninth, Molotov stated lamely that the People's Government of Finland had dissolved itself in the interest of peace. Kuusinen subsequently became the head of the New Soviet Karelian Republic. All references to the Finnish People's Republican Government of Kuusinen were deleted from Soviet history books for lower schools and no mention of him ever appeared in the Soviet press, while we correspondents were not permitted any reference to this extraordinary canard in our telegrams.

Travelers in Finland during the summer of 1940 were everywhere asked the same question: 'Why did the Russians stop when they did?'

'More than half our army was incapacitated. We had neither guns nor ammunition. They could have taken Helsinki in another week,' a Finnish officer told me.

I think there are two answers to the question. In the first place, Stalin's foreign agents had persuaded him that another week of war would have meant hostilities between the Allies and Russia. This Stalin wanted to avoid at all cost. Secondly, Stalin is a cautious man. He instinctively seeks to do things gradually. He swallowed the Baltic countries in two bites when one would have sufficed. He eliminated many of his political rivals by a series of maneuvers even when he had power enough to destroy them with one blow. Stalin wanted to dispose of what was left of Finland at his leisure. That was why Moscow so vigorously asserted on March twentieth that any Finnish-Swedish-Norwegian alliance would be considered a hostile act toward the Soviet Union on the part of Finland. The first step had been taken. The Finnish Sudetenland had been annexed. Normally the operation would have been completed within a few months. Actually, Germany's western campaign, the collapse of France, and the consequent revision of the balance of power between Germany and the Soviet Union to the disadvantage of the latter, changed Finland from a potential victim of Soviet strategic expansion into an active ally of Germany in an attack against the Soviet Union.

From the standpoint of diplomacy and statesmanship, the Soviet-Finnish War was a grotesque blunder from beginning to end. Yet from the military standpoint it was probably worth while. Had it not been

for the Soviet-Finnish War it is doubtful whether Russia could have offered such magnificent resistance to German aggression in 1941. The Finnish campaign gave Stalin an opportunity to ascertain the weak points in his military machine, to assess Soviet morale, to judge the standard of combat training of the Red Army soldier in terms of more or less modern warfare. As a result of the Finnish War Stalin was able to do away with considerable deadwood in the Red Army and to reorganize completely the system of combat training.

## **Part Five**

Balkan Gambit



UNTIL May tenth, 1940, the Moscow leaders were skeptical about the war in western Europe. This skepticism reflected itself in the press. When, on May tenth, the German legions crashed through Holland and Belgium, many Russians were greatly relieved. 'At least they will not attack us right now,' I heard on several people's lips.

The fear of a negotiated peace was gone. Stalin had already strengthened Russia's position in Poland and the Balticum as much as possible without getting involved in a major war. During the late spring and summer of 1940 while the Germans overran western Europe Stalin turned his attention southward, toward the Balkans.

On June fourth, even before the termination of the Baltic Anschluss, the Soviet Government raised with the Rumanians the question of the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. The province of Bessarabia, inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians, lying between the Prut and Danube Rivers and the Dniester, was taken by the Rumanians in 1918. During their twenty-odd years of Herrschaft the Rumanians did nothing to improve conditions in the province, which remained at an extremely low level. The Soviet Government had never really recognized the seizure of Bessarabia, and Soviet maps and atlases always displayed a Bessarabia colored the same tint as the Soviet Union, expressing the Russian view that the country was really a part of Russia, but for the time being was not included in its frontier.

The Rumanian Government refused to discuss the question until, on June thirteenth, Arkady Lavrentyev, Soviet Minister in Sofia, was sent on a special mission to Bucharest to demand the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union without further delay.

The Rumanians looked around for German or Allied support. Both the Reich and Britain were far too busy to bother about Bucharest, while France was writhing in its death convulsions. On the day after Lavren-



tyev's arrival, on June fourteenth, Paris fell, and a week later the armistice was concluded. At about the same time the Rumanians were given an ultimatum. Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, including the city of Cernauti, must be turned over immediately to the Soviet Union. The Rumanians faltered in indecision. The Germans, irritated though they were by Russia's abrupt action, nevertheless decided to approve and expedite the return of the contested province. Their army was still in France, and England refused to accept defeat.

Ribbentrop telephoned Bucharest and advised the Rumanian Government to give in to Russian demands. On June twenty-eighth a long Tass communiqué read over the entire Soviet radio system informed the Soviet public that the question of the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union had been settled peacefully by the governments in Moscow and Bucharest. (See Appendix 15.) Until this announcement the Russian public, and indeed most of the diplomats in Moscow, had no idea that the question of Bessarabia had been raised. Northern Bukovina was attached to Bessarabia in this territorial transaction on the basis of the ethnological and cultural kinship of the Ukrainians residing in this province with the basic populations of the Soviet Ukraine. The announcement was read at two o'clock Moscow time, and the occupation of the provinces by the Red Army began at the same hour and was carried out with extreme rapidity. The Rumanian forces in many cases were obliged to leave valuable matériel behind, while a great many Rumanian soldiers of Bessarabian or Ukrainian origin deserted and remained on Soviet territory.

The occupation of Bessarabia brought to light the rottenness of the Rumanian administration and the hopeless poverty in which most of the people of Bessarabia had been forced to live for two decades. Large portions of the land had been owned by absentee Rumanian landlords who spent their time in Bucharest and Paris, while the fields and vineyards were worked by illiterate and hopelessly impoverished Ukrainian peasants.

A considerable number of Germans lived in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Normally these would have been shipped off to the central regions of the Soviet Union where their national affinities would not

constitute a potential danger. In the case in point, however, the German authorities secured Soviet guarantees to expatriate all Germans living in the newly acquired provinces, even those who had been there for several generations and who had been Czarist Russian or Austro-Hungarian, and later Rumanian nationals. Moreover, the Soviet Union guaranteed to compensate German farmers in Bessarabia for all property which they were unable to take with them, including their houses and livestock but not including their land. A German commission of four hundred recruiters, organized by the Gestapo and the German repatriation organization, was officially admitted into the Soviet Union and worked for months in Bessarabia arranging for the expatriation of more than a hundred thousand Germans. It was a bitter pill for the Kremlin to swallow, but only a sample of what was to come.

The Soviet public heard nothing at all about the repatriation of the Germans in Bessarabia. Public attention was monopolized for some time with fanfare and brass-band descriptions of the historic reincorporation of a long-lost province stolen during a period of Russian weakness. Newspapers described Bessarabia in highly exaggerated terms, as a fertile region producing rich agricultural crops of all kinds. The Soviet acquisition of one side of the Danube Delta was given tremendous publicity in Russia, as an event placing her in a key position in southern Europe. Most Russians were pleased with the 'peaceful solution' of the Bessarabian question.

The Rumanians, on the other hand, were extremely upset by the affair. They had always sneered at the Russians. Their attitude was exemplified by the following anecdote which went the rounds of the Moscow intelligentsia during the Finnish War.

The Soviet Minister in Bucharest complains to the Rumanian Government that the fortifications under construction on the Rumanian side of the Soviet-Rumanian frontier evidence a spirit incompatible with the good relations between the two countries. The Rumanian Minister is apologetic. 'But my dear sir,' he says, 'we are not building these fortifications against the Soviet Union.'

'Pardon me,' says the Soviet Minister, 'but against whom but the Soviet Union would you fortify the Rumanian side of the Rumanian-Soviet frontier?'

'Why, against the Finns,' says the Rumanian Minister with a smile.

This attitude now changed completely. The Rumanians felt themselves beaten and were sulky and despondent. Bucharest was worried about further Soviet attacks. In an attempt to stabilize relations with Moscow, they sent Georgi Gafencu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and one of the most competent statesmen in southern Europe, to Moscow as Minister. I have heard on good authority that Gafencu was almost the only honest man (Maniu was another) prominent in Rumanian politics.

## 2

For several weeks the Rumanian question dropped out of the minds of Moscow diplomats in favor of more pressing issues.

Moscow had been honored by the arrival of new ambassadors from France and Great Britain. Sir Stafford Cripps and Erik Labonne arrived on the same plane on June thirteenth. Labonne disappeared into the French Embassy and stayed there for the next year, without ever showing himself at receptions or demonstrations and without entertaining anyone except an extremely small circle, of which I fortuitously became one. Cripps's arrival was somewhat clouded by the Soviet note refusing to acknowledge him as a special British envoy to Moscow. This note had been published while Sir Stafford was in Greece en route to Moscow. It had been a direct slap in the British Lion's face and it had caused considerable delay, as it meant that Sir Stafford had to be appointed Ambassador in place of the incompetent Sir William Seeds.

Sir Stafford went into action immediately upon his arrival in the Soviet capital. His main task was to woo the Russians away from the Germans and make allies of them. It was, for the time being, a hopeless assignment. Not only that, but Sir Stafford was forced to start out on the wrong foot because of Churchill's declaration in mid-June that

Great Britain could not recognize territorial acquisitions accomplished in the way in which the Balticum became part of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, by dint of hard work, Cripps managed on July seventeenth to get an interview with Stalin. This fact was concealed at the time by both the British and the Russians, and the substance of the conversation has never been revealed.

I had a long talk with Sir Stafford on August twenty-sixth. He was a tall, angular man, who spoke a beautiful English, so clear and decisive and so spontaneous that it was a pleasure to listen to him. Moreover, his idealistic personality made itself felt immediately. Long one of the most highly paid barristers in London, Sir Stafford had taken up politics with the Labor Party, from which he had been expelled for being too 'Red.' Though never a member of the Communist Party, he had considerable admiration and respect for some Communists and agreed with their point of view on many issues.

The first thing he said was that he had arrived in Moscow two years too late. It was very true. Had Cripps come to the Soviet capital before Munich, charged with the establishment of genuinely friendly Soviet-British relations and the creation of a sincere anti-Hitler front, it would have been a different story. Now Russia was friendly with Germany, while Germany and Britain were engaged in a death struggle.

I asked Sir Stafford whether he could tell me anything about Soviet-British relations. He stretched his legs out in front of the huge leather sofa in his enormous oak-paneled study in the Embassy, patted the long-eared hound sitting in front of him, and looked at the wood fire crackling on the hearth. 'For at least the present phase of the war, the Russians cannot be expected to change their attitude either toward us or toward the Germans.' He went on to state that nothing the Russians did would influence British resistance to any appreciable degree. The Russians, trembling with fear of Germany's military might, were supplying the Reich with large quantities of important raw materials, even when it meant cutting Russian consumption to a considerable degree. The Russians thus were *de facto* allies of the Germans. For several reasons, however, Sir Stafford stated, the Kremlin wanted to keep in touch with England. In the first place there was a possibility that some day soon

the United States and Great Britain would sit down at a peace conference to replan Europe and the world. The Russians wanted to be there too. In the second place, he said, the British Government had an alternative to an anti-German alliance with Russia; i.e., an anti-Russian alliance with Germany. Stalin wanted to avoid the adoption by the British Government of the latter alternative.

In the last few weeks, Sir Stafford said, he had been adopting a somewhat new attitude toward the Russians. He did not press them. He made them understand that he could wait. 'As soon as I see the slightest suspicion, I say that I'm really not interested.' Any talk of actual changes in the Soviet line was, at the moment, almost a provocation, as the Russians were being so vigilant about Anglo-French wedges between themselves and Germany, the Ambassador said.

Sir Stafford added that the Soviet Government had shown a growing interest in British aviation. The Russians had bought so much military equipment from the Germans under the impression that it was the best in the world that they were rather shaken to see that they had been mistaken. They were much interested in talking with the British Air Attaché about recent successes against the Germans.

Unfortunately, Sir Stafford did not command the respect of some of his diplomatic colleagues, many of whom considered him a Communist, a hopeless dreamer, and an illogical rattlebrain. This was understandable, I think, in terms of the extremely difficult personal position in which Sir Stafford found himself. He considered himself a revolutionary. He was interested in the establishment of a world socialist commonwealth. For years he had fought the Chamberlains and Halifaxes with every weapon at his disposal. He arrived in Moscow as British Ambassador under Halifax, faced with the hopeless spectacle of a *de facto* Russian-German alliance and hindered by London's refusal to recognize the Soviet acquisition of the Balticum. A conversation I had with Cripps in February was enlightening.

In January, February, and March of 1939, he said, the greatest campaign in British history had been carried on to establish a government in London which would sign an agreement with the Soviet Union. 'Had Churchill joined us at that time we should have ousted Chamberlain and

Halifax and become parties to an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance against the aggressor. As you know, this did not occur.' However, he continued, when he returned from China (March, 1940) and went into the fight again he finally succeeded in convincing the British Conservatives, who traditionally would rather do anything than sign an agreement with the Bolsheviks. He was sent to Moscow to carry out this basic change in British policy. However, the Foreign Office went right ahead with its old policy on Russian questions. Each issue was taken up as 'an isolated question wherein a new policy toward Russia could not be applied just yet.'

Sir Stafford was a deeply religious man, whose socialism always seemed somewhat Biblical. He was, concurrently, a Utopian liberal, an extremely competent corporation lawyer, an idealistic revolutionary, and His Majesty's Ambassador charged by the Prime Minister with carrying out one policy while Lord Halifax and many other elements in the British Government continuously did and said things incompatible with this policy. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that Sir Stafford should impress his colleagues as being inconsistent, illogical, and unrealistic.

One of the most interesting things that I witnessed in Moscow was the way in which the conservative, anti-Soviet staff of the British Embassy reacted to their new ambassador. Before his appointment he had been ignored or ridiculed as a hopeless imbecile, misled by clever Communists. From the day of his arrival he was 'H. E.' (His Excellency), His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, and the friction which I am sure existed was never apparent in public.

### 3

The fall of France made a fundamental change in German-Soviet relations. Germany had signed a pact with Russia for the principal purpose of avoiding a two-front war. As long as France was a great power,

as long as the French air force and the Maginot Line stood in Hitler's way, Berlin found it necessary not only to be polite to the Russians, but to share the spoils very generously with them. France out of the way, the picture changed, particularly since Hitler expected a British defeat and a negotiated peace within a few weeks. He therefore felt at liberty to turn on the Russians whistling a completely new tune. The original Molotov-Ribbentrop line of Soviet and German spheres of influence in eastern Europe left Bessarabia and part of Bulgaria, as well as the Baltics and Finland, to the Russians. There was even talk of a Soviet base on the Bosphorus. France having fallen, however, and the British having lost most of their military equipment, the Germans saw no reason for being so liberal with Moscow. The Baltic question was closed. The Russians were installed with political and military control and would not leave without a struggle. In the Balkans, however, the situation was still fluid. Therefore, in the Balkans, Ribbentrop began shouldering and elbowing his way, in order to clip Russian aspirations as much as possible.

On the other hand, Moscow's basic strategy in signing a pact of friendship with Berlin had been to maintain neutrality while the rest of the countries of Europe destroyed each other in a fratricidal war between capitalist states. Thus the Soviet Union would survive the war the strongest power in Europe. Stalin would be free to pursue a policy of revolutionary expansion into Europe or one of continued national Russian economic and cultural advance, as he saw fit. The fall of France upset this whole concept. Germany was winning.

The fall of France had serious effects on many Moscovites. Authoritative Soviet officials expressed astonishment and considerable worry at the speed and effectiveness with which Germany had swept to the Atlantic.

Soviet military publications featured long treatises wherein the Red Army Staff's surprise and anxiety were thinly clothed in technical phrases. Soviet military experts, including Russia's greatest strategists, had miscalculated German strength and French weakness. They had bet on a prolonged war of attrition in western Europe, which would have offered Russia plenty of time to prepare for any eventualities. The fall of France banished all such illusions.

'Now we shall have to tighten our belts and get ourselves organized for a fight,' said a Soviet journalist of my acquaintance.

Immediate internal measures were taken to increase production and to expedite the reorganization of the Red Army. In the field of foreign affairs, Stalin strove to consolidate his position in the Balkans as soon as possible. Bessarabia had been the first step, but it was only a beginning. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia must be drawn into Russia's sphere of influence, or the Germans would get through to the Straits and the Black Sea would become a German lake.

Fears of Anglo-French action against Russia were now dissolved. Germany was now the principal menace. This could not be mentioned openly, however, even to the Russian people, because it might provoke Hitler into action before Russia was ready.

Stalin saw he would have to try diplomacy rather than force. The Finnish War had shown the Red Army to be in no condition for a major operation against the German Army. Stalin was faced with the difficult task of changing the orientation of Soviet foreign policy and at the same time scrupulously fulfilling obligations to Germany and giving that country no excuse for hostility.

Fear of Germany became a dominant factor in Soviet foreign policy. Said the inimitable Cholerton, Moscow correspondent of the *London Daily Telegraph and Morning Post*, 'Russia has become the largest of the small frightened neutrals.'

## 4

On June twenty-fourth diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were resumed. Victor Plotnikov, former Soviet Minister in Helsinki, represented Moscow in Belgrade, while Doctor Milan Gabrilovich arrived in Moscow as Yugoslav Minister. Gabrilovich was a remarkable gentleman. In his early fifties, he was active and energetic



and spoke so fast that even his staff had difficulty in following him. He had a good Balkan biography, having served a considerable sentence in jail during the First World War for terrorist activities. For years he had been the leader of the Serbian Peasants' Party and editor of Belgrade's most influential daily newspaper, *Politika*. Short and stocky, his face was criss-crossed with innumerable furrows, giving the impression of a harried yet kindly man — which indeed he was. He was a great Slavophile and tremendously interested in the problems of the Russian peasants. My first conversation with him was centered around the Russian peasant. Having heard that I had spent some time in the Soviet Union, he singled me out at a reception one day not long after his arrival and asked me what criteria determined the quantities of the obligatory contributions of grains and other agricultural products which the collective farms delivered to the State at fixed low prices. I told him of recent laws, according to which the entire system had been revised as follows:

Previously grain-delivery norms were fixed in proportion to the crop. Then in order to increase production Soviet authorities had introduced the criterion of the sown area. The collective farms were obliged to contribute to the State a certain percentage, not of their crop, but of the harvest which they theoretically should have received from their sown area. In this way the collective farms were forced to struggle for a good yield per acre, or they might not have enough bread to last them through the winter. Since the spring of 1940, however, the process had gone one step further. The collective farms were required to contribute a certain percentage of the theoretical harvest from all the arable land at their disposal. It thus became the duty of the president of the collective farm to see that all his arable land was sown if he wanted to have enough bread to last through the winter. Decrees of this nature had been published applying to grain, meats, dairy products, hemp, flax, wool, fruits, and truck products. The entire Soviet agricultural system was speeded up. This I explained in detail to the newly arrived Gabrilovich. He would not believe me. 'It is impossible,' he said. 'No peasants would stand such regulations.'

The next day I brought him clippings from the newspapers dealing

with the recent agricultural decrees. I left him impressed with the ability of the Soviet Government to 'get away' with such legislation.

## 5

On August first the Supreme Soviet formally approved the incorporation of the Baltic countries and of Bessarabia into the Soviet Union. Molotov made his expected report on the international situation. He remarked the intensification of the war between Italy and Germany on one side and Great Britain and the Allied States on the other. These events, he said, had caused no change in the Soviet Union's foreign policy. 'True to the policy of peace and neutrality, the Soviet Union is not taking part in the war. Our relations with Germany, which underwent a turn nearly a year ago, remain wholly as laid down in the Soviet-German agreement. This agreement, strictly observed by our government, removed the possibility of friction in Soviet-German relations when Soviet undertakings were carried out along our western frontier, and at the same time it has assured Germany of a calm feeling of security in the East.' Molotov further attacked the United States and Great Britain for freezing gold belonging to the Baltic banks and purchased by the Soviet State Bank after the acquisition of the Baltic states.

Molotov ended up on the keynote of defense, quoting Stalin's impressive phrase, 'We must keep our entire people in a state of mobilized preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack.' It was a reflection of Soviet fear of Nazi Germany, modified to a certain extent by reassuring and ever-increasing American aid to Britain and what *Pravda* referred to as the 'inevitable' American intervention in the war.

No sooner had the excitement of the Supreme Soviet meeting — I say excitement because these meetings gave us virtually our only opportunity to observe the operations of Soviet government organs or, indeed, to do anything except read newspapers and official handouts — subsided

than Moscow became aware of a tense situation between Rumania and the Soviet Union. On August thirteenth the new Rumanian Minister Gafencu paid his first visit to Molotov, while *Pravda* and *Izvestia* editorials revealed that Moscow was throwing its weight in support of Bulgaria's claims for the return of southern Dobruja. A *Pravda* editorial stated, 'It is well known that the Soviet Union has always . . . supported these Bulgarian demands.'

Several notes presented to Gafencu accused the Rumanians of provocative attacks on the Soviet-Rumanian frontiers and threatened retaliation. Gafencu expressed fear that the Russians might try to take Rumanian Moldavia, thus setting up a strong defensive line on the crest of the Carpathians. On August thirtieth Gafencu gave me an interview. He was extremely preoccupied and obviously fearful of the complete destruction of his country by Russia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. He asserted that Soviet troops had occupied a small piece of territory between Bukovina and Bessarabia to which they had no right according to the agreement.

With Gafencu's help I got a fairly clear picture of the confused events during the last days of August. Late on the night of August twenty-ninth German Ambassador von der Schulenberg went to see Molotov and spoke to him of routine matters, such as the imminent arrival of Berlin's trade delegate, Karl Schnurre. Schulenberg did not inform the Russians of the Vienna decision reached a few hours later, giving Transylvania to Hungary and Dobruja to Bulgaria, and extending German and Italian territorial guarantees to Rumania. This failure to consult Moscow on an issue involving the Soviet sphere of influence was lamely explained to Moscow as due to the rapidity with which Ribbentrop worked. Schulenberg informed the Soviet Government of this decision only on the afternoon of the thirtieth, a few hours before it was publicly announced. The Soviet communiqué issued at two o'clock in the morning of the thirtieth and dated the twenty-ninth (See Appendix 16) threatening Rumania with direct action was written before the Kremlin had heard of these German guarantees to Rumania. It was, therefore, not an instance of Soviet 'defiance' of Germany as the British press made out.

In guaranteeing Rumanian frontiers without so much as informing Moscow, Berlin had violated both the Soviet-German consultation pact and the unpublished Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement dividing eastern Europe into spheres of influence.

The German Ambassador stated in my presence a few days later, with reference to the guarantees, 'Our actions in Rumania cannot be taken as a display of ill-will toward the Soviet Union. We had to strengthen the Antonescu Government and keep order.'

It is perfectly clear in retrospect that the provocative acts on the part of Rumanian frontier guards referred to in Molotov's notes and in the communiqué of August twenty-ninth actually took place and were instigated by King Carol, who hoped to start a war and thus maintain his position in the country.

When the German and Italian guarantees to Rumania became known the Soviet attitude immediately changed. The Kremlin dropped the matter like a hot potato, as any move against Rumania would then have involved engagements with German and Italian mechanized units which had already reportedly been sent to the Rumanian-Soviet frontier. The Kremlin, however, to avoid creating the impression inside of Russia that the Soviet Government was afraid of Germany or had backed down because of Germany, inspired several articles, one of which was published in *Pravda* on September ninth. This article made the point that the great anti-Soviet force in Rumania had been King Carol, who had ordered acts of provocation. As that sinister enemy had now been exiled from his country, the Soviet Union had nothing more to demand.

Two notes in my diary for September fourth and tenth remark that 'Most of the serious observers in Moscow consider that this is the turning point in the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.' It may well have been true. It was certainly one turning point. Russia had been stopped on the Prut when the Red Army Staff would obviously have liked to advance to the crest of the Carpathian Mountains, the only decent defensive position in southeastern Europe.

Although Berlin denied reports that German and Italian mechanized units had gone to Moldavia, it seemed quite likely that they were true, and the idea of investigating the rumor and looking around what seemed

to be the coming battleground intrigued me so much that I made arrangements to leave for a month's vacation trip through the Balkans. Financial considerations were equally important. I was paid by the *News Chronicle* in pounds, which unfortunately after the outbreak of war were not negotiable in Moscow. It therefore became imperative that I travel to some country where sterling was negotiable, and where I could exchange the accumulated pounds for American greenbacks — good anywhere.

The first thing I did was to apply to the Bulgarian Legation for a visa, which I received immediately, along with a quantity of frightened verbiage from two rather slow Bulgarian diplomats. 'We do seventy to seventy-five per cent of our foreign trade with Germany, largely because no other country would ever buy what we had to export,' I was told. 'Now we are completely dependent on Germany, economically, while ideologically and ethnologically the Bulgarian people are far more in sympathy with the Russians. Obviously Russian and German interests in the Balkans are clashing. The Germans will win, though Russia may get the rest of Finland and trans-Caucasian and Iranian lands as compensation.'

My Soviet visa was ready at last and I flew off to Sofia in a beautiful twenty-one-passenger Douglas operated by four thoroughly competent Russian aviators. The other passengers were diplomats of all nationalities, including British, Belgian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian diplomatic couriers. The passport examination in Kherson took a rather long time, principally because the British courier, an enormous John Bull with a beautiful red 'King's Messenger' passport, got his documents mixed and gave the wrong ones to the hard-faced, efficient Soviet frontier guard. By the time the misunderstanding had been straightened out by the King's Messenger's Scotland Yard escort, it was too late to make Sofia that night, and so we were packed into a bus and taken to a seedy hotel in the naval-construction town of Kherson. A French assistant air attaché, one of the passengers, and I went for a long walk around the town.

Conditions were bad. Bread was rationed, as were cereal grains, flour, and sugar, while dairy products, vegetables, and sausages were absolutely unobtainable. We saw one queue of a hundred and eighty women

waiting to get a quarter-pound of sugar each. We stood and watched for five minutes, listening to the excited grumbling of the women. (Kherson is in the middle of the biggest sugar-producing region of the Soviet Union.) During this time the queue increased in length. Several militiamen came to keep order at the door of the store, allowing only a half-dozen people or so to enter at a time. We were about to proceed when a veritable explosion came from within the store. A dozen irate Ukrainian women burst out of the door. 'No more. He says there's no more sugar,' they shouted.

'I'll bet the director gave it out through the back door to his friends!' shrieked several women. The long queue melted into an angry mob. Police whistles screamed, and in a few minutes half a dozen additional militiamen arrived and set about sending people home. They went sullenly.

It was both salutary and instructive to see something like this after a long residence in Moscow or abroad. Foreigners in the Soviet capital were scrupulously guarded from such unpleasantnesses. An artificially high standard of living was maintained for the Moscovites. Except for a few weeks during the Finnish War when unusually cold weather disorganized local transport, there had been no such food queues in Moscow since 1933 or 1934. After the Finnish War and during the summer of 1940 the supply situation in the Soviet capital stabilized very rapidly and the stores featured large quantities of almost all basic food products. In Kherson, however, in a region agriculturally much richer than the Moscow district, the situation was almost as bad as it had been in the early thirties in many of the cities of Russia. It was incredible.

Kherson was an important city in that here several score new flat-bottomed petroleum transport barges were being constructed for the shipment of oil through the Dnieper-Bug Canal to Germany. The entire waterfront was occupied by the shipyards and the clanging and uproar of construction work went on all night. Bad food conditions could not but react unfavorably on the quality of the boats built, as well as on the speed of construction. Such bad food conditions could be explained only in terms of serious food deficits caused by

- (a) Increased allocations of food products for reserves, and
- (b) Increased exports.

Our party, which included the wives of two ministers, was well treated in Kherson. The local chief of the NKVD came to the hotel and instructed the director to turn out a sufficient number of Soviet guests to make room for us. A dinner was arranged in the restaurant on the hotel's first floor for our whole party. This was injudicious. The authorities had secured several chickens, which were cooked for us and served along with buckwheat, cabbage soup, white bread, and wine. So extraordinary a meal was this that an enormous crowd gathered, not only around our table in the restaurant but around the door and windows facing the street. As we ate and drank they looked on stonily until the police came and made them leave.

The next morning we were down on the street at nine o'clock sharp, according to instructions. However, the bus did not arrive to take us to the airport and we spent an hour walking up and down, our two frontier guards with us. While we were standing there a tall, handsome Ukrainian girl of twenty or twenty-two with a frank, open, sun-tanned face came up to one of the women of our party and began a friendly conversation. She admired the Frenchwoman's coiffure, and asked where it was done, by whom, and with what instrument. The Frenchwoman was very uncomfortable as she noticed immediately the scowl in the eyes of the several NKVD men who were standing around. She was polite, however, and told the Ukrainian girl in broken Russian that she was a foreigner, but that the coiffure had been done in Moscow. The girl became very much interested and began to ask questions about Moscow, Paris, and other places. The Frenchwoman answered noncommittally but politely. When the questions began to involve the war the chief NKVD man came up to the girl as if accidentally and said out of the corner of his mouth, but so audibly that all of us could hear, 'Go into the hotel.' The girl looked at him, turned pale, and walked abruptly into the lobby of the hotel, where another NKVD man took her in hand. When we last saw her she was sitting in the cloakroom, extremely pale, with a uniformed militiaman watching over her.

The girl was probably released, unless there was some blemish on her record already, but incidents of this kind helped in producing the result aimed at by the NKVD, namely, the creation of an impenetrable wall

between foreigners and the run of Soviet citizens. This aim was achieved, needless to say, only at the expense of creating a very bad impression on most foreigners in Moscow. The story of the Ukrainian girl in Kherson, for example, subsequently spread among the members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow, was duly exaggerated, and was cited as an example of Bolshevik stupidity and terror.

A bus came finally and an hour later we soared up over the port of Kherson and out over the purplish-blue Black Sea. We flew high, and until we got out a mile or two from shore air pockets were bad. Once out to sea, however, we rode as smoothly as a canoe on a millpond. For more than two hours we were out of sight of land. Russian-Rumanian relations being strained, the plane flew around Rumania and the first land we sighted was the long Bulgarian cape near Burgas. We sighted one ship and one submarine on the way. Until then I had always wondered about the alleged ease with which aeroplanes can apprehend submerged submarines. The one we sighted was cruising along well under water, but we could see it as clearly as we could the surface craft.

After a short stop at Burgas, we flew off over the mountains to Sofia, where I began by eating the best steak in town, and purchasing a complete outfit for myself.

I had several long chats with Walter Duranty and some of the other newspapermen who were there at the time, and a talk with the head of the Bulgarian Press Department and several other government officials, all of whom impressed me as being frightened to death of the Germans. The local experts were unequivocal in their opinion that already Germany was practically dictating policy to King Boris. The city was full of German 'tourists,' some of whom were government and army officials who had gone to Bulgaria for a two-weeks vacation and some good meals.

While I was in Sofia, although I did not know it at the time, a tragic drama was being enacted. The Russians offered a mutual-assistance pact to Bulgaria. Moscow even made it known that they would permit of the possibility of Bulgarian capitulation to German demands that she join the Axis, but insisted that the little Slav nation should first sign a pact with the great Mother Russia.



King Boris refused. He did not like signing pacts in general, and furthermore his country was already too completely in the hands of Berlin.

After three days in the Bulgarian capital I took the train to Belgrade. In both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria I found a deal of pan-Slavism and considerable genuine pro-Soviet sentiment among the ordinary people. Learning that I had been in Russia, customs officers, hotel porters, fellow passengers on trains would come to me afire with enthusiasm. 'Ah, you are from Russia,' they would say. Then, with a longing smile, 'People are not poor there as they are here, are they?' This sentiment was extremely widespread. Even in Red-baiting Yugoslav government circles I found considerable under-cover respect and admiration for the Russians and for the Bolsheviks. Nor was I alone in this observation. A high official of the American Legation in Belgrade told me off the record that it was his private impression that the entire Yugoslav Army below the rank of major would be willing to have the Red Army come into Yugoslavia to help resist the German attack they felt coming, and subsequently to see Yugoslavia become a part of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Legation in Belgrade was perfectly aware of this situation and capitalized on it in no small way. They carried on systematic anti-German propaganda as well as extensive Soviet-Yugoslav cultural-relations work. They had a fertile field to work in, as Germany was in the process of sucking agricultural supplies, livestock, and other commodities northward from the Balkans into the Germanic maw. The Yugoslav farmers and also certain portions of the rural population were boiling mad because Germany had taken so many hogs that there were none to be had in and around Belgrade.

The Communist Party in Yugoslavia was carrying on intensive anti-German propaganda. Huge demonstrations were organized and were attended by workers, peasants, soldiers, and even officers and government officials. Money, some said, came from the Soviet Legation. This brought out an interesting fact. During the summer of 1940 the Balkan Communist Parties, particularly those in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, changed their line abruptly and began working against Germany. For obscure reasons the parties in Britain, in the U.S.A., in Sweden, and in Norway continued with the 'Fascism is a matter of taste — down with imperialist war' line until the next spring.

The standard of living of the peasantry in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was extremely low — approaching that of the collective farmers in the Soviet Union. They all seemed to think of Russia as a land of plenty, and I was overwhelmed by a strong conviction — which stands today — that the Red Army could go to the Adriatic in a week and be met with flowers and brass bands in every village and town. Obviously the sentiment would change as collectivization, nationalization of small enterprises, and similar activities made themselves felt, but, at least for the moment, incoming Red Army men would be welcomed as blood brothers, political liberators, and fellow enemies of Hitler Germany.

From Belgrade I took a train to Budapest, where I spent a week visiting with Hungarian friends with whom I had stayed on previous occasions, and talking to numerous people who had just come from Germany. Budapest was an excellent place from which to 'cover' Germany for those who, like myself, could not go to the Reich. The stories that I heard were mostly discouraging in that there were no indications of any immediate political or economic breakdown in the Reich. The British were bombing Berlin, but aside from keeping people awake at night the results seemed to be negligible. German industry was functioning well. Hungarian business men told me that Hungary actually owed Germany money; i.e., German exports to Hungary had exceeded Hungary's exports to Germany. The Reich was sending locomotives, automobiles, and military materials to Hungary — a country politically completely under German domination. The only explanation was that Germany was not as hard up for rolling-stock and munitions as the British and even the Russian press led one to believe.

Hungary was rejoicing in the acquisition of Transylvania. Flags were flying, bands were playing. As usual, the Hungarians were leaving most of the work to the peasants and the Jews. Magyars strode up and down the streets of the beautiful city, sipped wine or coffee in the cafés, and engaged in the flippancies so dear to them. It would be interesting to see what would happen in Budapest if the Jews were eliminated. Unless the Germans came in with bayonets to make the Hungarians work the national economy would not function at all.

I asked a number of people in the Hungarian capital why Germany

had agreed to the transfer of Transylvania as provided for in the Vienna settlement. Several well-informed and realistic Pesteters attributed Berlin's action to the pressure of Mussolini, who was anxious to create a strong Hungary in the hope that it might keep Germany out of the Balkans. Others asserted that the Vienna settlement and the subsequent guarantees of Rumanian territorial integrity were part of a German preparation of southern Europe for a crusade against the Soviet Union. Rumania had lost much territory. Berlin could turn to them when the time came and offer them as much land as they could grab in the Soviet Ukraine. The second view was probably the more accurate.

After an interesting conversation with the head of the Press Department of the Hungarian Foreign Office, one Zeleki-Sebes, who told me quite frankly that the country was for all intents and purposes a German protectorate, I entrained for Bucharest. Here I was to do my shopping and make some financial arrangements. It was the best place in the world for such activities. The Rumanian lei, officially valued at a hundred and sixty-odd to the dollar, was obtainable at six, eight, even nine hundred to the dollar. While there were serious restrictions on such financial transactions and also on the export of new commodities from the country, the organization of the state apparatus was such that a few well-placed dollars would remove any restrictions.

I took a room in the Athené-Palas Hotel, where a dozen American and British journalists hung out most of the time. Bucharest was the Balkan interest center at the moment. German infiltration was going on with great rapidity and the arrival of German troops in the country had been falsely rumored several times already. I was on vacation and was not interested in doing any writing. I turned my attention to business, bought literally packages of lei, and proceeded to raid the 'Galeries Lafayette,' the largest department store in the Balkans, which was still fairly well stocked. At the price I had paid for my lei commodities were ridiculously cheap.

The hotel director informed me one afternoon that he was very sorry but I would have to leave my room on the second floor and take another on the fourth. It was awkward, as the room was filled with suitcases and boxes and unpacked articles were knee deep on the floor. The director

insisted, however, and I acquiesced. That evening, having put my accounts in some kind of order, I went to dinner with Russel Hill of the *New York Herald Tribune*, who told me that a big story was afoot. Large units of German troops had some across the border, and were expected to arrive in Bucharest soon.

I went down to the censorship office, and spent the evening with a dozen irate journalists trying to file stories. I wish they could have worked in Moscow. By comparison the Rumanian censors were reasonable, polite, informative, and decent. The correspondents came in with their stories, sat down at a table with a censor who, having read the text, discussed various points, suggested changes, yielded if the correspondent could give an official source for the information, and tried to be helpful and polite. In Moscow not only was it impossible to discuss one's story with the censor, it was difficult even to see the gentleman and, in most cases, if one did get to see him, conversations could be carried on effectively only in Russian, as only one employee of the Press Department spoke good English.

The next morning we arose to find that the first two floors in the Athené-Palas were occupied by the General Staff of the German Balkan Army, including three generals and a score of colonels, majors, and captains. Ostensibly the Germans were there to instruct the Rumanian Army in modern methods of warfare. Actually they had taken over the country. A German military guard stood at the door of the hotel. The swastika flew side by side with the Rumanian standard over the entrance.

Motorized and mechanized units had come to the vicinity of Bucharest and large anti-aircraft units were installed in the neighborhood of Ploesti, center of the Rumanian oil fields.

I wound up my purchasing activities hurriedly and spent the next week dashing around with Russel Hill, Ed Stevens of the *Christian Science Monitor*, and Bob St. John of the Associated Press, trying to keep up with developments. The British Legation and most of the English correspondents left during this time, while the Russians chewed their fingernails nervously and asked everybody they met whether or not the Germans were planning to attack the Soviet Union. Our hotel lobby was a curious place. German staff officers in full uniform walked briskly

in and out, brandishing briefcases and maps amid a clicking of heels and clanking of swords. The Germans were scrupulously correct, which could not always be said of the British and the Americans. One evening Cyrus Sulzberger of the *New York Times*, a tall, striking, and distinctly Jewish-looking young American, walked into the lobby, looked around at the score of natty, bemonocled, and sausage-necked German staff officers seated around tables discussing maps and memoranda in subdued tones. 'What, these God-damned squareheads still here?' he said in a loud voice, putting his hands on his hips. The Germans never batted an eyelash, though most of them spoke excellent English.

As far as I could gather from fragments of conversations overheard and from brief talks with two of the German officers, the maps and memoranda dealt, generally speaking, with two problems:

(a) A joint German-Rumanian attack against the Soviet Union across the plains of Moldavia, the Prut, and the Dniester; and

(b) The transportation and supply of a large German force through Rumania and Bulgaria in the general direction of Greece and Turkey.

The Soviet diplomatic and other representatives in Rumania certainly received the same general impression that I did, and it was probably supplemented by a mass of concrete information, obtained in various ways, on just how and where the joint Rumanian-German attack was being planned.

The Germans were relieved that the Russians had not entered Moldavia and occupied the crest of the Carpathians immediately after the settlement of Vienna. At that time the Germans had not had sufficient forces in the neighborhood to stop such a move, while the Rumanians were hopelessly weak and demoralized. By mid-October, however, the Germans had constructed air fields in several places along the Soviet frontier and stationed strong mechanized units in Galatz, Jassy, and at several points along the lower Danube. Thus any Russian move at this time was forestalled, much to the relief of the German staff officers in Bucharest.

Russian chagrin was expressed by a Tass communiqué on October fourteenth stating that 'reports from abroad, clearly of German origin, asserting that the Soviet Union has been fully informed of German plans

to occupy Rumania, do not correspond with the facts.' Having delivered themselves of this cautious slap on the wrist the Russians lapsed into silence, broken only by another Tass communiqué on October thirty-first denying as fantasy rumors that Soviet aeroplanes had been sent to Salonica to help defend Greece.

With the arrival of the Germans, the green-shirted Iron Guard had practically taken over Rumania and had inaugurated a number of revolutionary measures to curtail bribery and corruption in public offices and to hammer the economy of the country into some kind of order. Results were, at first, frightening. To outlaw bribery in Rumania was to deprive the country's economy of one of its main foundations. Nothing happened. The wheels of commerce and industry squeaked to a stop for lack of customary lubricants.

To my personal horror I found that the thirteen boxes and suitcases of clothes and household equipment which I had purchased and packed came under a new and strictly enforced law and were legally unexportable even with the payment of an export tax. After a conversation with the chief of the Bucharest customs and a moderate token of my respect, however, I succeeded in sending three of the most difficult items through to Varna on a railroad ticket which I never used. After several days of frantic activity I succeeded in obtaining written permission to take out the remaining articles, provided they were not new. I entrained for the Bulgarian frontier, only to be turned back by the Giurgiu customs officers because the articles in my trunks were obviously new. Bribes were refused. The officials were all terrified. I returned downheartedly to Bucharest, where, after several days' negotiation with a lawyer, I finally obtained an export permit with the signature of the Minister of Finance. It instructed the Giurgiu customs to allow Mr. Scott to cross the frontier with his personal possessions 'in the condition in which they are.' The lawyer's fee was twenty-five thousand lei — about thirty dollars.

Bucharest was losing interest for Anglo-American journalists. It was a German town, just about as Bratislava was. The correspondents were leaving and I set off with Russel Hill and my remaining 'personal possessions.' The Giurgiu customs officers were frustrated and impolite but I got through all right, and after a day in Sofia went to Varna, Bulgaria's

largest port, to catch the Soviet boat for Odessa. Since the Bessarabian incident, there had been no train connections between Rumania and the Soviet Union, and as flying was out of the question with so much baggage, the boat was the only way.

I had a long talk in Varna with the British Consul, who told me that Soviet tankers were arriving regularly from Batum. Their cargoes were ferried to shore by four small Italian lighters (apparently left in the Black Sea especially for that purpose before Italy's entry into the war), then transshipped by rail to Germany via Sofia and Belgrade. This oil was flowing to Germany at the rate of about two hundred and fifty thousand tons a year and it was all, or almost all, first-quality lubricant. The Rumanian oil fields produced no petroleum suitable for manufacture into good lubricating oil, so that this Russian export was extremely important to the Reich.

After an overnight trip we docked in Odessa, where the customs were not only polite and efficient but quite gentlemanly in dealing with my purchases, which were far less extensive than those of several of my fellow travelers, members of the Moscow diplomatic corps, who brought with them literally tons of all kinds of foodstuffs, materials, office equipment, and furniture, as well as dozens of suitcases full of clothes. The Russians realized that their country boasted few opportunities to purchase things and were therefore comparatively lenient with people bringing them in from outside.

## **Part Six**

Face to Face





## 1

RETURNED to Moscow and to my forty newspapers a day, I found that I had missed almost nothing during my month's absence. At least nothing obvious had happened. Moscow had maintained a stony silence regarding the German occupation of the Balkans. I imagine the Kremlin had hoped that the strong pro-Soviet sentiment of the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs might still be a decisive factor in keeping Germany away from the Straits. However, it became more and more clear that such hopes were vain.

The Germans and Italians were putting up a naval base near Constanza on the Black Sea, while the German military infiltration along the Danube Delta eliminated the possibility of any Russian advances southward. Stalin had lost a piece in his Balkan gambit, and stood face to face with Hitler along a front stretching from the Arctic Sea to the Danube Delta.

## 2

In mid-October a close friend of mine returned from Finland, where he had spent a month traveling up and down the country. The Finns, he told me, were ready to fight Russia any day. They had more military material than they had had before the Finnish War in December, 1939. They were getting it from Germany. They had five times as many planes in September, 1940, as they had had in September, 1939. They had built new and very good fortifications. There was talk in Finland of regaining lost territory. The Germans were stimulating and encour-

aging such talk and were also exporting considerable quantities of manufactured goods to Finland. The Finns were thus well supplied and had a feeling of confidence. Obviously the Germans were preparing a base for operations against the Soviet Union. The then untrue accusation which the Russians made in October, 1939, spread all over the headlines of their newspapers and shouted from thousands of speakers' platforms, namely that Finland was preparing to act as a steppingstone for an anti-Soviet invader, had now become one hundred per cent accurate. Now, however, the Russians were not in a position to do anything about it.

On the other hand, commercial relations between the Reich and the Soviet were excellent. I had a long talk with the chief representative of the I.G. chemical trust, who told me that his company was delighted with the Russians and the way they were fulfilling their obligations. To their astonishment they had found that Soviet transport was capable of moving all the freight necessary, while the quality of Soviet exports was almost invariably irreproachable. The Russians were sticking scrupulously to the principle of reciprocal trade, he said; when the Germans delivered their shipment of machinery or aeroplane designs, the Russians completed the transaction by delivering their wheat or fodder.

The exact character and quantity of the Soviet exports to Germany was, and still is, a deep secret. I got a general idea, which is probably as good as that of anyone. The Russians delivered during the first nine months of 1940 in the neighborhood of 1,000,000 tons of cereal grains; almost 900,00 tons of fodder; just under 1,000,000 tons of oil, most of which was either lubricating oil or crude whose character was suitable for the production of lubricating oil; considerable quantities of cotton, man-ganese, cellulose, sugar, wool, fish, and hemp. In return the Germans exported machinery of various kinds, aeroplanes, pumps, and Ersatz chemical processes and apparatus.

Karl Schnurre, head of the Trade Department of the German Foreign Office, came to Moscow periodically to talk over the progress of Soviet-German commercial relations, and arrange for increases in volume of trade. It was extremely difficult to get any information from Schnurre or any of the members of his commission, but I was convinced to my own satisfaction that both the Germans and the Russians were pleased with

the trade relations between the two countries. During 1940, which was a bad year in the Soviet Union because of the Finnish War, Germany received very substantial quantities of strategic material. Furthermore, prospects for 1941 seemed even better.

As Sir Stafford Cripps told me several times, if political differences could be ironed out, Germany and Russia could trade peacefully and profitably for a half-century without stepping on each other's toes. The economies of the two countries were complementary. Russia needed machinery, precision instruments, and other products of the highly integrated German industry. Russia had raw materials and semi-manufactured goods to sell.

The fact remained, however, that economic considerations were not of primary importance. The dominating factors in the situation were Germany's obvious threat to Russia, as illustrated in Finland and in the Balkans; and Hitler's hope of winning a negotiated peace with Britain on the basis of an anti-Soviet policy.

On September thirteenth the Russians issued a communiqué asserting themselves as a Danube power and demanding that they be admitted to the coming Danube Conference organized by Germany. I went to see my fellow correspondent Ernst Schule, correspondent of the D.N.B., who was close to the German Ambassador and, as I found out long afterward, a responsible functionary of the Foreign Department of the Gestapo. Schule grinned. 'Ach, ja,' he said, 'the communiqué is relatively unimportant. The Russians are trying to assert themselves as a great power. They are building up a little prestige. It is quite harmless. The basic relations between Germany and Russia are unshaken. We are continuing to receive our wheat and oil. We shall, of course, allow the Russians to enter the Danube Convention, though there is no precedent in the matter, as Russia was not included before the last war. We just hadn't got around to it yet because the whole thing was arranged before the Russians took Bessarabia.'

## 3

At this point Sir Stafford Cripps presented far-reaching British proposals to the Russians. Early in October he had asked to see Molotov. The latter was, however, extremely busy and had no time to talk with His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador. Finally, on October twenty-second, Cripps presented the proposals to Vice Commissar Vyshinsky. London offered *de facto* recognition of the acquisition of the Baltic states, a place at the peace conference after the defeat of Germany, and a guarantee that Britain would never participate in any alliance or combination of powers directed militarily, politically, or economically against the Soviet Union.

In return for this London asked one thing: that the Russians adopt an attitude of real neutrality; i.e., that they maintain the same relations with Britain as with Germany. For example, they had an economic agreement with Germany, they should have one with Britain; they had a non-aggression pact with Germany, they should have one with Britain.

Sir Stafford told me months later that in early November the Russians seriously considered accepting these proposals, but that the decision had swung in the other direction and Molotov had gone to Berlin. American Ambassador Steinhardt, on the other hand, who was almost certainly better informed than Cripps, was convinced that the Russians had never wavered. How could they? The Germans were rapidly advancing into the Balkans. They were preparing Finland to attack the Soviet Union. Already they were massing troops on the eastern frontier. A Russian deal with Britain at that moment would have meant an immediate German attack. This the Russians were not prepared to meet. They could only bungle along, the Ambassador said, prepare their military forces feverishly, ignore the British proposals, and try to accomplish three hopelessly contradictory ends: (1) To placate Germany by being correct, polite, and helpful. (2) To stop further German progress southward by supporting those who resisted German aggression, e.g., Yugoslavia. (3)

(Most important) To gain time in which to mobilize all the resources and man-power in the country for the showdown which seemed more and more inevitable.

November seventh brought the usual reception for foreign diplomats and correspondents and Soviet celebrities. Foreign Commissar Molotov, his assistants, Dekanosov and Vyshinsky, and Foreign Trade Commissar Mikoyan stood with their ornately dressed wives and shook hands with the thousand-odd guests, who included Marshals Timoshenko and Budenny, and a galaxy of prominent Soviet ballet dancers, singers, writers, industrial and political leaders, and the usual army of plain-clothes men. When I shook hands with the four hosts, I noticed that I was taller than any of them. I am just over five feet seven.

One notable occurrence at the reception was a charming remark made by the Yugoslav Military Attaché to his Italian colleague.

'Colonel,' he said, 'allow me to congratulate you.'

'On what, my dear Major?' asked the Italian decorously.

'Why, on your marvelous resistance to the Greek aggression,' was the answer.

At this reception I got a fairly good chance to study Marshal Timoshenko. He made a thoroughly businesslike impression — tall, robust, and stentorian-voiced. His clean-shaven head was as round as the top of an egg. His manners, his approach to those around him, reflected a dominating personality, a man with sound convictions and the fortitude necessary to execute them. Like most of the guests, Timoshenko had several drinks more than would have been considered correct at diplomatic functions in most capitals. He ambled down the stairs from the banquet hall and began to boom out the 'Internationale' with a happy, self-satisfied expression on his face. He was extremely picturesque in his well-cut uniform, his diamond-studded marshal's star hanging at his throat, his breast covered with medals. At the bottom of the steps a little gentleman in plain clothes came up to him, tapped him on the arm reprovingly, and shook his index finger in the Marshal's face.

'Ach, da,' said the Marshal with a hiccup, and stopped singing.

## 4

On November eleventh Foreign Commissar Molotov entrained for Berlin with several assistants and a score of experts and advisers, among them one of the few Soviet officials with whom I could still speak as a personal acquaintance. Molotov spent two days in the German capital, was appropriately wined and dined, and conferred with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and with Hitler. Almost nothing was published about the substance of the conversation or the decisions made. I received a fairly clear picture, I think, of what took place, and present the following as a hypothesis for consideration until some future date when the wisdom of posterity may give us the documents.

Molotov made a reluctant courtesy call to return two visits by the German Foreign Minister to Moscow the year before. His main aim was to try to ascertain one thing from the Germans: Were they going to attack England or were they going to attack Russia? Molotov had no power to negotiate. He was only a high-powered messenger boy for Stalin.

Rumania and Slovakia joined the Axis only a few hours before Molotov's arrival in Berlin. The first thing which the Germans suggested to Molotov after the customary platitudes had been exchanged was that the Soviet Union likewise join the Axis and become a *de jure* ally of Hitler. Moscow's first action as a fellow member of the Axis would be to aid Germany in putting diplomatic and, if necessary, military pressure on the Turks. This would probably have meant war with Britain. Their second act would be to make certain economic concessions to Germany for the duration of the war. The Germans were to receive an economic lease on certain Ukrainian districts. In this connection both Ribbentrop and Hitler mentioned compensatory Soviet territorial acquisitions in Iran, Iraq, and India, a Soviet naval base on the Bosphorus, and a free hand in the rest of Finland.

Molotov did not acquiesce. How could he? Joining the Axis under these circumstances would mean sacrificing Soviet neutrality and sovereignty; it would be following in Mussolini's ill-fated footsteps. And besides, Molotov had come without any power to agree to anything.

In that case, said the Germans, 'We shall have to crack Turkey in our own way. We must break British power in the eastern Mediterranean with or without the cooperation of Russia.'

Molotov then mentioned the German troops in Finland. The Germans agreed to withdraw them, but warned Molotov that a second Soviet attack on Finland could not be tolerated.

The Soviet Foreign Commissar then asked whether the German military units in Rumania would actually defend that country in case Russia came in to occupy parts of Moldavia and Bulgaria which likewise fell on Russia's side of the original demarcation line of spheres of influence. Hitler said they would. Whereupon Molotov stated that in the opinion of the Soviet Government, Soviet safety from possible attacks by 'Britain or Turkey' required a Soviet garrison in Bulgaria and a military mission to Belgrade for the purpose of 'instructing' the Yugoslav Army. The Germans refused to discuss the matter, as such a move would obviously cut across one of the most important fields of German advance.

Neither party mentioned the considerable accumulations of military might on both sides of the German-Soviet frontier from the North Sea to the Balkans. The conversation was scrupulously polite.

On his return Molotov was met by Soviet officers, diplomats, brass bands, and due splendor, including an enormous red carpet along the station platform. His face registered no dismay, yet his trip had probably cast the die of the future. Stalin was convinced of Germany's hostile intentions. He saw that sooner or later Germany would attack. He hoped, however, that this could be postponed for another year — until 1942. This would give the Soviet Union an opportunity to prepare for effective defense. He counted on effective resistance by Yugoslavia, on increasing British bombardments of Germany, and on the power of the Soviet Union to stall Hitler by making a series of humiliating gestures of appeasement — concessions of every nature except those of major political significance such as the violation of Soviet territorial integrity or political sovereignty.



The Germans understood this attitude and made it clear through unofficial channels that the only convincing evidence of Soviet friendship which might be offered would be the recently mentioned joining of the Axis by the Soviet Union, accompanied by far-reaching commercial and economic agreements.

This Stalin could not agree to do. It would be suicidal and he knew it.

## **Part Seven**

### **Mobilized Preparedness**



WHILE Soviet and German interests were coming into open conflict in the Balkans and in Finland, while the chess game of diplomacy was being played move by move in Moscow and Berlin, interesting things were happening inside the Soviet Union.

The period between the spring of 1940 and May, 1941, was utilized by Stalin to oil the economic and industrial equipment of the Soviet Union and mobilize the entire country, its resources and military potential. It was a period of realization of Stalin's dictum, 'It is necessary to keep our people in a state of mobilized preparedness in order that no sudden move by the enemy shall take us by surprise.'

In the spring of 1940, industry and agriculture were in a somewhat disorganized state as a result of the Finnish War. In Baku oil production had fallen by some twenty-five per cent. Articles in the press daily complained that transport—both rail and water—machine-building, ferrous metallurgy, and a number of branches of agriculture were limping badly.

To take one example, the river transport newspaper *Rechnoi Transport* stated on July thirteenth, 1940:

River transport during the first six months of 1940 worked unsatisfactorily. The State plan during this period was underfulfilled. Especially bad results have been obtained in the shipment of the most important cargoes—grain, salt, coal, petroleum, and lumber.

This situation was duplicated in many places. It was the result largely of bad labor discipline, caused by the Finnish War, and inadequate supplies of food, consumers' goods, and all kinds of industrial equipment and materials.

Stalin set about systematically to improve conditions. There was a harsh clamping down throughout industry and agriculture. Laws

passed beginning in April, 1940, and continuing in a wave for a full year (Appendix 17) made it a crime to be more than twenty minutes late to work; increased the severity of penalties for hooliganism and minor theft cases; and established magistrates' courts to deal immediately and severely with disorderly conduct and other minor cases tending to demoralize the population. A law passed in June, calculated to improve the quality of Soviet industrial output, made the chief engineer or manager of every industrial plant or department thereof criminally responsible for bad-quality production in excess of the existing technological norm and for attempts to pass on to distributing organizations products which were incomplete or otherwise not up to specifications. Offenders under this law could get up to eight years in jail, and during the fall of 1940 the newspapers, both provincial and central, daily reported trials and convictions of industrial managers. For example, the director of an electrical apparatus factory near Moscow was sentenced to six years in jail because small electric motors produced by his factory were regularly not up to specifications.

A whole series of emergency agricultural decrees made collective farms' obligatory deliveries to the State directly proportionate, not to sown area, but to their arable land.

Thus, all along the line the legal apparatus was created for a systematic and hard-fisted struggle toward productive efficiency.

The inconvenience and irritation caused among the workers were considerable. The lateness and absentee law was strictly enforced, and thousands or tens of thousands of factory and office employees were sentenced to several months in actual confinement or to a term of 'forced labor' during which they worked at their regular jobs, but surrendered twenty-five and sometimes fifty per cent of their wages as a fine. Lateness of more than twenty minutes counted as absenteeism, unless a doctor's certificate could be produced. A Moscow office worker of my acquaintance was tried and sentenced because of unexcused absenteeism of the following character. The man and his wife both worked. Their two children stayed at home with a maid, who fell sick and went home to the village. They could not find another. They could not leave the children home alone—it was against the law as well as being obvi-

ously dangerous. For two days the mother did not go to work, having informed her director beforehand that she would be unable to work for several days. She was tried and sentenced to four months' forced labor at her regular job, with twenty-five per cent of her wages confiscated.

There had always been considerable difficulty in the Soviet Union getting skilled workers and technical personnel to go out to new construction jobs where living conditions were crude. Everybody wanted to stay in Moscow for the obvious reason that the capital was systematically better supplied with food and clothing than any other city or town in the country. It was partially as a result of this situation that the Soviet aviation industry was concentrated to so great an extent around Moscow. Factories had to be constructed where the skilled workers and the engineers lived.

In order to permit of decentralization a law was passed giving industrial commissariats the right to send any worker to any part of the country for any length of time deemed necessary. (See Appendix 17.) According to the provisions of the same law, a worker or employee was forbidden to quit work unless his resignation was accepted by the administration of his plant or office. Arbitrary quitting was a crime punishable by a jail sentence. It was, for all intents and purposes, an 'industrial army' law mobilizing the entire Soviet people as industrial soldiers. This law was strictly enforced, and hundreds of offenders were severely punished.

Late in 1940, the Central Council of the Soviet Trade Unions resolved, in the name of its twenty-five million constituency, to replace the seven-hour legal working day by an eight-hour day in the interest of speeding up industry and strengthening the Red Army. (See Appendix 18.) The resolution was, of course, unanimously approved by all concerned, and thus some fifteen per cent was added to the productivity of Soviet industry.

At the same time the strictest punishment was instituted for breaches of labor discipline. Failure to obey a foreman, carelessness with machinery, negligence with tools or blueprints, became a crime.

In November, 1940, approximately one million youths were conscripted into trade schools to be trained as railroad workers, mechanics,

welders, chemical workers, machinists, etc. (See Appendix 19.) These boys were seen in the streets in uniforms marching to and from their dormitories. The schools were free. The students received food and clothes, as well as books and other materials.

In order to reduce buying power, prices of a number of commodities rose abruptly during the last quarter of 1940. Furthermore, a number of communal services which previously had been free now had to be paid for. For example, all school children above the seventh grade had to pay tuition amounting to approximately two hundred roubles per year per child. (See Appendix 17.) This was directly inconsistent with the 1936 Stalinist Constitution, which provided for free education including higher education, but this formality did not trouble the Soviet authorities. The Constitution was not amended, it was simply edited.

## 2

A great deal of discussion took place among foreign observers about the results of this intensive campaign to increase production. It was perfectly obvious that large sections of the Soviet population were disgruntled, irritated, and above all fatigued by the increased effort required of them. This was evidenced by the fact that attendance in evening schools dropped off and drunkenness on holidays increased. The press, radio, and many cultural mediums, such as the theatre, were mobilized in an intensive pep campaign to rally public sentiment for further effort.

The Soviet Union had considered itself at war for ten years. It was a real war. In the battle of collectivization in the early thirties there were hundreds of thousands of casualties. The battle of the First Five-Year Plan of industrial construction likewise involved hundreds of thousands of casualties. If the people forgot from time to time that they were at war, Stalin remembered.

The battle of production during the fall of 1940 and the spring of 1941 was in many ways as serious as the battle of Finland in 1939 and 1940. The population was whipped into line by stinging administrative and political measures. I do not know how many casualties there were, but I would venture that there were not fewer than in the Finnish War.

By December, 1940, however, results were achieved. The production of coal, petroleum, and ferrous and non-ferrous metals increased substantially.

By December, 1940, pig iron was being produced at the rate of 17,000,000 tons a year, steel at the rate of 21,000,000 tons, and petroleum at the rate of 35,000,000 tons. All these represented considerable increases over any previous figures. Railroad transport buckled down during the last quarter of 1940 and improved its work very substantially — carloadings rose eleven per cent in 1940 over 1939. Total industrial production in 1940 was 137,000,000 roubles, compared with 124,000,000 in 1939. Investments in heavy industry and transport in 1940 considerably exceeded those in 1939.

Despite these improvements, certain industries lagged. For example, according to official information released at the Party Conference of February, 1941, the paper, timber, textile, construction materials, and rolling-stock manufacturing industries did not fulfill their 1940 plan, while the Fishing and Timber Commissariats produced absolutely less than in 1939. The petroleum, paper, and timber industries failed to fulfill their financial plans, while the water transport ton-mile plan was unfulfilled. These shortcomings were explained in terms of bad organization, swivel-chair methods of administration in industrial leadership, too much talk and not enough work. One of the speakers at the conference cited the example of the Maritime Transport Commissariat, which was instructed to draw up a plan for the liquidation of backwardness in Caspian shipping. It took the Planning Department of the Commissariat ten and one-half months to draw up the plan, but no one knew how long it would take actually to liquidate the backwardness of Caspian shipping.

The Party was, as always, a nucleus, a conscious minority, extremely important in fighting for production increases. In February, 1941, the



Party numbered more than two and a half million members and almost a million and a half candidates. This represented an increase of nearly 1,400,000 since March, 1939.

One interesting generalization can be made on Soviet industrial managers, and on the Communist Party functionaries—they were young. Of four hundred and thirty-seven delegates to the February, 1941, Party conference in Moscow, whose main attention was concentrated on internal economic and industrial matters, one hundred and sixty-three were under thirty-five, three hundred and fifty-eight under forty, and only eight were over fifty. Only twenty-four had been party members before 1918. One-fourth of all the delegates were professional engineers. The old Bolsheviks were no longer running the Soviet Union. Major political decisions were made by Stalin. The country was administered by tough, young Russian patriots, many of them trained engineers.

The party conference effected a considerable shakeup in managerial personnel in an attempt further to improve production. Numerous changes were made in the Central Committee. Sixty-five appointments and dismissals were announced laconically in the press. (See Appendix 20.) The most important change was the removal from the Central Committee of Maxim Litvinov, who, for nearly two years, had been doing 'literary work' and was never mentioned in the Soviet Press, though he still appeared at sessions of the Supreme Soviet, to which he was a deputy, and was occasionally seen in the opera or the theatre.

As a corollary to the improvement of the work in Soviet industry, the activities of three commissariats must be mentioned; i.e., the Commissariats of Foreign Trade, State Reserves, and Control.

The first of these three, headed by Anastas Mikoyan, worked feverishly all during 1940 and the early part of 1941 developing the foreign trade of the Soviet Union along the same general principles as those laid down in the original Soviet-German trade agreement—an exchange of Soviet raw materials for foreign manufactured commodities. Trade agreements were concluded with Belgium, Yugoslavia, Slovakia, Hungary, Iran, Greece, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Rumania, Norway, Afghanistan, Thailand, and China, as well as with

Germany. (See Appendix 21.) In most cases the exact quantities of exports and imports were not published.

The Soviet-German trade agreement of January, 1940, provided for the export to Germany of large quantities of petroleum, cereal grains, fodder, manganese, cotton, cellulose, apatites, sugar, wool, timber, and furs. By the spring of 1941 most of the other countries in Europe had come under German influence, so that the trade treaties negotiated with Denmark, Norway, and Belgium, for example, were actually signed by Hilger, the Counselor of the German Embassy in Moscow, as well as by the representatives of the countries involved. Thus Germany was taking the raw materials and food products from the Soviet Union in the name of secondary states to be distributed to them at the discretion of the German authorities. The above-mentioned Soviet exports were involved in almost all the trade agreements. Soviet petroleum, grains, fodder, and cotton were sent to every country in Europe except Holland, Spain, Portugal, France, and England. Even Rumania bought Soviet lubricating oil. In return Russia got precision tools from Switzerland, motor ships from Denmark, ball-bearings from Sweden, river ships and rolling-stock from Hungary, copper machine parts from Yugoslavia, maritime equipment from Greece, Diesel engines and rolling-stock from Belgium, and an unspecified quantity and assortment of military equipment from all.

Of course it meant that the Soviet public had to be satisfied with less cotton goods, less woolen material, and less foods than it otherwise would have consumed. It meant that, as a result of increased exports of timber and cellulose, civilian building construction in the Soviet Union tapered off, and as we saw above, the Soviet building-materials industry underfulfilled its plan by a considerable margin. It meant that hundreds of automobiles in Moscow alone were unable to operate because of shortages of gasoline, which was strictly rationed throughout the country, while nearly half a million Soviet tractors, trucks, and automobiles were rebuilt to run on carbide, compressed gases, charcoal, or wood.

Considerable inconvenience was involved for the Soviet people, but Soviet industry and the Red Army received valuable manufactured commodities from all parts of Europe, which under ordinary circumstances they would have been unable to obtain.

The Commissariat of State Reserves became a powerful organization after the fall of France. Its functionaries could walk into the warehouses and storage buildings of any Soviet enterprise and earmark large quantities of strategic war materials, machines, spare parts, and equipment of all kinds for state reserves. These items were then shipped off quietly to immense reserve dumps largely situated in the Urals and in western Siberia. Here millions of tons of wheat, probably at least fifteen million tons of petroleum products, and correspondingly large quantities of cotton, wool, manufactured goods, strategic metals, tools, etc. were stored away. This was quite aside from the military reserves of munitions, uniforms, aeroplanes, and other ordnance set aside by the Commissariats of Defense, Navy, and Internal Affairs.

This mass allocation to Reserves was one of the principal causes of the shortages of food which I saw in Kherson and of similar insufficiencies throughout the Soviet Union during 1940 and early 1941. The people were not told in so many words that this was going on, but at least administrative and managerial personnel, as well as political functionaries, were aware of it. Several acquaintances of mine who worked in factories near Moscow complained bitterly of the arbitrary power of the Commissariat of Reserves, which continuously and systematically filched raw materials and needed tools and equipment from the plant.

The third commissariat deserving of mention was the People's Commissariat of State Control, organized September sixth, 1940, and headed by L. Z. Mekhlis, former chief of the political administration of the Red Army and one-time editor of *Pravda*. Mekhlis had one of the most unpleasant faces I had ever seen. A burly man in his middle forties, he was tough and vindictive, almost truculent. His commissariat had the task of checking up on the fulfillment of financial and material plans in all branches of Soviet economy, including the military, and of verifying the fulfillment of state decisions. True, there were already several organizations in the Soviet Union occupied with similar activities—the Soviet Control Commission, the Party Control Commission, and the NKVD. Mekhlis' commissariat became a sort of super-control organization to check up on those who checked up on those who did the work. It may sound awkward and unnecessary, but in the Soviet Union

where large sections of the population were technically illiterate and unaccustomed to the complicated forms of modern industrial and economic organization, such double control was probably necessary.

### 3

The oil industry was one of the most important branches of the entire Soviet economy. Moreover, it began to look more and more as though Germany would win or lose the war on oil, and Russia had the largest petroleum production of any country in the Eastern Hemisphere. I wrote several long mail stories on oil which invariably got lost en route to London or New York. I visited Baku, and spent many hours reading every publication available on oil.

In view of its importance both nationally and internationally and the fact that the emergency measures of the 'mobilized preparedness' period were particularly effective in the oil industry, I am going to devote a few pages to an analysis of Soviet oil as a microcosm of what was going on all through Soviet economy during 1940 and the spring of 1941.

### 4

Soviet oil production fell to a low of about two million tons a month during the first six months of 1940. Labor laws and other administrative measures were undertaken during the summer to make labor more efficient, while similar drastic action was taken to improve supply and living conditions. These steps were so effective that by December, 1940, production rose to an all-time high of nearly three million tons a month.

The Soviet Union possesses known oil reserves to the extent of 6,370,000,000 tons, or about sixty-seven per cent of the known world resources. Thirty-two per cent of this Soviet oil is located in the 'Second Baku' region between the Volga and the Ural Mountains, twenty-nine per cent in the Baku region in the Caucasus, and the rest is scattered all over the Soviet Union — in Maikop, Grozny, Emba, Yakutia, Sakhaline, and other places. There are probably large deposits in Siberia still unsurveyed. Thus, Russia has well-distributed deposits rich enough to permit the production of oil at the present United States rate of output for thirty-seven years, or for two hundred and twelve years at Russia's own present rate of production. Nature has been kind to Russia, but the Russians have not been too adept at making use of Nature's gifts. (See Appendix 22.)

Russia, with more reserves than all the other countries in the world put together, produced only eleven per cent of the world's oil in 1938.

Russia's production was not nearly so well distributed as the oil itself. Baku accounted for more than three-quarters of the entire annual output of the country, yet Baku boasted little more than one-quarter of the reserves and was located thousands of miles away from some of the largest consumer districts. (See Appendix 23.)

The Baku oil fields are located on a stubby peninsula on the western coast of the Caspian Sea. The deposits have been exploited since 1833. Before the Revolution virtually all the enterprises there were owned by foreign capital and technical development was the work of foreigners. The Swedish magnate Nobel was the owner of large fields in Baku, where in 1913, fifty years after the fields were opened, production was little more than seven million tons annually.

One of the main technical disadvantages of the Baku fields is that the deposits are right on the coast, some even actually under the sea. In some cases drilling was done in the water and wells were often flooded by the sea. A strategic disadvantage was their proximity to the frontier. Foreign interests used to own Baku, and in 1919 the British actually occupied the fields for some time. The Kremlin remained very sensitive to questions of their safety. The presence in Baku of large units of the Red Army and Air Force illustrated this. In April, 1941, I saw nearly

one hundred up-to-date pursuit planes, lined up ready to fly, at an aerodrome almost in the center of the Baku oil fields.

The basic population in the Baku region, like that in northern Iran, was Azerbaidzhan, though there were many Armenians, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and other nationalities, a mixture to be found in any large industrial and administrative capital in the Soviet Union.

Grozny oil is richer than that of Baku, containing about ten per cent benzene compared to five or six per cent in Baku. The field was opened in the last century. The city itself had been a fortress used by the Russians against the Tartars in 1818.

The Grozny of 1940 was a city of one hundred thousand inhabitants in the northern foothills of the Caucasus not far from the shore of the Caspian. A pipeline connected it with Makhach-Kala on the Caspian and with Tuapse and Rostov on the Black and Azov Seas. In 1940 there were about seven thousand workers in the fields and refineries, one of which was a brand-new American-designed lubricating-oil plant completed in 1939.

The largest single oil deposit in the Soviet Union is located between the Volga and the Urals. This region, referred to as the Second Baku, was first surveyed only in 1928. In 1929 drilling commenced and six hundred tons of petroleum were produced. After this the region was developed very rapidly. By 1939 production exceeded two million tons. (See Appendix 24.)

The Second Baku region is estimated to have more than two billion tons of reserves. The crude is very rich in benzene, up to thirty per cent, but large sulphate and salt contents complicate not only its production but still more its refining. A glance at the map shows this immense region to be in the center of the largest country in the world, out of reach of any but the most modern long-distance bombers.

The capital investment in the Second Baku exceeded two billion roubles and included several refineries and cracking plants whose capacity was to mount to six million tons annually by 1942, according to plan. By that year the petroleum production should be seven million tons, the planners said, but it is doubtful whether anything approaching that amount will be produced.

The largest field in the Second Baku region was Ishembaevo, twenty-five miles south of Sterlitamak and ninety miles from Ufa, the capital of the Bashkir Republic. To the north four very rich fields were developed. These are the Suchovsky, Krasnokamsk, Severokamsk, and Palazno fields. In 1939 American engineers were at work installing high-octane gasoline units and other refinery equipment in Ufa, Saratov, and other places in the region. Another important field in the Second Baku area was Buguruslan, where one hundred new wells were to have been drilled in 1941. Buguruslan was almost unique in the country in that it overfulfilled its production plan for the first six months of 1940 by ten per cent.

The only pipeline in operation in the region covered the short stretch from Ufa to Ishembai.

In 1940, newspaper articles from the Kazakhstan press claimed that local geologists had discovered four billion tons of oil reserves in the region of the Emba River between the Caspian and the Aral Seas. This figure was probably exaggerated, but in any event there were large deposits in this section. Production was small, however.

The Maikop oil region is in the North Caucasus, at the opposite end of the range from Grozny. The oil produced was sent by pipeline either direct to Krasnodar to a plant manufacturing high-octane gasoline or to Tuapse, where it was loaded into Black Sea tankers.

Sakhaline Island, the most northerly in the Japanese Archipelago, owned jointly by Russians and Japanese, is rich in oil. The northern half of the island became part of the U.S.S.R. in 1925; the first oil was produced in 1929. A good deal of the capital was invested by the Russians themselves and several Japanese concessionaires were admitted to the fields on the Soviet part of the island. The production of the Russian-operated wells increased to nearly a million tons in 1938.

When the Russians and the Germans divided up Poland in September, 1939, the Russians received almost all the Galician oil fields. These wells had been underproducing for many years. They were owned by foreign oil interests which much preferred selling their imported oil products to Poland to assisting her to produce her own. Then the Russians took over. They were unquestionably interested in getting as

much black gold as possible from the Galician fields. Qualified observers estimated that 1940 production in Galicia was about four hundred thousand tons. The Russians brought in a good deal of equipment, more than three hundred Soviet engineers, and several thousand oil workers from Baku and other Soviet fields. It is fairly certain that virtually all of the Galician oil output went to Germany under the sweeping commercial agreement between the two countries until the outbreak of the war in June, 1941.

There are smaller fields scattered throughout the Soviet Union. Oil is to be found in Turkmenistan just across the Black Sea from Baku, in the Ukraine, in the Urals near Chelyabinsk, on the Upper Volga, and in the Moscow region. More than a hundred geological expeditions were at work in 1940 trying to tabulate the vast petroleum resources of the Soviet Union. A competent American engineer, who installed imported equipment in several of the Soviet oil fields, stated: 'I think the Russians are exaggerating when they claim sixty-seven per cent of the world's oil reserves, but their ignorance is mightier than their dishonesty. They probably have more than that, only they do not know it.'

This was the much-coveted Soviet oil industry, so important for the Russians in buying peace from Germany and later so decisive a factor in bringing the Germans and the war to the heart of the Soviet Union.

## 5

After the beginning of the war between Britain and Germany, great attention was paid to the question of the defense of the Soviet oil fields and refineries. Both Baku and Grozny could be bombed from Iranian, Turkish Iraqi, or even Syrian bases, though it would not be easy because of the Caucasus Mountains. In June, 1939, several foreign planes were reported to have flown over Baku and Batumi and the Soviet Government lodged protests with the government of a 'neighboring



country,' as Molotov put it in his report to the Supreme Soviet. At various times there was talk in London of the possibility of bombing Baku, though after the arrival in June, 1940, of Sir Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. no one spoke about it publicly. The Russians remembered, however, and were preparing. There were unconfirmed reports that a few of the very best German pursuit planes were in the Caucasus to meet any possible attackers. Far-reaching air-raid precautions were taken. In Baku repeated editorials in the local press demanded that the numerous petroleum lakes, which speckled the oil fields, be drained. In Grozny there was talk about decentralization of the refineries. Furthermore, very realistic practice air raids were staged, particularly in Baku. On October twenty-first and twenty-second, 1940, there were complete blackouts in the city and industrial aggregates. Aeroplanes flew over the city and dropped 'bombs', one of which fell on the central square, breaking a water main, knocking down several telegraph poles, and destroying a streetcar line and part of the street itself. All of this damage was repaired before morning by emergency crews. 'Incendiary bombs' started two fires which were immediately extinguished by the air-raid wardens of the neighborhood and the fire department. The entire population of the city was in shelters during the latter part of the day and all night, according to the newspaper *Bakinski Rabochi* (*Baku Worker*).

## 6

During recent years Soviet oil production consistently lagged behind plan. In 1938 the plan was underfulfilled by ten and two-tenths per cent; in 1939 by thirteen and one-tenth per cent; and in 1930 by eleven and three-tenths per cent. These percentages were calculated on the basis of the more or less reasonable annual plans. The longer-term Five-Year Plan figures were grotesquely high. For instance, the Sec-

ond Five-Year Plan drawn up in 1932 called for an oil production of forty-six million tons in 1937, while actual production in that year was less than thirty million tons.

It was unusually difficult to obtain statistics on the work of the oil industry in 1940 and there had been no foreign engineers in the fields since the beginning of the year. Thus, information was spotty and often contradictory. It was known, however, that the 1939 production was about 28,506,000 tons, or eighty-six and nine-tenths per cent of the yearly plan. There were abnormal difficulties toward the end of 1939 because of the Finnish War so that the oil industry, like many other Soviet industries, got off to a bad start in 1940.

During the first quarter of 1940 the war with Finland caused serious disorganization in the country. Transport was in bad shape. Many workers had been mobilized and food was scarce. Most important of all, many industrial units had dropped their normal work and were manufacturing military material. This meant great difficulty in obtaining replacement parts, tools, machinery, and materials of all kinds. During the first three months of 1940 there was a tremendous fall in production. A few quotations from the Soviet press will illustrate this point.

*Industria*, organ of the Oil Commissariat, wrote on May sixth, 1940:

The drilling plan for the Second Baku region was fulfilled by only forty-seven and seven-tenths per cent during the first three months of 1940. There are many good drillers in our fields but, in general, drilling goes on very slowly. The equipment is broken down or shut down for other reasons very frequently; necessary materials are not prepared ahead of time. There is lack of equipment. For instance, the whole Second Baku region received only six drilling machines during the first three months of the year instead of the twenty which they should have received according to plan. . . . With spare parts the situation is even worse. . . .

On June thirtieth, 1940, the same paper wrote:

Despite the successes of the individual wells, the oil industry in general is working unsatisfactorily. Of twenty-nine trusts under the Oil

Commissariat, only four fulfilled their plans for the first quarter of the year. In April the plan was fulfilled by five trusts. . . . One of the main reasons for this is the failure to drill new wells. During the first quarter of the year two hundred and two wells which should have been put into production were not drilled. The drilling plan was fulfilled by fifty-three and six-tenths per cent. . . . The number of wells actually in production is constantly decreasing. Throughout the Union five hundred and sixty-seven wells went into production during the first quarter of the year, but the total number of active wells decreased by one hundred and thirty-six. This is explained by the fact that the technical directors of the Baku fields concentrate their attention on gushers and do not bother about the whole fund of wells. They forget the simple fact that timely repairs and good upkeep are necessary to guarantee continuous production. . . . If we could put into operation the 5970 wells which could have been producing, but which were inactive during the first quarter of the year, the fatherland would receive additional tens of thousands of tons of black gold.

The *Turkmenian Iskra* stated editorially November first, 1940:

The Turkmenistan oil fields are working unsatisfactorily. The production plan for the first nine months of 1940 was fulfilled by ninety-two and four-tenths per cent but the drilling plan was fulfilled by only fifty-three and four-tenths per cent.

The *Kazakhstan Pravda* wrote in an editorial on November twenty-seventh, 1940

The Emba oil fields are not fulfilling their 1940 plan. Moreover, production is considerably less than it was for the first ten months of last year.

A long article in the same paper for September twenty-first, 1940, explained reasons for the bad work of the Emba fields:

In Emba transport is decisively important. Yet of three hundred and forty-seven trucks operated by the oil trust, only a hundred and sixty-six are working. The rest are 'out of order'. . . . Oil is badly stored in open lakes and is often stolen or disappears. During the first half of the year 106,000 tons of crude oil were lost no one knew where. . . . If we realized the money for this lost oil we would be able to build

metal tanks for the entire production of the Emba wells. . . . Labor discipline is bad. The number of absentees from work rose instead of falling after the law of June twenty-sixth, 1940. . . . Of eight hundred and four supposedly active wells only three hundred and fifty work regularly. The reason is neglect of current repairs and violation of the technical rules of exploitation. . . .

And it was not only American newspapermen who read these illuminating items. A competent staff at the German Embassy was reading all the time. Moreover, whereas the correspondents spent much of their time trying to cable through a cast-iron censorship and chewing their fingernails in frustration, the German Embassy had every opportunity to report to Berlin that 'in Emba 106,000 tons of petroleum disappeared no one knew where. . . .'

## 7

The summer brought some improvement in the work of the oil industry. The labor decrees of June twenty-sixth and July tenth were effective. Furthermore, a policy of deflation began to take effect. The result was a drastic increase in prices, particularly of luxury commodities, and a constriction of the buying power of the workers' wages. The amateur might have thought there would be trouble in Russia. Many did, and they were wrong. Production rose throughout Soviet industry after a summer's cudgeling. The third quarter in the oil industry showed a marked improvement. On October ninth, 1940, *Neft*, the newly-created newspaper of the Oil Commissariat, stated:

The third quarter brought a boom in almost all the oil fields of the country. Labor turnover decreased considerably, and the quality of production improved as a result of the laws of June twenty-sixth and July tenth. The Baku fields approached the fulfillment of their monthly plans. Several fields actually fulfilled their production plans. . . . In

Baku the number of active wells increased by a hundred and sixty-six over January first, 1940. . . . Grozny achieved successes during the third quarter. . . .

Then toward the end of the year articles began to appear which gave an idea of the work of the oil industry during the year as a whole. I. Sedin, People's Commissar of Oil Industry, wrote an article published in *Pravda* on November twenty-ninth, 1940:

Baku has fulfilled its plan for the second consecutive month. The Baku workers are producing much more oil than they did during the first half of this year, and more than they did during the corresponding months of last year. . . . The Grozny oil workers succeeded in checking the fall in production which had overtaken them. . . . The Second Baku and Maikop regions have worked very badly. . . .

In early December two big Baku trusts fulfilled their yearly plans. Editorials were cautious, reminding people that there was still much to be done.

On December thirteenth, 1940, *Pravda* published an interview with the Secretary of the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party, Bagirov. This party functionary said, among other things:

. . . If in January of this year there were more than 1000 cases of absenteeism from work, in October there were only a hundred and sixty. We have made progress, but still have not succeeded in fully liquidating violations of labor discipline. . . . We still suffer heavy losses of gas and oil due to bad exploitation. . . . One of the most backward sectors of our industry is drilling. . . . There are still many shutdowns and breakdowns due usually to violations of technological discipline. . . .  
[See Appendix 25.]

## 8

While promulgating labor laws to improve discipline, the Soviet Government made concurrent efforts to cut oil consumption. This was

not less complicated than increasing production because sixty per cent of the fuel oil consumed in the country went to agriculture, for which it was an absolute necessity. In 1939 the Soviet Union had less than half as many horses as Russia had in 1913. This decrease was due to slaughter by disgruntled peasants during the years of collectivization and dekulakization. Half a million tractors, one hundred seventy thousand combines and two hundred thousand trucks, which Soviet Russia was so proud of having manufactured, worked on the fields of the collective and state farms as necessities. Many observers believed that Stalin would live to regret mechanization of agriculture to the degree which had been attained, because it made Soviet agriculture directly dependent on petroleum. 'No gasoline, no bread.'

In spite of these difficulties the Kremlin put its teeth into the problem of cutting oil consumption. One hundred thousand trucks and tractors operating in Soviet lumber camps and on interurban transport in the forested districts were converted to burn peat or charcoal in an effort to save a million tons of crude oil a year. Carbide-gas generators were designed and manufactured by Soviet factories and could be seen on the streets of Moscow. Some of these units were mounted on trailers and could be hitched to a truck or tractor, converting them into carbide or peat burners in five minutes. Test runs of these units on stretches of several hundred miles demonstrated their practicability and economy. Strict measures were taken to prevent the consumption of petroleum products in stationary engines, which were replaced by wood, peat, coal, or carbide burning engines or else by watermills, windmills, or electric motors.

Particular attention was paid to the use of peat, of which the Soviet Union has enormous quantities (estimated at nearly a hundred billion tons). Progress was made in the introduction of this cheap fuel, consumption of which increased by one hundred per cent from 1931 to 1941, by which time twenty per cent of Soviet electric power was produced with peat.

Collective farms were urged to use horses or oxen for as much of their farm work as possible, and not to depend on tractors and trucks any more than was necessary. During the 1940 harvest the press repeatedly

attacked collective farm presidents who stubbornly waited for the State to send trucks to collect the legally stipulated obligatory grain contributions. The newspapers insisted that the kolkhozes deliver the grain to the nearest elevator on their own horse carts.

Unfortunately, there were no figures available on the number of motor cars and trucks idle for lack of gasoline. In Moscow queues of vehicles waited for gas and oil at filling stations despite the strict rationing system in effect after December first, 1940, while many garages were crowded with cars and trucks which either could not be supplied with gas or had no tires. Of course, this same situation prevailed throughout Europe, except in Rumania, where gas was cheap and plentiful though tires were unobtainable.

## 9

The Soviet Union had equipment for the annual refining of 33,700,000 tons of crude oil. Crude-oil production plans were consistently underfulfilled, but many of the refineries, planned to process an increased output, were completed and had nothing to refine. Because of a lack of crude the utilization of the refining capacity steadily decreased after 1935. (See Appendix 26.)

The Soviet Union had some very modern refining equipment, including high-octane gasoline units and up-to-date lubricating-oil units imported from the United States and installed in the late thirties. From all available reports these units worked much better than the American installation engineers themselves expected. The Russians put their best people on the jobs, as Marshal Timoshenko and other influential army people were demanding the best high-octane gasoline and lubricating oil available for the Red Air Force.

There was a good deal of waste in refineries, however, to which the press constantly referred. The Azerbaidzhan Party Organization passed

a resolution in the middle of November, 1940, which was published in the local press and which began as follows:

It is established that as a result of the irresponsibility of the Azerbaidzhan refining combines, the directors, the chief engineers, and the department chiefs of the refineries, there are still inexcusably large losses and much waste of crude and refined products in the refineries. . . .

The resolution went on to name the worst offenders and demanded decreases in losses and waste.

Losses were not confined to the petroleum itself. Both distributor and consumer were frequently attacked in the Soviet press as being irresponsible, even criminal, wasters of black gold. *Pravda* for December seventeenth, 1940, stated:

Oil in turbines and transformers in our plants lasts eight to twelve thousand hours. In Germany and America the same oils have a life of seventy, ninety, a hundred and twenty thousand hours. . . . Most of the norms for utilization of petroleum products were established eight years ago; during this time equipment has been perfected which utilized less lubricating oil, but our industry goes right on applying the old norms. . . . Industrial plants consistently burn more than their planned and allotted amount of liquid fuels and lubricants. During four months of this year fifteen metallurgical plants consumed 55,000 tons of petroleum products more than their plan provided. . . . During two months of this year the Hammer and Sickle plant squandered 2500 tons of oil; the First Ball-Bearing plant burned fifty-five tons of lubricating oil as fuel. . . . The technical leadership is accustomed to an irresponsible attitude toward petroleum products and habitually orders sixty to seventy per cent more than it actually needs. . . .

The article then condemned the utilization of crude oil as boiler fuel in general:

The industries of the Soviet Union annually burn under their boilers half a million tons of crude oil and about a million tons of first-fraction mazut. In other words, in boiler rooms they consume the equivalent of more than half a million tons of benzene. . . .



## 10

According to 1939 figures Russian oil transport was handled forty-four per cent by rail, twenty-five per cent by sea, sixteen per cent by inland waterways, and fifteen per cent by pipelines. The railroads, sadly overburdened, grumbled and strained over their oil shipments, which were slow and expensive. The work of the roads was complicated by shortages of tank cars; they used any car for any product which was to be shipped from the place where the car happened to be. This meant a difficult and expensive steaming and washing of the inside of the tank after almost every trip. It also meant that high-grade products, like high-octane gasoline and toluol, were often dirtied en route and had to be refractioned. There was also a good deal of waste in railroad transport. *Pravda* of December seventeenth, 1940, stated:

In the Odessa freight yards during forty-five days this summer seventy-two tons of benzene and twenty-eight tons of kerosene were taken from 'empty' tank cars and used as fuel by the local railroad people. . . . It is quite possible to reduce norms of petroleum losses in rail transport by fifty or sixty per cent. . . .

Difficulties in shipping oil from the Soviet Union to Germany were much less serious than was first expected. The Germans themselves were surprised and delighted, and no case was reported of delays in Soviet oil shipments to Germany occasioned by breakdowns in Soviet transport. No accurate figures were available regarding the quantities shipped to Germany, or the routes used, but it is fair to assume that a large portion of the deliveries went direct by rail across former Poland.

Oil transport in pipelines was not as cheap as water transport but it had a number of outstanding advantages: it was not seasonal, losses were small, the oil was transported rapidly and simply. For these reasons pipeline transport of petroleum became highly developed in the

United States, where 57,600 miles of pipe compared strikingly with the Soviet Union's 2668 miles. But the Russians began to pay attention to the construction of pipelines, and during the middle nineteen-forties the network was to have been doubled. The present main Soviet lines are the following:

OIL PIPE LINES IN OPERATION IN THE U.S.S.R. AS OF APRIL FIRST, 1940

From	To	Length in km.	Diam. in in.	Date com- pleted	Annual cap. 1000t.	Annual Traffic 1,000 tons		
						1932	1933	1934
Baku	Batumi	883	8	Pre-Rev.	1,000	920	921	885
Baku	Batumi	822	10	1928	1,750	1,565	1,645	1,672
Grozny	Makhach-Kala	162	8	1924		400	369	611
Grozny	Tuapse	618	10	1928	1,600	1,075	959	776
Maikop	Krasnodar	108	8	1930		912	577	905
Dossor	Rakusha	84	6	1930		205	156	121
Armavir	Trudovaya	488	12	1933	1,500	....	1,181	1,509
Malgobek	Vrezka	25	10	1934		....	....	101
Gurev	Orsk	758	12	1935		....	....	....
Koshchagil	Makat	130	8	1935		....	....	....
Ishembai	Ufa	166	12	1936		....	....	....
Baichuanas	Isline	22	8	1939	2,000	....	....	....
Koschagil	Kulsary	20	8	1939		....	....	....
Tuimaz	Ufa	150	12	1940		....	....	....
Stavropol	Batraki	73	12	1940		....	....	....
Batraki	Sysran	21		1940		....	....	....
Ishembai	Ufa	165		1940		....	....	....
Izberbash	Makhach-Kala	64		1940		....	....	....
Malgobek	Grozny	90		1940		....	....	....
Mirzaani	Kachreti	68		1940		....	....	....
Trudovaya	Dnepropetrovsk	364		Planned		....	....	....
Trudovaya	Voronezh	616		Planned		....	....	....
Ishembai	Chelyabinsk	600		Planned		....	....	....
Chelyabinsk	Kurgan							
Moskalvo	Nikolaevsk	150		Planned		....	....	....
Voronezh	Moscow	583		Planned		....	....	....

New lines to be constructed were to have handled refined products rather than crude oil, according to press reports. The same press, however, shed bitter tears over the fact that not only were the various means of petroleum transport under different commissariats but there were several organizations, all independent of each other, operating pipelines which were constructed by yet another organization and projected by a third organization — a trust under the Construction Commissariat. Perhaps this is why few lines were actually constructed and put into operation during the late thirties, though the press was loud in its praises of pipelines in general and in expressions of intentions to overtake and surpass the United States in pipeline mileage. Petroleum products were, nevertheless, transported as fast as they were produced and the lack of oil ready to ship delayed the railroad and tanker workers much more frequently than transport tangles blocked the producers.



There was a serious housing problem in most Soviet cities, but in at least several of the oil fields there were no houses at all. There were tents and barracks. Writing about the Sakhaline fields, *Izvestia* stated on April eleventh, 1940:

The most important factor in getting our workers to stay in Sakhaline is to improve their living conditions. . . . In the first place the construction of houses for the workers should be speeded up. The difficulty at the moment is that not only do the civil city organizations not build houses for the oil workers, but they fill oil trust houses with their city functionaries. While many oil workers have to live in temporary barracks, more than 6000 square meters of living space belonging to the Trust are occupied by functionaries of non-industrial organizations. . . .

*Izvestia* wrote the following about housing in the Second Baku fields in its issue of October seventeenth, 1940:

The City Elders in Ishembaevo make wonderful speeches about their beautiful future city but, unfortunately, they pay little attention to the convenience and comfort of the inhabitants of the town of today. In their efforts to create a gigantic city, they not infrequently forget the immediate interests of the oil workers. . . . For a population of 35,000 there is only one hospital. The living quarters are not prepared for winter. . . . It is still undecided who is supposed to build houses for the workers, the Ishembaineft Trust or the City Soviet. . . .

In Baku and Grozny, older cities, the situation was somewhat better, but housing was inadequate in all parts of the Soviet Union for the simple reason that during the past fifteen years thirty-five million peasants had become workers and had gone to live in towns and cities. Instead of investing capital in houses for these newcomers, investments were going primarily into heavy industry and the Red Army. The result was that people had to double up.

Along with housing came the problem of consumers' goods. The

average oil worker earned approximately four hundred roubles a month, which was the price of a good-quality pair of men's or women's dress shoes. A skilled driller or still operator made eight hundred to one thousand roubles a month, which was what one had to pay for a man's suit of medium quality. The answer was, of course, that most Soviet workers neither bought nor wore good-quality dress shoes or suits. They wore the Russian equivalent of blue jeans costing one to two hundred roubles, and cheap rubber-soled shoes costing twenty to fifty roubles. The latter item was very difficult to find in any part of the Soviet Union. There were not enough shoes or enough suits to be had. This lack of manufactured goods was an old story. There was a new wrinkle in it, however, in that prices had been increased drastically on medium-quality goods, with the result that such articles were in the stores to be bought but only highly paid engineers and a small number of Stakhanovite workers could afford to purchase them. The country had been concentrating its attention on the production of producers' goods and armaments.

The question of food supplies was even more important than that of clothes. Workers could get along quite well on inferior clothes, particularly in a warm climate and where everyone was in the same position and was not expected to maintain any particular standards of dress. But everyone had to have food every day if he was to do his work efficiently.

During 1940 there were serious food difficulties. Moscow, Leningrad, and perhaps Kiev were abundantly supplied. Groceries and fancy foods and beverages of every kind were on sale in the capital, including French champagne and Scotch whisky from Lvov and Riga. Prices were high, but the stuff was there. Not so, however, in places like Baku, Odessa, Ufa, and other local industrial centers. This was occasionally admitted in the newspapers. On December twelfth, *Neft* published an indignant letter from the Secretary of the Communist Party in Neftegorsk in the Maikop oil fields. The title of the letter was 'The Oil Workers Are Dissatisfied with Their Dining-Rooms' and it attacked the local dining-room trust bitterly:

The Trust has no source of supplies and they have not exerted themselves to organize one for themselves. The most they have been able to do is to acquire and keep eleven pigs.

In other words, it was impossible to buy food in sufficient quantities. Further, the letter charged that the directors of the Trust, instead of living and working in Neftegorsk where most of their dining-rooms were located, were housed some sixty kilometers away and refused to move to town because of the difficulty of securing rooms there. The letter charged that the Trust's dining-rooms did not have sufficient pots and pans for the preparation of food even when the food was there to prepare. Apparently there were no cooking utensils for sale in the neighborhood, as the letter spoke of the necessity for sending a purchasing agent outside the district to procure pots and pans. The Party Secretary further complained that the directors of the Trust, being far away, could not be forced by the local party organization to plant vegetable gardens in order to supply its dining-rooms with food—a common practice in this and many other industrial districts among dining-room, supply, and commercial organizations. The letter ended with a fervent appeal to the Commissariat of Internal Trade to 'at least organize the feeding of the oil workers, as without this it is difficult to struggle for an increase in oil production.'

In all the southern industrial towns there was a rather strict rationing of such food products as bread, cereal grains, cheese, and meat. Butter was almost impossible to secure, even at the new high prices (twelve roubles a pound). Travelers returning from Baku stated that no vegetables were to be found there. Bread and meat were made available to foreigners stopping at the best hotel in town, though for the population at large they were strictly rationed and rather difficult to obtain even with ration cards because of a comparative shortage. Why were there no vegetables? The Baku newspaper *Bakinski Rabochi* for December twelfth, 1940, gave an answer to the question in the form of a report of the findings of the local Commissariat for State Control:

The plan for vegetable supply for the city of Baku was found to have been fulfilled by only thirty-four per cent during the first nine months of 1940. The director of the supply organization did not control the plan fulfillment. Because of criminal negligence in storage many vegetables were spoiled. During the first eleven months of this year nine hundred and ninety-seven tons of vegetables were written off the books

as having been spoiled. Of these five hundred and fifty-eight tons were potatoes. Moreover, the throwing away of the ostensibly spoiled vegetables was not controlled. . . . In one case checked by the Commission, thirty-five tons of 'spoiled' vegetables in excess of those figured on the books were taken from the storehouse and supposedly thrown away. . . .

The report then continued at length to describe how the directors of the supply trust sold these 'spoiled' vegetables at speculative prices, thus making a profit of 1,700,000 roubles during several months. The population bought the bad vegetables at double and triple prices because there were no others to be had. The report then told of the failure of the local bread trust to deliver bread to the distribution points according to schedule, and then went into the financial irregularities of various organizations whose job it was to supply the population of Baku with food and other commodities. During these transactions the directors and other functionaries of these organizations coined millions of roubles in illegal and untaxable profits. The report concluded by stating that the various criminal grafters mentioned had been removed from their posts and indicted.

Organizing the production and distribution of consumers' goods without the incentive of private profit seemed to be difficult, particularly in a situation where the supply of almost every commodity was less than the demand, which resulted in a discrepancy between official prices and what people were willing to pay for things. Private profit kept cropping up in the form of speculation, embezzlement, and waste, of course, but with only negative and no positive results. It may be argued that this was a failure of the organization of supplies in Baku, or an expression of Russian organizational impotence in general, and not of the socialist system of production and distribution as such. Be this as it may, the fact remained — the Baku oil workers were not properly supplied with groceries and other consumers' goods. This was reflected in the low productivity of their labor.

During late 1940 the Party and the Government carried on an intensive campaign for improvement of workers' food supplies in the oil fields. So effective was it that by April, 1941, when I visited Baku the stores were well stocked, both with food products and consumers'

goods, and the workers were living relatively comfortably. They were producing well too, and hundreds of thousands of tons of oil were being absorbed by the Commissariat of Reserves and stored away.

The oil fields and the oil workers had been hammered into a state of mobilized preparedness for the struggle to come.

## **Part Eight**

Near-Eastern Interlude





FOR some time the *News Chronicle's* editors had been suggesting that they would like a comprehensive series on Soviet foreign policy, covering the Kremlin's relations with Berlin and with London and the prospects for the future. I decided to take a trip to some point beyond the range of the Soviet censors and from there to send such a series of articles, making it as objective and fair as possible, but including many points which the Soviet censors refused to pass or even to discuss with us.

Many other correspondents in Moscow had done such articles. Harold Denny of the *New York Times*, for example, went to France in the summer of 1937 and wrote an uncensored series on the Tukhachevsky trial of Soviet marshals and generals and on the political purges. His series had been scathing, yet he came back to Moscow a few weeks later and immediately received a new apartment and several other things which he had been trying to secure for a long time.

By the beginning of 1941 the war was already in a real sense one for oil. Germany must have oil — some ten million tons a year. She was receiving only a million or so tons from Russia. The only way to get ten times as much from Russia would be to come in and take it. And the only other region within striking distance where oil was to be found in large quantities was in Iraq and Iran.

I had never been in the Near or Middle East, so I decided on a trip through Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, which would give me an opportunity to write my articles, and to see something of a part of the world which bade fair to be a crucial battlefield.

The most difficult problem was an Iranian visa. The Persians disliked foreign correspondents, and Ambassador Saed in Moscow assured me that his Government had permitted no foreign journalists of any nationality to enter Iran since John Gunther had been there in the late

thirties. He was willing, however, to recommend that the Shah's Government give me a transit visa. The application was made. It was eight weeks before the visa came through, and then it took the combined efforts of the British and American Ministers in Teheran, as well as numerous telegrams from Ambassador Saed, to persuade the Iranian Government that my two weeks' trip through Iran would not endanger the state security of that country.

I went over to visit A. T. Cholerton, the *Daily Telegraph* and *Morning Post* correspondent in Moscow, to ask him to cover for me during my absence in the Near East, as I had done similar favors for him in the past. Cholerton, as usual, was puffing cigarettes, sipping red wine, periodically looking in all his pockets for his glasses, which were usually on his nose, and effervescing with humorous comment on the Soviet Union. Cholerton was the grand old man of the Moscow correspondent corps. A brilliant student of nineteenth-century French history at Cambridge in 1914, he had been drafted into the Intelligence Department of the British Government. He spent several years reading the French and Italian press and making analyses of political tendencies and enemy financial influences. In the early twenties he came down with tuberculosis and after sundry wanderings around Europe, wound up in Moscow as a correspondent for the *News Chronicle*. From pale pink he became true-blue Tory in his politics, was unreasonable and bigoted to an extreme in his political opinions. Yet so charming and brilliant a person was he, so alive with humor and feeling, that he was immediately forgiven his blind spots, and his admitted subjectivity, and was respected and regularly visited by correspondents of all nationalities. His Russian wife and their daughter had been living in Sweden and England since the early thirties, but old Cholerton, in his fifties and suffering from a quantity of diverse ailments in addition to his twenty-year-old tuberculosis, plugged along in Moscow, periodically writing brilliant stories on contemporary affairs, and then lapsing into gloomy, censor-ridden silence.

The bottle of Caucasian wine on the table was three-quarters empty when I arrived. Cholerton was overflowing with energy, good will, and humor. Of course he would cover for me while I went to Persia. De-

lighted. But had I noticed that his refrigerator was working? He poured me a glass of wine and proceeded to tell me the story of his massive Swedish electric refrigerator.

'It broke down in 1936,' he said. 'For about two years I got along without it, then I invited your American Embassy electrician to come and look at it. I sent my car for him and he came around very condescendingly. He took the thing all apart and then, like a great surgeon, left it for my chauffeur to put back together again while he drank several whiskies, making remarks all the time to the effect that the damned thing was no good anyhow, and I should buy an American refrigerator that he could get me at a special price.

'After he had left I noticed that the room smelled of gas. My chauffeur suggested that perhaps the gas had been let out by mistake. Relying on the technical skill of a U. S. electrician with sixteen years' experience I pooh-poohed the idea. The refrigerator worked one night and then stopped again.

'For two years he would come up every couple of months and do the same thing. It cost me half a bottle of whisky or so every time, and once I was on the verge of getting an American refrigerator through him, but I put it off. Then he left Moscow.

'Last summer it got hot and I finally agreed to take my secretary's advice and telephone to the 'Moskholodrembasa,' the Moscow refrigerator-repairing organization. The same evening a quiet chap in overalls came round, looked inside the refrigerator, said that the gas had been let out, but that otherwise it seemed to be in perfectly good condition. The next day he came back with a tank of gas, refilled the thing, and ever since it has been working perfectly.

'And then, this perfectly competent Russian having done the job as well as anybody could have wished, I have been six months trying to get a bill. It just came today. Three roubles and forty-six kopeks — sixpence!'

Cholerton was tickled to death with his story. He refilled his glass and went off into epigrams about the Russians. I mentioned the coming session of the Supreme Soviet.

'Oh, yes, the Supreme Soviet,' he said. 'The Moscow equivalent for

gladiatorial shows and bullfights is political trials. The main difference is that here the rough stuff takes place offstage. It's hard to find a Western equivalent for the sessions of the Supreme Soviet, though. . . .'

Cholerton started to tell me another story about the terrible difficulties the Russians got into in 1932 or thereabouts when the G.P.U. had to deal with a psychopathic young Russian named Stern, who attempted to assassinate the German Ambassador simply because he *was* psychopathic and wanted to attract attention. They caught the boy on the scene of the incident after he had fired three shots into the back of the Ambassador's car. He confessed proudly.

But according to Marxian theory one doesn't just assassinate an ambassador for some subjective reason, so the first night in jail they beat the boy up and he denounced about a hundred people as accomplices. Germany and Poland were quarreling at the time and the G.P.U. dragged the Poles in. They found an ex-Menshevik stooge who 'admitted' having persuaded Stern to commit the crime in the interests of the Polish Secret Police, from whom he had received substantial gifts. The case was tried publicly and started out well, but then the boy broke down and insisted indignantly that he tried to assassinate the Ambassador because he wanted to. The Poles and the Germans were furious with the Russians for dragging this silly incident in to complicate their relations. Both insisted on attending the secret sessions of the trial, and when it became obvious that no real connections with the Polish Secret Police had been established they kicked up such a row that Stern was pardoned, while the stooge, who no doubt had been promised an easy sentence, was shot. Cholerton laughed long and loud. 'An impossible situation. Imagine the G.P.U. presented with an actual attempt at assassination and a would-be assassin who pleaded guilty of his own accord and insisted that he did it because he wanted to!'

Cholerton started to tell another story, but I had to go.

## 2

Journalism was rather slow in Moscow in February. I read the papers every morning and wrote a story about civilian-defense maneuvers or industrial achievements, or else reported a *Red Star* reaction to the Libyan campaign. I got this off before my two o'clock deadline and then scouted around to see what was happening. The only real story in town was the Japanese negotiations. Japan was trying to get the Russians to sign a political document which would strengthen Matsuoko's position and which might end the Chinese War. Late in January, as I found out from an unimpeachable Japanese source, the little yellow men offered the Russians southern Sakhaline, an enormously rich island taken from Russia in 1905 at Portsmouth. Moscow refused, however. The Russians were biding their time. The Soviet censor refused to pass any allusions to these negotiations.

The Italians were downhearted and glum. The Germans were arrogant and confident until they had had a few drinks; then many of them would admit sorrowfully that they did not see how they could possibly win the war.

I got quite well acquainted with French Ambassador Labonne, who invited me to dinner several times, but never told me anything I could use for a cable. He was a typical French imperialist, former Governor-General of Tunis, and a great racist. 'All the French south of the Loire are Negroids,' he said, 'while the Germans east of the Elbe are Mongoloids. It's too bad that Europe can't be run by the Rhineland Germans and the Norman French.'

The French Ambassador was in a position to know certain things about Soviet-German relations. I think he knew as far back as March that Germany would attack soon. He hinted to me in this general vein but told me nothing definite.

The American Embassy was divided into two bitter schools — those

who thought that Germany would attack the Soviet Union during 1941, and those who thought there would be no hostilities between the two countries during the year. Major Ivan Yeaton, the American Military Attaché, was convinced that the Germans would have to attack within a few months. 'If they wait another year, it will be too late,' he said on several occasions. Ivan was an old artilleryman, and had been tremendously impressed by a visit to the Red Army Artillery School near Leningrad. 'It is better than anything we have,' he said.

Steinhardt was inclined to be cagey with the journalists. I was impressed with his inconsistency. One day he would tell us with a slap on the back, 'It won't be long now.' The next morning he would be off on another tack. For some time I thought his mind really worked that way, but when I got to know him better I came to the conclusion that that was just his method of finding out what the other fellow was thinking. His reports to Washington were, I believe, terse and concise, and contained more information than those of any other diplomat in Moscow with the exception of von der Schulenberg, who had at his disposal several times as many sources of information as Steinhardt. In conversation our Ambassador sounded opinionated and loquacious. He was actually just cagey. People respected him more and more as they got to know him better. The Ambassador was flanked by Walter Thurston, whose coolness and balance could only have resulted from his long and diverse experience. I think that the United States was better represented in Moscow than almost any other country.

On February twenty-seventh Sir Stafford Cripps flew off to Ankara in a special plane to talk with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. I tried to get him to take me with him in the twenty-one-passenger special Douglas rented from the Soviet Government, but he said the Turkish and Soviet authorities would not like it. I left on the train the same evening for Odessa, having obtained my Turkish visa in about ten minutes from Ambassador Haidar Aktai.

The train ride was the usual thing. Millions of Russians and an immense rich country. The people were all straining and sweating, plowing and grinding, driven on by the necessity of eating and paying the rising rents and taxes. They were indifferent to the war, to Europe, to

everything. They were overworked, and completely occupied with living. They wanted only to be let alone. They were grateful to the Soviet Government for having at least kept them out of war. The only thing which aroused them was talk of an attack on the Soviet Union. 'We'll show them,' the Russian invariably said, though he was usually hazy about who 'them' might refer to.

The food situation in Odessa was bad, though better than it had been five months before when I had passed through on my way back from Bulgaria.

### 3

I sailed from Odessa on March first on the trim Danish-made Soviet-run *Svanetia*, bound for Istanbul. In addition to a heavy cargo of agricultural machinery and other Soviet exports to Turkey, the *Svanetia* carried more than four hundred passengers: one hundred and fifty Jewish refugees from Lithuania and Latvia going to Palestine and New Zealand, several dozen stalwart Scandinavians passing through to join the Norwegian Army in Canada, or wherever their command considered that they were needed, a Rumanian trade delegation which had just concluded an eight-million-dollar Soviet-Rumanian commercial agreement in Moscow, three Swedish engineers going to Bangkok to erect a hydro-electric plant.

Most remarkable of all, there were some two hundred Czech aviators who had been in an internment camp near Gorki since the fall of Poland, in whose army they had served as volunteers. The Soviet Government was releasing them to proceed to Palestine for service in the R.A.F., while being careful to prevent Berlin from finding out about it.

Two hours out to sea the loudspeakers in the cabins and on deck brought the news that German troops had entered Bulgaria. Most of the people on the boat did not believe it. Minister Nemoyanu, chief of



the Rumanian delegation, picked his teeth contentedly in the dining-room, and reflected aloud to his secretaries and me that the agreement which had been reached was highly satisfactory politically as it tended to decrease the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Rumania in case Germany collapsed one day. The refugees told each other of their wanderings and speculated as to what the future had in store for them. Most of them had fled Fascism in Prague or Vienna years ago, and had become refugees in Poland, whence the war had driven them, destitute, to Lithuania. Classifying them as refugees from a foreign country, and not as native Lithuanians, the Soviet authorities permitted them to leave the Soviet Union and seek refuge elsewhere. If they could only get to America, they said. They opened their mouths in astonishment when I told them that every ship arriving in Vladivostok from America carried a load of expatriate Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians going back to Riga and Kaunas after having spent years in the United States.

The next afternoon we arrived in Varna, and there on the deck were German soldiers in uniform. The Norwegians retired to their cabins. Most of the Jewish refugees stood on deck and watched with the weary cynicism of people who had been through it before. The Soviet Consul in Varna came on board the boat very much excited and I heard him tell the captain of the *Svanetia* that eighteen German divisions had arrived in Bulgaria already and that there was fighting on the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier. He also said that the port of Varna was closed and no one could land. The Rumanians raised a howl. The head of the mission was a State Minister, and demanded that he be given the opportunity of telephoning to Bucharest. Finally, after this had been arranged, the Varna port authorities were informed from Sofia that by request of the German Legation the Rumanian mission was to be allowed to land.

The German soldiers did not come on board, and after loading several tons of sheet copper, the *Svanetia* put to sea and headed for the Bosphorus. Foundationless rumors went around the boat that the Germans were already in Istanbul. Many of the refugees considered the possibility of staying on the boat and going back to Odessa. The Norwegians and Czechs swore quietly at the prospect of an internment camp.

It took two hours instead of the usual twenty-five minutes to get down the Bosphorus. Mine-laying was going on intensively. At one place a submarine net stretched over most of the half-mile of water between Europe and Asia Minor. On the southern bank troops were scurrying back and forth between artillery emplacements which were visible from the boat, but well protected against aerial observation or attack by shelflike artificial roofs several feet thick, with trees planted on them.

Istanbul was quiet and unconcerned. The relieved passengers of the *Svanetia* went about arranging to continue their journeys. The Norwegians and Czechs were sent to Palestine, much to the chagrin of the Turks, who needed pilots and wanted to keep them. Most of the refugees were told to proceed to Palestine as soon as they could get tickets, which was usually several weeks, as waves of refugees were arriving from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia daily, and the Syrian railroads, never very good, were further disorganized by civilian disorders.

There were about eight hundred thousand Turkish troops in Thrace—the small portion of Turkey lying north of the Straits. They were ready to fight, I was assured by my British colleagues in Constantinople. Other people qualified in military matters pointed out, however, that Thrace was very good tank country, and that the Turks could not possibly hold the Germans there with the equipment and material at their disposal, let alone undertake any offensive activities in case Germany attacked Greece or Yugoslavia.

The Turks told Eden that they needed military equipment immediately. Eden assured the Turks that they would receive everything they needed, but in the first week of March when I was there, this matériel had not yet begun to arrive. Rumor asserted that it would come soon. 'Wait till you get to Baghdad,' people whispered to me, and hinted at immense British armies on their way from India and Australia to join the Turks.

I heard a few skeptical voices. 'And we should get killed in order to give Britain another three weeks,' a Turkish newspaperman said to me.

The consensus of opinion seemed to be that the Turks would fight if attacked now, but that after a few weeks or months of badgering and bargaining Turkey might well capitulate and join the Axis, unless Britain came across immediately with very considerable military aid.

## 4

I spent two days in my hotel room writing my series for the *News Chronicle*. I tried to make several points.

1. Russia's attitude toward Britain and Germany would not change unless the Soviet Union were attacked.

2. Russia's main aim was to avoid war with any major power in order to pursue peaceful internal construction.

3. Russia's basic strategy was to keep Britain and Germany fighting until both were exhausted.

4. Stalin's main interest was the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. His interest in other countries was incidental, except in cases where they threatened Russia.

I sent these stories, which pleased the *Chronicle* very much.

For nearly a week in Istanbul I rubbed shoulders with the unshaven, stubborn-looking Turkish recruits moving northward, while the number of German troops in Bulgaria and the pressure on Yugoslavia increased simultaneously. Then I took the train and went to Ankara, the shining new capital situated out in the middle of the plateau steppe in central Turkey.

No one in Ankara expected Turkey to take any offensive action, I was told by a number of people. It was an open question whether or not Turkey would defend herself if directly attacked by Germany. If this happened it seemed more or less clear that Thrace, and with it the historic city of Istanbul, would have to be abandoned almost immediately. The third line of defenses which lay on the Straits might be held. Behind that there were several other lines running right back to the Tauros Mountains. These the Turks could certainly hold.

There were two questions. In the first place, when would the British or the Americans deliver sufficient aviation material so that the Turks would feel reasonably safe from a mass descent in their rear? A friend

of mine was in Sofia during the German invasion of Bulgaria. For forty-eight hours he watched fifty-passenger German transport planes land every ten minutes, bringing German troops down from Bucharest. Turkey must have enough planes to spot mass descents in Turkey and shoot down at least some of the invaders.

The second question was: Were the Turks really willing to fight? My impression was that not only were they willing, they were r'aring to fight. It was a question only of what they were going to fight with.

I went to see Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador to Ankara, who had been machine-gunned by the Japanese in China several years before. He seemed cheerful and confident. He told me to look out for the British Army in Iraq, and seemed satisfied that Turkey was ready to fight. American Ambassador MacMurray was less optimistic. 'I hope the Turks don't get involved in operations against the Germans now,' he said, 'because they are not yet equipped for such an eventuality.' Other foreign observers were highly skeptical. 'Turkey had a three weeks' supply of munitions, and only three to four hundred planes, I was told. 'You can't fight the Germans without equipment, we have seen that too often,' a prominent diplomat said to me.

Being a British correspondent I could not see the Germans, but I was told that they were whispering sweetly in Turkish ears, 'Northern Syria, as well as northern Iraq, will become Turkish.' Furthermore, von Papen assured them Germany would guarantee Turkey against any possible Russian attack, whereas if the Turks persisted in their recalcitrance, the Russians might well take advantage of the moment to reoccupy the Kars district in Armenia, which was given to the Turks after the last war. This whispering had surprisingly little effect. Responsible Turkish circles estimated, I think correctly, that Russia would not attack Turkey if that might involve trouble with Britain; that if Germany got into Turkey she would immediately forget any promises made to the Turkish Government, and go about organizing a petroleum and grain base in the Middle East, using Turkish and Arab, aided perhaps by Polish, French, and Czech, conscript labor.

The Turks had no illusions about German promises. They were de-

terminated to resist. It all came back to the awkward question of planes and equipment. Ten days after I left Turkey, Eden had his second meeting with President Inonu. This talk was concerned entirely with this pivotal question — arms for Turkey.

## 5

It was a three-day trip from Ankara to Baghdad. After traversing the majestic Tauros Mountains, the train passed into Syria to Haleb or Aleppo, where it was divided into two sections, one going on to Palestine and the other back through the desert to Mosul and Baghdad. The latter line had only been in operation for a few months. It was the end of the 'Berlin-Baghdad' railroad which the Germans wanted to build before World War I, but now it had been constructed and was controlled by the Turks, the Iraqis, and the Syrian French. It passed through a remarkable district: hundreds of miles of treeless flat country, with a rich topsoil, needing only water to become again the breadbasket that it was for the ancient world.

Aleppo was burning with sedition and insurrection when I passed. We were not permitted to leave the station, although the train stood there more than an hour. People getting on said that there had been disorders in both Aleppo and Damascus as a result of grain requisitions ordered by the French authorities. The Arab population had been receiving large doses of German propaganda cleverly conceived and administered.

'In the heavens Allah is supreme, while on the earth Hitler is all-powerful,' was one simple slogan widely used. It spoke a language which appealed to the Arabs.

In addition to difficulties with the Arabs, a considerable proportion of the French officers in Syria were sympathizers of de Gaulle, and often guilty of insubordination. Many of these were sent back to

France, but enough remained to weaken the fiber of the French administration.

We saw the requisitioned wheat stacked up on station platforms guarded by native soldiers with fixed bayonets. Syria was feeling the pinch of the British blockade, and the Arabs felt annoyed at having their grain taken.

All along the line I kept looking for signs of a British army on its way to Turkey. I saw not so much as a soldier or a rifle. I heard from some travelers that two British ships had recently landed in Smyrna and were unloading military supplies, but there was certainly nothing coming along the railroad from Iraq or from Palestine. The traffic was all the other way — thousands of refugees from all over eastern and southern Europe, mostly Jews, going to Palestine, much to the disgust and irritation of the Arabs throughout Iraq and Syria as well as in Palestine itself.

The two-day train ride from Aleppo to Baghdad took me through the cradle of civilization, the upper valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Heavily forested several thousand years ago, and wooded in spots even as recently as the Middle Ages, the territory is now absolutely treeless. The soil is rich but it needs water; that means either reforestation, or extensive irrigation. The inhabitants are nomadic tribes of herders whose flocks of sheep and goats quite literally nip in the bud any attempt at reforestation. The flocks cannot be done away with as they are the only means of support of the local Arab population. Tribal warfare is rampant, particularly among the Kurds, the Druzes, who are still sun-worshippers, and numerous Moslem Arab tribes.

Rich oil deposits had been found in eastern Syria, but there were no transport facilities, and no extensive drilling or producing was going on. A few miles over the Iraq frontier in Kirkuk lay extremely rich oil fields which had barely been touched. Half a dozen gas wells were permitted to burn year in and year out, making great fires visible for tens of miles, because there were no facilities for piping or for utilizing the gas. New wells were rarely drilled because there was no way to transport the enormous quantities of oil which the fields there were capable of producing. The two oil pipelines going from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean were

used to capacity, but even then in 1940 production fell below four million tons, partly because of the bombing of the pipelines. Oil engineers from the district told me that production could be doubled and probably tripled in a year if there were any way to transport the produce. Here was a prize worth everything to Hitler.

All the way to Baghdad good agricultural land was plentiful, and almost everywhere it was untilled. A thousand years ago the territory which is now Iraq had forty-five million inhabitants. Now there are about three and a half million, and many of them look as though they had been consistently underfed since childhood. This impoverished country was a British mandate until 1930, and then Britain's ally. This was Iraq, in which I spent a week looking for a world scoop on the British Army coming from India to help Turkey, without finding anything but a lot of foundationless rumors and a big, empty field outside Baghdad, prepared months before with water and primitive sanitary facilities for about fifty thousand troops.

Several other things I did find in Iraq, however. On my first day in Baghdad I saw a parade of some ten thousand young Arab students and workers in uniform, led by reserve officers of the Iraqi Army. They shouted and sang slogans and songs of Arab independence and unity. I talked to some of them later, and they spoke and acted very much like the green-shirted Iron Guards in Bucharest. They told a long tale of woe. In 1916 Britain had promised them co-operation in the organization of an Arab State comprising Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia. Instead of this the Arab world had been partitioned. Syria had been given to France. Palestine had been used as a refuge for Jewish emigrants who were still pouring into the country to tread on Arab toes. Now, they assured me, there was a strong pan-Arab party all over the Arabian Peninsula. They had leaders, they had the assurances of a 'certain major European power' that after the war had been won the Arabs would receive that which had been denied them twenty years before by victorious Britain and France: an independent and united Arab State. The whole song and dance was woven around a motif of concerted German propaganda.

The Germans and Italians spent millions in Iraq. The money was

well invested. In 1938 the British Consul in Mosul was stabbed and stoned to death by an Arab mob which attacked the consulate, unhindered by the local police. To my surprise I found that the man in the street in Baghdad was intensely anti-British, and had no intention of defending Iraq in case the Germans came down through Turkey. 'The oil all belongs to the British anyhow. Let them defend it themselves,' they said.

I went to the British Embassy and spoke to Sir Basil Newton, the Ambassador. Yes, he said, the situation was very difficult, but if and when the British Army finally did arrive, the Arabs would adopt a different attitude. In the meantime the Italian Legation (Iraq broke relations with Germany in 1939, but failed to break with Rome when Italy entered the war) carried on intensive propaganda and spent a great deal of money.

Sir Basil requested me to abstain from writing anything about the situation in Iraq. 'Those who should know are well informed,' he assured me.

I was young and foolish and easily impressed by a sanctimonious British Ambassador. — If I had written the story it would have been an important scoop, as the Rashid-Ali anti-British insurrection came only a few days later.

Sir Basil was removed shortly thereafter.

Several educated and intelligent Arabs whose acquaintance I made were inclined to be pro-British with certain reservations. 'We know,' they said, 'that German promises are worthless, that if the Germans come in here we shall become nothing but slaves, while the British *did* give us our independence. The trouble is we cannot defend ourselves against Germany if Turkey collapses or is defeated. Britain will have to protect us. England has the right according to the Iraq-British alliance to send troops to Iraq. Where are they? If the British do not come we shall be at the mercy of the Germans, and if this is going to be allowed to occur, then we must begin re-orienting ourselves toward Germany now. Look what happened to Poland.'

The Germans very sagaciously varied their propaganda in different countries to suit local conditions. In Iraq the pan-Arab anti-Semitic or



rather anti-Jewish (the Arabs are Semites as much as the Jews) line took root easily, and was much more successful than I would have thought possible until I went to Iraq. Obviously this propaganda was insincere. Suffice it to point out that while in Ankara von Papen was whispering in Turkish ears promises of an *Anschluss* of northern Iraq and northern Syria to Turkey, in Baghdad the entire German propaganda machine was busy pumping out promises of a united Arab State embodying all Arab-inhabited territories.

It was not difficult to see what Hitler had in mind. It seemed clear to me after superficial observation that he was making extensive plans for the creation of giant raw-material and food base in the Middle East centered around the 'fertile Crescent.' Once installed, the Germans could organize transport and irrigation with their characteristic thoroughness, and supplement Arab labor power with Poles, Czechs, and Frenchmen if that seemed expedient.

## 6

I climbed into the Iranian Airways plane in Baghdad early one morning and took off for Iran. The three-passenger de Havilland was piloted by the ace of the Iranian Airways, and he took us over two ranges of snowcapped mountains with great skill. As we gained altitude over the Tigris River we could see the long straight furrows, only visible remains of the marvelous irrigation canals constructed in antiquity and destroyed centuries ago by wave after wave of nomad invaders. Then for two hours we picked our way among the high mountains which separate Iran from Iraq, and came down in Kermanshah, the scene of a great battle between the Russians and the Turks in 1916 and of innumerable clashes between the ancient Persians and their numerous enemies. Some fine cliff sculpture twenty-five centuries old frowned down disapprovingly on a modern oil refinery and a large grain elevator. The town consisted of some dilapidated huts.

A stiff customs examination completed, we took off again, and after two hours of very rough mountain flying landed in Tehran. Tehran is an old city, but it impressed me as more modern and better organized and planned than any other city in the Middle East with the possible exception of Ankara. Wide avenues separated blocks of modern well-designed brick houses, numerous large and handsome Ministries' and other public buildings. Latest-model American cars ran up and down the streets, while both the airport and the railroad station were the scenes of great activity.

Two decades or so ago Persia was in a state of complete disintegration. British, German, Turkish, and Russian armies invaded the country during the war to fight their battles on Persian territory. A period of chaos followed. There were no roads, let alone railroads. Every sizeable town had a customs ring around it. Life was most primitive. In a few years things jumped forward astonishingly, thanks largely to the initiative and energy of the Shah, Reza Shah Pahlevi. A railroad was constructed from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf. The line to Meshed, near the Afghan frontier, was nearly completed; while in the northwest, the line to Tabriz and Julfa on the Soviet frontier was completed as far as Zandjan and trains were expected to run from Tblisi to Tehran within about eighteen months. A southeastern line had been projected to connect with the Baluchistan Railroad, and actual construction work had gone as far as Yezd. Iranian railroads were standard European gauge, and the rolling-stock was mostly British, German, and Belgian.

Iranian highways were surprisingly good. I traveled more than one thousand miles by road and was greatly impressed. Driving from the capital to Isfahan, for example, we averaged forty miles an hour for six hours. The roads were a gravel-and-macadam combination and well laid out. One shortcoming was the lack of bridges. On the Tehran-Tabriz road, for example, one fairly large stream had to be forded, though in wet weather it was a rushing torrent.

Iran's principal national asset is oil. British capital and initiative were responsible for the development of Iran's vast petroleum resources. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which the British Government owned a controlling interest, bought a concession on the exploitation of Iran's oil

in 1901. In 1933 the Shah canceled this concession quite arbitrarily, and a new agreement was signed which gave Iran large sums in royalties and other surprising advantages, such as the reversion of all the oil and industrial equipment to Iran in 1993. The country produced nine and a half million tons of petroleum in 1940, as compared to eleven million tons in 1939. This is roughly as much as the combined production of all the countries of Europe, Russia excluded.

The cities and towns of Iran changed radically during the late thirties. Even small towns like historic Isfahan and the Caspian port, Pahlevi, off the railroad lines, were blossoming out in new buildings and wide avenues. Where one examined more carefully, however, one found many attributes of old Persia. Tehran, for example, had a fine railroad station and a number of very impressive buildings, but absolutely no sewage system. Water supply was very bad, and Europeans had to be extremely careful what they ate.

A British doctor-missionary with whom I talked in Isfahan told me that infant mortality was high and that syphilis, typhus, and other diseases were very widespread.

The people one saw on the streets of Isfahan and Tehran were for the most part in European dress; a striking contrast to the veiled faces and flowing robes to be seen in Iraq. The stores were well stocked, not only with food products, but with all kinds of imported manufactured goods.

It was difficult for foreigners of any nationality to enter Iran. To my surprise, however, I found an American girl, Miss Jeanny May of Boston, Massachusetts, singing 'Roll Out the Barrel' and tap-dancing in Tehran's biggest night club.

There were about three thousand Germans in Iran, but most of them had legitimate jobs as mechanics, engineers, installers of German equipment, or commercial representatives. Iran did a great trade with Germany. Cotton, wool, rice, tea, fish, and caviar were exchanged for manufactured goods of all kinds. Almost all exports and imports were transhipped through the Soviet Union.

Historically, northern Iran was under Russian influence, southern Iran was a British sphere, while France had a sort of cultural influence over the whole country. French was still the most widely spoken foreign

language except in the extreme north, where almost the entire population spoke either Azerbaidzhan-Turkish or Russian. The Shah was working for the creation of an absolutely homogeneous population. In doing this he decreed that only the Iranian language should be taught in schools and used officially. Thus the Jews, Armenians, Turks, and Russians were being Persianized.

Industry, transport, foreign trade, banking, and most of the rice, cotton, tea, and poppy-growing were State-controlled. Retail trade, handicrafts, most agriculture, and almost all wool-raising were private. The creation of industry, and the consequent appearance of a proletariat, in Iran gave rise to certain problems. German propaganda had something to put its teeth into. 'In Germany you would get three times as much money for your work,' the technicians told their Iranian workers. 'If we Germans come in here and help you to organize a National Socialist State, you will live like kings.' When talking to middle-class people, they advocated taking the oil away from the British altogether and using all the income from petroleum production for the benefit of the Iranian people.

Russian propaganda in the north was directed toward the peasants, particularly those on the Shah's private land. 'Land to the Landless' was their slogan, as it had been a quarter of a century earlier in Russia.

I left Tehran and set out in a car with a French diplomat for Pahlevi, on the shores of the Caspian Sea. We left at three-thirty a.m. and our Armenian chauffeur reluctantly agreed to take us over the new mountain road instead of the old highroad through Kazvin.

It was an astonishing drive. It was late March, and Tehran was quite warm, though the near-by mountains were snowcapped. We climbed steadily from four-thirty till noon. By that time we were winding up a narrow gorge far above the timber line, with snow as much as ten feet deep beside the road, which had been freshly cleared. Then we plunged into a mile-long tunnel recently completed by a Belgian construction company. Then for two hours we dropped steadily; first we lost the snow and ice, and trees appeared, then gardens, and then orange groves, and tea plantations, and the placid Caspian Sea.

We had to spend the night in Pahlevi because our boat had not

docked, which was not surprising because there was very little water in the port. We wandered around and stumbled into a whole nest of Germans and what looked very much like a floating drydock for small submarines. The Germans were members of the crew of a German dredge which had been working in and around the harbor for several years.

## 7

I left Pahlevi on the Russian freighter *Boyevoi* bound for Baku. The hold of the ship was full of Iranian baled cotton, while there was a heavy deck cargo of fish and caviar, all bound for Germany.

There were six passengers on the *Boyevoi*: two Soviet diplomatic couriers who, as usual, disappeared into their cabin before the boat sailed and stayed there until she docked; a French courier, a German military attaché's secretary, a stalwart young German who spoke several languages and was vague about what he had been doing in Iran for two years, and myself.

I have never been on any ship quite like the *Boyevoi*. It was not that she sailed one day late for no apparent reason, nor was it that everything aboard seemed to be tied together with rope or string or else jammed into place with wooden wedges. It was the way she acted on the long rolling swell of the southern Caspian. Every time the bow struck a wave the midships bounced up and down several times like a car with super shock-absorbers going over a bumpy road. The joints of the hull must have been so old and loose that the whole ship bounced and bent like a long plank supported at both ends. Be that as it may, the thousand-ton *Boyevoi* got us to Baku in seventeen hours instead of the eighteen provided for by the schedule.

Baku was a thriving port as well as an extremely busy industrial center. In the first place the port had water in it in sufficient quantities to handle the shipping without inconvenience — which was not the case in

Pahlevi. For some obscure reason the water level in the Caspian has fallen by five feet during the last half-dozen years. This has considerably inconvenienced transport all over the largest inland sea in the world, and has driven great quantities of fish (including the caviar-producing sturgeon) down into the southern Caspian along the Persian coast where the water is still relatively deep. This development drove numerous caviar and fishery trust officials in Russia to drink—or to exile for failure to fulfill their plans. On the other hand it helped Baku's enormous petroleum industry by uncovering acres and acres of the richest oil land under the Caspian. The Baku oil people would have been pleased to see the sea dry up sufficiently so that they could use all the oil land lying between the Baku and Nebit-Dagh oil fields just across the sea in Turkmenistan, and if the water level continues falling at its present rate, it will not be many decades before there will be very little water anywhere in the Caspian basin except along the Iranian coast.

Approaching Baku we could see the oil fields stretching for miles and miles along the coast, some of the wells several hundred yards out to sea. We saw prominent traces of petroleum on the water when still several miles out. We saw heavily laden tankers plowing clumsily out of the port on their way to the Volga with indispensable fuel for the tractors of central Russia. In 1940 Baku produced about twenty-three million tons of crude oil, roughly three-fourths of the Soviet Union's entire production. Baku's output equaled that of Iraq, Iran, Rumania, and Germany put together.

I took a long ride and a longer walk around one sector of the oil fields. Things seemed to be in good shape. There had been reports that one incendiary bomb dropped anywhere in the Baku region would set the whole oil-soaked district afire. In my opinion these stories were foundationless. The ground between the derricks was clear and trenched. There was very little wooden or other refuse lying about which could act as a wick. The few pools of oil around some of the wells were small. Furthermore, anyone who has ever tried knows that it is not easy to ignite even gasoline in an open container. If an incendiary bomb fell right into one of these pools it would just burn out slowly without doing much harm—or it would smother completely.

The Baku refineries were spread along the coast for several miles, and thus did not form a concentrated target. From as much as I could see over the walls, the refineries and grounds around them seemed very clean indeed. Thus, nothing short of a direct hit would have had much effect.

In the very center of Baku I saw a large military air field. Here I counted more than ninety I-16's and I-18's, Russia's best and newest pursuit planes, lined up with propellers uncovered, ready to take off. Several large hangars on the far side of the field undoubtedly contained more planes ready in case of need. The Russians seemed well prepared to defend their oil fields against any possible attackers.

When I was in Baku in April, 1941, the food stores were well stocked with bread, butter, meat, cereals, rice, cigarettes, vegetables, and eggs, as well as rich assortments of fish; while department stores offered a remarkably complete assortment of dry goods. The streets were clean and some of the new housing projects looked very neat. The polyglot population seemed satisfied enough with the way things were going.

After listening to an Azerbaidzhan opera wherein the wails and shrieks, particularly of the falsetto male voices, were quite incomprehensible to me, I set out on the sixty-hour train trip back to Moscow. On the way up the Caspian coast through Daghestan to Makhach-Kala I saw several oil fields of whose existence I had hitherto been unaware. Near a little town called Izber some hundred and fifty miles north of Baku, the train passed right through a comparatively small field containing more than a hundred new-looking wells, all apparently producing. For miles and miles along the fertile coastal plain immense tractor-plowed fields stretched almost as far as one could see on both sides of the railroad.

## **Part Nine**

The Red Army





I RETURNED to Moscow in the beginning of April just as the Yugoslav situation was becoming tense and scouted around among my colleagues to find out what I had missed. They all showed me their files, which was the least they could do for me in return for my having lugged nearly two hundred pounds of brake fluid, inner tubes, tools, and other automobile spare parts, as well as stationery supplies, a couple of suits, and many other minor items, back from the Middle East for them.

After getting settled I decided to do as serious an article as possible on the Red Army — one of the most important and least-known factors in Europe. I set aside three or four hours daily for this work and did not allow my routine telegrams and mail stories to interfere with it. My Red Army article was written in two versions. One I sent to the *News Chronicle*, the other to Joe Barnes of the *New York Herald Tribune*. Neither arrived at its destination, but some notes used in the preparation of these articles serve as a basis for the following sketchy description of the Red Army and Navy on the eve of the German attack.

Defense appropriations in the Soviet Union rose steadily every year: in 1938, 23,000,000,000 roubles were spent, while in 1939 the budget provided for an expenditure of 40,800,000,000 roubles. In 1940 the figure had risen to 57,000,000,000 roubles, while in 1941 the budget called for the expenditure of 71,000,000,000 roubles for defense. In 1940, forty kopeks out of every rouble produced in the Soviet Union went to defense.

Most of the expenditure went to the army and the air force which, incidentally, was under the army or navy command and did not constitute a separate branch of the services as in England or France.

The Soviet Union was divided into nineteen military districts: the Special Western Military District with headquarters at Minsk; the Odessa Military District with headquarters in that city; the Central

Asiatic Military District with headquarters in Alma Ata; the North Caucasus Military District with headquarters in Rostov; the Transcaucasian District with headquarters in Tblisi; the Orel District with headquarters in that city; the Siberian Military District with headquarters in Irkutsk; the Ural District with headquarters in Sverdlovsk; the Trans-Baikal District centered around Chita; the Volga Military District centered around Kuibyshev; the Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, and Kalinin Military Districts with headquarters in those cities; the First Far-Eastern Military District centered in Vladivostok; and the Second Far-Eastern Military District with headquarters in Khabarovsk. These were augmented by the creation of the Baltic Military District with headquarters in Riga and the Archangel Military District, both of which were created in December, 1940.<sup>1</sup>

In the Spring of 1941 the Red Army, including the air force and frontier units, was six to seven million strong. Approximately as many trained but immobilized reservists still occupied civilian positions. A third group of six to seven million were untrained, but physically fit for army duty. Thus the country's huge human reserve of more than twenty million potential soldiers was approximately two-thirds trained and one-third mobilized.

To give an idea of the human material received by the Red Army every year, the contingent called up in 1940, estimated at 1,600,000 men, was characterized as follows by official army sources: forty-four and four-tenths per cent of the contingent were members of the Communist Party and the Young Communist League; sixty-three and six-tenths per cent had passed air-raid-precaution examinations; fifty-eight per cent had undergone first-aid training in a civilian course and had passed examinations; thirty-four and four-tenths per cent had passed the 'GTO' physical-training examinations; forty and five-tenths per cent were 'Voroshliov Sharpshooters' (a fairly high standard of marksmanship); eleven and seven-tenths per cent had completed secondary or higher education; twenty-seven per cent had completed the seventh grade. 'Illiterates are very rare,' an *Izvestia* editorial said of this contingent, which was called up on September tenth, 1940, at the same time that

<sup>1</sup> See map.

about a million Red Army men who had completed their training period were released from active service and put on the reserve list. Thus, in one year, the Red Army and Navy combined received more than one and a half million young fellows in their early twenties, who had already received considerable military training.

## 2

At various times throughout the Soviet Union I have seen units of the Red Army traveling, maneuvering, demonstrating. The standard of dress was usually high. The men shaved every day, and maintained a fairly good discipline in their units. The equipment always seemed to be at least fair, although in this respect there was an enormous improvement from 1939 to 1941.

In 1939 during the Polish campaign and the Finnish War, first-line regular units looked well prepared, disciplined, and equipped. Their uniforms were in good shape and their morale seemed to be high. The mobilized reservists, however, presented a sorry picture—incomplete uniforms, no arms, sometimes no shoes. Inner unit organization was bad (for instance, inadequate arrangements were made for food supply en route). As the Soviet Command well knew, this condition had been at least partially responsible for the fiasco on the Central Front in Finland and even on the southern front during the first few weeks of fighting.

The Finnish War gave Stalin an excellent opportunity to assess his army and spot incompetent generals and inadequate services. It showed him what would have to be done to make the Red Army capable of carrying on serious operations against a major power.

During the fourteen months of 'mobilized preparedness' between March, 1940, and May, 1941, Stalin and the Red Army Command set about systematically improving conditions and putting even the re-

servist units on their feet, preparing and equipping them to go into action. First, the army must be properly equipped. This meant turning whole factories over for the production of army shoes, coats, gloves, rifles, and other equipment. This was done during the spring of 1940 with marked results. Second, a whole series of measures was adopted, calculated to raise the morale of the Red Army, improve discipline, intensify training, and generally bring it up to a level where it could compare with the German Army.

On May 8, 1940, Voroshilov, deemed incapable of putting through the sweeping reforms necessary, was kicked upstairs to the post of Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars and was replaced by Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, who was entrusted with the monumental task of hammering the Red Army into shape.

Timoshenko was born in 1895 in a little village in Bessarabia. After receiving an elementary education he went to work as a farm-hand. In 1915 he was drafted into the Czarist Army and trained as a machine-gunner. He saw service in the Fourth Cavalry Division. In 1917 he was court-martialed for beating an officer with his fists, and would probably have been shot had it not been for the 1917 Revolution.

Timoshenko fought all through the Civil War on the southern front. He rose from corporal to lieutenant, and later became, at twenty-six, the commander of a cavalry division. In 1922 he completed his studies in the Military Academy and later (1927 and 1930) did graduate work. In 1935 he became assistant commander of the Belorussian Military District. He then spent a number of months abroad studying foreign armies and on his return was made assistant commander of the Kiev Military District. In 1937 he was made commander of the North Caucasian Military District, from which he was transferred to the Kharkov Military District, and then back to the Kiev Military District. During the purge of the Red Army, Timoshenko was sent from place to place, filling the posts of liquidated commanding officers. In 1939 he led the Red Army into the western Ukraine and fought a strictly illegal battle with German forces outside Lvov in which several hundreds were killed on both sides. He was decorated several times, and was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Timoshenko's great contribution during the year of 'mobilized preparedness' was the reorganizing of combat training and the overhauling of the structure and discipline of the Red Army. Here is a short résumé of the way he went about it:

### 3

On June twenty-third, Timoshenko ordered that thenceforth Red Army men must salute their officers whenever they met them, on or off duty. This formality had not been practiced in Russia since 1917.

On June twenty-seventh Timoshenko ordered the tightening up of guardhouse discipline in order to make violators of army rules feel that they were being punished. 'We are not bourgeois philanthropists. We will never abstain from using force against those who undermine the greatest thing in our army — discipline,' stated an editorial in the Red Army organ *Red Star*.

In May a special commission was created to award the ranks of General and Admiral, which had been reinstated in the Red Army and Navy.

On August twelfth the institution of political commissars in the army was abolished as having fulfilled its function. The commissars were made into assistant commanders, keeping the same pay; but dual command in army units was abolished. Editorials in all the papers explained that commissars had been extremely important; without them the Red Army could not have been created; but now it was necessary for the commander to be the absolute boss. The military councils, created on May seventeenth, 1937, literally over Marshal Tukhachevsky's dead body, were left intact by the August twelfth decree abolishing commissars. The councils were probably left as being relatively unimportant. The commissars were abolished because the Finnish War and the German *Blitzkrieg* had made it clear that in modern military operations the

commander must be free to act as he thinks best, and must not be obliged to consult a political commissar. Furthermore, Stalin probably felt in 1940 that the army officers were solidly behind him and did not need such strict political supervision.

On August fifteenth extensive maneuvers were carried out in the Volga area, where an artificial fortified line was constructed and subjected to attack. Three thousand 'engagements' were fought with bayonets and hand grenades.

The next day Marshal Semyon Budenny of the gorgeous eight-inch mustaches was made Vice-Commissar of Defense and relieved of the post of Commander of the Moscow District, which was taken over by General Ivan Vladimirovich Tiulenev, former commander of the North Caucasian Military District. At the same time Marshal Boris Shapochnikov, Chief of Staff since 1938, was relieved of his post at his own request, because of ill-health, and made Vice-Commissar of Defense. General Kirill Meretskov, former commander of the Leningrad Military District, took his place. On August twenty-fifth extensive maneuvers were held in the Moscow Military District. Timoshenko participated personally, and went from unit to unit, explaining and persuading; trying to impress on everyone the necessity for carrying out the maneuvers under conditions as nearly as possible those of actual combat.

On September third the Soviet Union's five marshals received thirty-one-karat diamond stars, which rivaled in splendor anything worn by the officers of the old Czarist Army. On September fourth conscription of the new contingent described above was announced. Articles and editorials in all the papers emphasized the tense international situation and the necessity for absolute preparedness of the Red Army and Navy. On September fifth maneuvers were carried on in Odessa and in the Western Military District, while the city of Kiev was subjected to a practice aerial bombardment. The next day maneuvers began in the Central Asiatic Military District.

On September eighth the Leningrad Military District put on extremely realistic maneuvers. On the same day Timoshenko issued an order creating the rank of Army Transport Commander — the equivalent of a colonel.

In mid-September maneuvers took place in the Far-Eastern Districts and likewise in the Trans-Baikal Military District, commanded by General Konev, who later became one of the most important operative generals in the defense of Moscow.

On September twenty-first extensive maneuvers were begun in the Trans-Caucasian and Moscow Military Districts. An editorial in *Pravda* commented on the excellent results achieved in recent maneuvers. Military discipline must lead the way toward the improvement of civilian discipline in industry and agriculture, *Pravda* asserted, and continued to praise the achievements of the Red Army for 'following the best traditions of the great Russian armies of Suvorov and Kutuzov.'

Long articles in all the newspapers celebrated the first anniversary of 'the glorious victory of the Red Army' over the Polish armies in the interests of the liberation of Poland. No mention was made in any newspaper of the fact that Germany had been at war with Poland and that Hitler's divisions had actually broken the back of Polish resistance before the Russians came in.

In December winter maneuvers began in a number of military districts. Extensive ski hikes were organized for Red Army men as well as civilians and school children. One of these ski hikes had 1,300,000 participants throughout the Soviet Union, according to the press, which reported, however, with its tongue in its cheek, that only one-half of the hikers had skis. Weekly ski hikes became required activities for students in the secondary and higher schools. Often the skiers wore gas masks.

In mid-December military district party conferences were held all over the country. Speeches stressed the necessity for minute-to-minute preparation against a major attack, while all asserted that the newly adopted methods of combat training had produced excellent results. On December ninth articles in the press revealed that in their winter maneuvers a number of the military districts had utilized tanks in large numbers with surprising success.

On December thirteenth, articles on the new Baltic Military District Party Conference revealed that General A. D. Loktionov, former chief of the entire Red Army Air Fleet, had been made commander of this district. Numerous articles in the press described the enthusiasm with



which commanders and enlisted men of the Baltic and other military districts were carrying out their winter maneuvers. Everything was done to duplicate actual combat conditions. Those who had tried to fall back on conditional factors were roundly criticized. One article by Marshal Budenny told how he had gone to maneuvers and had found the corpulent commander of the unit walking along a road in a valley, while his men clambered over rocks and ledges high up on an adjacent hill. The marshal asked what the commander was doing away from his unit. 'Oh, I *am* up there with my unit,' said the commander. 'I'm only down here conditionally.'

On December thirtieth twenty new Red Army generals with Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian names were appointed and their ranks and pictures appeared in the Moscow press, indicating that the Red Army had taken into its fold at least some of the commanding officers of the Baltic armies.

In early January Timoshenko issued an order providing for the re-introduction of the sword as part of the uniforms of Red Army generals and commissioned officers — a move calculated to raise the authority of these commanders. At the same time, an editorial in the *Red Star* described an order, the text of which was not published, giving commanders the right to use physical force in disciplining enlisted men. From that day forth a Soviet general could use the flat of his sword to strike across the cheek a Russian peasant in uniform who had neglected to salute. This probably seldom or never occurred. But the order raised the authority of the officers, and improved discipline.

On February twelfth, General Gregory Zhukov was appointed Red Army Chief of Staff, replacing General Meretskov, who became Vice-Commissar of Defense in charge of combat training. Zhukov was a tall, lantern-jawed individual who, in August, 1939, organized and led the Red Army's first tank attack against the Japanese at Kholkhingol on the Mongolo-Manchukuo frontier. In 1940, Zhukov was made commander of the Kiev Military District. Little was known of his capabilities as a strategist or a military theoretician, but as an operative general he was first rate.

Thus the Red Army was hammered into a state of mobilized preparedness.

## 4

The question often arose as to whether any competent military commanders had been trained to take the places of the several hundred top-flight officers shot and exiled during the Red Army purge of 1937-38. While I do not pretend to know whether the new military hierarchy was as competent as the old, I can at least enumerate the dozen or so most important Red Army officers of 1941, the men who have since organized Soviet resistance to the German attack.

As chief of the Supreme Military Council, Stalin must be considered Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Union's armed forces, though it is doubtful whether he has interfered in the operative work, as his technical military training was not extensive. Marshal Klementi Voroshilov was likewise essentially a politician, rather than a soldier. After the spring of 1940 he had little operative power in the Red Army. Voroshilov was sixty-one. The son of a railroad watchman, he went to work in a coal mine at the age of seven and could neither read nor write until he was twelve. He organized a revolutionary strike in 1899 in a Ukrainian metal works. After that time he became a professional revolutionary. After the Revolution of 1917 he was a functionary of the Cheka (Soviet Secret Police). His rôle in the Red Army was essentially that of commissar rather than commander. He held the post of Commissar of Defense from 1925 until 1940.

Marshal Gregory Kulik, Vice-Commissar of Defense of the Soviet Union and organizer of the offensive against the Mannerheim Line in February and March of 1939, was an old artillery man, an extremely hard-fisted, realistic general, but lacking in imagination and intellectual power.

Marshal Boris Mikhailovitch Shaposhnikov, Vice-Commissar of Defense of the Soviet Union, and after September, 1941, Stalin's chief military aide, was unquestionably the best strategist in the Red Army.

He graduated from the Czarist General Staff Academy early in the century, and in 1914 was a colonel attached to the General Staff. Politically a Social Revolutionary, he joined the revolt in 1917 and almost immediately attached himself to Lenin's group (though he did not join the Communist Party until 1938), and from the moment of its organization was an important leader of the Red Army. For several years in the early twenties Shaposhnikov was head of Red Army Intelligence. In 1932 he was appointed Director of the Frunze Military Academy, the most important Soviet General Staff school. Shortly thereafter he was made a corps commander, and in 1938, when Marshal Yegorov disappeared in the army purge, Shaposhnikov took his place as Chief of the Red Army General Staff.

Shaposhnikov at sixty-one was not too sound in health. When I last saw him in the spring of 1941 in the theatre he looked haggard and nervous. It has been said of the old marshal that he is one of the few high officers of the Red Army who has maintained a consistently apolitical attitude. He was a Russian patriot and a military expert. This was enough. He did not intrigue with oppositionary groups or plan world revolutions.

Army General Dmitri Pavlov was commander of the Special Western Military District in the spring of 1941. His previous post was in the Far East and little was known about him.

Colonel General Gregory Stern was commander of the Twelfth Mechanized Army in the Far East and directed operations against the Japanese at Lake Hasan in 1938. He was later made commander of the Far Eastern front. In the summer of 1940 Stern was transferred to the west, where it was reported that he assisted General Pavlov in Minsk, though no official verification of this appeared.

Lieutenant General Jacob Smushkevich was appointed commander of the Red Air Force in 1940. He had risen from pursuit-plane lieutenant pilot several years before. He was one of the few Jews among the senior officers of the Red Army.

Lieutenant General Ivan Konev was commander of the Second Far Eastern Army in 1939, whence he was transferred to the Siberian Military District in 1940, and in October of 1941 he was an important general on the Moscow front.

## 5

The Red Army's mechanized equipment has for years been a subject of speculation. It was known that the Russians had many planes. In the Spanish War the pugnosed I-16 pursuit planes fought effectively against the Germans and Italians for months. Soviet trans-polar and other long-distance flights bespoke the high quality of the planes and pilots. Yet little was known as to the number of first-rate planes available. The same thing was true of tanks.

During demonstrations in Moscow on May first and November seventh of every year, the Red Army displayed large mechanized units, including immense tanks, field guns, and motorized equipment of all kinds, as well as hundreds of military planes. All this equipment was studied carefully by the foreign military attachés, who pronounced it good but not extraordinary. High Soviet circles indicated to foreign military attachés that the matériel displayed in these demonstrations was, of course, obsolete, and that Soviet technique had developed far beyond the level indicated by the quality and types of equipment officially displayed. Some foreign military attachés believed this. Some did not. A few tried to find out for themselves. One of these was Lieutenant Colonel Philip Faymonville,<sup>1</sup> American Military Attaché in Moscow from 1934 to '38, and special military observer and chief of the American supply mission in the Soviet capital in the fall of 1941. Faymonville studied Russian and made himself conspicuous in Moscow diplomatic society by preferring the company of Russians to that of other foreigners. He would disappear for weeks at a time and ramble around the Soviet countryside on a bicycle, in a canoe, or in third-class railroad carriages. He knew a large number of Red Army men.

An exceedingly warm, generous, and intelligent human being, Faymonville won my respect and admiration from the first time I met him, and I was one among very many.

<sup>1</sup> Now a brigadier general.

Faymonville was convinced on his own observation that the Red Army was strong, and would not collapse in case of an attack. He believed that the mechanized equipment and the planes being produced in the Soviet Union were qualitatively excellent and, moreover, that the Russians knew how to use them. Faymonville reported to Washington in this vein and was discredited by many as being a fool or a 'red' or both. But when Soviet resistance in July, 1941, showed that he had been correct in his evaluation of the Red Army, he was borrowed by the President from the War Department for duty as a special observer.

As far back as 1938, Faymonville estimated that the Russians had at least ten thousand tanks and probably as many planes.

By 1940 the mechanized and aviation strength of the Red Army had grown considerably. It boasted forty-five to fifty tank or armored brigades, each brigade consisting of six to seven thousand men, one hundred to two hundred tanks, and various motorized infantry and artillery auxiliary and supporting units. The Russians organized their mechanized forces into brigades instead of into divisions like the Germans. The old division in a mass army ran from seventeen to twenty thousand men. The Germans found that when mechanized this unit was too large and cut it down to twelve thousand. Instead of reducing the size of their divisions, the Russians split each into two brigades, which thus became miniature Panzer divisions.

In addition to these basic tank and motorized units, the Russians attached tank battalions to infantry divisions to be used as auxiliary units. Observers estimated that half the Soviet Union's tanks were used in specialized tank brigades for strategic purposes, while the other half were attached to artillery, infantry, and cavalry units for tactical use as auxiliaries. In the campaign in Finland the Red Army utilized predominantly tank units of the second category, *i.e.*, as auxiliaries to infantry units. In the occupation of Bessarabia, on the other hand, the Russians sent in tank columns, which ran scores of miles ahead of the infantry and had no direct connection with it. The Soviet tanks ranged in size from little two-man Christies to enormous, lumbering, seventy-ton moving fortresses, so large that military observers in Moscow did not see how they could get from one place to another — neither bridges nor roads would hold them.

For years the Soviet Union spent tremendous energy in the development of its air force. No reliable statistics are available, but military observers in Moscow during 1940 and early 1941 estimated that the Russians possessed fifteen to twenty thousand military planes. They did not know what proportion of these was obsolete. Russian plane production was estimated to be in the neighborhood of three thousand a month by one of the foreign military attachés. I doubt, however, that this was any more than a guess. The fact remained that the Russians had large numbers of good planes. The SB and DB bombers and the I-18 pursuit planes were good, speedy, and highly maneuverable planes, and they were making all three types in large quantities. On the first of May, 1941, some sixty I-18's roared over the Red Square at a speed estimated by the air attachés at approximately four hundred miles an hour.

## 6

The Red Navy was in no way comparable to the Red Army. On land the Soviet armed forces were second to none, with the possible exception of the German. The navy, on the other hand, was inferior to those of many far smaller countries.

Russia has five seas and two oceans to patrol. These bodies of water are, for the most part, widely separated and communications are difficult to maintain between them, while the Caspian is completely landlocked. The Red Navy was, therefore, divided into five fleets — the Baltic, Black Sea, Caspian, Pacific, and Arctic — and two river flotillas — the Amur and the Danube-Dniester. These fleets were almost independent of each other, and it was only with great difficulty that ships or squadrons could be transferred from one fleet to another.

The Russians had three battleships — the *Okt'yabrskaya Revolutsia*, built in 1911, 23,256 tons with a speed of twenty-five knots; the *Marat*, built in the same year and of the same speed, but several hundred tons

heavier; and the *Parizheskaya Kommuna*, of the same vintage. In addition to these, the Red Fleet had two new cruisers, the *Kirov*, built in 1936, 8500 tons, with a speed of thirty-three knots; and the *Voroshilov* of the same class, launched a year later. All the above-mentioned ships except the *Parizheskaya Kommuna* were stationed in the Baltic Sea in 1939 and remained there. The *Parizheskaya Kommuna* was the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet. The Caspian Fleet was composed of a half-dozen large cutters, armed with machine-guns and light cannon, and several mosquito boats. The composition of the Pacific Fleet was never known. It was thought to consist almost entirely of submarines and torpedo boats. The Arctic Fleet was composed principally of armed icebreakers.

The Russians had a 35,000-ton battleship almost ready to launch in the shipyards of Nikolaevsk in the Ukraine, but they themselves blew it up just before the Germans took the town in August, 1941.

Experts asserted that the Red Navy had two outstanding strong points: mine-laying and submarine warfare. The Russians were the first to develop the mine, and they have always been good at its use. During World War I the Russian Navy sank a number of German warships with well-placed mine traps. The outstanding ability of the Russians as mine-layers seems to be well recognized among naval men.

The Soviet submarine fleet has long been considered one of the largest in the world. The action during the Finnish War indicated that at least some of these Red U-boats were capable of carrying out complicated operations under severe conditions of storm and iceflow. The Red Navy was reported to have large numbers of submarines (some estimates put the figure as high as one hundred and fifty) in the Far East, where they constituted a potential menace to Japanese communications with the mainland. There were also numbers of submarines in the Black and Baltic Seas. Many of these, interestingly enough, were manufactured in the large 'Uralmarsh' heavy-machine-building plant in Sverdlovsk in the Urals, and were transported by rail in sections to the seas or oceans they were to patrol.

When it comes to icebreakers the Red Navy has practically a world monopoly. In any operations in arctic waters only navigable when the ice has been broken, the Russians have a great advantage over all possible enemies.

The Baltic Fleet held maneuvers in September, 1940. The People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, and most of the members of his staff attended the maneuvers, in which vessels of all types, as well as naval aviation and coastal defense units, participated. The central theme was the defense of the Baltic coast. Admiral Kuznetsov's lengthy analysis of the maneuvers was read to all the officers who had participated and later appeared in the press. A quotation or two gives some indication as to the strength of the Baltic Fleet and the degree of naval preparation.

It is a simple axiom that at long range the enemy will fire upon us unpunished. At short range he will fire on us also, but not unpunished. Therefore it is necessary to combine our forces in such a way that we will compensate for our weaknesses by effective use of our aviation, our submarines, and our torpedo cutters.

In other words, the Admiral expected to be outranged by any enemy, and emphasized the necessity for making up for being outranged by proper use of auxiliary forces.

The maneuvers showed shortcomings in the coordination of the action of units. In one very decisive moment when capital ships were going into action, and the aviation and auxiliary craft should have come up and rendered assistance, the aviation was late, so that the effect of the maneuver was spoiled by lack of coordination.

## 7

Not only were the Red Army and Navy reorganized and stiffened up during the year of mobilized preparedness, but elaborate measures were taken to intensify the already thorough civilian-defense preparations.

The Osoaviakhim Society for defense against chemical and aerial warfare boasted nearly twelve million members, and its activities became feverish after the summer of 1940.



Practice blackouts were organized in every large city in the Soviet Union, including Tashkent, Alma Ata, Baku, Odessa, and Kiev. In Baku imitation bombs were dropped from aeroplanes, several fires were started and extinguished, a main street was torn up — pavements, water-pipes, gas and electric lines included — and then repaired by special emergency crews. In Kiev, one section of the city was evacuated and all able-bodied men were mobilized to round up 'enemy parachutists.'

Air-raid wardens everywhere were strict and had the power to fine violators of any of the complicated A.R.P. regulations.

The maneuvers were not limited to the cities. In hundreds of rural districts throughout the western part of the Soviet Union, farmers were trained in guerrilla tactics, in the apprehension and liquidation of enemy parachutists, and in prevention of sabotage. Detailed plans were made and instructions given for the destruction of immovable property in case an enemy should threaten a given district.

During 1940, thirteen thousand new Osoaviakhim chapters were organized and more than a million new members enrolled. The training courses of the organization were expanded to include target practice, physical training, bayonet practice, grenade throwing, scouting, and advanced tactical problems for small units.

Regular army officers taught these classes and directed the maneuvers and exercises, which were carried out with surprising realism. I barely escaped being thrown upon a stretcher and carried off to a first-aid center to be arbitrarily bandaged as 'wounded' one day in Moscow.

The Osoaviakhim was complemented by a number of regiments of 'NKVD internal troops.' These were composed of tough, low-browed, beady-eyed individuals, picked to do dirty work. It was their function to suppress revolts or insurrections should they occur and to see to it that civilian-defense plans were carried out. The population was taught to stay off highroads and refrain from otherwise hampering the movements of the army, to destroy immovable property in case of evacuation, and to defend their homes against parachutists or enemy scouting columns. The N.K.V.D. internal troops were there to make sure that these operations were executed as planned.

One day in the spring of 1941, I came down from our apartment,

intending to go downtown. At the bottom of the stairs I was stopped by a grotesque figure dressed in heavy rubber overalls, boots, gauntlets, and gas mask. This apparition was both mute and dumb. Not only could I not tell who it was, but it was impossible to say whether it was man or woman — though I afterward found out it was the scrubwoman who washed the stairs.

For twenty minutes I stood and watched while super-realistic air-raid maneuvers went on. Our apartment house had been 'hit' by an H.E. bomb and a gas bomb. The former had demolished one wing of the building, the latter had contaminated one half the courtyard and the wall of the central wing of the building.

A first-aid unit arrived, wearing gas masks and oilcloth suits. They went into the demolished wing, took the first dozen people they found, threw them on stretchers, bandaged them arbitrarily, smeared T's on their foreheads to show that they had been inoculated against tetanus, and rushed them off to a base hospital, well wrapped in blankets.

A decontamination unit drove up and spread chemical neutralizers on the part of the courtyard and wall which had been contaminated by the gas bomb. In the meantime the fire brigade had put out the fire and the demolition squad was clearing up the mess.

This whole performance was organized and carried out by volunteer Osoaviakhim members. The Soviet people were really preparing for total war.

## 8

On May first, 1941, the diplomats and correspondents went to see the usual Red Army demonstration on the Red Square. Hundreds of cannons and tanks, ambulances, bicycles, motorcycles, armored cars, trucks, field kitchens, projectors, and other units raced across the immense square, while Stalin, Timoshenko, Voroshilov, and Dmitroff, the Com-

munist International Chief, stood on the reviewing stand above Lenin's tomb and saluted.

German Ambassador von der Schulenberg was prominent in the diplomatic box. He had just returned from Berlin, where he had had a long conference with the Fuehrer.

After the mechanized parade some fifty thousand troops, including sailors, marines, civilian guards, women's sanitary units, and regular infantry, carrying beautiful new tommy guns, marched across the banner-bedecked Square in excellent formation while a five-hundred-piece combined band played stirring marches.

The regular troops and home guards alike looked snappy, bronzed, and competent. The military attachés remarked on the excellence of the marching and on the fact that the Red soldiers looked more seasoned and mature than many units of German troops that they had observed at various times. Without knowing much about troops I certainly agreed. The Red units on the Square that day looked much better than the German units I had seen in Rumania and Bulgaria.

Before the last of the infantry had crossed the Square the planes began to sweep down from the direction of the military air base at Tushino. Nearly three hundred planes participated in the aerial demonstration and more than a hundred of them were of the latest types.

A regiment (about fifty planes) of the new I-18 standard fighters flew over the Square at a speed estimated by the military attachés at approximately four hundred miles an hour, or roughly that of the British Spitfire. This single-motored, water-cooled craft with retractable landing gear was being produced in large quantities in two plants, an attaché said. It displayed considerable maneuverability and was at least a hundred miles an hour faster than the old I-16 fighters used in Spain.

One of the air attachés told me that units of I-18's had been seen in Kaunas and Cernovitz as well as in Baku.

Another plane which attracted attention among the aviation men on May first was a twin-motored, water-cooled, double-ruddered light bomber, whose number was not known. Several of these all-around, high-speed diving planes roared steeply down over the Red Square as the last of the home guards marched off and the popular civilian demon-

stration began. Altogether some thirty of several variants of these new craft, which were identified tentatively by observers as the BA, flew over the Square. Other planes shown were the old SB and DB bombers, speeded up and re-equipped. The DB is the plane flown to America in 1937 by the Soviet ace Kokinaki. These planes were known to be available in enormous quantities in the Soviet Union.

It was interesting to watch the enthusiastic reaction of the Soviet populace to the military and aerial demonstrations on May first. The Russian people had tremendous confidence in their army. They had been paying through the nose for ten years to build up that formidable array of planes and mechanized equipment. Into it had gone the surplus of Soviet economy for a decade. It was in a very real sense a people's army, and the Moscovite shouted and stamped his feet that day with genuine enthusiasm. Forgotten were the extra hours of grueling work and the administrative and other restrictions which were keeping him tied down to his workbench under threat of criminal action. It was his army and he was very glad that it was there.



## **Part Ten**

Stalin Feeds the Hand That Smites Him



I SCARCELY had time to finish my Red Army article when several important stories broke all at once. The Yugoslav situation became tense, while the Russians chewed their fingernails in frustration. The Germans were swallowing the Balkan Peninsula and the last Balkan power which seemed at all inclined to resist the Nazi advance was gradually capitulating.

French Ambassador Labonne told me he thought the Russians might attack in the Balkans across Moldavia and on through to the Adriatic. It was a wild idea, but apparently some Berlin authorities took it seriously because reports reached Moscow of blackouts in the German cities of Koenigsberg and Breslau and in a number of Polish cities along the Soviet frontier. Other stories told of a rapid increase in the number of German troops in Finland.

At the same time the Russians began reflooding the Pinsk swamps in the western Ukraine, thus undoing a monumental drainage job that they had just completed and creating an excellent tank trap against German invasion. A Soviet acquaintance of mine, a student in a Moscow engineering school, was taken away from his studies along with his entire class and sent to regions along the German frontier to build fortifications and flood swamps.

When the extraordinary coup d'état occurred in Yugoslavia and the pro-Axis Government was shouted down, the Kremlin drew a deep breath of satisfaction. The new anti-Nazi Yugoslav Government included the Yugoslav Minister in Moscow, Doctor Milan Gabrilovich. Moscow immediately gave the new Belgrade Government to understand that Yugoslavia would receive direct and extensive aid from her great Slavic mother.

In Belgrade the cafés again rocked with the song which had not been sung for more than twenty years —

The wind is blowing from the other side of the Carpathians,  
And we and the Russians are two hundred million strong.



The Serbs began to mobilize. They were going to fight. Stalin's line of action was clear — support them as much as possible without violating the letter of the Soviet-German Pact. Stalin hastened to draw up and sign a pact with the Yugoslavs (see Appendix 27), knowing that it would stiffen Serb resistance, while, if concluded before German-Yugoslav hostilities actually broke out, it would not involve the Russians too seriously.

Berlin had not informed Moscow of Hitler's intentions, so that when hasty negotiations ended with the conclusion of a pact of friendship and non-aggression, the Russians had committed no *de jure* violations of their obligations to Hitler. Gabrilovich and Molotov affixed their signatures just in time, however, as within a few hours of the signature of the pact, on the evening of April fifth, Belgrade was bombed and Yugoslavia invaded at a number of points.

The Moscow papers on April sixth featured the text of the pact and a large photograph of Stalin smiling on as Molotov and Gabrilovich signed. These newspapers did not, however, inform the Soviet public of the German attack on Yugoslavia until the next day.

The most interesting points in the pact itself included a provision that should either signatory be attacked by a third power the other signatory undertook to maintain a friendly policy toward the one who was attacked. Thus within a few hours of its signature the pact bound Russia to friendship with Germany's most recent enemy.

Editorially *Pravda* emphasized the importance of the pact, not only as an expression of Soviet-Yugoslav friendship, but as a move for the strengthening of peace in the Balkans. The aims of the pact were explained to the Soviet people at popular meetings. *Izvestia* asserted that it expressed the wishes of the majority of the Yugoslav people, who had clearly voiced their dissatisfaction with the Cvetkovic Government when it 'threatened to draw Yugoslavia into the orbit of the war.'

I spoke to Sir Stafford Cripps about the possibility of the Soviet Union's really aiding Yugoslavia. Sir Stafford thought that if the Yugoslavs could hold out for a month, the Russians might do something.

The Soviet papers on the eighth of April printed long telegrams and press comments from Tokyo, London, New York, and Berlin on the

Soviet-Yugoslav Pact. The Moscovites were very much aroused over the slaughter which took place during that week, and for the first time since the Spanish War I heard people on the streets of Moscow saying, 'Why don't we do something about it?' Nothing was done, however, and the press confined itself to printing detailed descriptions of the military operations without any mention of what concrete steps Moscow was taking in fulfillment of its obligations to Yugoslavia.

It is extremely doubtful that the Soviet military authorities sent a single plane or any other concrete token of their friendship and support to Yugoslavia. Moscow, did, however, rebuke the Hungarian Government for its attack on Yugoslavia. On April thirteenth all Moscow papers published the text of a note delivered by Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky to the Hungarian Minister in Moscow (see Appendix 28). The note reminded the Hungarians that only four months previously they had concluded a treaty of eternal friendship with Yugoslavia; it further pointed out to the gentlemen of Budapest that Hungary itself had a large national-minority population and pertinently asked the question:

'How would you feel if someone attempted to "liberate" them from your domination?'

This was a menacing question, as one of the largest national minorities in Hungary was the 'Carpatho-Ukrainians,' a Slavic people with openly-expressed pro-Russian sentiments, inhabiting the Carpathian Mountains in what was until 1939 eastern Czechoslovakia.

## 2

While this extremely blunt statement of Russian sympathies was being delivered, Stalin was in earnest conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoko, about the possibility of the conclusion of a non-aggression or neutrality pact.

It seemed doubtful that the Soviet Government would agree to Japanese requests for a political document expressing concretely the friendship between the two countries. For nearly two years Berlin and Rome had been urging a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement, but Moscow consistently shied away. Not many months before Japanese Ambassador Tatekawa had offered the Soviet Union the southern (Japanese) half of Sakhalin Island in return for such a political document, and the Russians had turned it down cold. Stalin had seen no advantage in concluding a pact with Japan at the time.

In April, 1941, however, in the face of the imminent collapse of the entire Balkan Peninsula, in the face of unmistakable signs of German preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, Stalin agreed.

On the night of April twelfth, my Japanese colleagues had been glum and pessimistic. No pact would be signed, they said. Matsuoko was leaving the next day for his ten-day Trans-Siberian trip homeward.

However, at eleven a.m. on the next day Stalin called Matsuoko to the Kremlin. At two p.m. on April thirteenth, after a three-hour conversation, a five-year neutrality pact was signed by Matsuoko and Molotov. It provided that both signatories maintain neutrality in case either became the object of military action by a third power. The first political agreement to be concluded between the two countries since the Russian Revolution, it strengthened Japan's hand in the Far East as well as improving considerably Russia's position vis-à-vis Germany. (See Appendix 29).

The obvious explanation was that Stalin wanted his eastern frontier secure in case of a German attack from the west, which he felt was possible, if not imminent.

The departure of Matsuoko from Moscow involved one of the most astonishing performances I saw during eight years in Russia. Both Russians and Japanese were delighted with their pact and went out to celebrate after signing it.

The train was to leave the Yaroslavsky Station at four-fifty-five. We journalists arrived at four-thirty, and found the station roped off and patrolled by squads of uniformed and plain-clothes policemen, as is customary in Moscow when important personages appear in public

places. Half an hour passed and no one appeared on the platform except the diplomatic representatives of the lesser Axis powers, the German military and naval attachés in full dress uniform, and the chief of the Protocol Department of the Soviet Foreign Office. We still had not sent full stories on the pact itself, and were anxious to get back to the Press Department and have our cables censored and sent. We called the residence of the Japanese Ambassador and were told that Matsuoko was engaged and would arrive at the station shortly.

Soviet railroad officials walked up and down the platform looking at their watches. Soviet trains sometimes arrived late, but serious attempts were being made to have them at least depart on time. At about five-fifteen a high railroad official appeared and stated that the departure of the train had been postponed until five-fifty-five. It was the regular Trans-Siberian express, but the last four cars were reserved for Matsuoko and his suite. The passengers in the rest of the train had long ago taken their places, and were looking out of the windows to see what the trouble was, while police looked on vigilantly. We pushed through the police lines and the crowd of open-mouthed Moscovites and had vodkas at the station bar.

At five-fifty the limousines began to arrive, first the German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenberg, then Italian Ambassador Rosso, then numerous Japanese with important-looking briefcases. The number of plain-clothes men on the platform increased with each diplomatic arrival; there were about fifty diplomats and at least twice as many 'Y.M.C.A. men,' as the plain-clothes men were called by flippant foreigners. Matsuoko arrived at five-fifty-five, and walked down the platform flanked by Solomon Lozovsky, Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

They shook hands in a rather dazed fashion with Schulenberg and Rosso. I had met Matsuoko and everyone else there before. So after exchanging a few words with the Japanese correspondents, who were noticeably tight and smiling from ear to ear, I turned to go. I went about five steps and nearly bumped into Stalin, who was cruising down the platform under his own steam, dressed in his long military coat, leather boots with overshoes over them, and his brown visored cap. Molotov was just behind him.

We did not often have opportunities to see Stalin close up. He was very retiring and extremely well guarded. Furthermore, he had never seen any foreign dignitary off at a railroad station. Two years before when Ribbentrop came to Moscow he was met by a vice-commissar. I therefore got out my Leica, and stayed to see what would happen.

The Japanese came to life with a bang when Stalin and Molotov made their unexpected appearance. The Soviet leaders were surrounded by Japanese diplomats and attachés who began shaking their hands, slapping their backs, and talking in several languages, and in very raucous voices. Then we realized why they had appeared dazed. They were all very definitely in their cups, as were some of the Russians. While the foreign diplomats and newspapermen gathered around craning their necks, Stalin and Molotov began embracing the Japanese, patting them on the shoulders and exchanging expressions of intimate friendship.

As few of the Japanese or Russians could speak each other's language, the remark most frequently heard was 'ah . . . ha' very loud, with the accent on the 'ha,' punctuated by a slap on the back or a playful punch in the ribs. Stalin went up to the aged and diminutive Japanese Ambassador General, punched him rather hard on the shoulder with an 'ah . . . ha,' so that the four-foot-ten, bald-pated general staggered back three or four steps, which caused Matsuoko to laugh in glee.

I was wedged in between half a dozen towering German military men dressed up like Christmas trees, trying my best to get some pictures without being too conspicuous. Everyone pushed and shoved trying to see what was going on. Stalin's plain-clothes guards looked very worried because they could not keep their eye on Russia's bull-necked and gray-haired leader. The Japanese Military Attaché staggered up to the dapper and fastidious Barkov, Soviet Chief of Protocol, and began slapping him on the back. Just then Stalin detached himself from the crowd of Japanese and came over toward me.

Stalin is a smallish man, five feet five or six in height, and has a very distinctive bearlike walk. He swings his arms very low and puts his right arm forward at the same time as his right foot, instead of vice versa like most people. The 'vozhd' was sixty-one and looked his age. He swung up to Colonel Krebs, assistant to the German Military Attaché, who was standing right in front of me, tapped him on the chest,

and looked up into his face searchingly for a few seconds. 'German?' he said, not sure of the uniform. The six-foot German stood at attention and mumbled out an embarrassed affirmative in bad Russian. 'Ah . . . ha,' said Stalin, slapping him on the back and shaking his hand. 'Bud-yem s vami druzyami.' ('We will be friends with you.') The colonel said nothing and Stalin laughed and shook for a dozen seconds.

This incident impressed me tremendously. He made this declaration of friendship for a German soldier he did not know with sincerity. Stalin wanted very much to be friends with Germany. But he feared hostilities would develop nevertheless. The Soviet-Japanese Pact just signed strengthened Russia's hand considerably in her game with Germany.

The crowd surged along the platform. Everyone craned his neck trying to hear what Stalin was saying. Molotov exchanged an 'ah . . . ha' with Tatekawa. For about the third time Stalin shook Matsuoko's hand, and they embraced.

Finally Stalin and Matsuoko got into the special car which was to take the Japanese Foreign Minister across Siberia. Inside the car Stalin said to Matsuoko, 'You are an Asiatic. I am an Asiatic. Out there' and he waved his hand toward the platform where the diplomats were standing 'are all those Europeans.' Again raucous laughter from both Asiatics.

Finally, after Stalin and Molotov had spent nearly twenty minutes on the platform, the train whistled and pulled out, an hour and twenty-five minutes late. Stalin ambled down the platform, and climbed into his huge armor-plated Packard with its three-inch-thick machine-gun bullet-proof windows, and his squad of guards, and drove off.

We went back to the Press Department and spent the evening trying to get the story through the censorship. We did not succeed. Stalin and Molotov had come to the station, and the atmosphere had been friendly, that was all we could say.

The Embassies, however, did send out full reports. The whole performance was staged to impress the Germans, in my opinion. And the egocentric and dull-witted Matsuoko thought it was a genuine expression of Soviet friendship to Japan, coupled with the hit he personally had made with the Soviet leaders.

## 3

The Soviet-Japanese Pact was essentially a phase of Soviet-German relations, rather than of Soviet-Japanese relations. Stalin was clearing the decks for action against Germany. However, Soviet-German commercial relations flourished. The following is a rough estimate by commercial experts in Moscow of the 1940 Soviet exports to Germany:

	Thousands of Metric Tons
Wheat, rye, barley, oats, and corn .....	1,250
Oil seeds .....	10
Beans and peas .....	50
Oil cake .....	50
Starch products .....	20
Sugar .....	10
Dressed poultry .....	8
Fish .....	2
Leather .....	10
Manganese ore .....	30
Asbestos .....	7
Magnesite .....	7
Soda .....	15
Wool .....	8
Flax .....	3
Petroleum products .....	1,200
Pharmaceutical and chemical products .....	8
Zinc ore .....	7
Wood .....	1,000
Cotton and cotton waste .....	5
Copper .....	Considerable quantity

The Soviet Union imported from Germany in 1940 the following commodities, though here it is impossible even to estimate quantities:

internal-combustion engines; air pumps; compressors; fans; metal- and wood-working machine tools; roller bearings; electrical equipment; optical equipment; chemical equipment and apparatus; surgical and other fine tools and instruments; chemical ersatz processes; aviation designs and a few actual planes; fire-fighting equipment.

In addition to this, German agents in the Far East and Iran were buying enormous quantities of everything from soy beans to cotton, which were transshipped through Russia to Germany as a perfectly legitimate commercial transaction. The Germans received a maximum of a hundred railroad cars a day over the Trans-Siberian, according to well-informed sources in Moscow.

In addition to this legitimate business, the Russians engaged in a re-export trade which violated at least the spirit of the American priorities system and the British blockade. American cotton exports to the Soviet Union increased from an average of two hundred and fifty bales per quarter during recent years to a hundred and fifty thousand bales during the fourth quarter of 1940. Smaller increases were noticed in Soviet imports of copper and other products. These items were bought by the Soviet Union for internal use and replaced similar Soviet products exported to Germany.

Thus the Soviet Union had become very closely tied to Germany by commercial bonds. Stalin realized the danger involved and during the first quarter of 1941, irked by German demands made to Molotov, military preparations, and the obvious German plans in the Balkans, he squirmed more and more.

On February eleventh, 1941, Moscow concluded a trade agreement with Germany providing for the delivery of a million and a half tons of oil during the ensuing eighteen months. For the next two months, however, not a drop of oil was delivered to Germany. For two months Soviet export organizations and German buyers haggled about prices and no oil was shipped. On April ninth the contracts were signed and shipments resumed. Prices were not disclosed, but it was obvious that the Germans thought that they had been forced to pay too much. Stopping oil shipments for eight weeks in the middle of the war was a very serious thing for Hitler. In doing this Stalin was waving a red flag in



front of the Nazi bull. It was a risky gesture and a good indication that, at least until the collapse of Yugoslavia, Stalin did not intend to allow his country to be run by or in the interests of Nazi Germany.

During the first week in May, however, there was a political crisis in Moscow. Germany had overrun the Balkans and stood face to face with Russia. What was Moscow to do? the Politburo asked itself. The world may never find out exactly what took place. It seems probable that the younger elements in the Soviet Government came out with a plan to attack Germany or, at least, to continue getting in Germany's hair to a degree which might result in immediate hostilities between the two countries. This younger group, including Foreign Trade Commissar Mikoyan and Railroad Commissar Lazar Kaganovich, was extremely anti-Nazi and was anxious for a showdown. Stalin, older and wiser, believed that it was essential that the Soviet Union maintain peace for another year, cost what it might. By the spring of 1942 the Red Army would be strong enough to hurl back any German attack, perhaps even to invade Germany. In 1941 this would be impossible. The Russians would lose ground and costs would be stupendous. Stalin insisted, therefore, on outward concessions to Germany, combined with intensified internal preparations for war.

The altercation was brought to a head by Count von der Schulenberg, the German Ambassador, who returned to Moscow on the eve of May first after having conferred with Hitler at some length, and had his first talks with Molotov on May fourth and fifth. It is probable that Schulenberg said nothing of great importance to Molotov, but that the innuendoes and inflections of his remarks left no doubt in the mind of the Soviet Foreign Commissar that the situation was touch and go and that one injudicious move on the part of the Kremlin would suffice to bring down the entire might of the German Army in a crushing blow on Russia.

The persistent reports during the first and second weeks of May that Schulenberg was packing his personal baggage, and the actual departure from Moscow of almost all the wives and children of the German Embassy staff, was a pointed reminder to the Russians that Hitler meant business.

## 4

Early in May the new French Ambassador in Moscow, Gaston Bergerie, arrived in Moscow fresh from Berlin, where he had had an opportunity to converse with high officials. He made some interesting remarks to two journalists on May ninth, which I find written out in detail in my diary.

The German General Staff asserts that its army could defeat the Red Army and occupy the Caucasus and the Ukraine in three weeks to three months. It does not want to try this, however, because it would be extremely expensive and would disrupt German supplies for some time. German Army circles are putting pressure on the government (on Ribbentrop and Hitler) to settle outstanding difficulties with Russia peacefully.

The basic German aims with regard to Russia are as follows:

1. Russia must be incorporated into the New Order in Europe; i.e., trade barriers must fall, Russian resources must be made available to a greater degree to Germany.
2. Russia must join the Axis, and the Soviet Government must give substantial guarantees of its friendly attitude toward Germany; i.e., the Red Army must be partially demobilized, Moscow must break relations with London.

The German Government hopes to accomplish these aims during the course of one or two years, utilizing diplomatic negotiations, military threats, and internal political intrigue in the Soviet Union.

Sooner or later the question of the organization of Soviet industry and agriculture will have to be dealt with. German specialists will have to be introduced into the Soviet economy as advisers and administrators.

The Russians are very wise to begin to make concessions to Germany. Russia could not stand a year's all-out warfare against Germany now, but in 1942 or 1943 — who can tell?

If a traveling French Ambassador could tell such a story to American

journalists in Moscow, it was almost certain that Stalin had received reports to the same effect and was aware that by clever bargaining he might stave off the German attack for another year.

In order to do this it would be necessary to give Germany the impression that the Soviet Government was capitulating, and was prepared to make the desired fundamental concessions to the Reich. Stalin started out in early May to do these things—to try to placate Germany, cost what it might, until the end of the summer, thus postponing a German attack until 1942.

In order to make absolutely sure that no bungling precipitated a Soviet-German crisis, Stalin personally took over the functions of the head of the Soviet Government on May sixth. He replaced Molotov, who became Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars while continuing as Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Thus, after nearly two decades of exclusively political activity, during which time Stalin wielded his power through the Communist Party, holding no cabinet post, he took the same position as that occupied by Lenin—President of the Council of the People's Commissars—while retaining his key position as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Firmly installed as the operative head of the Soviet Government, Stalin went to work without loss of time. On May eighth and ninth the Soviet Government withdrew its recognition from the Governments of Belgium, Norway, and Yugoslavia. The Belgian and Norwegian Ministers received short notes stating that inasmuch as they no longer represented governments situated on the territory of their countries, the Soviet Government could no longer consider their credentials valid. The case of Yugoslavia was somewhat more delicate inasmuch as Moscow had only a month before signed a friendship pact with the Government of Belgrade, one of whose members was Minister to the U.S.S.R. At nine p.m. on May eighth, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky called Gabrilovich to the Foreign Office and made a long speech to him to the effect that the Soviet Government had the best possible attitude toward the Yugoslav Government, but that, nevertheless, a situation had arisen where he found it necessary to read a purely formal note which in

no way expressed the 'personal opinions of the Soviet Government.' Whereupon he read a communication stating that Moscow no longer recognized the Yugoslav envoy's credentials as being valid. Vyshinsky added immediately that the Minister or any of his staff could remain in Moscow as long as they wished as private citizens.

Gabrilovich called a meeting of the entire staff of the Yugoslav mission in Moscow on the morning of the tenth. 'Gentlemen,' he said, 'nous quittons Moscou.'

## 5

On the eighth of May, Tass issued an interesting denial. 'Red Army concentrations on the western frontier have not even been contemplated,' Tass asserted, denying reports in the foreign press to that effect as pure fantasy. Tass named the Kiev Military District, where, allegedly, enormous concentrations of Red Army units were preparing for major military operations, as the subject of an especially vehement denial and also asserted that the Red Army had neither ordered nor contemplated the transfer of submarines or any other craft to the Black or Caspian Seas. This denial was a sop to Germany and at the same time an unequivocal warning to Turkey that no assistance could be expected from the Soviet Union in case of difficulties with Germany. This was calculated to impress Berlin as an indication that Moscow was willing to comply with Ribbentrop's request to Molotov in November that Moscow co-operate with Berlin in applying pressure to the Turks.

On May twelfth, Stalin took a further step toward appeasing Berlin. The Soviet Government recognized Rashid Ali's German-paid gang in Baghdad as the legal government of Iraq.

Within the next week the Germans received considerable increases in transit freight from Manchukuo via the Trans-Siberian.

In early June, on the very day the evacuation of the Greek Govern-

ment from the island of Crete was announced, the Kremlin summoned Greek Minister Diamontopoulos and informed him that his credentials could no longer be recognized.

Thus Stalin sought to appease Hitler, to stall off a German attack. I am convinced that Stalin undertook these measures on his own initiative. Germany did not ask him to recognize the government of Rashid Ali or to expel the Greek Minister from Moscow. Stalin did it on his own hook, hoping in this manner to pacify the Nazis.

It is of tremendous importance that Stalin's appeasements did not involve issues of basic, strategic consequence. A minister more or less in Moscow made little real difference. On important questions like the demobilization of the Red Army, economic concessions to Germany on Soviet territory, or political changes in the Soviet Government at Germany's behest, Stalin stood firm. He realized that any important political capitulation of a decisive nature would destroy the possibility of defending his country should that become necessary. He was willing to increase shipments to Germany only up to the point where they would interfere with Soviet military reserves. Stalin clung to the essential attributes of sovereignty and independence. He knew that if he sacrificed these Russia would probably be annihilated and he personally would lose his seat, perhaps his head.

## 6

Concurrently with these gestures of appeasement, none of which was announced to the Soviet public, Stalin began letting the people know that all was not well between Berlin and Moscow. A subtle campaign was carefully planned to prepare Soviet public opinion for war, to undo the work of the past eighteen months during which the Soviet press had been plugging Soviet-German friendship, and at the same time to avoid giving Germany any grounds for complaint.

On April thirtieth the Soviet Government published a decree prohibiting the transport of military materials or equipment in transit through Soviet territory. This was a gesture against Germany in that Soviet readers interpreted it as such.

On the same day *Pravda* reported the arrival in Finland of twelve thousand German troops with complete equipment, including tanks and artillery. For us there was nothing new in the arrival of German divisions in Finland, but when the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (a newspaper with a circulation of over three million) spread the information all over the foreign-news page, thus for the first time informing the Russian people, it became an important internal political measure.

On this occasion the Soviet censor let me write: 'Last year the Red Army fought for four months . . . in order to ensure the security of Leningrad against the possible attacks of warmongers who might well utilize Finland as a jumping-off place for an invasion of the Soviet Union's most important industrial district.' In its context as connected with the presence of German troops in Finland, this became an expression of hostility toward the Reich.

I asked some of the German Embassy officials in Moscow what the twelve thousand troops were doing in Finland with artillery and tanks. 'They are going through to Narvik as provided for by a well-known Finnish-German agreement,' I was told.

'And what do you need tanks and artillery for in Lapland?' I insisted. 'To hunt polar bears,' was the answer.

One of the most extraordinary expressions of Stalin's policy of preparing for war was the speech of the Soviet leader himself in early May, when he told an audience of several thousand to prepare to fight Nazi Germany to the death.

When a member of the Soviet Government proposed a toast to the 'Stalinist Peace Policy,' the sober, austere, shaggy-maned, sixty-one-year-old Bolshevik leader rose to his feet, brushed aside the proposed toast with a wave of the hand, and said: 'No. Not to the Stalinist Peace Policy, but to the victory of our glorious Red Army in the great battle against Fascist Germany.'

The occasion of these sensational statements was the graduation ceremony of the Red Army academies held in the Kremlin on May sixth, 1941. No details were published, but later I received indirectly an eyewitness account of what occurred.

Stalin spoke for forty minutes, emphasizing the importance of the reorganization, re-equipment, and modernization which had brought the Red Army up to the minute in contemporary technique. Then the all-powerful Georgian 'little father' of the largest country in the world went much further:

'Our glorious Red Army must be prepared to fight Fascist Germany at any moment, and to fight on enemy territory,' Stalin is reported to have stated in his simple, penetrating Russian. 'As long as Hitler occupied himself with the rectification of the injustices of Versailles, we could and did support Germany. Now Hitler is striving for world domination. This we cannot tolerate. We will fight Germany to the death,' he continued, speaking with his slight Georgian accent.

Not only the several thousand Red Army academy graduates, but also the entire Soviet Government and the ranking officers of the Red Army and Navy, were present while the 'boss' told them which way the wind was blowing.

This version of Stalin's remarks may be inaccurate, but the fact that it was being passed around from one Moscovite to another was almost more important than what Stalin actually may have said. The Soviet population was being prepared for war against Germany.

While giving *de jure* recognition to Hitler's New Order in Europe, Stalin made every attempt to counteract the effects of two years of Soviet-German friendship pacts and good relations and stimulate anti-German sentiment among his people. The speech in the Kremlin to the Red Army academy graduates was the utmost he could do and still maintain friendly diplomatic and economic co-operation between Moscow and Berlin.

## 7

All during May actual military preparations proceeded rapidly. Every morning from three until six o'clock troop trains were leaving Moscow bound westward. Several times I went down to see them. This was difficult because the departing Red Army men and officers entrained at freight stations around the edges of the city of Moscow, rather than at the main railway stations. I saw enough, however, to be impressed by the improved quality of their clothing and equipment.

Several times large tank and motorized units passed near Moscow on their way westward.

At the same time material reserves were moving in the opposite direction. The Commissariat for State Reserves was stocking up wheat, metal ores, spare parts, liquid fuels, and many other materials, which were sent to huge storage dumps in the Urals and in western Siberia, out of reach of the best German bombers. Several of my Russian friends, engineers in factories, told me of the consternation caused by the arrival of a State Reserves Commissariat inspector in the plant. He would walk through the warehouse, look at the inventory, and then designate whole blocks of supplies and materials to be taken over as state reserves. The plant administrators ranted and raved, but to no effect.

Not only reserves were moved eastward, but several factories, in process of construction near Moscow, were transferred to the Urals. Equipment and machinery which were being installed were reloaded and shipped off. This happened in two factories that I saw personally. The Russian General Staff was worried about long-distance German bombers.

Internal economic changes still further reduced the buying power of the Soviet public, and thus decreased consumption. Basic foodstuffs were not available in sufficient quantities in the Union as a whole to meet the demand at current prices. Prices were therefore increased from



twenty-five to seventy-five per cent during a period of several months. Furthermore, rationing was introduced, even in Moscow. A purchaser was not permitted to get more than two and a half pounds of bread, a quarter-pound of butter, a quarter-pound of cheese, one pound of meat, one pound of sausage, five eggs, one pound of sugar, or one can of any kind of preserves at any one time. In Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev there was nothing to prevent one from going from store to store and accumulating as much as one wanted to buy and had money enough to pay for. Throughout the rest of the country, however, each person was assigned to a specific store and had to do his purchasing there, while a record was kept of how much he bought.

Throughout the Soviet Union new postal regulations made it illegal to send food by mail. Moreover, railroad passengers were subjected to rigid examination. Baggage, and sometimes pockets, were searched for food products at stations throughout the country.

The population of the Soviet Union was producing as much as it had two years before, plus fourteen per cent for the eight-hour day, plus a fifteen per cent average rise in the productivity of labor. It was consuming much less.

That quantity of currency which could not be drained off from the population by the sale of necessities plus taxes, tuition for schooling, and other recently developed or increased expenses was siphoned off by the sale of vodka, Cologne water, tobacco, and other commodities on which the State made a profit of fifteen hundred per cent or so. Thus the Soviet financial authorities sought to avoid inflation and decrease consumption while increasing production.

The Soviet Government paid considerable attention to the preparation of morale for the possible Soviet-German war. Late in May I went to the Red Army theatre to see the play 'Suvorov.' The immense theatre was crowded with young Red Army men and N.C.O.'s in their early and middle twenties, big husky fellows with sunburned faces and calloused hands. The play traced the life of General Suvorov, the popular eighteenth-century Russian warrior. A skillful soldier, Suvorov was continually at loggerheads with the Czar, who imported everything from Germany and who worshiped Frederick the Great as a god.

The first act of the play takes place in Berlin. Russian armies have captured the German capital and Suvorov, then a colonel, has occupied the residence of the burgomaster of Berlin. The broad-faced Russian soldiers are surveying the splendor of Berlin with condescension. The Moscow audience grinned from ear to ear.

The rest of the play dealt with the trials and tribulations of Suvorov, his exile, and his final death in obscurity. Suvorov was portrayed as the pure Russian national patriot, interested above all else in the welfare of the Russian people, in Holy Mother Russia.

During May intensive civilian-defense maneuvers were carried out throughout the western part of the Soviet Union. On May fifteenth and sixteenth gigantic maneuvers were held in Ramenskoye. Twenty thousand civilians participated in a series of operations aimed at combating four different parachute descents, an intensive bombardment of several villages and towns, and incendiary-bomb attacks on forests and agricultural buildings, as well as a gas attack on the town of Ramenskoye. All roads and communications were taken over by the home guardsmen.

In Moscow itself large-scale civilian-defense maneuvers were carried out. In several cases entire districts of the city underwent 'alarms.' Lights were blacked out. Civilians were forbidden to walk on the streets. Women and children were evacuated. First-aid and emergency demolition squads raced around the streets in special vehicles. Similar exercises were held in Minsk, Kiev, Leningrad, Petrozavodsk, Odessa, Kharkov, as well as in hundreds of smaller towns throughout western Russia. By the first of June military observers estimated a concentration of one hundred and fifty Red Army divisions along the Soviet-German frontier, while the same observers estimated that a total of seven to eight million men had been mobilized in the Soviet Union and were standing by fully trained, equipped, and armed, waiting for orders to march to the defense of their country.

## 8

Thus, for a period of many weeks the Soviet Union carried out simultaneously a program of intensified military preparations and deployment, and a program of appeasement and capitulation to Hitler on a number of points. During the day westward-bound trains out of Moscow carried petroleum products and other important military materials to Germany. During the night the same railroads carried trainload after trainload of Red troops and materials to the German frontier.

The Soviet population, which knew by hearsay of the intensive military preparations, was unaware of the expulsion of the Yugoslav diplomats and other acts of appeasement, and sensed war. Many foreign diplomats, on the other hand, were unconscious of the intensive military preparations going on among the Russian people, and, therefore, concluded that Stalin had unconditionally capitulated and that the Soviet Union could be expected to join the Axis any day.

During late May and all of June, wild rumors circulated throughout most European capitals. Stalin had decided to cede the Ukraine to Germany, widespread economic concessions in the Soviet Union were to be granted to German concerns. One of these stories was denied with great vehemence by Soviet political commentator Zaslavski in *Pravda* for May twenty-fifth. The article stated that the author of a story in the Finnish paper *Helsinki Salomat* must have been listening to Edgar Lear's children songs, which apparently served as an inspiration for his political reports. The article sizzled with vituperative indignation at the mere suggestion that conversations between the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin and German leaders had touched on the possibility of territorial concessions to Germany.

This story clarified one point, namely, that Moscow did not want the Soviet people to get the impression that Stalin was considering territorial concessions to Germany.

I wrote several articles for my paper, the *News Chronicle*, in which I attempted to throw some light on the situation in Moscow. Sending anything but published material through the censorship was out of the question, so I made use of the fact that the Soviet authorities did not exercise censorship over mails and air-mailed them direct to London. In summer, air-mail service from Moscow to Stockholm was regular and the British had organized special plane service between Stockholm and London, so that my articles arrived in some cases only three or four days after I had written them. The *News Chronicle* liked them and gave them a big play. In these articles I attempted to describe the two concurrent, yet mutually contradictory, tendencies of appeasement and defiance; concessions and military preparations.

The first article appeared under a headline (which I did not write) 'Stalin the Appeaser.' It summarized Stalin's policy of concession and appeasement and attempted to explain Stalin's reasons, in fact his great wisdom, in making every attempt to stall off a German attack in 1941.

These articles, combined with my Istanbul series mentioned in the last chapter, caused the Soviet Foreign Office to decide on my expulsion early in June.



## **Part Eleven**

The Blow Falls



DURING the months following the collapse of Yugoslavia a hundred and ninety-odd million Russians were told officially by the press that Russia and Germany were the best of friends, though imperialist warmongers in London and Washington were seeking in vain to drive a wedge between them.

Of course they did not all believe it; the Soviet public has developed a healthy skepticism with regard to official utterances. Nevertheless, until mid-May a large proportion of Soviet citizens thought of Germany as a friend, and of England and France as warmongers.

Stalin's speech at the War College graduation early in May, and the frantic scramble to eject from Moscow the representatives of Norway, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and, later, Greece, occurred without wide popular knowledge or comment. On May twenty-first, however, for the first time, a strong anti-Nazi article appeared in the press. 'The peoples of Europe have been made into colonial slaves. They are experiencing the cruel and ruinous results of military weakness,' wrote the *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. The article went on in this general vein for several paragraphs.

I sat down and wrote a powerful piece. The censor deleted the above quotation, leaving in only the innocuous 'A whole group of capitalist countries has suffered defeat in this war,' and the interesting conclusion of the article: 'Every Soviet family, school, or political organization is duty bound to instill in the Soviet youth from the earliest age those qualities necessary to the Red soldier: military spirit, a love of war, endurance, self-reliance, and boundless loyalty.' The article concluded with biting criticism of some Soviet educational institutions, which 'instead of raising the mobilized preparedness of our people, and developing an over-the-top aggressiveness in Soviet youth, a willingness to make sacrifices and suffer for the common good, only frighten their stu-



dents with the horrors of war and stimulate a sentimental pacifism.' With some difficulty I made an appointment with the chief censor. The paragraph deleted from my telegram, a direct quotation from an authoritative Soviet newspaper, had not been taken out of context or misinterpreted. Quite the contrary, the idea was an integral part of the whole article, which suffered much in sequence and power through its deletion.

The censor was polite but absolutely unreasoning and unreasonable. 'You can write what you please, Mr. Scott. It is your right as a free correspondent. I, on the other hand, can strike out what I please. It is my prerogative as a censor. I am under no obligation to explain to you why I cross out what I cross out. If you are not able to understand without my explanation, then you will have to get along without understanding.'

'Clearly, all reference to Germany which might be interpreted as in any way derogatory to that country is cut out,' I said. 'As long as this policy was followed by the Soviet press, it was certainly logical not to permit foreign correspondents to speculate or prognosticate along these lines. However, when you tell the Soviet people that the peoples of Europe have become colonial slaves of Hitler's Fascism, it is neither logical nor fair that you should not let me record it.'

'I am under no obligation . . .' said the censor, repeating verbatim the phrase he had used before.

'It is particularly bad, because mails are so slow,' I said, 'and those stories which we send without benefit of your censorship take so long that they are out of date before they arrive.'

'Not always,' said the censor, with a nasty leer.

I thought of the censor's last remark as I left the Foreign Office. I surmised that at least one of my recent mail stories on extraordinary preparations in the Soviet Union had appeared in the *News Chronicle* and had attracted the attention of the Soviet Embassy in London. There might well be trouble brewing for me. Still I had never once been warned, while old Cholerton, for instance, had received at least a half-dozen warnings of immediate expulsion if his attitude did not change. His attitude had never changed and despite his outspoken hostility to the Soviet Union, he was treated with respect by the Russians and was

granted many privileges, and no expulsion proceedings had ever been undertaken against him.

On June third the Yugoslav and Norwegian diplomats left the Soviet capital. Greek Minister Diamontopoulos went to the station late in the morning to see his colleague, Doctor Milan Gabrilovich, entrain for Turkey. When he returned to his residence he found a note explaining that, inasmuch as the Government of Greece was no longer situated on Greek territory, the Soviet Government could not recognize the continued validity of his ministerial credentials. The usual scramble began to purchase desired objects from the Greek mission — furniture, clothes, imported canned foods and liqueurs, office equipment, etc.

On June fifth, Foreign Office telephoned me in the early afternoon, and requested me to appear in the office of the chief of the Press Department sometime during the afternoon. At about five o'clock I climbed the five flights of wooden stairs, showed my press card to the necessary officials and guards, and in due course was ushered into the office of the former Tass correspondent in Paris, who acted as chief of the Foreign Office Press Bureau. He was grave, even pale, as he offered me a chair and a cigarette.

'I summoned you to come here in order to inform you that a decision has been taken to request you to leave Soviet territory immediately.'

I politely requested information as to the causes of the expulsion.

' . . . for systematically tendentious and slanderous articles written by yourself and sent, unseen by our censors, to the *News Chronicle* in London, which published them.'

I could get no more details and was informed that I was to be out of the Soviet Union within three days. This was physically impossible, as I told the head of the Press Bureau. It was impossible to get either a German or a Swedish visa in less than ten days.

I telephoned home and heard to my astonishment that the militia had already come to summon me to the Central Visa Bureau. This would not do. I knew that if I were put on a train to Germany without a German visa or on a plane to Stockholm without a Swedish visa, the Swedes or Germans would refuse to admit me, and according to international law and also according to an article of the recently concluded

German-Soviet frontier agreement, the Russians would have to take me back. It might mean an unpleasant two weeks somewhere until the matter was clarified.

I took my passport and went to see Ambassador Steinhardt, who was in bed with a cold. After a short conversation I left him the passport and I went to the Militia Passport Bureau. A colonel of the militia received me politely, brought out a timetable, and showed me that the only way in which I could fulfill the decision of 'higher bodies' and quit Soviet territory within three days was to take the train at noon the next day and he intended me to do it. When he asked me for my passport and I told him the American Ambassador had it, he was at a loss. He requested me to leave the room while he made several telephone calls. Then he told me that I would have to go to the Ambassador and get my passport back. By this time it was nearly eleven p.m., and I stated that it was not usual to call on an ambassador at such an hour about a passport, particularly when the ambassador was ill. I offered to telephone the Ambassador. The colonel pushed his telephone toward me and I dialed the number. When the servant came to the telephone I said, 'This is the Visa Department of the Militia calling and —' I got no further. The colonel disconnected the telephone with his hand.

'Now, Mr. Scott,' he said.

'I beg your pardon,' I said. 'You want my passport — I don't.'

Again I was asked to leave the room while the colonel telephoned to 'certain people.' When I got back in the room, he gave me a pencil and paper and asked me to write a statement saying that I had been informed of the decision to expel me from the Soviet Union within three days and that I undertook to fulfill the decision. I refused on the ground that I could not undertake to do something which was physically impossible. It looked for a while as though I would spend the night in the police station. About midnight, however, I was told to go home and appear as early as possible the next morning with my passport.

For some time I had wanted to leave the Soviet Union. Now I was going, that was clear. The all-important question was whether or not the Soviet authorities would allow Masha and the children to leave with

me. For more than two years Masha's application for an exit visa to go to America had been pending. According to Soviet law we should have had an answer within six months, but in our case no answer was forthcoming. Now there would be a showdown. If they did not let Masha and the children leave with me, then they probably never would get out. So before going to bed I drafted a telegram to Stalin requesting that Masha's two-year-old petition be granted, that we might leave together. I also tried to cable my paper and my mother, but the telegraph office had orders to accept no cables of any kind from me.

## 2

The first thing in the morning I went to see Sir Stafford Cripps. I informed him of my expulsion, told him that I was unable to send telegrams, and asked him first, to inform my newspaper of what had happened, second, to assist me in obtaining a stay of ten or fifteen days, and third, to do what he could to secure my wife's exit permit.

Sir Stafford offered to request the London Foreign Office to notify my newspaper, but stated that anything else was completely out of his power. 'It has been more than six months since I have seen Molotov,' he said. 'It has been many weeks since I have seen any Soviet official of any rank. In cases where we have a clear juridical right to something it is only with the greatest difficulty that I am able to make representations which in some cases result satisfactorily. In cases where it is not a question of juridical right but of courtesy and respect I can do absolutely nothing. Were I in the position of Count von der Schulenberg it would give me great pleasure to help you. Unfortunately, I am the British Ambassador and can do absolutely nothing, particularly as you are an American citizen. I am very sorry. Please go and see Steinhardt.'

Cripps stated further that 'the more tension between Berlin and

Moscow, the less the Russians want to see of me. I see no chance of any change in this attitude unless Germany attacks the Soviet Union.'

The next day Sir Stafford flew off to London via Stockholm to confer with his Government. This trip was probably an outgrowth of Hess's flight to London. To digress for a moment with some interesting theorizing: Hess informed British Government leaders during the third week in May that Germany was about to attack the Soviet Union, and asked for a negotiated peace between Britain and Germany. Churchill relayed this information to Soviet Ambassador Maisky late in May. The Soviet Government, however, suspected British provocation and an 'Anglo-American wedge between Germany and Russia.'

Seeing that the Russians had not taken his warning seriously, Churchill decided to recall Cripps, who could return to Moscow with detailed information concerning Hess's statements, and might make some impression on the Kremlin.

According to another theory, on the other hand, the Germans took Cripps's flight to London as an indication that Churchill had accepted Hess's proposition, and was recalling his ambassador to Moscow in preparation for a complete break with Russia. According to this story Cripps's flight on June seventh was decisive in making up Hitler's mind to attack the Soviet Union immediately. It took him two weeks to fill his planes with gasoline and otherwise prepare for the actual assault.

### 3

After leaving Sir Stafford's office I went to see Steinhardt and told him of my experiences of the night before with the militia. The Ambassador promised to take the matter up immediately. He was sure he could get me an extension of at least ten days, which would permit me to leave in a dignified fashion through the Far East. He said he would do the best he could to get permission for Masha and the children to

go at the same time. He suggested that I stay in the Embassy until he had secured an extension of the expulsion order.

Until five that afternoon I stomped around the Embassy. Then Steinhardt returned from the Foreign Office with the news that a fifteen-day extension had been granted, but that no decision had yet been reached with regard to Masha. Only the next day, in the early afternoon, when I was at the Japanese Embassy getting a visa, did word come through simultaneously from the Embassy and from the Passport Division that Masha's permission had been granted.

It was a great moment. For more than two years we had been waiting, and our repeated inquiries had been answered by a laconic 'When a decision is made you will be informed.'

I never did learn the nature of the representations made by Ambassador Steinhardt to the Soviet authorities with regard to Masha's departure, but it seemed clear that had it not been for the energetic action taken by the Ambassador, and, perhaps, simultaneously by the State Department in Washington, I should have left alone.

On the eighth Masha received her exit permit, which stated that she had renounced Soviet citizenship and undertook to leave the country within thirty days, never to return. In order to get this document she had to surrender her birth certificate, our marriage license, her internal Soviet passport, and the children's birth certificates. Only with great difficulty did she persuade the authorities to let her keep her college diploma.

We had to leave the Soviet capital on the tenth. We had two days to liquidate our affairs and try to dispose of our furniture, an interest in a summer cottage, an automobile which I was in the process of buying, and the thousand and one household and personal articles, which could not possibly be taken on a trip nearly around the world under wartime conditions where baggage was worse than a nuisance.

Within forty-eight hours she had disposed of almost everything except some winter clothing. Two or three of the buyers were first-class Soviet artists in one field or another. One of the best-known Moscow Ballet premières danseuses, whom I knew slightly but who had never been in our apartment, came with one or two of her acquaintances and bought

Masha's evening clothes and considerable cosmetic equipment as well as our best pieces of furniture. Money was absolutely no object to her and her friends. They made hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of roubles a year, and had great difficulty in spending it.

The night before we left we spent out at the quiet American Embassy dacha, or summer cottage, fifteen miles from Moscow with secretaries Charlie Thayer and Freddie Reinhardt. The Ambassador was more than cordial, and explained that he would not be able to see us off on the train the next day because I had been expelled and it might look like a demonstration on his part, but that he was sending a box of food for the trip.

Masha's bearded peasant father came to Moscow to say good-bye, and shed copious tears to see one of his eight children depart on so long a trip.

## 4

At nine p.m. on the tenth we said good-bye to the allied newspapermen and the American and British Embassy people who had come to the station, and boarded the train for our ten-day Trans-Siberian trip. The children were excited and fascinated; we were both deliriously happy.

We had one four-bed, first-class sleeper compartment, which was very good, considering the crowding on the train. Had it not been for my expulsion order, we should have been unable to get any seats at all for at least two weeks. The two compartments next to ours were occupied by an Englishman, his Norwegian wife and three children, en route from Stockholm to Ottawa, while the other passengers in the car were two Turkish diplomats, the Japanese Ambassador's personal secretary, two American consular clerks going from Istanbul to Washington, and two Soviet admirals assigned to Vladivostok.

The food in the dining car was inadequate after the fourth or fifth day, but we all had something with us. The Ambassador's food-box turned out to contain two bottles of excellent Scotch and several cans of powdered milk, both invaluable acquisitions.

Ten days in the train should make anyone, and particularly small children, nervous and irritable, but we survived with a much higher morale than I had hoped for.

The trip itself was extremely interesting. The train made good time, was never more than a couple of hours late, and sometimes ran as much as two hours ahead of schedule. While passing through Sverdlovsk and other Ural and western Siberian cities we were astonished at the feverish activity we saw. New factory buildings were going up, railroad sidings being put in place. In Sverdlovsk and Novosibirsk we saw factory buildings which had been completely constructed, but which as yet housed no machinery. This was an extremely interesting phenomenon which I incorrectly interpreted at the time as overfulfillment of building-construction plans and backwardness of the machine-building industry. It is now clear that these industrial buildings were constructed to house machinery and equipment to be evacuated from industrial enterprises near the Soviet Union's German frontier.

Conditions along the road were fair, though uneven. To my astonishment we found evidences of a food shortage in the immensely rich western-Siberian cereal grain-growing district. Here in a number of towns our dining car was raided by several hundred people, including the ticket-office clerks and the station policemen, all anxious to buy bread. Obviously the grain harvested in these regions was going into the gigantic maw of Soviet military reserves.

We passed several eastbound prison cars along the road, but there was nothing like the steady flow of hundreds of prison trains which had bumped across the Trans-Siberian taking prisoners to the Soviet Far East during the purge years of 1937 and '38.

The railroad line was in good shape everywhere. Double-tracked from the Urals to Khabarovsk, it had been triple-tracked from that point to Vladivostok. Stations, switching-yards, roundhouses, and signal systems looked well kept and functioned normally. Several of the



long bridges over the Siberian rivers seemed shaky and unsteady, which was natural because they were built before the last war, and since that time the average weight of Russian trains has more than doubled. Bridges and tunnels were closely guarded by the NKVD internal troops, in some cases armed with machine-guns.

The most extraordinary thing we saw on the trip was an extensive movement of military units from east to west. Between Novosibirsk and Chita for more than two days we passed a large number of west-bound military trains. I imagine that it was the Twelfth Mechanized Army, which, under the command of General Gregory Stern, had made such an excellent showing against the Japanese at Kholkhingol in September, 1939. Stern himself had been transferred to the western front the year before and now his army was following him. More than two hundred and fifty trains passed us. They were running right along, every fifteen or twenty minutes, at a good rate of speed. Apparently they took precedence over all other westbound traffic.

Each train consisted of from fifteen to twenty cars; the first ten carried tanks, trucks, artillery, ambulances, field kitchens, and other machines. The equipment looked worn but well cared for and in good shape. After these flatcars there followed several boxcars filled with crates and boxes, which probably contained spare parts and other material, and then several more boxcars, each carrying a score or so of men.

I found out from other travelers who came before and after we did that this stream of military matériel and Red Army men began flowing westward during the first days of June.

Along the railroad line from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok military preparations were very much in evidence. This road ran parallel to the Soviet-Manchukuo frontier, in some places so closely that looking out of the train window we could see the hills and forests of Japan's puppet state. The cities and towns along this railroad were cleaner and more modern than those of any other part of the Soviet Union. Every railroad station boasted an air-raid shelter. Frequent lateral roads and railroad lines ran at right angles to the main line of the Trans-Siberian connecting it with the frontier, making possible swift and efficient maneuvering in case of hostilities with the Japanese.

The entire Maritime Province, which runs from the Amur River south to Vladivostok, was for all practical purposes organized and administered by the military authorities. A large proportion of the men seen on the streets were in some kind of uniform. Soviet citizens required special permission to go to the Maritime Province, and only those who had some important reason for residing there were allowed to stay.

The stores of Khabarovsk and Vladivostok tended to be better supplied with food and manufactured goods than those in other parts of the Soviet Union. Wages in the Maritime Province were nearly twice as high as in other parts of the country.

The population itself had undergone curious changes during the last few years. Travelers in Vladivostok before the First World War and even as late as the early thirties reported that a large proportion of the population was Chinese or Korean. When I passed through the town late in June I saw not a single oriental face on the streets, but only Russian and Ukrainian pug noses. Several hundred thousand Chinese and Koreans had been evacuated from the Maritime Province to Central Asia during the middle thirties and replaced by politically more dependable Russians.

The same afternoon we were taken down through the large, complicated, and disorderly commercial port to the customs house. We had only three fairly small suitcases and a duffle bag full of dirty clothes, and yet it took us almost an hour to clear the customs. Every scrap of paper in the suitcases, as well as in my pockets, was gone over minutely, nor was I the only one thus favored. Everyone in the train, except those with diplomatic passports, was subjected to the same minute scrutiny.

Finally we boarded the Japanese ship *Harbin Maru*, to find that the only first- and second-class cabins more or less habitable were already occupied. The steward showed me a cabin forward, apparently originally fitted as crew's quarters, which had neither washing facilities nor heat. After considerable conversation I finally got the Japanese Ambassador's secretary, who was still traveling with us, to intercede with the purser, and by paying a supplement of thirty dollars in greenbacks we got the royal suite — sitting-room, large bedroom, and private bath — on the boat deck.

Masha and the children were thrilled. The meals aboard were good. The five or six courses were served quietly and efficiently. Everything was immaculately clean, and everything from bread to fruit tasted extraordinarily good.

## 5

While we were crossing Siberia Moscow had fermented in rumors of frontier incidents which were vehemently denied by both Berlin and the official Soviet agency — Tass. Military preparations on the Russian side continued apace, while the Soviet censorship became even more difficult and unreasonable.

German Ambassador von der Schulenberg stayed in his Embassy writing telegrams. He did no last minute negotiating with the Kremlin leaders. Similarly, in Berlin, Soviet Ambassador Dekanosov was engaged in no important conversations with the Wilhelmstrasse.

On June twentieth, as we were embarking on the *Harbin Maru*, one of the secretaries of the German Embassy in Moscow gave American Ambassador Steinhardt to understand that war was imminent. The next day the Ambassador's wife and daughter flew to Stockholm, and the embassies in Moscow prepared for bombs and possible evacuation.

The next morning Hitler's hordes invaded Russia.

Hitler's attack was not a surprise to the Soviet Union. Stalin had been preparing for months. It was unexpected only in terms of minutes or hours. Stalin knew in general that it might come any time during May, June, July, or August, and that the taking of Crete and the transfer of enormous quantities of German war matériel to the Soviet frontier during the first week in June indicated that the attack might be expected any time toward the end of that month.

When the Germans did strike, however, on June twenty-second, it was so sudden and so well planned that the Russians lost some seven

hundred planes on the ground. One can prepare for a war by bringing up armies, deploying them, and supplying them with what they need. It is impossible to prepare for an assault unless you know exactly when it is coming. You cannot keep your planes in the air and your tank motors running all the time.

We heard of the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union while we were in the middle of the Sea of Japan. I wrote a story for cabling as soon as I should arrive on 'Russia on the Eve.'

The showdown had come.

## 6

It was a three-day trip from Vladivostok to Tsuruga, a port on the western coast of Japan. More than half these three days, however, was spent in the two Japanese military ports in Korea—Rashin and Seishin. Had we sailed directly across the Sea of Japan, it would have taken only some eighteen hours in the antiquated Japanese steamer *Harbin Maru*. Russian submarines and war vessels could cover the distance in much less time, while modern bombers operating from the numerous air fields near Vladivostok could be over Japan in little more than two hours. I did not see the Soviet warships and bombing planes in Vladivostok because of rigid restrictions on the movements of foreigners within the city, but several people in a position to know assured me that the Russians had nearly two thousand bombers in the Far East ready to bring the terrors of war to the center of Japan in case of hostilities. I was also assured that the Red Fleet of the Pacific was equipped with more than a hundred modern submarines which would be in a position to paralyze Japanese shipping and thereby practically cut the Nipponese off from Korea, Manchukuo, and China.

Of course the Japanese would be expected to bomb Vladivostok, attempt landings on the coast, and push eastward from Manchukuo.

The Korean port of Rashin, only a few hours' sail from Vladivostok, was constructed by the Japanese Navy as a base for just such operations. Japanese naval units were in the port when I was there, but we were not permitted to leave the boat, which was docked in such a position as to render invisible from our decks the part of the port occupied by war vessels. It is well known that considerable Japanese naval and land forces have for a long time been concentrated in Korea, Manchukuo, and Sakhaline Island in preparation for operations against Vladivostok and the surrounding territory.

Two very important factors must be remembered in considering mutual bombings, shellings, and landings between Vladivostok and Japan. The entire Soviet Maritime Province is an armed camp. The civilian population is small. Vital industries have been kept at a distance. Therefore the Japanese would not have much to hit. The entire island of Nippon, on the other hand, with all its industrial centers and its paper and plywood cities, is within range of bombing planes, Soviet and/or American, operating from bases near Vladivostok.

The stronghold of Soviet resistance is in the enormous industrial district of the Urals and western Siberia, out of reach of any Axis attack. Japan's entire economy, however, is vulnerable to naval, aerial, and military attack from Soviet bases.

Arrived in Japan I found that Nipponese military and political leaders were well aware of the strength of the Soviet Union in the Far East and respectful of the qualitative excellence of Soviet army and aviation units.

The thing which impressed me most about Japan was the high degree of cleanliness and efficiency attained by the Nipponese in industry and agriculture. The Japanese railroads functioned extremely well. The factories worked efficiently, every square foot of land was utilized. The people were humorless, grim, always busy, and very often arrogant in their attitude toward foreigners.

For several days we lived in the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, which deservedly earned Frank Lloyd Wright an international reputation but which was not designed for little children in the rainy season. Then we arranged for Masha and the children to spend three weeks in the seashore

resort of Kamakura while I stayed in Tokyo, wrote my war commentaries for the *News Chronicle* and for *Time* magazine, and talked to travelers arriving from the Soviet Union.

The hotel in Kamakura was large and full of Germans. Some of them were refugees from the United States who had been en route to Germany and had been cut off by the Soviet-German War. Others were just 'tourists.' They seemed always to be busy and complained loudly about the poor quality of the food.

The Kamakura beach, however, was excellent, and after the first of July the sun came out and Masha and the children spent a pleasant three weeks bathing in sun and surf.

For two or three years, articles and books had appeared stating that Japan's economy was shattered by the Chinese War, that the financial situation was critical, that revolution and chaos threatened the Land of the Rising Sun, which simply could not go on fighting any longer. Journalists and authors spoke of severe shortages of food and other commodities.

During the year previous to our arrival in Japan I had visited almost every country in eastern Europe and the Near and Middle East. Compared with these countries Japan was fairly well supplied with everything. In the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo we could get a nourishing, even tasty meal for from three to five yen (seventy-five cents to a dollar and a quarter). Our first two days in Tokyo were spent in the large Mitsukoshi Department Store, where we bought shoes, stockings, dresses, underclothing, coats, and other things for the children, Masha, and myself. Cigarettes, wine, liqueurs were likewise obtainable, though the quality was not good.

The Americans resident in Tokyo as well as the Japanese, however, complained bitterly that they couldn't get this or that, that prices had gone up and quality depreciated. It went to show that, while Japan had suffered as a result of the American blockade and the war with China, things were still a great deal better than they were in most countries in Europe.

The Tokyo Government had taken advantage of shortages of a number of products to force restrictions on the people for 'the good of the

nation.' All cafes, beer halls, and bars closed at ten or eleven p.m., depending on the district. Rice was strictly rationed, and the people were urged to eat less of it and more vegetables, an excellent idea for most Japanese. The restrictions with regard to gasoline were most severe. A large proportion of the automobiles in Tokyo were not operated because of shortages of fuel, while many of those running coughed and sneezed or refused to run at all on the poor-quality gasoline they were getting.

I met a number of extremely anti-German Japanese, who were resentful of German influence in Japan, and anxious to renounce Axis affiliations, retire gradually and as gracefully as possible from China, and come to a cordial understanding with the United States. This was definitely a minority opinion and represented business and financial groups as well as the well-to-do peasantry, interested in a flourishing world trade and high prices for exported silks and manufactured goods.

Another opinion frequently heard by foreigners was that 'Japan cannot tolerate the transport of materials and equipment to Vladivostok.' Most Japanese with whom I talked feared the Russians much more than they feared the Americans, while they gave me to understand that the large industrial proletariat and the poor peasantry of Japan were often sympathetic with the Soviet Union.

The Russians in Tokyo were extremely nervous. Women and children were evacuated to Vladivostok in late June, and several members of the Embassy expressed anxiety that Japan might move north and try to carry out General Araki's old dream of taking eastern Siberia.

The Russians were, incidentally, very cordial to me. 'You must understand the situation, Mr. Scott,' they said. 'The things you said in your articles were true enough, but we were trying in every way to avoid provoking Germany. It was obvious that we could not allow correspondents to write that sort of thing without taking some measures. If you had written your articles two or three weeks later and the expulsion had not been announced before June twenty-second, I am sure you would have had no trouble at all. Quite the contrary . . .' etc.

Most Japanese with whom I talked thought that Russia would fight well against the Germans and minimized the possibility of a Soviet

collapse. In this they turned out to be a good deal more correct than most other observers of the Soviet-German War.

I saw the British and American Ambassadors in Tokyo several times. Like all other foreigners in Japan, they seemed at great pains to understand Japanese policies and the extremely complicated internal political system in the Island Empire. My old friend Charles Bohlen, previously at the American Embassy in Moscow, made more sense to me than anyone else. Not having been in Tokyo long himself, he did not go off into complicated and incomprehensible explanations of things Japanese, which no one but an old resident of the country could follow.

But at best the picture was hazy. Japanese big business wanted peace and reconciliation with the United States. The army chiefs—the warlords—wanted war against everybody. The army and navy staffs, on the other hand, probably realized that they could not fight everybody at the same time, and had preference as to whom to start on. Most Japanese feared a Russian attack because of the proximity of Vladivostok and the reputed cruelty of the Russians. On the other hand, the proletariat and poor peasantry were tainted with Communist ideas. The German Ambassador, Eugen Ott, and Germany's special Gestapo envoy Franz Huber were among the most important political figures in Japan. They spent money like water, had agents all over the country, and were in a position to dictate policy to some extent, both internally and externally. Almost everybody in Japan hated the Germans. Almost all the people wanted peace. This was a rough summary of the popular situation. When it came to the question of political power it was much more difficult. No one seemed to know which of the political parties was in power, or what its program was. No one knew what the Emperor thought or, generally speaking, whose interests he represented, if any. It was a headache.

The *News Chronicle* had cabled requesting me to go to Shanghai to act as their Far-Eastern correspondent. I could not see it, however. The Far East was no place for Masha and the children and it would hardly have been fair to send them to America alone. Masha's English was inadequate and she knew no one in the United States. Moreover, I had a book, written some time previously, but never really put into shape for



publication, and a second manuscript which was partly finished. I wanted very much to try to get these things published, and to spend some time in the United States after almost ten years of continuous absence.

## 7

On July eighteenth, therefore, we boarded the Japanese liner *Asama Maru*, bound for San Francisco via Honolulu. The *Asama* was a fine boat, the food was good, and the service excellent. There were very few passengers aboard and the first week at sea was a real pleasure and a much-needed rest.

On July twenty-first a notice was posted announcing that by order of the Imperial Ministry of Communications the ship's telegraph office was closed until further notice. The next day the ship slowed down to half-speed. On the twenty-third at seven in the morning the ship's course changed and we ran due north at half-speed. Later in the day the course was changed to northwest. The following day we ran at about two knots through a dense fog, somewhere in the North Pacific, until about five p.m. when we changed our course and headed for Honolulu at half-speed.

On the twenty-fifth a notice was posted to the effect that we should arrive at quarantine in Honolulu at noon of the twenty-eighth, three days late. Everybody on board breathed a sigh of relief. It was perfectly obvious that something was wrong. We suspected war, but not being permitted to listen to the radio or to receive telegrams, we did not know.

Just before dinner on July twenty-fifth, there was a great stir about the ship. She put about hard and started off at forced speed due west in the direction of Yokohama. The next morning a sign appeared on the bulletin board, stating that in accordance with an order from the Imperial Government the ship was returning home.

We had no July twenty-seventh because we crossed the international date line going west. At ten a.m. on the twenty-eighth, however, the ship put about once more and started out full speed for Honolulu. All day the twenty-eighth we steamed along toward Honolulu, watching our pocket compasses nervously. The next day was also the twenty-eighth inasmuch as we had recrossed the international date line, for the third time. On the thirtieth we finally sighted the Hawaiian Islands, while on the same day we were permitted to use the radio and found out what had been going on, namely the Japanese invasion of French Indo-China and the reciprocal American-Japanese freezing of assets. Among other things, we heard over the radio that the whereabouts of the Japanese liner *Asama Maru* was unknown, but that it was assumed she was standing by somewhere in the Pacific.

Throughout this unusual trip the Japanese personnel of the ship had been extremely considerate, even friendly. When most of the passengers announced their intention of getting off at Honolulu and continuing their voyage on an American boat, the purser smiled sympathetically and made out a refund order without comment.

As we sighted Diamond Head near Pearl Harbor, two U.S. Army seaplanes flew up to us to have a looksee. I am no specialist in aviation, but I should be willing to wager that these planes were at least ten years old, if not twenty. They flew faster than the ship, it was true, but not very much. When we got closer to Honolulu we sighted small ships of the United States Navy. These likewise looked obsolete and down-at-the-heels. It was something of a comedown after seeing the spick-and-span hundred per cent modern Japanese fleet in Yokohama Harbor, and after watching up-to-the-minute Japanese seaplanes roaring over Kamakura in regiments at three hundred-odd miles an hour.

On July thirtieth we docked in Honolulu, and after the usual immigration and custom formalities set foot on American soil. Masha and the children entered their country for the first time, while I had lived abroad so long that I was almost as thrilled as they were.



## **Part Twelve**

The Soviet-German War — and  
Afterward



ON JUNE twenty-second, 1941, Hitler struck.

The reasons for his decisions are complicated and probably will eventually be determined by psychiatrists as well as by historians. I know from conversations with officials of the German Embassy in Moscow during 1940 and the spring of 1941 that responsible German observers were impressed with Russia's strength and were convinced that a German attack would be horribly expensive and probably would not cause a collapse of the Soviet régime or of Russia's economic and military machinery.

On the other hand, it was clear to all observers after the end of 1940 that Russia was becoming stronger week by week and month by month and that if a German attack were to be successful it would have to be made soon.

Hitler apparently thought that his armies could take Moscow, the Ukraine, and the North Caucasus oil fields within a few weeks, or at most a few months. Many of his advisers probably disagreed with him. But Hitler paid little attention to them. It is said that the Scandinavian campaign in the spring of 1940 was undertaken against the advice of the German Admiralty and the High Command, who considered the operation impracticable. Hitler insisted. The Germans attacked and overran Denmark and Norway within a few days with comparatively small losses. This confirmed the Fuehrer's opinion of himself as infallible and of his military and political counselors as overcautious, wooden-minded drones incapable of making major decisions.

Be that as it may, on June twenty-second the Germans opened their offensive in the east and threw the bulk of the German Army as well as considerable Rumanian, Finnish, and Italian forces into the campaign for the Ukranian wheatfields and the oil of Baku.

I shall not attempt to describe the military operations of this campaign

or to picture the life of the Russians or the foreigners in Russia during the Soviet-German War. Several excellent books have appeared which do this job very well: those of Alexander Poliakov, Erskine Caldwell, Alexander Werth, Wallace Carroll.

I am going to try to trace the development of Soviet foreign policy after June twenty-second and to set down in chronological order those events which seem to be its most significant expressions. In this way it will perhaps be possible to determine the general trend of Soviet policy with regard to Europe and to describe in terms of several variants the future of Russia's relations with the other countries of Europe after the war.

## 2

Within a few hours German, Finnish, and Rumanian military units invaded Russia and the governments of Slovakia, Spain, Hungary, and Vichy France expressed their intention of participating in the war against the Soviet Union.

The hostile declarations of Vichy involved at least one dramatic incident in Moscow which gave me profound satisfaction, although I was not present. A day after the German invasion, French Ambassador Bergerie called together in his ornate *salle*, the members of his staff and a handful of assorted French residents of the Red Capital, among them my old boss, Jean Champenois, of Havas. Bergerie stated that Vichy was at swords' points with the Russians, and that, in a day or two, war would probably be declared. 'When this occurs, all you gentlemen will gather here, and we shall be interned for a few days, and then be repatriated to La France. . . .'

'Ah, non!' interrupted someone from the back of the room, and Champenois got to his feet, took the eternal, saliva-blackened cigarette from his lips: 'Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,' he said, 'allow me to state at

this point that I, for one, have had quite enough of you, and of Vichy also. I hereby declare that as of today I renounce all allegiance to Vichy and everything associated with Vichy, and offer my services and my loyalty to De Gaulle. Bon jour.' And he walked out. Jean had been suppressing his desire to make that little speech for many months, and I am sure he felt better for having made the break. The Free French agency, on the other hand, acquired one of the finest correspondents that I have ever known in any country.

Stalin ordered the Red Army to resist the invaders with all means at its disposal and Foreign Commissar Molotov made a speech by radio in which he told the Soviet people what had happened and outlined the measures necessary to win the war, which, as Molotov said, had been forced upon the Soviet Union not by the German people, but by a clique of Fascist rulers who had already enslaved a number of other nations. (See Appendix 30.)

On the same June twenty-second, Winston Churchill told the House of Commons that the British Government would support Russia in every way possible and make common cause with the Soviet Government in their war against Nazi Germany.

Two days later, on June twenty-fourth, President Roosevelt told a press conference that the United States would help the Soviet Union. The President's words were given weight by the fact that while he was saying them the Treasury Department released thirty-nine million dollars of frozen Soviet funds to be used for the purchase of war materials in the United States.

On June twenty-seventh Sir Stafford Cripps returned to Moscow accompanied by British economic and military missions. Cripps saw Stalin and Molotov on the evening of his arrival while the missions conferred with Foreign Trade Commissar Mikoyan and Red Army Chief of Staff General Zhukov.

The Soviet Government took immediate measures that put the country on a war footing. A decree on June twenty-seventh canceled all leaves and vacations throughout the country and made it obligatory for Soviet workers to put in from one to three hours of overtime every day, for which they received time-and-a-half payment. On June twenty-



eighth all privately owned radio sets were confiscated for the duration of the war. On June twenty-ninth Acting Patriarch Sergei, Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church and Metropolitan of Moscow, told the Russian people of the decision of the Church to enlist its entire resources in the war effort. Thus, in the interests of unity, the Soviet Government utilized an institution to which it had long been hostile.

On June twenty-eighth, Solomon Lozovsky, as Vice-Chief of the newly formed Information Bureau, announced that German airplanes had violated Soviet frontiers on a number of occasions during the weeks immediately preceding the German attack, and explained that the Soviet Government had not publicized these incidents because of its firm intention to avoid war at all costs.

On July third, Joseph Stalin made a radio speech to the Soviet peoples in which he defined his government's war aims:

The aims of this people's war in defense of our country against the Fascist oppressors is not only elimination of the danger hanging over our country, but also aid to all European peoples groaning under the yoke of German Fascism . . . for their independence, for democratic liberties . . . a united front for peoples standing for freedom from threats of enslavement by Hitler's Fascist army. . . .

In this speech Stalin also inaugurated his scorched-earth policy and ordered the destruction of all property which could not be removed from those areas evacuated by the Red Armies. (See Appendix 31.)

On July eighth Maxim Litvinov, who still held no government post, addressed the peoples of Britain and the United States in English by radio and urged an immediate second front in western Europe, a cry which he continued to echo for more than a year. The ex-Foreign Commissar said 'Victory will open new vistas for the organization of a happier life in conformity with the desires and aspirations of each of the liberated nations.'

On July twelfth a Soviet-British mutual-assistance pact was concluded in Moscow and signed by Cripps and Molotov. (See Appendix 32.) It provided that the two governments render each other assistance and support in the war against Hitler's Germany and stipulated that neither

would negotiate or conclude a separate armistice or treaty of peace with Germany.

On July sixteenth the institution of Political Commissars was re-established in the Red Army. (See Appendix 33.) Two days later the Soviet Government signed a pact with the émigré government of Czechoslovakia. (See Appendix 34.) The next day the Yugoslav Minister, Doctor Milan Gabrilovich, who had been so undecorously expelled from Moscow less than two months before, returned to the Soviet capital.

On July twentieth Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense, thus becoming concurrently head of the government, Chief of the Supreme War Council, Commissar of Defense, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. On July twenty-sixth the former chief of the political administration of the Red Army, Meklis, was reappointed to his old position.

On July twenty-sixth the Soviet military mission arrived in Washington and almost at the same time Harry Hopkins flew to Moscow, where he delivered to Stalin President Roosevelt's pledge of aid to the Soviet Union.

All these measures and occurrences were of a routine character. They implemented the forced volte-face in Soviet foreign policy which made Russia the friend of those powers whom she had so recently characterized as 'plutocracies and imperialist warmongers,' while diplomatic relations were broken off and, in many cases, hostilities begun with those European nations who had for nearly two years been her friends. On July thirtieth, however, the Soviet Government concluded a treaty with the government in exile of Poland which was anything but routine. Signed by General Sikorski in London, the treaty provided for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, nullified the Soviet-German agreement regarding Polish territory, provided for the formation of a Polish army on Soviet territory and for an amnesty of Polish nationals interned or arrested in the Soviet Union. (See Appendix 35.)

On August second the Soviet-American trade agreement was renewed with provisions for substantial increases in American exports to Russia.

(See Appendix 36.) Two weeks later, on August sixteenth, a Soviet-British trade agreement was signed in Moscow providing for a ten-million-pound British credit at three per cent for five years for the purchase of war materials in England.

On August twenty-fifth, after a series of altercations with the Shah of Persia about German infiltration into his country, Britain and Russia invaded Iran, whereupon the Shah abdicated in favor of his son. German agents were expelled from Iran and the British and Soviet troops occupied large areas of the country. This operation was carried out without misunderstandings or friction between the British and the Russians, although for many decades Iran had been a bone of contention which caused repeated difficulties between the two countries.

While the Red troops were occupying the southern coast of the Caspian Sea, the Germans were pushing ever deeper into the Ukraine. On August twenty-eighth Lozovsky announced one of the most spectacular events of the war — the blowing up of the huge Dniepr Dam by the retreating Russians. For more than a decade the immense Dnieprstroy Dam and power station had symbolized the mechanization and electrification of new Russia. One of the major achievements of the First Five-Year Plan, the project had cost millions and had become associated in the minds of the Russian people with the new society they were building. The first immense turbines were bought in the United States; those installed later were built in the Soviet Union by Russian workers with Russian materials. The power from Dnieprstroy furnished the entire countryside with electric light and supplied dozens of large industrial enterprises with electricity. In late August all this was destroyed by the Russians themselves in carrying out the scorched-earth policy which Stalin had ordered in his speech of July third.

On September eighth, the Volga German Republic was liquidated and nearly half a million Volga Germans were evacuated behind the Urals. The reason given was that the local populace had not reported to the central Soviet authorities fifth-column activities which had been going on there.

On September eighteenth, a decree ordered the conscription of all Russians from sixteen to fifty years of age for military training after

working hours. On the same day Mufti Abdurakhman Rasulev, the leader of the Moslems in the Soviet Union, called upon all those of his faith to rise in defense of their country. Thus Stalin enlisted millions of still-faithful Turkemen, Azerbaizhans, and other Moslem groups in the war effort against Hitler.

During the late summer two unpleasant incidents occurred. On August third, *Izvestia* took issue with the Polish Chief of State, General Sikorski, who had made a statement saying that the pre-1939 Polish frontiers could not be questioned. The Soviet newspaper pointed out that the German attack had proved the necessity of the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in September, 1939, and said in so many words that the Soviet Union could not consider turning over the territories of the Western Ukraine and western Belorussia to Poland. The matter received little publicity as all concerned were anxious to avoid friction between the governments of the nations fighting Germany. The problem of the Soviet Union's western frontiers, however, had already begun to show itself the knotty one which it remains today.

The second incident which introduced a discordant note into Russia's relations with her allies was the speech of a member of the British Cabinet, J.T.C. Moore-Brabazon, in early September. This astute politician blurted out the hope that the Red Army and the German Army would exterminate each other. Here again the incident was played down, though I am sure the Russians remember it clearly and consider that the remark expressed the opinion of a powerful group within the British Government.

Despite these shadows Moscow's relations with London and Washington improved steadily. On September twenty-second, the Harriman mission arrived in the Soviet capital. The Americans were impressed, even inspired, by what they saw of Soviet industry, aviation, and the Red Army. They were likewise deeply impressed by Stalin.

On September twenty-fourth, the Soviet Government announced its inability to continue supplying arms to China. For nearly four years the Russians had been the only people who had continuously helped the Chinese in their war against Japan. They stopped only when the critical position of their armies in the west made it imperative for them to keep and use every shell and every gun they had.

On September twenty-sixth, the Soviet Government concluded an alliance with the Free-French Government in London, and four days later a treaty was signed with the government of Czechoslovakia providing for the formation of a Czech army on Soviet territory.

On September thirtieth, the popular Soviet atheist newspaper, *Bezbozhnik*, was discontinued, and just a week later the anti-religious magazine, *Anti-Religiosnik*, suspended publication. The reason given was shortage of paper. It is probable, however, that the collaboration of the orthodox and Moslem churches with the Soviet Government in fighting the war had something to do with the discontinuation of these two large and powerful anti-religious periodicals.

In mid-October, the military situation became critical. The Germans were advancing on Moscow and were pushing deeper and deeper into the Ukraine in the direction of the Caucasian oil fields. On October twenty-first, Stalin took over the command of the army with Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov as his chief technical adviser. Two days later Marshals Voroshilov and Budenny were relieved of their commands of the northern and southern fronts respectively and sent back behind the Volga to organize new armies. General Zhukov, Chief of Staff, became commander of the central front, while Marshal Timoshenko, who had been replaced as War Commissar by Stalin, took command of the southern front. Marshal Shaposhnikov replaced General Zhukov as Chief of Staff.

As Russia's military position became more and more serious, British and American aid increased. President Roosevelt announced a loan of one billion dollars for the purchase of war materials to be sent to the Soviet Union. Stalin sent a warm message of thanks to the President. (See Appendix 37.) A week later, on November sixth, Maxim Litvinov was appointed Ambassador to Washington, replacing Constantin Oumansky, who became head of Tass and later a member of the Collegium of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Before Litvinov left for the United States he was made Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

On the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin made two speeches in two days. He announced a war of annihilation against Germany, urged the establishment of a second front, and pre-

dicted that within a year, perhaps within six months, Hitler's Germany would burst under the weight of its own crimes. Stalin gave a precise definition of his government's war aims and of its future relations with the peoples of Nazi-dominated Europe:

We have not, nor can we have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories, or the conquest of other peoples irrespective of whether they be European peoples and territories or whether they be Asiatic peoples and territories, including Iran. Our first aim is to liberate our territory and our people from the German Nazi yoke.

We have not, nor can we have, such war aims as the imposition of our will and our régime on the Slavic and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are waiting for our help. Our aim is to aid these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny and then to give them the possibility of arranging their own lives on their own land as they see fit with absolute freedom. No interferences of any kind with the domestic affairs of other nations!

Stalin made another interesting point: The Nazis could claim and get the support of the German people as long as they were winning back *German* lands, but when they began to go after non-German lands, 'any legitimate basis for popular support disappeared,' Stalin asserted.

An indication of the methods which Stalin proposed to use in achieving his worthy aims was given on November eleventh, when the first political conference of German war prisoners in Russia met and drew up a message to the German people calling on them to revolt against Hitler and to create a free and independent Germany. Many such conferences have taken place since, and other indications have shown Stalin's willingness to talk over the heads of the Nazi leaders to the German people offering them a 'free and independent Germany' with the right of forming their own government.

In late November the tide of war turned with the recapture of Rostov by Marshal Timoshenko. The Germans had spread themselves too thin, had lengthened their lines of communication to the breaking point. Marshal Timoshenko chose his moment with care, struck a forceful blow, and sent the German armies reeling back several score

of miles in the general direction of Berlin. It was an historic moment. For the first time in World War II an important unit of the German Army had been driven out of a position which it wanted to hold. Rostov was the gateway to the Caucasian oil fields. It was strategically the most important Russian city which had fallen to the Germans during the entire campaign. Timoshenko's recapture of the city was a major turning point of the war. It might be compared with the battle of the Marne. From then on the front became more or less stabilized. The Germans had failed to achieve any of their several major aims. They had not captured Moscow. They had not fought their way to oil. They had not destroyed the Red Armies. They had lost heavily and won nothing.

On December fourth, the important Soviet-Polish alliance was signed in Moscow. (See Appendix 38.) This 'Declaration of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Polish Republic on Friendship and Mutual Assistance' was signed by Stalin and Sikorski. Its all-important Article 3 stipulated that:

After the victorious war and the appropriate punishment of the Hitlerite criminals, it will be the task of the allied states to insure a durable and just peace. This can be achieved only through a new organization of international relations on the basis of the unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance. Respect for international law, backed by the collective armed forces of all the allied states, must form a decisive factor in the creation of such an organization. Only under this condition can Europe, destroyed by German barbarians, be restored and can a guarantee be created that the disaster caused by the Hitlerites will never be repeated.

As if further to clarify this expression of his war aims, Stalin did an unprecedented thing. He arranged that General Sikorski speak over the Moscow radio. It has long been a policy in the Soviet Union never to allow the Soviet press, radio, theatre, or screen to voice opinions not endorsed by the Soviet Government unless their expression is immediately followed by appropriate criticism and explanation. It may therefore be assumed that Sikorski's radio speech was 'cleared' by Stalin and met with his general approval. General Sikorski said in part:

I address my countrymen and, on behalf of the allied governments, all other peoples who share the fate of Poland.

A new and just world will emerge from this struggle, a world of free peoples placing freedom above all else, a world based on the inviolable foundation of honest democracy.

. . . The Polish soldiers will fight heroically with you for the liberation of their country — the more so that the Soviet Union has realized that a strong Poland, which in the future will be administered in accord with the spirit of the epoch and her own traditions, *forms an indispensable factor in a stable European equilibrium*. [My emphasis — J. S.]

Both sides are ready to forget everything that separated them in the past. . . . Mutual good faith and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty — these are the only things that make such relations possible between us. . . .

This war has taught us Poles many things and, therefore, we are uniting and fighting in concert for a new Poland, a Poland whose strength will be founded on the equality of all its citizens before the law, without distinction of race or creed; on social, political, and economic democracy.

It is, in my opinion, of tremendous significance that the Soviet Government thus associated itself with the re-creation of a strong Poland as an indispensable factor in a stable European equilibrium. The implication certainly was that Stalin had agreed to a post-war balance-of-power organization in Central Europe.

But post-war questions obviously were secondary. The first thing to do, everyone agreed, was to win the war. On December sixth the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decreed that elections of the Supreme Soviet scheduled for December be postponed and that the powers of the present Supreme Soviet be extended for one year.

As Japanese bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, Maxim Litvinov arrived in the United States. He presented his credentials on December eighth, spoke of the friendship and high esteem which the Soviet peoples entertained for the American people, and expressed appreciation for the substantial support which the Soviet Union was receiving from America.

During early December there were rumors of German peace offers



to Moscow. More or less reliable sources stated that the Germans had offered to restore the June, 1941, western frontiers of the Soviet Union and pay reparations for damage done. The story of these peace offers was to a certain extent authenticated by a *Pravda* editorial on December eleventh asserting categorically that any negotiations with Hitler were out of the question. Clearly Stalin would make no more pacts with Hitler no matter how difficult his military position became.

On December twenty-first the German High Command staged a minor revolt as a result of which Hitler replaced von Brauchitsch. For the next few months the German armies, deprived of air support, underfed and badly clothed, reeled back along the whole front under the impact of the brilliant Soviet winter counter-offensive.

During the latter part of December Foreign Secretary Eden went to Moscow and carried on extensive talks with the Russians. The communiqué was not very informative, stating merely that 'exhaustive exchange of views on questions relating to the conduct of the war and to the post-war organization of Europe . . . resulted in . . . complete agreement.'

As the year ended the Supreme Soviet passed a law mobilizing all armament workers for the duration of the war. Not reporting for work, or leaving one's job without permission, was thenceforth tried by court martial as desertion. On January first a special wartime graduated income tax law was passed by the Supreme Soviet. *Pravda* celebrated the New Year by a categorical editorial statement — 'We shall win in 1942.'

All during the winter and spring the Russians drove the Germans back, dickered with Japan about fisheries and other matters, while Britain and the United States increased their shipments to Russia. During this period the American, and particularly the British people, developed a profound respect and admiration for the Russians, while the Soviet press took to printing President Roosevelt's and Prime Minister Churchill's speeches in full and giving other expressions of friendship. Russia became one of the united nations and subscribed to the Atlantic Charter.

There was some difficulty with the Poles. The Polish Army on Soviet

territory kept getting into the Russians' hair for obscure reasons and was finally ordered out of Russia and sent to fight with the British in Lybia. There were no very clear explanations offered. It is conceivable that the N.K.V.D., particularly vigilant in wartime, placed unpleasant — and from their point of view unreasonable — restrictions on the Polish officers and soldiers: where they could go, whom they could see, what they could say, read, and write. Another cause may have been the severity with which the Russian authorities enforced discipline on their own people and probably on the Poles as well. There may have been discussions or perhaps only remarks about the restoration of the pre-1939 Polish frontiers which irked the Russians. Be that as it may, the attempt to maintain a Polish army on Soviet territory failed. It is my guess that any foreign army operating on Soviet territory and subject to Soviet military and administrative authority would not get along well.

While the Polish Army left the Soviet territory, American, British, and other diplomats, correspondents, and military observers remained in Moscow and Kuibyshev. They had their troubles. Press censorship was unreasonable. To give an amusing example, my successor as *News Chronicle* correspondent in Moscow, Philip Jordan, after spending several months in the Soviet Union, went to Cairo, whence he cabled the *Chronicle*: 'Now free from the intolerable burden of Soviet censorship, I can at last express my profound conviction that the Soviet Union will win the war.' The correspondents and allied military observers were restricted in their movements and, with one or two exceptions, had no opportunity to visit the front. They were not given military and technical information necessary to ensure the shipment of the necessary quantity and quality of war materials to Russia. All this irked London and Washington. In my opinion it expressed no ill-will. The Russians were not purposely being nasty. Suspicion and secrecy have long been characteristics of the Russians and antedated the Bolshevik régime by centuries. One can find descriptions of exactly this same attitude in the letters of the Marquis De Custine, who visited Russia in 1838-39.

On May first, Stalin issued an order of the day as Commander of the Soviet Army (see Appendix 39) in which he reaffirmed his previously

expressed war aims but limited his attacks to the German Government and the Nazi leaders, who, he asserted, were the running dogs of the German bankers and barons. He called for an intensification of guerilla warfare behind the German lines and promised victory in 1942. During this same period the internal Soviet radio began to make a series of statements, the gist of which was that after the Russian victory the German people were to be made to rebuild the devastated territories in the Soviet Union.

At the end of June, Foreign Commissar Molotov flew to London, where he signed a twenty-year mutual-assistance pact with the British Government. (See Appendix 40.) He then flew to Washington, where an agreement was reached on the urgent tasks for the opening of a second front in 1942.

The Soviet-British Pact was the most important document signed by the Soviet Government since September, 1939. It provided that the two high contracting parties collaborate not only during the war to defeat Germany but afterward in the reorganization of post-war Europe. Britain and Russia agreed to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war; they agreed to act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and non-interference in the affairs of other states. They agreed to be guided by the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter.

Thus Russia became a formal ally of Great Britain not only in war but in peace, and subscribed to the principles and aims laid down by Britain and the United States for the organization of the post-war world.

As I write, Hitler's summer offensive is beating itself out, again without having achieved decisive results. Territorial gains were less extensive than during the summer of 1941, and costs were as great. The German forces face another disastrous winter during which their grotesquely long lines of communication will be subject to attack by Russia's indomitable winter troops and by American, British, and Russian planes operating from Soviet bases.

## 3

The Duel for Europe is raging with unabated fury.

Germany shows no signs of cracking internally. German-controlled plants throughout western and central Europe are producing large quantities of military matériel whose quality is still high.

Russia is breathing hard, but still very much in the ring. Thanks to ten years of intensive economic and military preparations, to the loyalty of millions of Soviet workers and peasants willing to die defending the economic and cultural gains received as a result of their October Revolution, Russia's army is well equipped, and its morale high. Furthermore, thanks to his astute utilization of 1812 national patriotic slogans and the Orthodox and Moslem churches; thanks to his emphasis on the 'people's war' to liberate the country from a foreign invader, Stalin has unified Russia as it has seldom been unified in the past. Even those millions of Russians who suffered at the hands of Bolshevism — kulaks, old-régime adherents, and others; even those Communists who suffered defeat in a struggle for power against Stalin — all have united in the interests of freeing Russia from Hitler's armies.

Economically Russia is still strong. The new industrial enterprises in the Urals and Siberia, Stalin's Ural stronghold, are supplying the Red armies with ordnance. Factories and shops — machines, materials, and workers — have been evacuated from western Russia and are in operation in the Urals, turning out the metals and machines for war or peace. Russia's oil fields have not been damaged. They are producing somewhere between thirty and forty million tons of petroleum annually — more than the production of all the other countries of the eastern hemisphere put together. In addition to all this Russia is receiving a great deal of aid from the United States and Great Britain.

Reading the Soviet press during recent months I have been struck by the overwhelming emphasis on exterminating the German invaders.

Every sentence, every line hammers away at that one all-important point—‘the bloody German Fascists have occupied our Russian lands and are committing unbelievable atrocities. We must exterminate them! . . .’ All other questions are of secondary or tertiary importance. Post-war organization is rarely mentioned. The attention of every Russian is being centered on the immediate problem of defeating Hitler and winning the war.

Thus Russia’s war aims coincide almost exactly with those of Britain and the United States. The only difference is that the Russians insist on winning in 1942, while at least until recently, London and Washington have been speaking of a decisive offensive in 1943.

It is safe to say that during the present phase of the war relations between Washington, London, and Moscow will be more than good. The war aims of the three are identical, and all have adhered to the generalities of the Atlantic Charter as an outline for the peace.

## 4

There is still a great deal to do to defeat Hitler; but as far as Soviet foreign policy goes, as far as Soviet-American and Soviet-British relations are concerned, the way is clear.

It seems likely that one of these days Germany will collapse. Probably this will follow military defeats for Hitler on both his eastern and western fronts.

What then?

I consider it axiomatic that there will be a series of revolutions all over Europe, as there were in 1918. These may be proletarian, Bolshevik revolutions. They may be reactionary monarchist, royalist revolutions. They may be simply apolitical uprisings—a lot of war-weary and hungry men and women who are angry and want a new deal.

Revolutions in Britain and Russia are possible, but improbable.

According to the basic premise of this book, 'The Duel for Europe,' if Hitler collapses, Stalin should inherit the European continent. But the war may terminate leaving Russia so exhausted that she will be unable to take any active part in post-war politics. On the other hand, Russia may emerge the strongest military and political power in Europe.

After this war Russia is going to want peace in the worst possible way, both to lick her wounds and to continue the economic development of her country. Not so many years ago, in an interview, Roy Howard asked Stalin what, in his opinion, was the main cause of war. Stalin's answer was beautifully simple: 'Capitalism,' he said. There is no reason to believe that Stalin has changed his opinion, and therefore, while he may hope for a 'durable peace' on the basis of an Anglo-American-Soviet coalition, he would feel *sure* of a 'permanent peace' if capitalism were eliminated, at least in Europe.

However, in view of his overwhelming desire for *peace now*, Stalin certainly would not try to ease capitalism out of Europe if he thought this might involve a war with any major power. Therefore, if on the collapse of Germany, America and Britain are united and their armies thoroughly reliable, Stalin will take the 'durable peace' of cooperation and live up to it meticulously until or unless some basic change in the world situation—an Anglo-American war, or a revolution in one or both of these countries—upsets the balance of power in the western world.

These various possibilities make it necessary to postulate a number of variants. If the reader will bear with me, I shall try to put down the most likely of these. I apologize for not dealing with the Far Eastern War and colonial problems in these speculations; they are complicated enough without bringing in China, Japan and India. I also apologize for trying to solve equations composed exclusively of unknown variables.

### *Variant I*

Major premise:

Germany wins. Russia is unable to withstand the blows of Hitler's legions. The Red Army collapses. Economic and political chaos follow in Russia.

I consider this unlikely, but possible if Hitler succeeds in taking or destroying Baku, and if no second front is opened in the West.

Such a collapse of the eastern front would probably be followed by a Japanese seizure of eastern Siberia, and possibly by a negotiated peace between Britain, Germany, and the United States. In any case, Russia would cease to play any independent rôle in the war or the peace. The Duel for Europe would have been won by Hitler.

### *Variant II*

Major premise:

Stalin and Hitler negotiate a peace, divide the ring into spheres of influence again, and withdraw to their corners to get their breaths for the next round in the Duel for Europe, which would probably come soon.

I consider such a variant highly unlikely. There is too much bad blood on both sides for Hitler and Stalin to come to terms permanently on the basis of a divided Europe. Besides, Stalin would stand to lose too much by negotiating a peace on any terms.

### *Variant III*

Major premise:

Germany is defeated. The subsequent revolutions in central and eastern Europe are either Left, or apolitical. The revolutionary governments invite the Red Army to come in and help them suppress counter-revolutionary movements. In Britain, Russia, and America there are no revolutions, and Russia is still militarily strong.

One of three things can happen:

- a. Russia refuses to interfere in any way, and leaves it to Britain and the United States to do as they please in Europe.
- b. Russia comes in at the request of London and Washington to 're-establish order,' i.e., put down the revolutions and facilitate the formation of governments considered safe and reasonable by London and Washington.
- c. Russia comes in and supports the revolutions in Europe, whereupon, following the Baltic patterns, the countries of eastern and/or central Europe vote themselves into the Soviet Union by

overwhelming majorities in elections which would, in all probability, express the will of the majority of the populations of the countries involved.

The first of these contingencies is, in my opinion, the most likely. Stalin refuses any interference in Europe, stays behind his western frontiers, which may or may not include the Baltic states (the May 26, 1942, Soviet-British agreement left the question open), concentrates his attention on the reconstruction of his devastated areas and development of 'communism in one country.'

If, moreover, the Allied powers so desired, Stalin might send the Red armies into Europe to participate in the 'establishment of order' along with the Anglo-American troops which would probably be there by that time. After this aim had been achieved, on the request of the Allied commands, Stalin would retire behind his frontiers.

In either case Europe might be blessed with fifty years of peace and prosperous collaboration under the principles of the Atlantic Charter *if* Britain and the United States renounced imperialism and balance-of-power organization in Europe and refrained from building up once more a strong Germany as a protection against Bolshevism.

It is necessary to remark parenthetically that the strict application of the principle of self-determination of peoples as expressed in the Atlantic Charter would necessarily involve the creation of a strong Germany. The self-determination of nations clause in the Atlantic Charter is going to cause many a headache because no criteria are provided for determining what self-determination means. In the city of Vladivostok in 1920 four governments existed concurrently. If this happens in Berlin in 1943, who is to determine which represents the will of the people?

Stalin has left the road open for several lines of action. His pact with the Poles, his adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and his treaty of May twenty-sixth, 1942, with Britain laid the basis for a prolonged collaboration with Britain and the United States, as in Variant III, *a*. Stalin did not burn his bridges, however, and with his typical flexibility left the road open for the adoption of policy III, *c*.

After Hitler's collapse, Britain and America may be unable to exert any appreciable pressure on the Soviet Union or undertake an anti-Soviet



military campaign in Europe, because of the development of critical Anglo-American antagonism, exhaustion, weakness, and disunity in Britain and the United States, or powerful pro-Soviet and anti-war public opinion in England and America. Then Stalin might well accede to the requests of revolutionary governments in Berlin, Budapest, and Belgrade, and send the Red Army into central Europe to facilitate the organization of a Union of Socialist European States dominated by Moscow. The peoples of Europe would thereupon vote for socialism and Stalin. Stalin would have won the Duel for Europe and could turn to Britain and America and say:

1. This is not territorial aggrandizement because the peoples of Europe voted to join the Socialist European Confederation, wherein Russia happens to be the largest unit.

2. The principles of self-determination as laid down by the Atlantic Charter have been observed.

Britain and the United States would have to accept this state of affairs or embark on a war, postulated above as impossible.

Stalin has said and done many things quite recently which prepare for such a line of action. For example, the *Red Star* for February twenty-second, 1940, quotes Stalin as characterizing the Red Army as follows:

The first and principal characteristic of our Red Army is that it is the army of the liberation of the workers and peasants, it is the army of the October Revolution, the army of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . Its second characteristic is that it is the army of fraternity among the peoples of our country. . . . Its third characteristic is that it is the army of the proletarian revolution, the army of the oppressed and exploited peoples of all countries.

Thus, of Variant III, *a*, *b*, and *c*, *a* or a combination of *a* and *b*, is the more likely, *c* less likely.

#### *Variant IV*

Major premise:

Germany is defeated. The subsequent revolutions in Europe are reactionary: monarchist, royalist, or super-Fascist.

In this case it is unlikely that Stalin would take any part in European affairs except at the direct request of, and in cooperation with, Britain and the United States, as any independent action would almost surely embroil Russia in a war which Stalin would want at all costs to avoid. Thus in the case of Variant IV, Stalin's line of action would be similar to that in Variant III, *a*.

#### *Variant V*

Major premise:

The war causes revolutions not only on the European continent. Either revolution or a very far-reaching socialist evolution develops in Britain—a government composed of Sir Stafford Cripps, R. Palme Dutt, Pritt, Laski, Pollitt, J. B. Priestley, for example.

In this case the road is open for the creation of a European socialist confederation organized jointly by Britain and Russia. After a period of re-education Germany would get proportionate representation in the European Council of Nations, and Britain would, within a very few years, become a second-rate power, because England's industrial and economic position warrants no more. Questions of economic and social organization would be decided around a council table. Europe would disarm. There would be considerable painful internal readjustment in European countries. Erstwhile landlords, big industrialists, coupon-clippers, and financiers would have to make a drastic reorientation to life, but the masses of people would be much happier.

In this case America would, if the administration were wise, cooperate and join what would thus become a world commonwealth of nations. If, on the other hand, America yielded to reactionary influences and tried to re-establish nineteenth-century capitalism in Europe, there would be another bloody war—this time a war of hemispheres which might well turn us back to the Middle Ages.

This variant seems unlikely, for the moment, because powerful forces oppose so far-reaching a revolution, or evolution, in Britain.

#### *Variant VI*

Major premise:

The war drags along for another two years or so, and leaves Russia

so exhausted and devastated that Stalin either loses his place or is unable to participate in the post-war reorganization of Europe. In this case, American food and gentle Anglo-American political pressure push Russia along in the direction desired by the governments of Washington and London, whatever that may be.

This completes a sketchy and oversimplified analysis of post-war variants.

## 5

In conclusion, it seems to me that after the end of this war, it is absolutely necessary that some kind of European confederation be created. If Europe is reorganized along balance-of-power, imperialistic lines there will be another another war before my children are out of college; and it seems doubtful that our civilization could survive another world war.

We had a chance to organize a world commonwealth in 1918. It was allowed to slip between our fingers. America went home and washed its hands of Europe, except for making loans at high rates of interest which were never repaid. Britain and France quarreled. The City of London insisted on building up a strong Germany to trade with and in order to balance France and later Russia. A number of small countries were created and kept mutually hostile in the interests of the maintenance of basic British hegemony.

We may soon have another opportunity to organize a European confederation, either on the basis of a socialist evolution or revolution in Britain and on the Continent, as in Variant V, or without any basic change in the structure of social forces in Britain, as in Variant III, *a*, and III, *b*.

If we fumble this opportunity, we may never have another.

## **Appendix**



I

M. COULONDRE, *French Ambassador in Berlin*,  
to M. GEORGES BONNET, *Minister for Foreign Affairs*.

BERLIN, May 22, 1939.

FROM a reliable source I have received certain indications of Herr von Ribbentrop's present attitude to the international problems of the moment, which it appears to me advisable to pass on to your department.

The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it absolutely unbelievable that Poland should have rejected the Führer's proposals. These were Herr Hitler's personal suggestions. Herr von Ribbentrop himself would never have approved them. In his opinion, they were quite incomprehensible in 'their clemency and their generosity.' It was unthinkable that Herr Hitler should have revealed, at the same time such modesty in his demands, and such generosity in his offers. Furthermore, last January, M. Beck had accepted these advantageous proposals. It was because of the internal situation in Poland that he had been unable to keep his word. The Warsaw Government had therefore missed a most unlooked-for chance of securing the continued existence of Poland for twenty-five years. But nothing would be lost by waiting.

The possibility that Poland might accept the German point of view, and enter into her orbit, although it seemed highly remote at the moment, had not been altogether set aside by Herr von Ribbentrop.

But what, in fact, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich thinks is that the Polish State cannot last very long. Sooner or later it would be bound to disappear, once more partitioned between Germany and Russia. In Herr von Ribbentrop's mind the idea of such a partition was closely linked with that of a *rapprochement* between Berlin and Moscow. To him such a reconciliation seemed, in the long run, both indispensable and inevitable. It would be in accordance with reality, and with a tradition still very much alive in Germany and would be the only way of bringing about a permanent settlement of the German-Polish dispute; that is, according to

the methods already applied in the case of Czechoslovakia, the deletion of Poland from the map.

But above all it would give the rulers of the Reich the means of destroying the power of Great Britain. That was the chief objective which Herr von Ribbentrop had set himself, the *idée fixe*, which, with fanatical determination, he was unceasingly striving to achieve.

The hope that a Russo-German cooperation would one day give the Reich a chance of striking a mortal blow at the world power of the British Empire had been strengthened latterly in Herr von Ribbentrop's mind by the difficulties which were met with in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. It was true that the Fuhrer was still opposed to the political designs of the Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to Soviet Russia. Herr Hitler considered that, for ideological reasons, it would be extremely difficult to bring about such a reorientation of Germany policy. However, Herr von Ribbentrop had his backers, notably amongst the Higher Command and the more important industrialists. The Chancellor himself had, to a certain extent, already taken account of these tendencies of his Foreign Minister by making no attack against Soviet Russia in his speeches during the past few months, and by allowing the German Press for the time being to lower the tone of its anti-Bolshevik tirades.

One of the immediate objects that the advocates of a reconciliation with the U.S.S.R. hoped to gain appeared to be the possibility of persuading Russia to play the same role in an eventual dismemberment of Poland that the latter country had played with regard to Czechoslovakia. The ultimate object appeared to be to make use of the material resources and man-power of the U.S.S.R. as a means to destroy the British Empire.

It is possible that up to the present the Fuhrer has resisted these appeals, or at any rate hesitated to commit himself to such a policy, for ideological reasons. But, even admitting that such is his present attitude, there is nothing to indicate that he will not change his mind.

In any case, the ease and rapidity with which rumors of a Russo-German reconciliation found credence in Germany at the time of M. Litvinov's resignation were enough to allay any fears that Herr Hitler might have had as to the effect on public opinion. One cannot eliminate the possibility that it was to enlighten the Chancellor on this point that the advocates of Russo-German reconciliation put about these rumors.

At this moment, when the Anglo-Franco-Russian negotiations seem to have entered upon a decisive phase, we should keep clearly conscious of this

situation and bear in mind that the Reich would do its best to take advantage, to the detriment of France and Great Britain, of any failure, howsoever veiled, in the conversations now taking place with Moscow.

COULONDRE

(The Yellow Book of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, English Edition, p. 162)

## 2

M. COULONDRE, *French Ambassador in Berlin*,  
to M. GEORGES BONNET, *Minister for Foreign Affairs*.

BERLIN, June 13, 1939.

A PERSON in close touch with this Embassy has just gathered together the following observations from someone in Herr von Ribbentrop's immediate entourage:

Beneath the apparent calm which at the moment prevails in Berlin and astonishes some people and worries others, they are feverishly at work at the Wilhelmstrasse. Preparations are being made to face all manner of eventualities, but before directing his foreign policy into any one definite channel, Herr von Ribbentrop is awaiting the outcome of the talks between the Western Powers and Russia. The Danzig question is, in his eyes, only a detail which in itself does not interest him. For him it is the whole Polish question which is at stake. This problem could be settled:

- Either by an arrangement with England and France, as was the Czechoslovak problem;
- Or by an arrangement with Poland itself;
- Or by an arrangement with Russia.

The first solution is ruled out by the attitude adopted by France and England since March 15.

The second has met with the rigid resistance from Poland, backed by the British guarantee. There is now no longer much hope of its being realized, for the so-called negotiations in progress between Warsaw and Berlin only deal with technical details and do not touch on the conflict of principle.

There remains, therefore, the third solution, namely the destruction of the Polish State by partition between the Reich and Russia.



Herr von Ribbentrop has not given up this idea. He will not abandon it until the Anglo-Russian Pact is signed. Until then he reserves all decisions, while continuing to show every consideration to the Soviets.

The return of the 'Condor' Legion should normally have been an occasion for diatribes against Bolshevism. Herr von Ribbentrop saw to it that none of the speeches contained anything likely to offend Russia. The Fuhrer himself, when addressing the 'Condor' Legion never uttered the word 'Bolshevism' or 'Communism.' It was against the 'Democracies,' the 'warmongers and war profiteers,' the promoters of 'encirclement,' that his thunderbolts were directed. The reserve that he observed with regard to Russia was evidently not due to chance. It was due to the influence of Herr von Ribbentrop who still has hopes of winning over the Russians, or at any rate of seeing them remain outside the bloc constituted under the aegis of France and England.

These considerations, which bear out information I have already communicated to Your Excellency, seem clearly to reflect certain designs of Herr von Ribbentrop and the National-Socialist Government with regard to Poland and Russia. One could imagine, perhaps, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich is himself the originator of these 'confidences.' Yet it is difficult to conceive how it would be to his interest to spread news which would incite the Western Powers to speed up the negotiations whose conclusion seems to be so much feared in Berlin. On the other hand, Your Excellency is aware that similar information reached me from Field Marshal Goering as well as from other sources.

The maneuver which the advocates of collaboration with Moscow hope to bring off evidently consists of a repetition, to the detriment of Poland and with the aid of Russia, of the device already employed so successfully against Czechoslovakia.

COULONDRE

(The Yellow Book of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, English Edition, p. 175)

## 3

M. GARREAU, *French Consul General in Hamburg*,  
to M. GEORGES BONNET, *Minister for Foreign Affairs*.

HAMBURG, *July 4, 1939*.

THE German Press gives no information about the German-Soviet commercial negotiations at present in progress. Commercial circles in Hamburg, however, which are usually very well informed, are under the impression that, if some agreement is not shortly concluded between London, Paris, and Moscow, the Soviet Government will be prepared to sign a pact of non-aggression with the Reich for a period of five years.

For some time past there has been anxiety in those circles about the rapid evolution of the National-Socialist system in the direction of autarchy and collectivization. People do not disguise their fear of seeing this tendency still further strengthened by political cooperation between Berlin and Moscow. It is felt, moreover, that such cooperation would aggravate the risks of an early aggression by the Reich against Poland and thus precipitate a general conflagration.

GARREAU

(The Yellow Book of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, English Edition, p. 201)

## 4

COMMUNIQUE ON THE CONCLUSION OF TRADE-CREDIT AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND GERMANY

ON AUGUST 19, after long negotiations which terminated successfully, a Trade-Credit Agreement was signed in Berlin between the U.S.S.R. and Germany.

The agreement was signed by Assistant Trade Representative E. Dabarin for the U.S.S.R., and by Mr. Schnurre for Germany.

The Trade-Credit Agreement provides for a German credit of 200,000,000 marks to the U.S.S.R. for seven years at 5 per cent for the purchase of German commodities during two years from the date of signature of the agreement.

The agreement likewise provides for the delivery of 180,000,000 German marks' worth of Soviet commodities to Germany during the same period; that is, two years.

(*Izvestia*, August 21, 1939)

## 5

### SOVIET-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT

THE Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Germany, led by a desire to consolidate the cause of peace between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, and proceeding from the basic provisions of the treaty on neutrality concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Germany in April, 1926, arrived at the following agreement:

ARTICLE I. The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action, and any attack against each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.

ARTICLE II. In the event that either of the contracting parties should be subjected to military action on the part of a third power, the other contracting party will not lend that power support in any form.

ARTICLE III. The Governments of the two contracting parties will in the future maintain contact for consultation in order to inform each other on matters affecting their common interests.

ARTICLE IV. Neither of the contracting parties will participate in any grouping of powers which either directly or indirectly is aimed against the other contracting party.

ARTICLE V. In the event of disputes or conflicts arising between the contracting parties on matters of one or another kind, the two parties will solve these disputes or conflicts exclusively in a peaceful way through an amicable

exchange of views, or, in case of need, by setting up commissions for the settlement of the conflict.

ARTICLE VI. The present pact is concluded for a term of ten years with the provision that, unless one of the contracting parties denounces it one year before the expiration of this term, the term of the validity of the pact will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

ARTICLE VII. The present pact is subject to ratification within the shortest possible space of time. The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place in Berlin.

The pact comes into effect as soon as it is signed.

Done in Moscow in two originals in the German and Russian languages on August 23, 1939, signed on the authorization of the Government of the U.S.S.R., by Molotov; for the Government of Germany, by Ribbentrop.

(*Izvestia*, August 24, 1939)

## 6

### INTERVIEW WITH VOROSHILOV ON THE ANGLO-FRENCH-SOVIET MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS

A REPRESENTATIVE of the newspaper *Izvestia* addressed to the head of the Soviet military mission, Voroshilov, a number of questions, to which Voroshilov gave the following answers:

*Question.* How did negotiations with the British and French military missions end?

*Answer.* In view of serious differences which were revealed, the negotiations have been broken off. The military missions have left Moscow for their respective countries.

*Question.* May one know the substance of these differences?

*Answer.* The Soviet military mission considered that the U.S.S.R., having no common frontier with the aggressor, can render assistance to France, Great Britain, and Poland only if its troops will be allowed to pass through Polish territory, because there is no other way for Soviet troops to establish contact with the aggressor's troops. Just as British and American troops in

the past World War would have been unable to participate in military collaboration with French armed forces if they had had no possibility of operating on French territory, the Soviet armed forces could not participate in military collaboration with the armed forces of France and Great Britain if they were not allowed on Polish territory.

Despite the perfectly obvious correctness of this position, the French and British military missions disagreed with this position of the Soviet mission, while the Polish Government openly declared that it does not need and will not accept military assistance from the U.S.S.R.

This made military collaboration of the U.S.S.R. with those countries impossible.

This forms the basis of the differences, and it is upon this that the negotiations have been broken off.

*Question.* Was the question of assistance to Poland by raw and war materials discussed during the negotiations?

*Answer.* No, it was not. Assistance by raw and war materials is a matter of commerce, and the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance, not to speak of a military convention, is by no means necessary in order to supply raw and war materials to Poland. The United States, just as a number of other states, has no pacts of mutual assistance nor military convention with Japan; however, for two years now it has been selling raw and war materials to the Japanese, despite the fact that Japan is in a state of war with China. The negotiations dealt with assistance by troops and not assistance by raw and war materials.

*Question.* The diplomatic observer of the newspaper *Daily Herald* alleges that the British and French military missions asked the Soviet mission whether the U.S.S.R. was prepared to supply Poland with airplanes and ammunition and keep the Red Army in readiness on the border, and that the Soviet military mission allegedly replied to this by a proposal 'immediately after the outbreak of war to occupy Vilno and Novogrudok in the northeast, also Lvov, Tarnopol, and Stanislaw Provinces in the southeast, so that the Red Army could render the Poles military assistance from those areas if need arises.'

How do you regard this statement by the diplomatic observer of the *Daily Herald*? Is it in conformity with the facts?

*Answer.* This statement is a lie from beginning to end, its author is an insolent liar, and the newspaper which printed this lying statement by its diplomatic observer — a slanderous paper.

*Question.* Reuter's Agency reports by radio: "Today Voroshilov told the heads of the British and French military missions that in view of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, the Soviet Government regards further negotiations with Great Britain and France as purposeless."

Is this statement by Reuter's in conformity with the facts?

*Answer.* No, it does not conform to the facts. It was not because the U.S.S.R. concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany that the military negotiations with Great Britain and France were broken off, but, on the contrary, the U.S.S.R. concluded the non-aggression pact with Germany as a result, among other reasons, of the fact that the military negotiations with France and Great Britain reached a deadlock in view of insuperable differences.

(*Moscow News*, August 28, 1939)

## 7

NOTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R. HANDED TO THE POLISH  
AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ON THE MORNING  
OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1939

*September 17, 1939*

MR. AMBASSADOR:

The Polish-German War has revealed the internal insolvency of the Polish State. In the course of ten days of military operations, Poland has lost all her industrial districts and cultural centers. Warsaw, as the capital of Poland, no longer exists. The Polish Government has disintegrated and shows no signs of life. This means that the Polish State and its Government have virtually ceased to exist. Thereby the treaties concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have ceased to operate. Left to herself and without leadership, Poland has become convenient ground for any contingency and unexpected happenings which may create a menace to the U.S.S.R. Hence, having remained neutral until now, the Soviet Government can no longer maintain a neutral attitude to these facts.

Nor can the Soviet Government remain indifferent to the fact that the kindred Ukrainians and Belorussians living on the territory of Poland, abandoned to their fate, have been left defenseless.

In view of this situation the Soviet Government has instructed the High Command of the Red Army to order troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the lives and property of the population of western Ukraine and western Belorussia.

At the same time the Soviet Government intends to take all measures to deliver the Polish people from the disastrous war into which they have been plunged by their unwise leaders and to give them the opportunity to live a life of peace.

Accept, Mr. Ambassador, assurances of my highest consideration.

V. MOLOTOV

People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

MR. GRZYBOWSKI,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Poland,

The Polish Embassy, Moscow.

### SPEECH OF COMRADE V. MOLOTOV,

CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE U.S.S.R.,  
BROADCAST OVER THE RADIO ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1939

COMRADES! Men and women citizens of our great country!

The events arising out of the Polish-German War have revealed the internal insolvency and obvious incompetence of the Polish State. The Polish ruling circles have become bankrupt. All this has taken place in the briefest space of time.

A mere fortnight has passed and Poland has already lost all her industrial centers and the major part of her large cities and cultural centers. Warsaw, as the capital of the Polish State, no longer exists. No one knows the whereabouts of the Polish Government. The population of Poland has been abandoned by its ill-starred leaders to its fate. The Polish State and its Government have virtually ceased to exist. In view of this state of affairs, the treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and Poland have ceased to operate.

A situation has arisen in Poland which demands of the Soviet Government especial concern for the security of its State. Poland has become convenient ground for any contingency and unexpected happenings which may

create a menace to the Soviet Union. Until the last moment the Soviet Government remained neutral. But in view of the circumstances mentioned, it can no longer maintain a neutral attitude toward the situation that has arisen.

Nor can it be demanded of the Soviet Government that it remain indifferent to the fate of the kindred Ukrainians and Belorussians living in Poland, who even earlier were nationals without any rights and who have now been entirely abandoned to their fate. The Soviet Government deems it its sacred duty to extend a helping hand to its brother Ukrainians and brother Belorussians inhabiting Poland.

In view of all this, the Government of the U.S.S.R. has this morning handed a note to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow stating that the Soviet Government has instructed the High Command of the Red Army to order troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the lives and property of the population of western Ukraine and western Belorussia.

The Soviet Government also stated in this note that at the same time it intends to take every measure to deliver the Polish people from the disastrous war into which they have been plunged by their unwise leaders and to give them the opportunity to live a life of peace.

In the early part of September, when a partial call-up of the Red Army reservists was undertaken in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and four other military areas, the situation in Poland was not clear and this call-up was undertaken as a precautionary measure. Nobody could have expected that the Polish State would have betrayed such impotence and such swift collapse as has now already taken place all over Poland. But inasmuch as this collapse is a fact and the Polish statesmen have become utterly bankrupt and are incapable of changing the situation in Poland, our Red Army, having received large reinforcements as a result of the recent call-up of reservists, must perform with credit the honorable duty laid upon it.

The Government expresses the firm conviction that our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will this time too display its combative might, consciousness, and discipline and that it will perform its great emancipatory task with new feats of heroism and glory.

Simultaneously, the Soviet Government handed copies of its note addressed to the Polish Ambassador to all Governments with which the U.S.S.R. has diplomatic relations, at the same time declaring that the Soviet Union will pursue a policy of neutrality toward all these countries.

This determines our recent steps in foreign policy.



The Government also addresses itself to the citizens of the Soviet Union with the following explication. In connection with the call-up of reservists, some of our citizens have shown a tendency to hoard food and other commodities for fear that a ration system of supply will be introduced. The Government deems it necessary to declare that it has no intention of introducing a ration system for food and manufactured goods, even if the measures of state necessitated by foreign events should continue for some time. I am afraid that from these excessive purchases of food and goods only those will suffer who go in for this and hoard unnecessary supplies, thus subjecting them to the risk of spoiling. Our country is provided with all it requires and can get along without a ration system.

Our task now, the task of every worker and peasant, of every employee and intellectual, is to work honestly and selflessly at his post and thereby assist the Red Army.

As to the fighters in our glorious Red Army, I have no doubt that they will perform their duty to their country with credit and glory.

The peoples of the Soviet Union, all men and women citizens of our country, fighters in the Red Army and Navy are all united as never before around the Soviet Government, around our Bolshevik Party, around their great leader, the wise Comrade Stalin, for the achievement of new and unparalleled successes of labor in industry and on the collective farms, and of new glorious victories of the Red Army at the battle fronts.

*(Moscow News, September 18, 1939)*

## 8

### GERMAN-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND THE FRONTIER BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND GERMANY

AFTER the dissolution of the former Polish State the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government regard as their exclusive task to restore peace and order on that territory and to secure to the peoples living thereon a peaceful existence in conformity with their national particularities. With this aim in view they have arrived at an agreement as follows:

ARTICLE I. The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Govern-

ment establish as the frontier between the interests of their respective states on the territory of the former Polish State the line which is drawn on the map appended hereto and which will be described in more detail in a supplementary protocol.

ARTICLE II. Both parties recognize the frontier between the interests of their respective states established in Article I as final and will eliminate any interference with this decision by third powers.

ARTICLE III. The necessary state reorganization on the territory west of the line indicated in Article I shall be effected by the German Government, and on the territory east of this line by the Government of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE IV. The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government regard the said reorganization as a reliable foundation for the further development of friendly relations between their peoples.

ARTICLE V. This treaty is subject to ratification. The exchange of ratification instruments shall be effected in Berlin as early as possible.

The treaty comes into force as soon as it is signed.

Done in two originals in the German and Russian languages.

MOSCOW, September 28, 1939

On the authorization of the Government of the U.S.S.R.: V. MOLOTOV

For the Government of Germany:

J. RIBBENTROP

(*Pravda*, September 29, 1939)

#### DECLARATION OF THE SOVIET AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS

OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1939

AFTER the conclusion today by the German and Soviet Governments of an agreement regulating the questions arising from the disintegration of Poland, thus creating a firm basis for protracted peace in eastern Europe, they (the Soviet and German Governments), in mutual agreement, express the opinion that the liquidation of the present war between Germany on one side and England and France on the other side would coincide with the interests of all the peoples. Therefore, both Governments are directing their common efforts, and, in case of necessity, in agreement with other friendly powers, toward the achievement of this aim as soon as possible. If, however, these efforts of both Governments are unsuccessful, then it will have been established that England and France carry the responsibility for the continuance of the war. In case of the prolongation of the war, the Governments of

Germany and the Soviet Union will consult with each other on necessary measures.

For the Soviet Government  
V. MOLOTOV

For the German Government  
J. RIBBENTROP

*September 28, 1939*

To the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. J. Von Ribbentrop

MISTER MINISTER:

On the basis of our conversations, we have the honor to reaffirm to you, that the Government of the U.S.S.R., on the basis of and in the spirit of the general political agreement reached by us, desires in every possible way to develop economic relations and commodity turnover between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. In this end both sides will undertake an economic program according to which the Soviet Union will deliver raw materials to Germany, to be paid for by Germany, during a long period of time, by deliveries of manufactured goods. Both sides will construct this economic program in such a way that Soviet-German commodity turnover will attain again in size the largest volume reached in the past.

Both Governments will issue the immediate necessary orders for the realization of the above mentioned measures, and will see to it that conversations begin as quickly as possible, and are brought to conclusion.

Accept, Mr. Minister, repeated assurance of my complete respect.

V. MOLOTOV.

In answer to the letter of September 28 of Molotov the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, sent a reply stating that the German Government agrees to give all the necessary orders in the spirit of Mr. Molotov's letter.

(*Izvestia*, September 29, 1939. My translation J. S.)

## 9

### PACT OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE ESTONIAN REPUBLIC

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the one side and the President of the Estonian Republic on the other side, for the purpose of

developing the friendly relations established by the Peace Treaty of February 2, 1920, and based on the recognition of the independent state existence and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other party; recognizing that the Peace Treaty of February 2, 1920, and the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts of May 4, 1932, form as heretofore a firm basis for their mutual relations and undertakings; convinced that the definition of the exact conditions of insuring mutual security corresponds to the interests of both contracting parties, found it necessary to conclude the following Pact of Mutual Assistance and appointed for this purpose as their authorized representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; the President of the Estonian Republic; Kaarel Selter, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which authorized representatives have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I. The two contracting parties undertake to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of direct aggression or the menace of aggression arising on the part of any great European power against the maritime frontiers of the contracting parties in the Baltic Sea or their land frontiers through the territory of the Latvian Republic, as well as against the bases set forth in Article III.

ARTICLE II. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to render the Estonian army assistance in armaments and other military equipment on favorable terms.

ARTICLE III. The Estonian Republic secures to the Soviet Union the right to maintain naval bases and several airdromes for aviation on lease at reasonable terms on the Estonian islands of Saaremaa (Oesel), Hiiumaa (Dago), and in the town of Paldiski (Baltisky Port). The exact sites for the bases and airdromes shall be allotted and their boundaries defined by mutual agreement.

For the protection of the naval bases and airdromes the U.S.S.R. has the right to maintain at its own expense on the sites allotted for the bases and airdromes Soviet armed land and air forces of strictly limited strength, their maximum numbers to be determined by special agreement.

ARTICLE IV. The two contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliances nor to participate in coalitions directed against one of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE V. Realization of this pact shall not affect to any extent the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their economic systems and state organization.

The sites allotted for the bases and airdromes (Article III) remain the territory of the Estonian Republic.

ARTICLE VI. The present pact comes into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange of said instruments shall take place in the city of Tallinn within six days of the date of the signing of the present pact.

The term of validity of the present pact is ten years and if one of the contracting parties does not find it necessary to denounce the present pact one year prior to the expiration of its term, the pact shall automatically continued valid for the next five years.

ARTICLE VII. The present pact is done in two originals in the Russian and Estonian languages in the city of Moscow on September 28, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV

K. SELTER

*September 28, 1939*

*(Moscow News, October 2, 1939)*

## 10

### PACT OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the one side and the President of the Latvian Republic on the other side, for the purpose of developing the friendly relations established by the Peace Treaty of August 11, 1920, and based on recognition of the independent state existence and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other party; recognizing that the Peace Treaty of August 11, 1920, and the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts of February 5, 1932, form as heretofore a firm basis for their mutual relations and undertakings; convinced that the definition of the exact conditions of insuring mutual security meets the interests of both contracting parties, found it necessary to conclude the following Pact of Mutual Assistance and appointed for this purpose as their authorized representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; the President of the Latvian Republic; Vilhelm Munters, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which authorized representatives, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in due form and good order, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I. The two contracting parties undertake to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of direct aggression or the menace of aggression arising on the part of any great European power against the maritime frontiers of the contracting parties in the Baltic Sea or their land frontiers through the territory of the Estonian or the Lithuanian Republics, as well as against the bases set forth in Article III.

ARTICLE II. The Soviet Union undertakes to render the Latvian army assistance in armaments and other military equipment on favorable terms.

ARTICLE III. For the purpose of guaranteeing the security of the U.S.S.R. and consolidating her own independence, the Latvian Republic grants the U.S.S.R. the right to maintain naval bases in the towns of Liepaja (Libava) and Ventspils (Vindava) and several airdromes for aviation on lease at reasonable terms. The exact sites for the bases and airdromes shall be allotted and their boundaries defined by mutual agreement.

For the protection of the Irben Strait, the Soviet Union is granted the right to establish on the same conditions a coast artillery base on the coast between Ventspils and Pitragi.

For the protection of the naval bases, airdromes and coast artillery base, the Soviet Union has the right to maintain at its own expense on the sites allotted for the bases and airdromes Soviet armed land and air forces of strictly limited strength, their maximum numbers to be determined by special agreement.

ARTICLE IV. Both contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliances nor to participate in coalitions directed against either one of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE V. Realization of this pact shall not affect to any extent the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their state organization, economic and social systems and military measures.

The sites allotted for the bases and airdromes (Article III) remain the territory of the Latvian Republic.

ARTICLE VI. The present pact comes into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange of the instruments shall take

place in the city of Riga within six days of the date of the signing of the present pact.

The term of validity of the present pact is ten years and unless one of the contracting parties finds it necessary to denounce the present pact one year prior to the expiration of its term, the pact shall automatically continue valid for the next ten years.

In witness whereof the above-mentioned authorized representatives have signed the present pact and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in the city of Moscow in two originals, in the Russian and Lettish languages, on October 5, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV

V. MUNTERS

(*Moscow News*, October 9, 1939)

## II

### TREATY ON THE TRANSFER OF THE CITY OF VILNO AND VILNO PROVINCE TO THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC AND ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND LITHUANIA

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the one side and the President of the Lithuanian Republic on the other side, for the purpose of developing the friendly relations established by the Treaty of Peace of July 12, 1920, and based on recognition of the independent state existence and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other party; recognizing that the Treaty of Peace of July 12, 1920, and the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts of September 28, 1926, form as heretofore a firm basis for their mutual relations and undertakings; convinced that the definition of the exact conditions of insuring mutual security and the just settlement of the question regarding the state appurtenance of the city of Vilno and Vilno Province, unlawfully wrested from Lithuania by Poland, meet the interests of both contracting parties, found it necessary to conclude between them the following Treaty on the Transfer of the City of Vilno and Vilno Province to the Lithuanian Republic and on Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania and appointed for this purpose as their authorized representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; the President of the Lithuanian Republic; Juozas Urbys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which authorized representatives, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in due form and good order, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I. For the purpose of consolidating the friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, the city of Vilno and Vilno Province are transferred by the Soviet Union to the Lithuanian Republic and included in the territory of the Lithuanian state, the boundary between the U.S.S.R. and the Lithuanian Republic being established in accordance with the map appended hereto, which boundary shall be specified in more detail in a supplementary protocol.

ARTICLE II. The Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic undertake to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of aggression or the menace of aggression against Lithuania, as well as in the event of aggression or the menace of aggression against the Soviet Union through Lithuanian territory on the part of any European power.

ARTICLE III. The Soviet Union undertakes to render the Lithuanian army assistance in armaments and other military equipment on favorable terms.

ARTICLE IV. The Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic undertake jointly to effect protection of the state boundaries of Lithuania, for which purpose the Soviet Union is granted the right to maintain, at its expense, at points in the Lithuanian Republic mutually agreed upon, Soviet armed land and air forces of strictly limited strength. The exact location of these troops and the boundaries within which they may be quartered, their strength at each particular point, and also all other questions, such as economic, administrative, jurisdictional, and other, arising in connection with the presence of Soviet armed forces on the territory of Lithuania under the present Treaty, shall be regulated by special agreements.

The sites and buildings necessary for this purpose shall be allotted by the Lithuanian Government on lease at reasonable terms.

ARTICLE V. In the event of the menace of aggression against Lithuania or against the U.S.S.R. through the territory of Lithuania, the two contracting parties shall immediately discuss the resulting situation and take all measures found necessary by mutual agreement to secure the inviolability of the territory of the contracting parties.



ARTICLE VI. The two contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliances nor to participate in coalitions directed against either of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE VII. Realization of this pact shall not affect to any extent the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their state organization, economic and social systems, military measures and, in general, the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.

The localities in which the Soviet armed land and air forces will be quartered (Article IV of the present Treaty) under all circumstances remain a component part of the territory of the Lithuanian Republic.

ARTICLE VIII. The term of validity of the present Treaty in regard to the undertakings for mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and the Lithuanian Republic (Articles II-VII) is fifteen years and unless one of the contracting parties finds it necessary to denounce the provisions of the present Treaty established for a specified term one year prior to the expiration of that term, these provisions shall automatically continue valid for the next ten years.

ARTICLE IX. The present treaty comes into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange of the instruments shall take place in the city of Kaunas within six days of the date of the signing of the present treaty.

The present treaty is done in two originals, in the Russian and Lithuanian languages, in the city of Moscow on October 10, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV

J. URBSYS

(*Moscow News*, October 16, 1939)

## 12

### SOVIET NOTE TO FINLAND ON THE EVE OF THE SOVIET-FINNISH WAR

*To the Finnish Minister in Moscow.*

MR. MINISTER:

The reply of the Government of Finland to the note of the Soviet Gov-

ernment on November 26 constitutes a document reflecting the profound hostility of the Government of Finland toward the Soviet Union and designed to carry to the extreme the crisis in the relations between the two countries.

1. The denial by the Government of Finland of the fact of the abominable shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish troops, which resulted in victims, cannot be explained by any other reason than by a desire to lead astray public opinion and to deride the victims of the firing. Only the lack of a sense of responsibility and a contemptuous attitude toward public opinion could inspire the attempt to explain the abominable incident of the artillery firing by 'training drills' of Soviet troops in artillery firing near the very frontier line before the eyes of the Finnish troops.

2. The refusal of the Government of Finland to withdraw the troops which perpetrated the villainous shelling of Soviet troops, as well as the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Finnish and Soviet troops, formally proceeding from the principle of equality of both sides, betrays the hostile desire of the Government of Finland to keep Leningrad under threat. In reality we have here, not equality in the positions of the Finnish and Soviet troops, but, on the contrary, an advantageous position of the Finnish troops. The Soviet troops do not menace the vital centers of Finland, because they are removed from those centers for hundreds of kilometers, while the Finnish troops stationed 32 kilometers from Leningrad — vital center of the U.S.S.R. counting 3,500,000 population — create an immediate threat to it. It need hardly be mentioned that, properly speaking, there is no room for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, since the withdrawal of Soviet troops for 25 kilometers would mean stationing them in the suburbs of Leningrad, which is obviously absurd from the viewpoint of the security of Leningrad. The proposal of the Soviet Government regarding the withdrawal of Finnish troops for 20 to 25 kilometers constitutes a minimum, because its purpose is not to eliminate this inequality in the positions of the Finnish and the Soviet troops, but only to reduce it to some extent. If the Government of Finland declines even this minimum proposal, it means that it intends to keep Leningrad under the direct menace of its troops.

3. By concentrating large forces of regular troops near Leningrad and thus placing under immediate threat one of the most important vital centers of the U.S.S.R., the Government of Finland committed a hostile act against the U.S.S.R., incompatible with the non-aggression pact concluded between the two countries. Moreover, by refusing to withdraw the troops at least

20 to 25 kilometers after the villainous shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish troops, the Government of Finland has shown that it continues to maintain a hostile attitude toward the U.S.S.R., does not intend to pay attention to the provisions of the non-aggression pact, and has decided to keep Leningrad under threat in the future also. The Government of the U.S.S.R., however, cannot reconcile itself to a situation wherein one side would violate the non-aggression pact while the other side would undertake to carry it out. In view of this, the Soviet Government finds itself compelled to state that from this date it considers itself free from the obligations undertaken under the non-aggression pact concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Finland and systematically violated by the Government of Finland.

Accept, Mr. Minister, assurances of my perfect respect.

V. MOLOTOV

People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

*November 28, 1939*

*(Moscow News, December 3, 1939)*

## 13

### TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF FINLAND

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the one side and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Finland on the other side, being convinced that now, when the most dangerous seat of war, which had been created near the borders of the Soviet Union by the former plutocratic power in Finland to please imperialist powers, is being eliminated through the heroic struggle of the people of Finland and through the efforts of the Red Army of the U.S.S.R., and when the people of Finland has formed its Democratic Republic which fully relies on the support of the people, the time has come to establish lasting friendly relations between our two countries and to insure by joint efforts the security and inviolability of our states; recognizing that the time has come for the realization of the age-old aspirations of the Finnish people for the reunion of the Karelian people

with its kindred Finnish people in a single state of Finland, also with a view to a favorable settlement of frontier problems corresponding to the interests of both parties, especially insuring the security of Leningrad and the southern coast of Finland; aiming to strengthen the spirit and the fundamental principles of the Peace Treaty of October 23, 1920, based on mutual recognition of the state independence and non-intervention in internal affairs of the other party, found it necessary to conclude the following Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Finland, and have appointed for this purpose their authorized representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.; V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; the People's Government of Finland; O. V. Kuusinen, Chairman of the People's Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, which authorized representatives, upon mutual presentation of their credentials, found in due form and good order, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I. In token of the friendship for and profound confidence of the Soviet Union in the Democratic Republic of Finland, meeting the national aspirations of the Finnish people for the reunion of the Karelian people with the Finnish people in a single and independent state of Finland, the Soviet Union expresses consent to the transfer to the Democratic Republic of Finland the districts of Soviet Karelia with a predominating Karelian population — altogether 70,000 square kilometers, which territory is to be included in the state territory of the Democratic Republic of Finland. The frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Democratic Republic of Finland is to be established in accordance with the appended map.

In token of the friendship for and profound confidence of the Democratic Republic of Finland in the U.S.S.R., meeting the desires of the Soviet Union concerning the consolidation of the security of the U.S.S.R., and especially the city of Leningrad, the Democratic Republic of Finland expresses consent to a certain shifting of the frontier on the Isthmus of Karelia northward from Leningrad and to transfer to the Soviet Union territory amounting to 3970 square kilometers, while the U.S.S.R. considers itself obligated to compensate Finland for the cost of sections of railway lines on the territory of the Karelian Isthmus which is to be transferred to the U.S.S.R., to the amount of 120,000,000 Finnish marks.

ARTICLE II. In the mutual interests of the consolidation of the security

of the U.S.S.R. and Finland, the Democratic Republic of Finland expresses consent:

- (a) to lease to the Soviet Union for a term of thirty years the Peninsula of Hangoe and the surrounding waters within a radius of five miles southward and eastward and three miles westward and northward, also a number of islands adjoining it from the south and the east in accordance with the map appended hereto, for the purpose of establishing there a naval base capable of protecting against aggression the entry to the Gulf of Finland in the interests of insuring the security of Finland and the U.S.S.R. For the purpose of protecting the naval base, the Soviet Union is granted the right to maintain there, at its own expense, armed land and air forces of strictly limited strength whose maximum numbers will be determined by special agreement;
- (b) to sell to the Soviet Union the islands Suursaari (Hogland), Seiskari, Lavansaari, Tytarsaari (small and big), Koivisto (Bjorko), in the Gulf of Finland, and also parts of the peninsulas Rybachi and Sredni belonging to Finland on the coast of the Arctic Ocean for the agreed sum of 300,000,000 Finnish marks.

ARTICLE III. The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Finland undertake to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of attack or the threat of attack on Finland and also in the event of attack or the threat of attack on the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland on the part of any European power.

ARTICLE IV. The contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliance nor to participate in any coalitions directed against one of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE V. The contracting parties have agreed to conclude a trade treaty within the shortest space of time and to raise the annual trade turnover between the two countries considerably higher than it was in 1927, when it reached a maximum of 800,000,000 Finnish marks.

ARTICLE VI. The Soviet Union undertakes to render the People's Army of Finland assistance in armaments and other military equipment on favorable terms.

ARTICLE VII. The term of validity of this treaty in part referring to undertakings on mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and the Democratic Republic of Finland (Articles III-V) is twenty-five years, and if, one year prior to the expiration of this term, none of the contracting parties deems it necessary to denounce the provisions of this treaty for which a definite

time limit has been set, these provisions automatically remain in force for another twenty-five years.

ARTICLE VIII. The present treaty comes into force on the date of its signing and is subject to subsequent ratification. Exchange of instruments of ratification will be effected within the shortest possible time in the capital of Finland — the city of Helsinki.

This treaty is done in two originals, in the Russian and Finnish languages, in the city of Moscow on December 2, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV

O. KUUSINEN

(*Pravda*, December 3, 1939)

## 14

### TEXT OF PEACE TREATY BETWEEN U.S.S.R. AND FINLAND

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on one side and the President of the Republic of Finland on the other, guided by the desire to put an end to hostilities that arose between the two countries and create stable mutual peaceful relations, convinced that a definition of the exact conditions insuring mutual security, including the security of the cities of Leningrad and Murmansk as well as the Murmansk railway, corresponds to the interests of both contracting parties, found it necessary to conclude a peace treaty for these purposes and appointed their authorized representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.: Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and Commissar of Foreign Affairs; Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.; Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevski, Brigade Commander; the President of the Republic of Finland: Risto Ryti, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Finnish Republic; Juhu Kusti Paasikivi, Minister; Karl Rudolph Walden, General; Vajne Voionmaa, Professor. The above authorized representatives, upon mutual presentation of their credentials, which were found in due form and good order, agreed upon the following terms:

ARTICLE I. Hostilities between the U.S.S.R. and Finland shall cease immediately in accordance with procedure provided for in a protocol appended to this treaty.

ARTICLE II. The state frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Finland shall be established along a new line in accordance with which the territory of the U.S.S.R. will include the entire Karelian Isthmus with the town of Viborg (Viipuri) and Viborg Bay with islands, the western and northern shores of Ladoga Lake with the towns of Keksholm (Kakisalmi), Sortavala, and Soujarvi, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the territory east of Merkjarvi with the town of Kuolajarvi, part of the peninsulas of Rybachi and Sredni, in accordance with a map appended to this treaty.

A more detailed description of the frontier line will be determined by a mixed commission of representatives of the contracting parties, which commission must be formed within ten days from the date of signing of this treaty.

ARTICLE III. Both contracting parties undertake mutually to refrain from any attack upon each other, not to conclude any alliances and not to participate in coalitions directed against one of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE IV. The Republic of Finland expresses consent to lease to the Soviet Union for thirty years, with an annual payment by the Soviet Union of eight million Finnish marks, the peninsula of Hangoe (Hanko) and the territorial waters surrounding it in a radius of five miles to the south and east and three miles to the west and north of the peninsula and a number of islands adjoining it in accordance with the appended map, for the purpose of creation there of a naval base capable of defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland against aggression; for the purpose of protection of the naval base the Soviet Union is granted the right to maintain there at its own expense land and air armed forces of the necessary strength.

Within ten days from the date when this treaty becomes effective the government of Finland shall withdraw all its troops from the peninsula of Hangoe, and the peninsula of Hangoe, together with its adjoining islands, shall pass under the administration of the U.S.S.R. in accordance with this article of the treaty.

ARTICLE V. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to withdraw its troops from the Petsamo region, voluntarily ceded to Finland by the Soviet State in accordance with the Peace Treaty of 1920. Finland undertakes, as was provided by the Peace Treaty of 1920, to refrain from maintaining in waters

along her coast of the Arctic Ocean, naval and other armed ships excepting armed ships of less than one hundred tons displacement, which Finland has the right to maintain without restriction; also to maintain not more than fifteen naval and other armed ships whose tonnage shall not exceed four hundred tons each. Finland undertakes, as was provided by the same treaty, not to maintain in the said waters any submarines and armed aircraft. Finland similarly undertakes, as was provided by the same treaty, not to establish on that coast military ports, naval bases and naval repair shops of greater capacity than necessary for the above-mentioned ships and their armaments.

ARTICLE VI. As was provided by the Treaty of 1920, the Soviet Union and its citizens are granted the right of free transit across the Petsamo region to Norway and back and the Soviet Union is granted the right to institute a consulate in the Petsamo region. Freights in transit across the Petsamo region from the U.S.S.R. to Norway, and, likewise, freights in transit across the same region from Norway to the U.S.S.R., are exempted from inspection and control excepting only such control as is necessary for the regulation of transit communications. The said freights also are exempted from payment of custom duties, transit and other dues. The above-mentioned control of transit freights is permitted only in the form observed in similar cases in accordance with established usages of international communications. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. traveling across the Petsamo region to Norway and back from Norway to the U.S.S.R. have the right of free transit passage on a basis of passports issued by the proper Soviet organs. Soviet non-armed aircraft shall have the right to maintain air service between the U.S.S.R. and Norway across the Petsamo region with observance of general operating rules.

ARTICLE VII. The Finnish Government grants the Soviet Union the right of transit trade between the U.S.S.R. and Sweden, and, in order to develop this transit trade by the shortest rail route, the U.S.S.R. and Finland recognize the necessity of building a railroad joining the town of Kandalaksha and Kemijarvi, each on its own territory, if possible during 1940.

ARTICLE VIII. On the coming into force of this treaty economic relations between the contracting parties will be reestablished and for this purpose the contracting parties will enter into negotiations to conclude a trade treaty.

ARTICLE IX. This peace treaty comes into force immediately upon signature and is to be ratified subsequently. Exchange of ratification notes will take place within ten days in the city of Moscow.



This treaty is done in two originals, each in Russian, Finnish and Swedish, in the city of Moscow, March 12, 1940.

(Signed)	MOLOTOV	RYTI
	ZHDANOV	PAASIKIVI
	VASILEVSKI	WALDEN
	VOIONMAA	

(TASS, March 12, 1940)

TEXT OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R.  
AND FINLAND OF MARCH 12, 1940

THE contracting parties agree to the following order of cessation of hostilities and of withdrawal of their troops to the state frontiers established by the treaty:

1. Military operations of both parties shall cease at noon March 13, 1940, Leningrad time.

2. From the established time of the cessation of hostilities a neutral zone, one kilometer in width, will be established between the positions of the advanced units, and in the course of the first day the troops of the party which are on the territory of the other party, according to the new state frontiers, shall be withdrawn one kilometer.

3. The withdrawal of troops behind the state frontier and the advance to the frontier of the troops of the other side shall begin at 10 a.m. on March 15, 1940, along the whole frontier from the Finnish Gulf to Lieksa and at 10 a.m., March 16, north of Lieksa. The withdrawal will be completed by daily marches of not less than seven kilometers per day, and the advance of the troops of the other side will take place at the same rate so that there will be a distance of not less than seven kilometers between the rear units of the withdrawing troops and the advance units of the troops of the other side advancing toward the new frontier.

4. The period for the withdrawal on various sectors of the state frontier is established in accordance with Article III as follows:

- (a) On the sector from the source of Tuntisartaii, Kuolajarii, Takala, the eastern shore of Lake Junanoijarii, the withdrawal of troops will be completed at 8 p.m., March 20, 1940.
- (b) On the sector to the south from Kukhmonieni in the Latva district, the withdrawal of troops will be completed at 8 p.m., March 22, 1940.
- (c) On the sector Longavaara, Vartsila, Mart Station, the withdrawal of troops of both sides will be completed at 8 p.m., March 22, 1940.

(d) On the sector Koitsanlakhti-Enso Station, the withdrawal of troops will be completed at 8 p.m., March 25, 1940.

(e) On the sector Enso Station to Estate Island, the withdrawal of troops will be completed at 8 p.m., March 19, 1940.

5. The evacuation of the Petsamo region by Red Army troops will be completed April 10, 1940.

6. During the withdrawal of troops to the state frontiers, the commanders of both sides must take necessary measures in towns and villages which are to be transferred to the other side for their protection and take the necessary measures so that the towns and villages, defense and economic structures (bridges, dams, storehouses, railroad yards, industrial establishments, telegraph, electric stations) will be protected from damage and destruction.

7. All questions which may arise in the transfer from one side to the other of districts, points, towns and other objects mentioned in Article 6 of this Protocol will be settled by representatives of both sides on the spot, and for this purpose the command will name special plenipotentiaries on each of the basic routes for the movement of both armies.

8. The exchange of prisoners will take place as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities on the basis of a special agreement.

(Signed) MOLOTOV RYTI  
ZHDANOV PAASIKIVI  
VASILEVSKI WALDEN  
VOIONMAA

(TASS, March 12, 1940)

## 15

### TASS STATEMENT ON THE TRANSFER OF BESSARABIA AND NORTHERN BUKOVINA TO THE U.S.S.R.

ON JUNE 26, 1940, Comrade V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., made the following representation to Mr. Davidescu, the Rumanian Minister in Moscow:

In 1918, Rumania, taking advantage of the military weakness of Russia,

forcibly wrested from the Soviet Union (Russia) part of its territory — Bessarabia — and thus broke the age-old unity of Bessarabia, which is populated chiefly by Ukrainians, with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

The Soviet Union has never reconciled itself to the forcible seizure of Bessarabia, as the Government of the U.S.S.R. has more than once openly declared for the whole world to hear.

Now, when the military weakness of the U.S.S.R. has become a thing of the past and the present international situation demands the speediest solution of outstanding issues inherited from the past in order at last to lay the foundations of durable peace between countries, the Soviet Union considers it necessary and timely in the interests of the restoration of justice to take up jointly with Rumania the immediate settlement of the question of the restoration of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers that the question of the restoration of Bessarabia is organically linked with the question of the transfer to the Soviet Union of that part of Bukovina, the population of which in its overwhelming majority is bound with the Soviet Ukraine by unity of historic destinies, as well as by unity of language and national composition. This act would be all the more just in that the transfer of the northern part of Bukovina to the Soviet Union would constitute — it is true, only in an insignificant degree — a means of compensation for the tremendous harm inflicted on the Soviet Union and the population of Bessarabia by the twenty-two years of Rumania's domination in Bessarabia.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. proposes to the Royal Government of Rumania that it:

1. Restore Bessarabia to the Soviet Union.
2. Transfer to the Soviet Union the northern part of Bukovina within the boundaries shown on the appended map.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. expresses the hope that the Royal Government of Rumania will accept these proposals of the U.S.S.R. and will thus create the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the protracted conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. awaits the reply of the Royal Government of Rumania during the Course of June 27.

*June 26, 1940*

On June 27 Mr. Davidescu, the Rumanian Minister, handed Comrade Molotov the following reply of the Rumanian Government:

The Government of the U.S.S.R. has addressed a note to the Rumanian Government which was handed at 10 p.m. on June 26 by His Excellency, Mr. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Davidescu, the Rumanian Minister in Moscow.

Being inspired, like the Soviet Government, by the same desire to see a peaceable settlement of all the issues which could cause differences between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania, the Royal Government declares that it is prepared to proceed immediately and in the broadest sense to a friendly discussion with common accord of all the proposals emanating from the Soviet Government.

Consequently, the Royal Government requests the Soviet Government kindly to designate the place and the date which the latter chooses to fix for this purpose.

As soon as the Rumanian Government receives the reply of the Soviet Government, it will appoint delegates, and it hopes that the negotiations with the representatives of the Soviet Government will result in the establishment of durable relations, good will, and friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania.

*June 27, 1940*

To the question put by Comrade Molotov as to whether the Rumanian Government accepted the proposals of the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarding the immediate transfer of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina to the Soviet Union, Mr. Davidescu replied that the Rumanian Government accepted these proposals.

In this connection Comrade Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., yesterday handed Mr. Davidescu the following reply of the Soviet Government:

The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers the reply of the Royal Rumanian Government of June 27 as indefinite, since the reply does not state directly that it accepts the proposals of the Soviet Government on the immediate transfer of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina to the Soviet Union. But in view of the fact that Mr. Davidescu, the Rumanian Minister in Moscow, explained that the said reply of the Royal Rumanian Government signifies its consent to the proposals of the Soviet Government, the Government of the U.S.S.R., proceeding from this explanation by Mr. Davidescu, proposes that:

1. The Rumanian troops evacuate the territory of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina during the course of four days, beginning 2 p.m. Moscow time on June 28.

2. The Soviet troops occupy the territory of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina during the same period.

3. The Soviet troops occupy Chernovitsy, Kishinev, and Akkerman during the course of June 28.

4. The Royal Government of Rumania assume responsibility for the preservation and prevention of damage to railways, locomotives, railway cars, bridges, warehouses, airdromes, industrial enterprises, power stations, and telegraph communications.

5. A committee, consisting of representatives of the Soviet Government and the Rumanian Government, two from each party, be appointed for the settlement of disputable questions concerning the evacuation of Rumanian troops and institutions from Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina.

The Soviet Government insists that the Royal Government of Rumania reply to the above proposals not later than noon on June 28.

*June 27, 1940*

At 11 a.m. on June 28, Mr. Davidescu handed Comrade Molotov the following reply of the Rumanian Government to the last statement of the Soviet Government:

To preserve the possibility of avoiding serious consequences which would result from the application of force and the outbreak of hostilities in this part of Europe, the Rumanian Government finds itself obliged to accept the conditions of evacuation stipulated in the Soviet reply.

The Rumanian Government would wish, however, that the time limit provided by Clauses 1 and 2 be extended, bearing in mind that in consequence of rains and floods, which have damaged communications, it would be extremely difficult to effect the evacuation of the territory during the course of four days.

The joint commission established on the basis of Clause 5 could discuss and decide this question.

The names of the Rumanian delegates to this commission will be communicated in the course of the day.

*June 28, 1940*

Thus, the Rumanian Government accepted the proposal of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the immediate transfer of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina to the Soviet Union.

Comrade Molotov informed Mr. Davidescu that the U.S.S.R. had appointed General Kozlov and General Bodin as its representatives on the Soviet-Rumanian commission for the settlement of disputable questions concerning the evacuation of the Rumanian troops and institutions from Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina, and that they were ready this very day to proceed to work in Odessa jointly with the representatives of Rumania. Comrade Molotov also told Mr. Davidescu that, in case of necessity, the Soviet-Rumanian commission would be able to discuss the question of postponing for several hours the execution of Clauses 1 and 2 of the Soviet proposals of June 27.

Mr. Davidescu promised to communicate immediately to the Soviet Government the names of the Rumanian representatives on the above Soviet-Rumanian commission.

Precisely at 2 p.m. on June 28 the Soviet troops will begin to cross the Rumanian frontier to occupy the cities of Chernovitsy, Kishinev, and Akkerman.

*(Moscow News, July 3, 1940)*

## 16

### EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENTS

ON AUGUST 19, 1940, V. G. Dekanosov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, handed to Mr. Gafencu, the Rumanian Minister in Moscow, a note of protest against the provocative actions on the part of Rumanian troops on the Soviet-Rumanian frontier. The note pointed to the inadmissibility of the repeated firing upon Soviet frontier detachments to which in separate cases the Soviet frontier guards had been forced to reply.

On August 29, 1940, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs summoned Mr. Gafencu, the Rumanian Minister, and handed him another note of protest both against the new hostile actions on the part of the

Rumanian frontier guards and military detachments on the Soviet-Rumanian frontier, and against a number of cases of Rumanian military planes having violated the Soviet frontier. The Soviet note of August 29 points out that so far, it is true, there have been no casualties on the Soviet side, but should they occur matters might take a serious turn. The Soviet Government holds the Rumanian Government fully responsible for possible consequences of the above-mentioned actions on the part of the Rumanian troops and military planes.

In the course of the conversation Mr. Gafencu handed Comrade Dekanosov the Rumanian Government's note dated August 26 in reply to the Soviet Government's note of August 19. In its note the Rumanian Government disputes the fact that there had been any shooting from the Rumanian side, as indicated in the Soviet note, and declares that it has repeatedly instructed the Rumanian frontier guards strictly to avoid all incidents that may impair the good-neighborly relations between the two countries. Moreover, Mr. Gafencu made a statement alleging that the Rumanian frontier detachments had been fired upon, and that aeroplanes from the Soviet side had crossed the Rumanian border.

Comrade Dekanosov said that Mr. Gafencu's statements would be verified and affirmed the need for the Soviet Government to receive an urgent and satisfactory reply to its protest reiterated today, since, notwithstanding the note of the Rumanian Government dated August 26, the Soviet frontier continues to be violated by Rumanian troops to this day.

*(Izvestia, August 30, 1940)*

## 17

### TEXT OF EDICT OF PRESIDUM OF SUPREME SOVIET OF U.S.S.R.

ON THE PROCEDURE OF OBLIGATORY TRANSFER OF ENGINEERS, TECHNICIANS,  
FOREMEN, EMPLOYEES, AND SKILLED WORKERS FROM ONE ENTERPRISE  
OR INSTITUTION TO ANOTHER

THE problem of securing skilled forces for new plants, factories, mines, construction jobs, and transport services as well as for enterprises undertaking

the production of new lines, demands the correct distribution of engineers, technicians, foremen, employees, and skilled workers among the different enterprises and the transfer of industrial personnel from enterprises possessing skilled forces to enterprises experiencing a shortage of them.

The existing situation, under which the People's Commissariats do not have the right of obligatory transfer of engineers, employees, and skilled workers from one enterprise to another, is an obstacle to the development of the national economy.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. decrees:

1. To invest the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. with the right of obligatory transfer of engineers, designers, technicians, foremen, draftsmen, bookkeepers, economists, accountants, and planning personnel, as well as skilled workers of the sixth category and up, from one enterprise or institution to another, regardless of the territorial location of the institutions or enterprises.

2. The transfer of engineers, employees, and skilled workers, in accordance with this Edict, to employment in other localities must in no way lead to any material loss to the person transferred. To establish in this connection that the People's Commissariat is obligated to pay the person transferred: (a) the traveling expenses for himself and members of his family to the new place of employment; (b) the cost of transporting his effects; (c) a daily allowance while en route; (d) wages while en route, plus an additional six days; (e) lump sum assistance for setting up home in the new place to the amount of three or four months' wages (depending upon the district) at the former place of work for the person transferred and one-quarter of his monthly earnings for each member of his family who moves to his new place of employment.

3. To establish that engineers, employees, and skilled workers transferred from one enterprise to another in the same locality are to preserve their record of continuous service (*stazh*) and those transferred to other localities are to have one year added to their record.

4. To establish that directors of enterprises and heads of institutions are obligated to release from their enterprise or institution wives of engineers, employees and skilled workers transferred to other localities in accordance with the present Edict.

5. Persons failing to carry out the instructions of the People's Commissar on their obligatory transfer to another enterprise or institution are to be regarded as having left the enterprise or institution without permission



and are committed for trial in accordance with Article 5 of the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of June 26, 1940, on prohibiting workers and employees from leaving enterprises or institutions without permisison.

6. To cancel, as of October 20, 1940, contracts concluded for a specified time by People's Commissariats and enterprises with the engineers, employees, and skilled workers enumerated in Article I of the present Edict, and to permit the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. to retain these engineers, employees and skilled workers at the enterprise where they are at present employed on contract.

M. KALININ

Chairman of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

A. GORKIN

Secretary of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW, *October 19, 1940*

#### ORDER OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF TUITION FEES

TAKING into account the rise in the living standards of the working people and the substantial expenditures borne by the Soviet State for the construction, equipment, and maintenance of the ever-increasing number of secondary and higher educational schools, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. considered it necessary that part of the expenses of tuition in secondary schools and higher educational establishments be borne by the working people themselves, and in this connection has decided:

1. To introduce as of September 1, 1940, tuition fees for the eighth, ninth and tenth classes of secondary schools and in higher educational establishments.

2. To set the following tuition fees for the eighth to tenth classes of secondary schools:

- a. Two hundred rubles a year for the schools of Moscow and Leningrad, and also for the schools in the capitals of the Union Republics;
- b. One hundred and fifty rubles a year for the schools of all other cities, as well as villages.

*Note:* The tuition fees for the eighth to tenth classes of secondary

schools apply to students of technical, pedagogical, agricultural and medical schools and other special secondary schools.

3. To set the following tuition fees for higher educational establishments of the U.S.S.R.:

- a.* Four hundred rubles a year for higher educational establishments in Moscow, Leningrad, and the capitals of the Union Republics;
- b.* Three hundred rubles a year for higher educational establishments in other cities;
- c.* Five hundred rubles a year for higher educational establishments giving instructions in art, the theatre, and music.

4. Tuition fees to be paid to the corresponding educational institutions in equal sums, twice a year: on September 1 and February 1.

*Note:* Payment for the first half of the 1940-41 term to be made not later than November 1, 1940.

5. Payment for correspondence courses in secondary and higher educational establishments to be fixed at half the regular tuition fee.

6. Beginning November 1, 1940, stipends are to be granted only to those students of higher educational establishments as well as pupils of technical schools who excel in their studies.

*(Moscow News, October 3, 1940)*

## 18

### THE SOVIET HOURS LAW

THE eight-hour day which had been proclaimed four days after the Revolution, was a year later confirmed in the R.S.F.S.R.'s Code of Labor Laws which served as a model for the codes of the other Soviet republics. For Soviet workers and employees, the normal working day was fixed at eight hours. Soviet writers distinguish between the normal length of the working day and the special length, which may be shorter or longer. The lengthened day is severely limited to certain seasonal work; the shorter day, ranging from four to seven hours, was established for workers in certain hazardous trades, for minors, for particular groups of office employees,

and others. In 1927 the tenth anniversary of the Revolution was celebrated with a federal decree setting the seven-hour day for industrial workers as a goal to be achieved gradually in the next few years. In January, 1929, the date was definitely fixed for October 1, 1933, but the transition was actually effected some months earlier. On June 26, 1940, the length of the working day was revised upward to an eight-hour maximum. It was decreed to increase the length of the working day of workers and employees in all state, cooperative and social enterprises and institutions.

- (a) From seven to eight hours in places with a seven-hour working day.
- (b) From six to seven hours except in professions with harmful conditions of work.
- (c) From six to eight hours for employees of institutions.
- (d) From six to eight hours for those over 16.

In his speech (June 25, 1940) urging passage of the law, the trade union leader, Shvernik, pointed to the colossal armaments manufacture in Europe and the consequent increase in military danger for the Soviet Union. The seven- and six-hour working day was insufficient, he maintained, to enable the Soviet Union to increase its economic and military might to meet the new international situation. While Shvernik and others sought the return to the eight-hour day, they did so in statements that showed their regret and their pride at the same time. The seven-hour day had been a lauded achievement and it was regrettable that the necessities of 'the second imperialistic war' stopped the downtrend in working hours. Nevertheless, they express pride that even the dangerous international situation had not caused them to exceed the eight-hour maximum, and that the normal working day set by law in the Soviet Union has never gone beyond this limit.

The June, 1940, legislation also changed the length of the working week. The seven-day week had been reduced in 1929 to the five-day week for most industries and a six-day week for the others, but in 1932 the six-day week became the rule and the five-day week the exception. Since June, 1940, the seven-day week, which had been retained in rural areas all these years, is to be the rule for all state, cooperative, and social enterprises.

## 19

DECREE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE LABOR RESERVES  
IN THE U.S.S.R.

With the object of creating state labor reserves for industry, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. resolves:

1. To recognize as essential the annual training for industry of state labor reserves of from 800,000 to 1,000,000 persons by teaching the urban and collective farm youths definite industrial professions in Trade Schools, Railway Schools and Industrial Training Schools.

2. To organize Trade Schools with a two-year course of study in cities for training skilled metal workers, metallurgists, chemists, miners, oil workers and workers of other skilled professions, as well as qualified workers for marine transport, river transport and communications.

3. To organize Railway Schools with a two-year course of study for the training of skilled railway workers, assistant locomotive engineers, locomotive and car repair men, boilermakers, crew leaders for track repairs, and other skilled workers.

4. To organize Industrial Training Schools with a six months' course of study for training workers of the more widely applied professions, in the first place for the coal, mining, metallurgical and oil industries, and building trades.

5. To establish that instruction in Trade Schools, Railway Schools, and Industrial Training Schools is to be free of charge, and that pupils are to be maintained by the State during the period of their studies.

6. To establish that the State reserves of labor power are to be under the direct jurisdiction of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and are not to be utilized by people's commissariats and enterprises without permission of the Government.

7. To empower the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. annually to draft (mobilize) from 800,000 and 1,000,000 persons of the urban and collective farm youths (male) of fourteen and fifteen years of age, for training in Trade and Railway Schools, and of sixteen and seventeen years of age, for Industrial Training Schools.

8. To obligate chairmen of collective farms to designate by drafting (mobilizing) annually two youths (male) of fourteen and fifteen years of age for Trade and Railway Schools and of sixteen and seventeen years of age for Industrial Training Schools per each 100 members of the collective farm, counting men and women between the ages of fourteen and fifty-five.

9. To obligate City Soviets of Working People's Deputies annually to designate by drafting (mobilizing) youths (male) of fourteen and fifteen years of age for Trade and Railway Schools and of sixteen and seventeen years of age for Industrial Training Schools, the number being fixed annually by the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

10. To establish that all those who graduate from the Trade Schools, Railway Schools, and Industrial Training Schools are to be considered as mobilized and are obliged to work four years continuously in state enterprises, as directed by the Central Labor Reserves Administration under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., securing them wages at the place of work in accordance with general rates.

11. To establish that all persons graduating from Trade Schools, Railway Schools, and Industrial Training Schools are to be temporarily exempted from being drafted into the Red Army and Navy until the period of obligatory work in state enterprises, in accordance with Article 10 of the present edict, expires.

M. KALININ

Chairman of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

A. GORKIN

Secretary of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

Moscow, *October 2, 1940.*

## 20

### PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY ANNOUNCED IN THE EIGHTEENTH PARTY CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, FEBRUARY, 1941

F. A. MERKULOV, Commissar of Ferrous Metallurgy; N. M. Antselovich,  
Commissar of Timber Industry; I. A. Likhachev, former Commissar of

Medium Machine Building Industry, were removed from the Central Committee of the Party. I. A. Benediktov, Commissar of Agriculture; E. A. Shchadenko, former Vice-Commissar of Defense, were demoted from members to candidates of the Central Committee. P. S. Zhemshuzhina, Molotov's wife, a functionary in the Light Industry Commissariat; General P. M. Kovalev, former Commander of the Belorussian Military District; V. P. Zhuravlyev, former Chief of the Moscow District N.K.V.D.; A. I. Samokhvalov, Commissar of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, were among the many removed completely from the Central Committee. Removal from this body involved simultaneous dismissal from the administrative or managerial post occupied. Among those pushed up into the Communist Party hierarchy were Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London, and V. G. Dekan-  
osov, Soviet Ambassador in Berlin; Otto Kuusinen, Chief of the Karelo-Finnish Communist Party; I. I. Nosenko, Commissar of Shipbuilding; A. D. Krutikov, Vice Commissar of Foreign Trade; General G. K. Zhukov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army; General Kirponos, Commander of the Leningrad Military District; General I. V. Tyulenev, Commander of the Moscow Military District; General I. R. Apanasenko, Commander of the Central Asiatic Military District; Admiral I. S. Yumashev, Commander of the Pacific Fleet; A. I. Zaporozhets, Vice-Commissar of Defense.

## 21

THE following communiques were issued on the conclusion of trade agreements with Finland, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark, Slovakia, Germany, Rumania, and Belgium.

Trade pacts were signed with Iran on March 25, 1940; with Switzerland on February 24, 1941; with Afghanistan on July 28, 1940; with Yugoslavia on May 11, 1940; and with China on January 4 and January 11, 1941; but the communiques contained no interesting details.

### U.S.S.R. TRADE AGREEMENT WITH FINLAND

AGREEMENTS on trade and payments between the Soviet Union and Finland were signed on June 28, 1940 in Moscow.

The trade agreement provides for most-favored-nation treatment for both sides. A special appendix to the trade agreement regulates the legal status of the Trade Representation of the U.S.S.R. in Finland. The protocol to the trade agreement sets the turnover between the two countries for the first year that the agreement is in force at 7,500,000 American dollars for each side; that is, a total of 15,000,000 dollars.

Finland will supply the Soviet Union with tugboats, lighters, electrical equipment, copper wire, leather, industrial paper, animal fats, meat, and other goods. The Soviet Union will supply Finland with wheat and rye, oil products, manganese ore, cotton, tobacco, and other goods.

The agreements were signed on behalf of the Soviet Union by Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., and on behalf of Finland by V. A. Kotilainen, Minister for Trade of the Republic of Finland, and J. K. Passikivi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Finland to the U.S.S.R.

*(Moscow News, July 3, 1940)*

#### COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE CONCLUSION OF A TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND HUNGARY

A TREATY on commerce and navigation and an agreement on trade and payments was signed between the U.S.S.R. and Hungary on September 3, 1940, in Moscow.

The agreement on trade and payments provides for the development of trade between the U.S.S.R. and Hungary. During the first year of the agreement the trade turnover between the two countries will amount to 3,700,000 American dollars on each side.

The U.S.S.R. proposes to import from Hungary railway car wheels, axles, oil piping, vessels, electric motors, and other equipment. The Soviet Union will supply Hungary with sawn timber, cotton, manganese and chromium ores, and other articles.

The treaty on commerce and navigation as well as the agreement on trade and payments enters into force as of September 15, 1940.

The treaty was signed by Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., for the Soviet side, and by Mr. A. Nickl, Hungary's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

*(Moscow News, September 5, 1940)*

## U.S.S.R.-SWEDEN TRADE-CREDIT AGREEMENTS

AN AGREEMENT on trade and payments and a credit agreement were signed between the U.S.S.R. and Sweden in Moscow on September 7.

The total volume of trade during the first year that the agreement on trade and payments is in force is fixed at 150,000,000 Swedish kroner, or 75,000,000 on each side.

If allowance is made for deliveries under the credit agreement, Sweden's exports to the U.S.S.R. during the first year of the agreement will amount to more than 100,000,000 Swedish kroner, as against 18,000,000 in 1938. Sweden's imports from the U.S.S.R. will amount to 75,000,000 Swedish kroner, as against 12,000,000 in 1938.

The Soviet Union will import car wheels and other railway supplies, machine tools, high-grade steel, ball bearings, and other equipment from Sweden. In exchange, the U.S.S.R. will supply Sweden with oil products, grain, oil cake, manganese ore, and other goods.

According to the terms of the credit agreement, Sweden is extending the U.S.S.R. credit to the amount of 100,000,000 Swedish kroner for a period of five years at 4.5 per cent interest annually. The U.S.S.R. will utilize this credit in the course of two years to pay for additional orders of machinery and equipment placed in Sweden.

The agreements were signed by Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., on behalf of the Soviet side, and by Mr. G. Eriksson, Minister of Economic Regulation, on behalf of the Swedish Government.

*(Moscow News, September 10, 1940)*

## TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S.S.R. AND DENMARK

AN AGREEMENT on trade and payments was signed between the U.S.S.R. and Denmark in Moscow in September 18, 1940.

The volume of trade between both countries is fixed by the agreement in the sum of 14,400,000 Danish kroner, or 7,200,000 Danish kroner on each side for the first six months the agreement is in force.

The Soviet Union will purchase ships, Diesel engines, electric motors, compressors, presses, and other equipment in Denmark.

In exchange for these goods the U.S.S.R. will supply Denmark with cotton and cotton waste, kerosene, benzine, apatites, and other goods.

The agreement was signed by Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, People's Com-



missar of Foreign Trade, on behalf of the Soviet Union, and by Mr. G. Larsen, Minister of Public Works of Denmark, and by Mr. H. Halse, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Denmark.

*(Moscow News, September 10, 1940)*

### U.S.S.R.-SLOVAKIA TRADE AGREEMENTS

A TREATY on commerce and navigation and also an agreement on the volume of trade and payments were signed in Moscow, December 6, between the U.S.S.R. and the Slovakian Republic.

The treaty provides for the reciprocal application of the most-favored-nation principle and regulates the legal status of the trade representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the Slovakian Republic.

Under the terms of the agreement on the volume of trade and payments, Slovakia will supply the U.S.S.R. with cable, electric motors, steel tubing, yarn, and other goods. The U.S.S.R. will export cotton, grains, phosphates, and other goods to Slovakia. The total volume of trade during the first year of operation of the agreement is set at 4,800,000 United States dollars.

The treaty on commerce and navigation and the agreement on volume of trade and payments were signed on the Soviet side by Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., and on the Slovakian side by Mr. J. Orsag, Chairman of the Slovakian Trade Delegation.

*(Moscow News, December 7, 1940)*

### COMMUNIQUE ON THE CONCLUSION OF AN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND GERMANY

THE Soviet-German economic negotiations held in Moscow since the end of October of last year were concluded on January 10, 1941, by the signature of an enlarged economic agreement. The agreement was signed on behalf of the U.S.S.R. by Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., and on behalf of Germany by Doctor K. Schnurre, Envoy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The new agreement is based on the Soviet-German Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, and constitutes a further stage in the execution of the economic program outlined by the two governments in 1939. The agreement regulates the trade turnover between the U.S.S.R. and Germany

until August 1, 1942. It provides for an amount of mutual deliveries considerably exceeding the level of the first year of the operation of the agreement. The U.S.S.R. is to deliver to Germany industrial raw materials, oil products, and foodstuffs, especially cereals; Germany is to deliver to the U.S.S.R. industrial equipment.

The negotiations passed in a spirit of mutual understanding and confidence conforming to the friendly relations existing between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. All economic problems, including those which arose in connection with the incorporation of new territories into the U.S.S.R., were solved in conformity with the interests of both countries.

*(Moscow News, January 15, 1941)*

#### U.S.S.R.-RUMANIA TREATY ON COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION

A TREATY on commerce and navigation and an agreement on trade and payments were signed between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania on February 26 in Moscow.

The commercial treaty provides for the application of most-favored-nation treatment to both parties.

According to the agreement on trade and payments, the total volume of trade between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania during the first year of its operation is fixed at 8,000,000 United States dollars, or 4,000,000 from each side.

The chief item of export from Rumania to the U.S.S.R. will be benzine, while the chief item of export from the U.S.S.R. to Rumania will be cotton and pig iron.

The treaty and agreement were signed on behalf of the Soviet side by Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., and on behalf of the Rumanian side by Mr. G. Gafencu, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of Rumania in Moscow, and Mr. P. Nemojanu, Chairman of the Rumanian Trade Delegation.

*(Moscow News, February 28, 1941)*

#### U.S.S.R.-BELGIUM AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND PAYMENTS

AN AGREEMENT on trade and payments was signed between the U.S.S.R. and Belgium in Moscow on April 4. The agreement was concluded as the result of negotiations between Comrades M. S. Stepanov, Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., and D. D. Mishustin, Chief

of the Trade Agreements Department of the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade, on the one hand, and Herr Hilger, Counselor of the German Embassy in Moscow, with the participation of M. Gerard, Director General for Foreign Trade and Exchange of the Ministry of Economy of Belgium.

(*Moscow News*, April 10, 1941)

## 22

### WORLD ANNUAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTION IN THOUSANDS OF TONS

Country	1913	1921	1929	1932	1935	1938	1940
U.S.A. ....	34,030	64,716	138,104	107,645	134,880	173,000†	193,100
U.S.S.R. ....	9,234	.....	13,809	22,318	29,199*	30,300	31,000
Venezuela ....	.....	218	24,402	17,185	21,990	27,000†	26,400
Rumania ....	1,848	1,168	4,837	7,348	8,385	7,200†	6,200
Iran .....	248	2,223	5,549	6,549	7,605	10,200†	11,200
Mexico .....	2,838	28,978	6,700	4,842	5,871	6,600†	.....
	*1936	†1937					

## 23

### DISTRIBUTION OF OIL PRODUCTION IN U.S.S.R. IN PER CENT OF TOTAL

	1913	1929	1933	1938
U.S.S.R. ....	100	100	100	100
Baku .....	83.05	63.40	71.17	74.40
Grozny .....	13.09	33.10	22.50	8.58
"Second Baku" ..	.....	.....	0.16	4.04
Maikop District ..	0.94	1.14	3.41	6.98
Far East .....	.....	0.13	0.88	1.12
Turkmenistan .....	1.40	0.06	0.69	1.35
Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan ...	0.25	0.18	0.23	0.70
Kazakhstan .....	1.27	1.95	0.88	2.02

## 24

## OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION IN THE 'SECOND BAKU' REGION

Year	Amount in Tons	Per Cent of Entire Soviet Production
1931. ....	6,200	0.03
1932. ....	10,600	0.05
1933. ....	36,300	0.16
1934. ....	74,800	0.29
1935. ....	413,800	1.54
1936. ....	977,510	3.34
1937. ....	1,024,740	3.37
1938. ....	1,299,000	4.04
1939. ....	2,004,000	5.72
1940. ....	about 2,000,000	5.
1942 (plan) .....	7,000,000	12.50

NUMBER OF ACTIVE WELLS IN THE SOVIET OIL INDUSTRY AND THEIR  
AVERAGE YIELD

Year	Number of Wells	Average Yield per Well
1934. ....	5,852	431
1937. ....	9,700	294
1938. ....	9,473	317
1939. ....	9,670	293
1940. ....	9,500	292
1942 (Planned) .....	17,900	301

Thus, the number of active wells was less for 1940 than for 1937 and the average yield lower.

## 25

## PRODUCTIVITY OF WELLS AND OIL WORKERS

	U.S.A. 1937	U.S.S.R. 1938	Baku 1938
Average production per well (tons per day) .....	1.3	5.9	6.8
Average number of workers per well including drillers .....	.38	2.94	2.63
Average oil production per worker (tons per year) .....	1,088.	726.	938.
Average workers' production of oil and all by-products (tons per year) .....	1,470.	744.	1,017.

(Taken from Soviet newspaper *Neft* for October 23, 1940)

## 26

## SOVIET GASOLINE REFINING

Year.....	1932	1935	1938
Utilization of refining capacity in percentage .....	94.4	86.5	84.3

Nevertheless, gasoline production increased substantially, reaching 4,000,000 tons in 1939:

Year.....	1936	1937	1938	1939
Gasoline production in thousands of tons	3,005	3,460	3,677	4,000

The increase was steady, but when Soviet figures were compared with the 75,000,000 tons produced in 1934 in the United States the limited scale on which the Soviet petroleum industry operated became apparent.

## 27

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND  
YUGOSLAVIA

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia, inspired by friendship existing between the two countries and convinced that preservation of peace forms their common interest, decided to conclude a treaty on friendship and non-aggression and appointed for this purpose their representatives: The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.: Viacheslav M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia: Milan Gavrilovitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Yugoslavia, Bozhin Simich and Colonel Dragutin Savich; which representatives, after exchanging their credentials found in proper form and due order, agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I. The two contracting parties mutually undertake to desist from any aggression against each other and to respect the independence, sovereign rights and territorial integrity of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.

ARTICLE II. In the event of aggression against one of the contracting parties on the part of a third power, the other contracting party undertakes to observe a policy of friendly relations towards that party.

ARTICLE III. The present treaty is concluded for a term of five years. If neither of the contracting parties finds it necessary to denounce the present treaty one year before expiration of the above term, the treaty automatically will remain valid for the following five years.

ARTICLE IV. The present treaty comes into force from the moment of its signing. The treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of ratification instruments shall take place in Belgrade.

ARTICLE V. The treaty is drawn up in two originals in Russian and the Serbo-Croat languages, both texts being equally valid.

Moscow, April 5. On behalf of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov; on behalf of His Majesty King Peter, M. Gavrilovitch, B. Simich, Colonel Savich.

(TASS, April 6, 1941)

## 28

## COMMUNIQUE ON SOVIET NOTE TO HUNGARY

ON APRIL twelfth of this year the Hungarian Minister in the U.S.S.R., M. de Kristoffi, called on the Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Comrade A. Y. Vyshinski, and delivered a note in the name of the Hungarian Government, explaining the motives of the Hungarian Government in sending their troops into Yugoslav territory, and expressing the hope that the Soviet Government would find these motives just and adequate.

Comrade Vyshinski made the following answer to the Hungarian note:

If the Hungarian declaration was really made in order to get the Soviet Government to express its opinion, then I must state that the Soviet Government cannot approve such Hungarian actions [as the invasion of Yugoslavia]. The Soviet Government is particularly unfavorably impressed by the fact that Hungary began its war against Yugoslavia only four months after signing a pact of eternal friendship with Yugoslavia. It is not difficult to understand in what a position Hungary would be if she herself fell into misfortune, and was torn into pieces, in as much as it is well known that Hungary likewise has national minorities.

The Hungarian Minister promised to communicate the declaration of the Soviet Government to his government.

(*Izvestia*, April 13, 1941)

## 29

## NEUTRALITY PACT BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND JAPAN

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by a desire to strengthen peaceful and

friendly relations between the two countries, decided to conclude a pact on neutrality, for the purpose of which they appointed as their representatives: For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Viacheslav M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. For His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jusanmin, Cavalier of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, first class; and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the U.S.S.R., Lieutenant General, Jusanmin, Cavalier of the Order of the Rising Sun, first class, and the Order of the Golden Kite, fourth class; who, after the exchange of their credentials, which were found in due and proper form agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1. Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party.

ARTICLE 2. Should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

ARTICLE 3. The present pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both contracting parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the contracting parties denounces the pact one year before expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

ARTICLE 4. The present pact is subject to ratification as soon as possible. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Tokio also as soon as possible.

In confirmation whereof the above-named representatives signed the present pact in two copies, drawn up in the Russian and Japanese languages, and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in Moscow April 13, 1941, which corresponds to the 13th day of the fourth month of the 16th year of Showa.

Signed by Molotov, Yosuke Matsuoka, Koshitsugu Tatekawa.

### *Declaration*

In conformity with the spirit of the neutrality pact concluded April 13, 1931, between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the governments of the U.S.S.R. and Japan in the interests of insuring peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, solemnly declare that the U.S.S.R. pledges to



respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchoukuo, and Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Moscow, April 13, 1941, signed on behalf of the government of the U.S.S.R. by Molotov; on behalf of the government of Japan by Yosuke Matsuoka and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa.

(TASS, April 13, 1941)

## 30

### MOLOTOV'S SPEECH

(Broadcast, June 22, 1941)

CITIZENS of the Soviet Union:

The Soviet Government and its head, Comrade Stalin, have authorized me to make the following statement:

Today at 4 a.m. without any claims having been presented to the Soviet Union, without a declaration of war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders at many points and bombed from their airplanes our cities of Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas, and some others, killing and wounding over 200 persons.

There were also enemy air raids and artillery shelling from Rumanian and Finnish territory.

This unheard of attack upon our country is perfidy unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was perpetrated despite the fact that a treaty of non-aggression had been signed between the U.S.S.R. and Germany and that the Soviet Government most faithfully abided by all provisions of this treaty.

The attack upon our country was perpetrated despite the fact that during the entire period of operation of this treaty the German Government could not find grounds for a single complaint against the U.S.S.R. as regards observance of this treaty.

Entire responsibility for this predatory attack upon the Soviet Union falls fully and completely upon the German Fascist rulers.

At 5.30 a.m.—that is, after the attack had already been perpetrated, Von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, on behalf of his government made the statement to me as People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs to the effect that the German Government had decided to launch war against the U.S.S.R. in connection with the concentration of Red Army Units near the eastern German frontier.

In reply to this I stated on behalf of the Soviet Government that, until the very last moment, the German Government had not presented any claims to the Soviet Government, that Germany attacked the U.S.S.R. despite the peaceable position of the Soviet Union, and that for this reason Fascist Germany is the aggressor.

On instruction of the government of the Soviet Union I also stated that at no point had our troops or our air force committed a violation of the frontier and therefore the statement made this morning by the Rumanian radio to the effect that Soviet aircraft allegedly had fired on Rumanian airdromes is a sheer lie and provocation.

Likewise a lie and provocation is the whole declaration made today by Hitler, who is trying belatedly to concoct accusations charging the Soviet Union with failure to observe the Soviet-German pact.

Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already been committed, the Soviet Government has ordered our troops to repulse the predatory assault and to drive German troops from the territory of our country.

This war has been forced upon us, not by the German people, not by German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose sufferings we well understand, but by the clique of bloodthirsty Fascist rulers of Germany who have enslaved Frenchmen, Czechs, Poles, Serbians, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece, and other nations.

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its unshakable confidence that our valiant army and navy and brave falcons of the Soviet Air Force will acquit themselves with honor in performing their duty to the fatherland and to the Soviet people, and will inflict a crushing blow upon the aggressor.

This is not the first time that our people have had to deal with an attack of an arrogant foe. At the time of Napoleon's invasion of Russia our people's reply was war for the fatherland, and Napoleon suffered defeat and met his doom.

It will be the same with Hitler, who in his arrogance has proclaimed a new crusade against our country. The Red Army and our whole people

will again wage victorious war for the fatherland, for our country, for honor, for liberty.

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses the firm conviction that the whole population of our country, all workers, peasants and intellectuals, men and women, will conscientiously perform their duties and do their work. Our entire people must now stand solid and united as never before.

Each one of us must demand of himself and of others discipline, organization and self-denial worthy of real Soviet patriots, in order to provide for all the needs of the Red Army, Navy, and Air Force, to insure victory over the enemy.

The Government calls upon you, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally still more closely around our glorious Bolshevik party, around our Soviet Government, around our great leader and comrade, Stalin. Ours is a righteous cause. The enemy shall be defeated. Victory will be ours.

*(The New York Times, June 23, 1941)*

## 31

### STALIN'S SPEECH

*(Broadcast, July 3, 1941)*

COMRADES! Citizens! Brothers and Sisters! Men of our Army and Navy!

I am addressing you, my friends!

The perfidious military attack on our fatherland, begun on June 22 by Hitler Germany, is continuing.

In spite of heroic resistance of the Red Army, and although the enemy's finest divisions and finest air force units have already been smashed and have met their doom on the field of battle, the enemy continues to push forward, hurling fresh forces into the attack.

Hitler's troops have succeeded in capturing Lithuania, a considerable part of Latvia, the western part of Belorussia (White Russia) and a part of the Western Ukraine.

The Fascist air force is extending the range of operations of its bombers and is bombing Murmansk, Orsha, Mogilev, Smolensk, Kiev, Odessa, and Sevastopol.

A grave danger hangs over our country.

How could it have happened that our glorious Red Army surrendered a number of our cities and districts to the Fascist armies?

Is it really true that German Fascist troops are invincible, as is ceaselessly trumpeted by boastful Fascist propagandists? Of course not!

History shows that there are no invincible armies, and never have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible, but it was beaten successively by Russian, English, and German Armies. Kaiser Wilhelm's German Army in the period of the first imperialist war was also considered invincible, but it was beaten several times by Russian and Anglo-French forces, and was finally smashed by Anglo-French forces.

The same must be said of Hitler's German Fascist Army today. This army has not yet met with serious resistance on the continent of Europe. Only on our territory has it met serious resistance, and if as a result of this resistance the finest divisions of Hitler's German Fascist Army have been defeated by our Red Army, it means that this army, too, can be smashed, and will be smashed as were the armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm.

As to part of our territory having nevertheless been seized by German Fascist troops, this is chiefly due to the fact that the war of Fascist Germany on the U.S.S.R. began under conditions favorable for German forces and unfavorable for Soviet forces.

The fact of the matter is that troops of Germany, as a country at war, were already fully mobilized, and 170 divisions hurled by Germany against the U.S.S.R. and brought up to the Soviet frontiers were in a state of complete readiness, only awaiting the signal to move into action, whereas Soviet troops had still to effect mobilization and move up to the frontiers.

Of no little importance in this respect is the fact that Fascist Germany suddenly and treacherously violated the non-aggression pact she concluded in 1939 with the U.S.S.R., disregarding the fact that she would be regarded as an aggressor by the whole world. Naturally, our peace-loving country, not wishing to take the initiative of breaking the pact, could not resort to perfidy.

It may be asked: How could the Soviet Government have consented to conclude a non-aggression pact with such treacherous fiends as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was this not an error on the part of the Soviet Government? Of course not!

Non-aggression pacts are pacts of peace between two states. It was such a pact that Germany proposed to us in 1939. Could the Soviet Government

have declined such a proposal? I think that not a single peace-loving state could decline a peace treaty with a neighboring state even though the latter was headed by such fiends and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop.

But that, of course, only on one indispensable condition — namely, that this peace treaty does not infringe either directly or indirectly on the territorial integrity, independence and honor of the peace-loving state.

As is well known, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. is precisely such a pact.

What did we gain by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany? We secured for our country peace for a year and a half and the opportunity of preparing its forces to repulse Fascist Germany should she risk an attack on our country despite the pact.

This was a definite advantage for us and a disadvantage for Fascist Germany.

What has Fascist Germany gained and what has she lost by treacherously tearing up the pact and attacking the U.S.S.R.?

She gained a certain advantageous position for her troops for a short period, but she has lost politically by exposing herself in the eyes of the entire world as a bloodthirsty aggressor.

There can be no doubt that this short-lived military gain for Germany is only an episode, while the tremendous political gain of the U.S.S.R. is a serious and lasting factor that is bound to form the basis for development of decisive military successes of the Red Army in the war with Fascist Germany.

That is why our whole valiant Red Army, our whole valiant navy, all our falcons of the air, all peoples of our country, all the finest men and women of Europe, America, and Asia, and, finally, all the finest men and women of Germany, condemn the treacherous acts of the German Fascists and sympathize with the Soviet Government, approve the conduct of the Soviet Government and see that ours is a just cause, that the enemy will be defeated, that we are bound to win.

By virtue of this war which has been forced upon us our country has come to death grips with its most malicious and most perfidious enemy — German Fascism.

Our troops are fighting heroically against an enemy armed to the teeth with tanks and aircraft. Overcoming innumerable difficulties the Red Army and Navy are self-sacrificingly disputing every inch of Soviet soil.

The main forces of the Red Army are coming into action armed with

thousands of tanks and airplanes. Men of the Red Army are displaying unexampled valor. Our resistance to the enemy is growing in strength and power. Side by side with the Red Army the entire Soviet people is rising in defense of our native land.

What is required to put an end to the danger hovering over our country, and what measures must be taken to smash the enemy?

Above all, it is essential that our people, the Soviet people, should understand the full immensity of the danger that threatens our country and abandon all complacency, all heedlessness, all those moods of peaceful, constructive work which were so natural before the war but which are fatal today when war has fundamentally changed everything.

The enemy is cruel and implacable. He is out to seize our lands watered with our sweat, to seize our grain and oil secured by our labor.

He is out to restore the rule of landlords, to restore Czarism, to destroy the national culture and national state existence of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians, Tartars, Uzbeks, Moldavians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidzhanians, and the other free peoples of the Soviet Union, to Germanize them, to convert them into slaves of German princes and barons.

Thus the issue is one of life or death of the Soviet State, for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. the issue is whether peoples of the Soviet Union shall remain free or fall into slavery.

The Soviet people must realize this and abandon all heedlessness, they must mobilize themselves and reorganize all their work on new, wartime lines, when there can be no mercy to the enemy.

Further, there must be no room in our ranks for whimperers and cowards, for panic-mongers and deserters; our people must know no fear in the fight and must selflessly join our patriotic war of liberation, our war against the Fascist enslavers.

Lenin, the great founder of our state, used to say that the chief virtue of the Soviet people must be courage, valor, fearlessness in struggle, readiness to fight together with the people against the enemies of our country.

The splendid virtue of the Bolshevik must become the virtue of millions and millions of the Red Army, or the Red Navy, of all peoples of the Soviet Union.

All our work must be immediately reconstructed on a war footing, everything must be subordinated to the interests of the front and the task of organizing demolition of the enemy.

The peoples of the Soviet Union now see that there is no taming of German Fascism in its savage fury and hatred of our country which has insured all working people labor, freedom and prosperity.

The peoples of the Soviet Union must rise against the enemy and defend their rights and their land. The Red Army, Red Navy, and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend every inch of Soviet soil, must fight to the last drop of blood for our towns and villages, must display the daring initiative and intelligence that are inherent in our people.

We must organize all-round assistance to the Red Army, insure powerful reinforcements for its ranks and supply of everything it requires, we must organize rapid transport of troops and military freight and extensive aid to the wounded.

We must strengthen the Red Army's rear, subordinating all our work to this cause, all our industries must be put to work with greater intensity to produce more rifles, machine guns, artillery, bullets, shells, airplanes; we must organize the guarding of factories, power stations, telephonic and telegraphic communications, and arrange effective air raid protection in all localities.

We must wage a ruthless fight against all disorganizers of the rear, deserters, panic-mongers, rumor-mongers, exterminate spies, diversionists, enemy parachutists, rendering rapid aid in all this to our destroyer battalions. We must bear in mind that the enemy is crafty, unscrupulous, experienced in deception and dissemination of false rumors.

We must reckon with all this and not fall victim to provocation. All who by their panic-mongering and cowardice hinder the work of defense, no matter who they are, must be immediately hailed before a military tribunal.

In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated; to the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway car, not a single pound of grain or a gallon of fuel.

Collective farmers must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain to the safekeeping of state authorities for transportation to the rear. All valuable property including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel which cannot be withdrawn must without fail be destroyed.

In areas occupied by the enemy, guerrilla units, mounted and foot, must be formed, diversionist groups must be organized to combat enemy troops, to foment guerrilla warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, and to set fire to forests, stores, and transports.

In occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step and all their measures frustrated.

This war with Fascist Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies, it is also a great war of the entire Soviet people against the German Fascist forces.

The aim of this people's war in defense of our country against the Fascist oppressors is not only elimination of the danger hanging over our country, but also aid to all European peoples groaning under the yoke of German Fascism.

In this war of liberation we shall not be alone.

In this great war we shall have loyal allies in the peoples of Europe and America, including German people who are enslaved by Hitlerite despots.

Our war for the freedom of our country will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic liberties. It will be a united front of peoples standing for freedom and against enslavement and threats of enslavement by Hitler's Fascist armies.

In this connection the historic utterance of British Prime Minister Churchill regarding aid to the Soviet Union and the declaration of the United States Government signifying readiness to render aid to our country, which can only evoke a feeling of gratitude in the hearts of the peoples of the Soviet Union, are fully comprehensible and symptomatic.

Comrades, our forces are numberless. The overweening enemy will soon learn this to his cost. Side by side with the Red Army and Navy thousands of workers, collective farmers and intellectuals are rising to fight the enemy aggressor. Masses of our people will rise up in their millions. The working people of Moscow and Leningrad already have commenced to form vast popular levies in support of the Red Army.

Such popular levies must be raised in every city which is in danger of an enemy invasion, all working people must be roused to defend our freedom, our honor, our country — in our patriotic war against German Fascism.

In order to insure a rapid mobilization of all forces of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., and to repulse the enemy who has treacherously attacked our country, a State Committee of Defense has been formed in whose hands the entire power of the State has been vested.

The State Committee of Defense has entered into its functions and calls upon all our people to rally around the Party of Lenin-Stalin and around the Soviet Government so as self-denyingly to support the Red Army and Navy, demolish the enemy, and secure victory.



All our forces for the support of our heroic Red Army and our glorious Red Navy!

All the forces of the people — for the demolition of the enemy!

Forward, to our victory!

## 32

### TEXT OF ANGLO-SOVIET PACT

#### *The Agreement*

AGREEMENT for joint action by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the war against Germany:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have concluded the present agreement and declare as follows:

1. The two governments mutually undertake to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.

2. They further undertake that during this war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

The present agreement has been concluded in duplicate in the Russian and English languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, *July 12, 1941.*

By the authority of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: *Molotov*, Deputy President of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

By the authority of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom: *Stafford Cripps*, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*The Protocol*

Protocol to the agreement for joint action by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the war against Germany, concluded July 12, 1941:

Upon conclusion of the agreement for joint action by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the war against Germany, the contracting parties have agreed that the aforesaid agreement enters into force immediately upon signature and is not subject to ratification.

The present protocol has been drawn up in duplicate in the Russian and English languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, *July* 12, 1941.

By the authority of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: MOLOTOV, Deputy President of the Council of Peoples' Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

By the authority of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom: STAFFORD CRIPPS, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(*New York Times*, July 14, 1941)

**33****DECREE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R.**

ON THE Organization of the Organs of Political Propaganda and the Introduction of the Institution of Military Commissars into the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army:

The war which was thrust upon us has fundamentally changed the conditions of work in the Red Army. It has broadened the scope of political work in our Army and has made it imperative that our political workers do not limit their work to propaganda but take upon themselves responsibility for military work at the front as well.

On the other hand the war has also complicated the work of regiment and division commanders, and demands, therefore, that the political workers render all possible aid to the regiment and division commanders not only in the sphere of political work but in the sphere of the military as well.

All these new factors in the task of the political workers, connected with the transition from peace to war time, call for increasing the role and the responsibility of the political workers, just as took place during the Civil War against foreign military intervention.

In connection with this, and in accordance with the wishes of the State Committee of Defense and the Chief Commands, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. decrees:

1. To reorganize the administration and divisions of political propaganda into the *Political Administration* and *Political Divisions* of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army.

2. To introduce into all regiments and divisions, staffs, military schools and establishments of the Red Army, the institution of Military Commissars, and into companies, batteries and squadrons, the institution of Political Instructors.

3. To ratify the Order concerning military commissars in regiments and divisions of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army.

M. KALININ,

*President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.*

A. GORKIN,

*Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.*

MOSCOW, KREMLIN, July 16, 1941.

Ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

The Order concerning the Military Commissars of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army:

1. The institution of military commissars is established in all regiments, divisions, staffs, military schools and institutions of the Red Army at the front as well as in the rear.

2. A military commissar is a representative of the Party and the Government in the Red Army, who equally with the commander carries full responsibility for the fulfillment of all military tasks by the fighting unit, for its steadfastness in combat and its unwavering readiness to fight to the last drop of blood against the enemy of our country and to defend honorably every inch of Soviet soil.

3. A military commissar is a moral leader of his unit (or larger body), the prime defender of its material and spiritual interests. "If a commander of a regiment represents the head of a regiment, then a commissar should be the father and the soul of his regiment." (Stalin).

4. A military commissar is obliged to render every conceivable aid to the commander who carries out honorably and unstintingly all fighting tasks, to strengthen his authority as a commander, and to exercise rigid control over the fulfillment of all orders issued by the high command.

5. A military commissar must issue a timely warning to the Supreme Command and the Government concerning commanders and political workers who are not worthy of the title of commander or political worker and who by their conduct deface the honor of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army.

6. It is the duty of the political commissar to inspire the troops in the struggle with the enemy of our country. In the critical moments of combat, the military commissar must raise, by personal example of courage and fearlessness, the fighting spirit of a military unit, as well as strive to achieve an unconditional fulfillment of the fighting order.

7. A military commissar must encourage and popularize the best fighters and commanders, cultivate in the personnel of the fighting unit courage, fearlessness, composure, initiative and sagacity, instil contempt for death and readiness to fight the enemy of our country to the victorious end.

8. A military commissar has to carry on, with the support of the wide masses of Red Army men and commanders, a ruthless struggle against cowards, panic-mongers and deserters, upholding with a firm hand revolutionary order and military discipline. Coordinating his work with the organs of the 3rd Administration of the People's Commissariat of Defense, a military commissar has to nip in the bud every attempt at treason.

9. A military commissar supervises the political organs, as well as the Party and Komsomol organizations, in the fighting units.

10. A political instructor is subordinate in his work to the commissar of the regiment, a commissar of the regiment to the commissar of a division, and a commissar of a division to the Military Council of the Army and to the Chief Political Administration of the Red Army.

11. All orders issued by the regiment, division, administration and institutions, are signed by the commander and the military commissar.

(*Trud*, July 17, 1941)

## 34

TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE  
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC

SIGNED in London on July 18, 1941, on behalf of the U.S.S.R. by Ivan Maisky, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain, and on behalf of the Czechoslovakian Republic by Jan Masaryk, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The text of the agreement reads:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia have reached the following agreement:

1. The two Governments have agreed immediately to exchange ministers.
2. The two Governments mutually undertake to aid and support each other in every way in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.
3. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consents to the formation on the territory of the U.S.S.R. of national Czechoslovak military units under a commander appointed by the Czechoslovak Government in agreement with the Soviet Government. The Czechoslovak military units on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will operate under the direction of the high military command of the U.S.S.R.
4. The present agreement comes into force immediately after its signature and is not subject to ratification.
5. The present agreement is drawn up in two copies, each of them in Russian and the Czechoslovak languages. Both texts have equal force.

*(New York Times, July 19, 1941)*

## 35

TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE  
EXILED GOVERNMENT OF POLAND

SIGNED in London on July 30, 1941, on behalf of the U.S.S.R. by Ivan Maisky, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R. and on behalf of the exiled Polish Government by Premier General Wladislas Sikorski.

The text of the agreement reads:

1. The Government of the U.S.S.R. recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity. The Polish Government declares Poland is not bound by any agreement with any third power which is directed against the U.S.S.R.

2. Diplomatic relations will be restored between the two Governments upon the signing of this agreement, and an immediate exchange of Ambassadors will be arranged.

3. The two Governments mutually agree to render one to another aid and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.

4. The Government of the U.S.S.R. expresses its consent to the formation on territory of the U.S.S.R. of a Polish army under a commander appointed by the Polish Government in agreement with the Soviet Government, the Polish army on territory of the U.S.S.R. being subordinated in an operational sense to the Supreme Command of the U.S.S.R., in which the Polish army will be represented. All details as to command, organization, and employment of this force will be settled in a subsequent agreement.

5. This agreement will come into force immediately upon signature and without ratification. The present agreement is drawn up in two copies, in the Russian and Polish languages. Both texts have equal force.

The Soviet Government grants amnesty to all Polish citizens now detained on Soviet territory either as prisoners of war or on other sufficient grounds, as from the resumption of diplomatic relations.

(*New York Times*, July 31, 1941)

## 36

## AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

THE commercial agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which was proclaimed on and became effective on August 6, 1937, and which was renewed for successive periods of one year on August 5, 1938, August 2, 1939, and August 6, 1940, was continued in force for another year, that is, until August 6, 1942, by identic notes exchanged at Washington on August 2, 1941, by the Acting Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Sumner Welles, and the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Constantine Oumansky.

Although it is expected that in the coming year the character and amount of United States trade with the Soviet Union will be governed largely by the defense needs of the United States and of the Soviet Union and other countries struggling against the forces of armed aggression rather than by the usual commercial considerations, the exchange of notes will insure the continuance during the emergency period of our established commercial relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the 1937 commercial agreement.

The following table gives the value in dollars of exports to and imports from the Soviet Union in the agreement years:

Agreement Year (beginning August)	U.S. domestic exports to U.S.S.R. (in thou- sands of U. S. dollars)	U.S. imports for consumption from U.S.S.R. (in thou- sands of U.S. dollars)
1935-36 .....	33,286	21,200
1936-37 .....	30,987	23,240
1937-38 .....	64,338	22,874
1938-39 .....	50,160	24,739
1939-40 .....	73,636	24,773
1940-41 (10 months) * .....	57,481	22,710

\* Preliminary data for the 10 months, August 1940 through May 1941.

(Official records of the United States Department of Commerce.)

The text of the identic notes exchanged follows:

WASHINGTON, *August 2, 1941*

EXCELLENCY:

In accordance with the conversations which have taken place, I have the honor to confirm on behalf of my Government the agreement which has been reached between the Governments of our respective countries that the agreement regarding commercial relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recorded in the exchange of notes of August 4, 1937, between the Ambassador of the United States of America at Moscow and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which came into force on August 6, 1937, on the date of proclamation thereof by the President of the United States of America and approval thereof by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and which was renewed on August 5, 1938, August 2, 1939, and August 6, 1940, shall continue in force until August 6, 1942.

The present agreement shall be proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Accept (etc.).

WELLES-OUANSKY EXCHANGE OF NOTES

THE Department of State made public on August 5, 1941, the following exchange of notes between the Acting Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Sumner Welles, and the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Constantine A. Oumansky:

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union

*August 2, 1941*

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

I am pleased to inform you that the Government of the United States has decided to give all economic assistance practicable for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression. This decision has been prompted by the conviction of the Government of the United States that the strengthening of the armed resistance of the Soviet Union to the predatory attack of an aggressor who is threatening the



security and independence not only of the Soviet Union but also of all other nations is in the interest of the national defense of the United States.

In accordance with this decision of the Government of the United States and in order to implement the policy enunciated above, the Government of the United States is giving the most friendly consideration to requests from the Government, institutions, or agencies of the Soviet Union relative to the placing in this country of orders for articles and materials urgently required for the needs of the national defense of the Soviet Union and, for the purpose of promoting the speedy completion and delivery of such articles and materials, is extending to these orders priority assistance upon the principles applicable to the orders of countries struggling against aggression.

In order to facilitate the extension of economic assistance to the Soviet Union, the Department of State is also issuing unlimited licenses permitting the export to the Soviet Union of a wide variety of articles and materials needed for the strengthening of the defense of that country, in accordance with the principles applicable to the furnishing of such articles and materials as are needed for the same purpose by other countries resisting aggression.

The appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States, in pursuance of the decision to which I have above referred, are also giving their favorable consideration to requests for the extension of available American shipping facilities for the purpose of expediting the shipment to the Soviet Union of articles and materials needed for the national defense of that country.

I am (etc.)

SUMNER WELLES

The Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State

*August 2, 1941*

MY DEAR MR. ACTING SECRETARY:

I am pleased to take notice of the contents of your communication of this date in which you informed me that the Government of the United States has decided to give all economic assistance practicable for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression. You add that this decision has been prompted by the conviction of the Government of the United States that the strengthening of the armed resistance of the Soviet Union to the predatory attack of an aggressor who is threatening the security and independence not only of the Soviet Union but also of

all other nations is in the interest of the national defense of the United States.

On behalf of my Government, I wish to emphasize the correctness of the view that the aggressor who has treacherously invaded my country is threatening the security and independence of all freedom loving nations and that this threat naturally creates a community of interest of national defense of those nations. My Government has directed me to express to the Government of the United States its gratitude for the friendly decision of the Government of the United States and its confidence that the economic assistance you refer to in your note will be of such scope and carried out with such expedition as to correspond to the magnitude of the military operations in which the Soviet Union is engaging, in offering armed resistance to the aggressor—a resistance which, as you so justly observed, is also in the interest of the national defense of the United States.

I am also pleased to note your statement that:

‘In accordance with this decision of the Government of the United States and in order to implement the policy enunciated above, the Government of the United States is giving the most friendly consideration to requests from the Government, institutions, or agencies of the Soviet Union relative to the placing in this country of orders for articles and materials urgently required for the needs of the national defense of the Soviet Union and, for the purpose of promoting the speedy completion and delivery of such articles and materials, is extending to these orders priority assistance upon the principles applicable to the orders of countries struggling against aggression.

‘In order to facilitate the extension of economic assistance to the Soviet Union, the Department of State is also issuing unlimited licenses permitting the export to the Soviet Union of a wide variety of articles and materials needed for the strengthening of the defense of that country, in accordance with the principles applicable to the furnishing of such articles and materials as are needed for the same purpose by other countries resisting aggression.

‘The appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States, in pursuance of the decision to which I have above referred, are also giving their favorable consideration to requests for the extension of available American shipping facilities for the purpose of expediting the shipment to the Soviet Union of articles and materials needed for the national defense of that country.’

I am (etc.)

CONSTANTINE A. OUMANSKY

## 37

THE UNITED STATES' \$1,000,000,000 LOAN TO THE SOVIET UNION  
EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED  
STATES AND MR. JOSEPH STALIN

The following is a paraphrase of the text of a letter addressed by the President under date of October 30, 1941, to Mr. Joseph Stalin, as released by the Department of State of the United States:

I have examined the record of the Moscow Conference and the members of the mission have discussed the details with me. All of the military equipment and munitions items have been approved and I have ordered that as far as possible the delivery of raw materials be expedited. Deliveries have been directed to commence immediately and to be fulfilled in the largest possible amounts.

In an effort to obviate any financial difficulties immediate arrangements are to be made so that supplies up to one billion dollars in value may be effected under the Lend-Lease Act. If approved by the Government of the U.S.S.R. I propose that the indebtedness thus incurred be subject to no interest and that the payments by the Government of the U.S.S.R. do not commence until five years after the war's conclusion and be completed over a 10-year period thereafter.

I hope that special efforts will be arranged by your Government to sell us the available raw materials and commodities which the United States may need urgently under the arrangements that the proceeds thereof be credited to the Soviet Government's account.

At this opportunity I want to tell you of the appreciation of the United States Government for the expeditious handling by you and your associates of the Moscow supply conference, and to send you assurances that we will carry out to the limit all the implications thereof. I hope that you will communicate with me directly without hesitation if you should so wish.

The following is a paraphrase of the text of a letter by Mr. Joseph Stalin

under date of November 4, 1941, to the President of the United States, as released by the Department of State of the United States:

The American Ambassador, Mr. Steinhardt, through Mr. Vyshinski, presented to me on November 2, 1941, an aide memoire containing the contents of your message, the exact text of which I have not yet received.

First of all I would like to express my sincere thanks for your appreciative remarks regarding the expeditious manner in which the conference was handled. Your assurance that the decisions of the conference will be carried out to the limit is deeply appreciated by the Soviet Government.

Your decision, Mr. President, to grant to the Soviet Union a loan to the amount of one billion dollars subject to no interest charges and for the purpose of paying for armaments and raw materials for the Soviet Union is accepted with sincere gratitude by the Soviet Government as unusually substantial aid in its difficult and great struggle against our common enemy, bloodthirsty Hitlerism.

I agree completely, on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union, with the conditions which you outlined for this loan to the Soviet Union, namely that payments on the loan shall begin five years after the end of the war and shall be completed during the following ten-year period.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. stands ready to expedite in every possible way the supplying of available raw materials and goods required by the United States.

I am heartily in accord with your proposal, Mr. President, that we establish direct personal contact whenever circumstances warrant.

*(Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., November 7, 1941)*

## 38

### DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC ON FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

THE Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Tass) reports that as a result

of negotiations held December 3—4 of this year in Moscow between Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., Joseph Stalin, and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Vyacheslav M. Molotov, on the one hand, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish Republic, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, and Ambassador of the Polish Republic in the U.S.S.R., Stanislaw Kot, on the other, a Declaration by the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Polish Republic was signed December 4.

The Declaration was signed by Mr. Stalin on the authorization of the Government of the U.S.S.R., and for the Government of the Polish Republic by General Sikorski.

The signing of the Declaration was attended on behalf of the U.S.S.R. by Messrs. Molotov, Malenkov, and others and on behalf of the Polish Republic by Ambassador Kot, General Wladyslaw Anders, General Sigismund Sziszko-Bogusz, Colonel Okulicko, and others. The text of the Declaration follows:

The Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Polish Republic, imbued with a spirit of friendly concord and fighting collaboration, declare:

1. German Hitlerite imperialism is the worst enemy of mankind — no compromise with it is possible. Both states, jointly with Great Britain and other Allies and with the support of the United States of America, will wage war until complete victory and the final destruction of the German invaders.

2. Implementing the treaty concluded July 30, 1941, both Governments will render each other during the war full military assistance, and the troops of the Polish Republic located on territory of the Soviet Union will wage war against the German bandits hand in hand with the Soviet troops. In peacetime their relations will be based on good neighborly collaboration, friendship, and mutual honest observance of the undertakings they have assumed.

3. After the victorious war and appropriate punishment of the Hitlerite criminals, it will be the task of the Allied States to ensure a durable and just peace. This can be achieved only through a new organization of international relations on the basis of unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance. Respect for international law, backed by the collective armed force of all the Allied States, must form the decisive factor in the creation of such an organization. Only under this condition can a Europe

destroyed by the German barbarians be restored and can a guarantee be created that the disaster caused by the Hitlerites will never be repeated.

Signed: By authorization of the Government of the Soviet Union

STALIN

For the Government of the Polish Republic — SIKORSKI

*(Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., December 6, 1941)*

## 39

### STALIN'S ORDER-OF-THE-DAY ON MAY DAY, 1942

COMRADES — men, commanders and political workers of the Red Army and Red Navy; guerrillas, men and women; workers, men and women; peasants, men and women; brain workers, men and women; brothers and sisters beyond the front line, in the rear of the German fascist troops, who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German oppressors! On behalf of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevik Party, I greet and congratulate you on May Day!

Comrades! This year the peoples of our country celebrate International May Day in conditions of patriotic war against the German fascist invaders. The war has laid its imprint on every aspect of our life. It has laid its imprint also on this day, on the May 1 celebration. Mindful of the war situation, the working people of our country have renounced their holiday rest in order to pass this day in intense labor for the defense of our country. Living at one with our men at the front, they have converted the May 1 celebration into a day of labor and struggle, in order to give maximum assistance to the front and supply it with more rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, tanks, aircraft, ammunition, bread, meat, fish, and vegetables. This means that, with us, front and rear form a single, indivisible fighting camp, ready to overcome any difficulties on the road to victory over the enemy.

Comrades! More than two years have elapsed since the German fascist invaders plunged Europe into the abyss of war, subjugated the freedom-loving countries of the European continent — France, Norway, Denmark,

Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece — and sucked their blood for the enrichment of German bankers. More than ten months have elapsed since the German fascist invaders basely and treacherously attacked our country and began plundering and devastating our villages and towns, outraging and murdering the peaceful population of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Moldavia. For more than ten months the peoples of our country have been waging a patriotic war against the bestial enemy, in defense of the honor and freedom of their motherland.

In this time we have had opportunity to gain sufficient knowledge of the German fascists, to understand their real intentions, to know their true face and understand it, not according to their verbal profession, but from the experience of war, from universally known facts. Who, then, are these enemies of ours, the German fascists? What kind of people are they? What does the experience of war teach us on this point?

It is said that the German fascists are nationalists, protecting the integrity and independence of Germany against attacks on the part of other states. This is of course a lie. Only liars can assert that Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Greece, the Soviet Union, and other freedom-loving countries made attempts on the integrity and independence of Germany. In reality the German fascists are not nationalists but imperialists, who seize foreign lands and suck their blood to enrich German bankers and plutocrats. Goering, chief of the German fascists, is himself well known as one of the biggest bankers and plutocrats, exploiting dozens of factories and plants. Hitler, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, Himler, and other rulers of Germany today are the watchdogs of German bankers and place the interests of the latter above all other interests. The German Army is a blind tool in the hands of these gentlemen and is called on to shed its own blood and the blood of other peoples and to cripple itself and other peoples, not for the interests of Germany, but for the enrichment of the German bankers and plutocrats. This is what the experience of war tells us.

It is said that the German fascists are socialists, endeavoring to defend the interests of the workers and peasants against the plutocrats. This is of course a lie. Only liars can assert that the German fascists, who introduced slave labor in their plants and factories and re-established a system of serfdom in the villages of Germany and of subjugated countries, are defenders of the workers and peasants. Only insolent liars can deny that the system of slavery and serfdom instituted by the German fascists is advantageous to

the German plutocrats and bankers, and not to the workers and peasants. In reality, the German fascists are reactionaries, serf-owners, and the German Army is the army of the serf-owners, shedding blood to enrich the German barons and re-establish the power of the landowners. This is what the experience of war tells us.

It is said that the German fascists are carriers of European culture, waging war for the dissemination of this culture in other countries. This is of course a lie. Only professional liars can assert that the German fascists, who have filled Europe with gallows, who plunder and outrage peaceful populations, burn and blow up towns and villages and destroy the cultural values of the peoples of Europe, can be the bearers of European culture. In reality the German fascists are enemies of European culture, and the German Army is an army of medieval obscurantism, called upon to destroy European culture and assert the slave-owning 'culture' of the German bankers and barons. This is what the experience of war tells us.

This is the face of our enemy, exposed and brought to light by the experience of war. But the experience of war is not restricted to these conclusions. The experience of war shows in addition that, in the period of the war, important changes have taken place both in the position of fascist Germany and its army, and in the position of our own country and the Red Army. What are these changes?

It is beyond doubt, first, that in this period fascist Germany and its army have become weaker than they were ten months ago. The war has brought grave disillusionments, millions of human sacrifices, starvation and poverty to the German people. The end of the war is not in sight, and reserves of manpower are coming to an end, oil is coming to an end, raw materials are coming to an end. Realization that Germany's defeat is inevitable is growing on the German people. The German people realizes with growing clarity that the only way out of the present situation is to liberate Germany from the adventurist clique of Hitler and Goering.

Hitlerite imperialism has occupied vast territories in Europe, but it has failed to break the will to resist of the European peoples. The enslaved peoples' struggle against the regime of the German fascist highwaymen is beginning to acquire a universal character. Sabotage at war plants, explosions in German storehouses, wrecking of German military trains, murder of German officers and soldiers have become common occurrences in all the occupied countries. Whole Yugoslav and Soviet districts occupied by the Germans are swept by the conflagration of guerrilla war. All these circum-



stances have resulted in weakening the German rear, and consequently in weakening fascist Germany as a whole.

As for the German Army, despite its stubbornness in defense, it is nevertheless much weaker than ten months ago. Its old, experienced generals like Reichenau, Brauchitsch, Todt, and others have either been killed by the Red Army or else driven out by the ruling German fascist group. Its regular officer corps has been partly exterminated by the Red Army and partly demoralized as a result of plunder and violence against the civilian population. Its rank-and-file effectives, badly weakened during war operations, receive less and less reinforcement.

It is beyond doubt, second, that in the past period of war our country has become stronger than it was at the beginning of the war. Not only our friends but even our enemies are bound to admit that our country is now united and rallied around its Government more closely than ever before, that front and rear in our country are united in a single fighting camp, firing at the same target, that the Soviet people in the rear supply our front with constantly growing quantities of rifles and machine guns, trench mortars and guns, tanks and aircraft, food and ammunition.

As for the international relations of our motherland, they have recently grown and gained strength as never before. All freedom-loving peoples have joined forces against German imperialism. Their eyes are turned to the Soviet Union. The heroic struggle which the peoples of our country are waging for their freedom, honor, and independence calls forth the admiration of all progressive humanity. The peoples of all freedom-loving countries regard the Soviet Union as a force capable of saving the world from the Hitlerite plague. First place among these freedom-loving countries is held by Great Britain and the United States of America, to which we are bound by ties of friendship and alliance and which rendering our country constantly increasing military assistance against the German fascist invaders. All these circumstances show that our country has become much stronger.

Lastly, it is beyond doubt that in the past period the Red Army has become better organized and stronger than it was at the beginning of the war. One cannot regard as accidental the universally known fact that, after the temporary retreat caused by the treacherous attack of the German imperialists, the Red Army brought about a change in the course of the war and passed from active defense to successful offense against the enemy troops. The fact is that, thanks to Red Army successes, the patriotic war

has entered a new stage — the stage of liberation of the Soviet lands from the Hitlerite vermin. True, the Red Army undertook execution of this historical task in the difficult conditions of a severe and snowy winter, but nevertheless it achieved great success.

Having taken into its hands the initiative in war operations, the Red Army inflicted a number of severe defeats on the German fascist troops and compelled them to evacuate a considerable part of Soviet territory. The invaders' plan to take advantage of the winter for a respite and consolidation of positions along their defense line suffered a fiasco. In the course of its offensive, the Red Army annihilated enormous amounts of enemy manpower and equipment, captured a fairly large quantity of equipment from the enemy, and compelled him prematurely to expend his reserves from the distant rear, which had been destined for spring and summer operations. All this shows that the Red Army has become better organized and stronger, that its officers' corps has grown steeled in battle and its generals more experienced and farsighted.

A change has also taken place in the Red Army rank and file. Complacency and heedlessness in the attitude toward the enemy, observed among Red Army men in the first months of the patriotic war, have disappeared. The atrocities, plunder, and violence perpetrated by the German fascist invaders upon the non-combatant population and Soviet war prisoners have cured our men of this disease. Red Army men have become more bitter and ruthless. They have learned really to hate the German fascist invaders. They have realized that one cannot defeat the enemy without learning to hate him heart and soul.

There is no more idle talk of the invincibility of the German troops, which occurred at the beginning of the war and which served to disguise fear of the Germans. The famous battles at Rostov and Kerch, at Moscow and Kalinin, at Tikhivin and Leningrad, in which the Red Army put the German fascist invaders to flight, convinced our Red Army men that idle talk about the invincibility of the German troops is but a fairy tale invented by fascist propagandists. The experience of war has convinced our Red Army men that the so-called courage of the German officer is something highly relative, that the German officer displays courage when dealing with unarmed war prisoners and the peaceful civilian population, but that courage leaves him when he is confronted by the organized strength of the Red Army. Recall the popular saying: 'Brave when facing a sheep, but a sheep when facing the brave.'

These are the conclusions from the experience of war with the German fascist invaders. What do they show? They show that we can and must continue to smite the German fascist invaders in the future until their final extermination and the final liberation of the Soviet land from the Hitlerite scoundrels.

Comrades! We are waging a patriotic war of liberation, a just war. We do not set ourselves the aim of seizing foreign countries, of conquering foreign peoples. Our aim is clear and noble. We want to liberate our Soviet land from the German fascist scoundrels. We want to liberate our brothers, the Ukrainians, Moldavians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians, and Karelians, from the disgrace and humiliation to which they are subjected by the German fascist scoundrels.

To achieve this aim we must defeat the German fascist army and exterminate the German occupants to the last man, as long as they will not surrender. There is no other way. We can do this and we must do this at any cost. The Red Army possesses everything necessary to achieve this lofty aim. Only one thing is lacking — ability to make full use against the enemy of the first-rate armament supplied to it by our motherland. Therefore, the task of the Red Army — its men, its machine gunners, its artillerymen, its trench mortar crews, its tankists, its fliers and cavalymen — is to study military art, to study persistently, to learn their arms to perfection, to become experts in their line, and thus to learn to defeat the enemy surely. Only in this way can one learn the art of defeating the enemy.

Comrades! Men, commanders and political workers of the Red Army and Navy! Guerrillas, men and women! Greetings and congratulations to you on May Day. I order:

(1) The rank and file must learn to use the rifle perfectly, become masters of their arms, hit the enemy without fail, as is done by our glorious snipers, exterminators of the German occupants.

(2) Machine gunners, artillerymen, trench mortar crews, tankists, and fliers are to learn to use their arms to perfection, to become experts in their specialties, to smite the German fascist invaders point-blank until they are finally exterminated.

(3) Commanders of army units are to learn to perfection the coordination of arms, to become experts in the art of directing troops, to show the whole world that the Red Army is capable of fulfilling its great mission of liberation.

(4) The entire Red Army is to see to it that the year 1942 shall become

the year of the final defeat of the German fascist troops and the liberation of Soviet soil from the Hitlerite scoundrels.

(5) Men and women guerrillas are to intensify guerrilla warfare in the rear of the German invaders, to destroy enemy means of communication and transport facilities, to destroy enemy headquarters and equipment, not to spare cartridges against the oppressors of our motherland.

Under the invincible banner of great Lenin, forward to victory!

Signed: STALIN

*People's Commissar of Defense*

(Moscow, TASS, May 1, 1942)

## 40

### TEXT OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN TWENTY-YEAR TREATY

HIS MAJESTY the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and British Dominions Beyond Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for joint action in the war against Germany signed at Moscow, July 12, 1941, and to replace them by formal treaty; desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe; desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on a basis of the principles enunciated in the declaration made Aug. 14, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered; desiring finally to provide for mutual assistance in the event of attack upon either high contracting party by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe; have de-

cided to conclude a treaty for that purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions Beyond Seas, Emperor of India, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M. P., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: M. Vyacheslaff Mikhailovich Molotoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs —

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE II. The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggression intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE III. 1. The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period.

2. Pending adoption of such proposals, they will after termination of hostilities take all measures in their power to render impossible the repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE IV. Should either of the high contracting parties during the post-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III, Section 2, in consequence of the attack by that State against that party, the other high contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military and other support and assistance in his power.

This article shall remain in force until the high contracting parties, by mutual agreement, shall recognize that it is superseded by adoption of proposals contemplated in Article III, Section 1. In default of adoption of such

proposals, it shall remain in force for a period of twenty years and thereafter until terminated by either high contracting party as provided in Article VIII.

ARTICLE V. The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after reestablishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.

They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

ARTICLE VI. The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

ARTICLE VII. Each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.

ARTICLE VIII. The present treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom signed at Moscow July 12, 1941.

Part One of the present treaty shall remain in force until the reestablishment of peace between the high contracting parties and Germany and the powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part Two of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years. Thereafter, unless twelve months' notice has been given by either party to terminate the treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until twelve months after either high contracting party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

In witness whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in London on the twenty-sixth day of May, 1942, in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

*(The New York Times, June 12, 1942)*














#### MILITARY DISTRICTS

- 16 The Siberian Military District - Headquarters at Irkutsk
- 17 " Trans-Baikal " " Chita
- 18 " First Far Eastern Army " " Vladivostok
- 19 " Second " " " Khabarovsk

It is estimated that the Navy, the Air force of the Army and Navy, the Coast Guard, and the NKVD units had a personnel of 2-2½ million men thus bringing the total number of men under arms up to nearly 7 million



Total Red Army mobilized force - Spring - 1941 is estimated to have been . . . . .

80 Motorized Infantry Div.	roughly 1.3 million men
120 Non-motorized " "	2.2 " "
50 Tank Brigades	4 " "
40 Cavalry Divisions	4 " "
*200 Regiments of Light Artillery	.8 " "
*100 " " Heavy " "	.4 " "
*Attached to and included in Infantry Divisions.	Total 4.3 excluding air force

1 Symbol represents roughly 5 Divisions, Brigades thus 2 = 10 Tank Brigades or Regiments, etc.

10  
2270